The training flaw that doomed 228 people - AF447
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- čas přidán 17. 10. 2022
- An Air France Airbus A330-200 was destroyed when it crashed into the sea while on transatlantic flight from Rio de Janeiro-Galeao International Airport, RJ (GIG) to Paris-Charles de Gaulle Airport (CDG). All occupants, 12 crew members an 216 passengers, were killed.
Source: BEA final report
Simulator: X-Plane 11
Aircraft: JAR Design A330
Helicopters: UH-60 from X-Plane.org - Věda a technologie
It took them a while to find the wreck of this aircraft. The crash took place in a communication "dead zone" over the ocean, which made finding the plane take so long. This stands out as one of the worst cases of bad training ever. Every pilot knows that you must push the yoke forward to get out of a stall. They had plenty of altitude to recover, but the CRM was almost nonexistent. Untrained pilots seem to want to pull the nose up during an situation where a stall is imminent, but training needs to be more rigorous. As far as the pitot tubes go, the erroneous readings made it all that much worse. They should have pushed the nose down, kept the wings level and pulled back on the power until the stall is corrected. At the rate of descent they were in, combined with the utter confusion in the cockpit, it's not so surprising this happened. They literally fell 37,000 feet in minutes before slamming into the water.
@@aviationinvestigationchannel very true statement concerning the recovery training, yet the inherent dangers remain regarding the multiple threats associated with side stick technology, and the insidious nature in which Airbus automation quietly degrades into Alternate Law, with the pilot being left completely oblivious that all their trusted flight envelope protections have been withdrawn.
Concerning stall warnings and protections with Yoke controlled aircraft, in addition to all aural alerts and annunciated warnings they typically feature both a stick shaker and stick pusher in a stall, to reinforce to the pilot the correct recovery actions.
As Euclidus correctly asserts, basic airmanship dictates that the pilot trades altitude for speed to recover from the stall. Even the stick pusher is not idiot proof and can be overridden by being erroneously pulled back, as was the fatigued startled response of the Colgan Air Dash 8 crew on approach to Buffalo, NY.
It might be necessary to override for any potential traffic threat or less likely, elevated terrain avoidance but hopefully they’d not be that low!)
The secondary protection offered by the traditional yoke control is two-fold, the clear and obvious actions being taken by the other pilot due to all actions being duplicated in front of both pilots, therefore giving the opportunity to correct any erroneous pitch and roll control.
The other benefit is inability to make dual and opposite inputs without being obvious to the other pilot.
With the AF447 scenario, had they had a yoke control system rather than the side stick tech, F/O Robert would have been not only able to identify F/O Bonin's erroneous pitch control by either taking over and pitching down, or instructing his confused colleague to do so, ultimately recovering the stall.
F/O Robert would also have had the opportunity to prevent F/O Bonin from over correcting the aircraft’s roll, which had the effect of inducing and maintaining such extreme roll oscillations.
Had this aircraft been afforded those features, it would have been just another flight that encountered some challenges enroute but landed safely at its intended destination, simply slipping into irrelevance vs the tragic infamy it is now known for, a truly horrific accident that should never have occurred in a perfectly operating flyable aircraft.
If you’re at all interested I’ve written an expanded account in the comments regarding these threats with potential solutions, along with a couple of other observations and contributing factors to this accident.
My profession in the airline industry, including air crew training, involves extensive aviation safety research which I also studied at a tertiary postgraduate level. I really enjoy your well researched and brilliantly produced presentations. Cheers, Anton
at least they could slowly land into watter instead of crashing
its so weird that pilots do stalls so often as if they are not knowiung what causes it, when I even I understand
I wish more pilots talk in cocpit sound. PLus would be good sound and video of passangers but thats the job of aircrat manufacturers
22 hours from Rio de Janeiro to Paris?? are you sure?
6:20 The image of that CVR/FDR in that murky water looks so ghostly and foreboding, with the horrific historical information it contains, it kind of is!
