The confusion is that Jaynes seems to be using the term 'consciousness' in two ways. He often loosely applies it to a broader awareness of an active self-identity that isn't limited to a specific kind of identity, as separate from basic perceptual awareness and biological reactivity. As such, one is 'unconscious' while driving without thought and without an intentional sense of self-control. But as part of his specific theory, 'consciousness' is often focused on the container metaphor of the egoic self, and this aspect personally interests me the most. In common usage, these two understandings of the same word are typically kept distinct; and so this is where confusion begins. Maybe people feel an intuititive impulse to push back against what could be seen as an unnecessary or unhelpful conflation, whether or not that assessment is accurate and fair. Because they lack the discernment to make a potentially worthy argument for that distinction, they instead dismiss Jaynes' theory whole cloth through misinterpretation and oversimplification. They get to the wrong start with the first step. We need clarification to determine if there is something of value to be unpacked. Bicameral humans still had a sense of self or selves and, as one could argue, might even have had a sense of active self-control. It's just that this self would've been non-egoic in that the self wouldn't have been personally contained but interpersonally shared. What held the self together, instead of the isolated individual body, was the communal space of a walled town or city-state with a shared visual center (temple, pillar, obelisk, etc). The whole communal identity of bundled mind was contained. Jaynes could've been partly incorrect in that the contained self maybe was developing much earlier in the Bronze Age, if the container was much larger and more broadly inclusive. The ego theory of mind hasn't necessarily been the only or first variation of a contained self. It's possible that it could also operate with a bundle theory of mind. As such, bicameral mentality could be taken as a transitional phase of more expansive containment between the amorphous uncontained animistic mind and the narrowly contained egoic mind. That is to say bicameral humans could've driven a wagon with or without awareness, just as modern humans drive cars with or without awareness. It's just that the driver when aware would've experienced the directing thought in the communal world, not in the body (skull, heart, etc). Rather than one possible driver, bicameral humans had access to multiple selves who could motivate and direct action. Each of those selves, though, could have other non-egoic forms of containment (songlines, megaliths, etc). This still fits in with Jaynes' overall theory, albeit modified slightly.
The confusion is that Jaynes seems to be using the term 'consciousness' in two ways. He often loosely applies it to a broader awareness of an active self-identity that isn't limited to a specific kind of identity, as separate from basic perceptual awareness and biological reactivity. As such, one is 'unconscious' while driving without thought and without an intentional sense of self-control. But as part of his specific theory, 'consciousness' is often focused on the container metaphor of the egoic self, and this aspect personally interests me the most.
In common usage, these two understandings of the same word are typically kept distinct; and so this is where confusion begins. Maybe people feel an intuititive impulse to push back against what could be seen as an unnecessary or unhelpful conflation, whether or not that assessment is accurate and fair. Because they lack the discernment to make a potentially worthy argument for that distinction, they instead dismiss Jaynes' theory whole cloth through misinterpretation and oversimplification. They get to the wrong start with the first step.
We need clarification to determine if there is something of value to be unpacked. Bicameral humans still had a sense of self or selves and, as one could argue, might even have had a sense of active self-control. It's just that this self would've been non-egoic in that the self wouldn't have been personally contained but interpersonally shared. What held the self together, instead of the isolated individual body, was the communal space of a walled town or city-state with a shared visual center (temple, pillar, obelisk, etc). The whole communal identity of bundled mind was contained.
Jaynes could've been partly incorrect in that the contained self maybe was developing much earlier in the Bronze Age, if the container was much larger and more broadly inclusive. The ego theory of mind hasn't necessarily been the only or first variation of a contained self. It's possible that it could also operate with a bundle theory of mind. As such, bicameral mentality could be taken as a transitional phase of more expansive containment between the amorphous uncontained animistic mind and the narrowly contained egoic mind.
That is to say bicameral humans could've driven a wagon with or without awareness, just as modern humans drive cars with or without awareness. It's just that the driver when aware would've experienced the directing thought in the communal world, not in the body (skull, heart, etc). Rather than one possible driver, bicameral humans had access to multiple selves who could motivate and direct action. Each of those selves, though, could have other non-egoic forms of containment (songlines, megaliths, etc). This still fits in with Jaynes' overall theory, albeit modified slightly.