The sad thing about this accident, it never would have occurred on an aircraft with a traditional yoke. The other pilot would have recognised the erroneous input immediately and corrected it thereby recovering the aircraft.
In a startle scenario, especially if fatigued or in one's circadian low, this can precipitate a phenomenon known as Cognitive Incapacitation, a mentally blunting event where the individual either freezes and does not respond to the stimuli, or make opposite and inappropriate actions. The feature that identifies the event is the incapacitated individual's inability to communicate or respond to spoken commands.
This is probably less likely the case with F/O Bonin, although he made inconceivable decisions that contradict the expected actions of a well trained pilot, he appeared to be engaging purposefully in discussion with F/O Robert.
Stall recovery with even the most basic skills of airmanship compels a pilot to pitch down, trading Altitude for Speed when there is the altitude available, with limited available altitude a pilot still pitches slightly down while increasing thrust to recover aerodynamic lift.
As soon as sufficient and effective airspeed over the wing and other aerofoils (horizontal stabiliser) is restored, aerodynamic lift is restored thus recovering from the stall.
F/O Bonin certainly had more than a significantly generous volume of altitude in which to recover this aircraft, yet remarkably he pitched up holding the nose high despite being told to push forward and pitch down. He complied briefly, then resumed a nose high attitude sealing the cruel and horrific fate for all onboard, needlessly perishing in a perfectly functioning flyable aircraft!
The hideous intolerable absurd culture of Airbus automation is insidious in the way their aircraft will kill you:
- The Automation upon entering the degraded mode of so-called Alternate Law’, removing all expected flight envelope protections, does not capture the attention of the pilots through Aural Alerts or Annunciated Warnings, leaving them oblivious to their precarious condition and maintaining a false sense of security in the aircraft’s systems.
- The side stick becomes markedly more sensitive to inputs, making over correction guaranteed**
- Side stick technology permits opposing dual inputs. Even worse it subtracts the difference between the inputs, averaging them out then responding to the newly calculated input average.
- The alerting of dual input is ambiguous and in repeated demonstrations it is always missed due to the high stress high workload event as a consequence of its passive ineffective nature.
- Not only is there the inability to see and identify what inputs one's colleague is making with their side stick, there is also no synthetic feedback to actually feel what input, if any, they’re making should the other pilot attempt any side stick input, again averaging both inputs as previously described.
- The side stick on the side of the flight deck NOT being operated remains motionless, as does both flight sticks when under the control of automated adjustments.
Consequently offering no indication or clue to the actions/input being exerted by the opposite pilot or autopilot.
To circumvent or warn against these dangers there ought to be the following:
WARNINGS FOR DEGRADED ALTERNATE LAW:
- A loud aural warning when automation degrades into ‘Alternate Law'
- A visual message on the screen (flashing if possible) stating:
: : : : ! ! ! ! ALTERNATE LAW - NO FLIGHT ENVELOPE PROTECTION ! ! ! ! : : : :
- An annunciator warning stating “ALTERNATE LAW - NO FLIGHT ENVELOPE PROTECTION!” which is as loud, assertive and repertory as are the aural warnings
“STALL STALL” “SINK RATE SINK RATE” “BANK ANGLE BANK ANGLE” etc.
- A loud aural warning when dual side stick inputs are detected
WARNINGS FOR SIDE SICK INPUT AWARENESS AND DUAL OPPOSING INPUT ALERT:
- Synthetic Resistance of the Side Stick/s - if opposing inputs are detected/attempted, resistance immediately confirms the actions/input of the opposite pilot or autopilot if engaged.
(Like all aircraft, resistance over a set limit of measured force being exerted, disengages the autopilot, confirmed with a loud clear aural alert and the loss of resistance on the yoke/side stick.)
- Additionally - Obvious Clear, potentially Exaggerated movements duplicated on the opposite side stick (or both with autopilot engagement). Exaggerated for purpose of clarity and attention capturing because the movements of the side stick are quite subtle.
- Alternatively or Additionally - an Illuminated scale within close proximity to each side stick and on the PFD that clearly illustrates the degree of roll and pitch being exerted by the opposite activated side stick or both in the case of autopilot engagement.
The illustrated display ought be active in all its locations irrespective of which, though indicative of which side stick/s is/are activated.
- An annunciator warning stating “DUAL INPUT - LEFT PITCHING DOWN - RIGHT PITCHING UP” or whichever is applicable, or perhaps other words to same effect.
- The normally steady state displays of the illuminated side stick orientation displays ALL commence flashing including an appropriate indication of which side is orientated where, perhaps with arrow on each side indicating the active side, with the arrow's orientation illustrating the orientation of the respective side stick.
- In the absence of stick shaker/stick pusher technology^^ in a stall alert;
An annunciator stating “STALL STALL - PUSH FORWARD - PUSH DOWN”
which is as loud, assertive and repertory as described above and repeated continuously until the stall is recovered from.
** & ^^ relevant notes appear at the bottom.
Absolutely NO aircraft is idiot-proof, crash-proof or perfect, but Airbus and similarly minded manufacturer's technology and automation is deeply flawed and error-prone therefore it is dangerous, misleading and confusing in specific events, typically when the pilot needs all the assistance they can get, particularly startled and confused pilots, or pilots with poor airmanship skills.
Instead the automation sneaks away quietly, then when everything begins to 'hit the fan' in the pilot’s most stressed state, the automation cuts out completely!
Other pilots like F/O Bonin have consumed the Airbus 'Kool-Aid' in falsely believe with a strong but extremely flawed sense of security that their aircraft is so safe it is impossible to take it outside its claimed safe flight envelope.
Many pilots have with shock and disbelief discovered this to be untrue during the most dire and threatening circumstances, some have lived to talk about it, tragically others have perished due to their trust in this questionable technology!
Consequently I can not respect in the slightest how their dangerous, rubbish automation systems as they currently stand, and the unnecessary ridiculous side sticks are ever certified by the regulatory bodies, who are established to safeguard against such inherent danger. It is truly unforgivable when considering the unacceptable number of accidents and subsequent lives lost on account of these systems.
** the absence of dampening in its degraded alternate law state, and the subsequent over sensitivity of the side stick input was demonstrated in this accident, F/O Bonin was unintentionally swinging the aircraft side to side through its Roll Control, completely confused why the roll was not dampening out as it usually would, then further exacerbated by the stalling dynamics of aircraft roll and extreme buffeting as they dropped vertically at extreme speeds. It is incredible that the airframe maintained its integrity with high loads placed upon it.
Just as his erroneous pitch up inputs permitted the aircraft to exceed its flight envelope safety limitations. He had a false sense of security due to the heavily promoted Airbus marketing tripe that a pilot can not stall an aircraft no matter what he/she does because they are just so safe! - PHOOEY!
^^ Boeing aircraft and many other yoke-based controls, not only do they have an annunciator repeatedly stating “STALL STALL”, they also have a STICK SHAKER that rattles the yoke column loudly and with extreme tactile sensitivity. If no action is taken, it is followed by a STICK PUSHER, that physically pushes/rotates the yoke column forward, telling and showing the pilot to pitch down to recover from the aerodynamic stall. The stick pusher once activated requires a reasonable amount of force to pull back, to reinforce to the pilot that this is the appropriate action to be taking. Obviously it can be pulled back with a degree of exertion in case of terrain clearance concerns etc, but the pilot should then realise to pitch down as much as is safe to do so in mitigating circumstances.
Unfortunately this is not possible with those flimsy ridiculous side sticks Airbus and other mindless manufacturers are so he’ll-bent on. So there ought to be some additional protections such as the attention-grabbing annunciator warnings along the lines of the examples I’ve given!
Good video. You should have a native English speaker edit your narration script to make sure you are using correct English grammar and syntax. These are simple fixes.
It might.be a frog or zipperhead doing this,.so if so the English is very good