"Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942" by Dr. Robert Citino
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- čas přidán 22. 07. 2014
- The 1942 campaigning season ended in disaster for the German Wehrmacht, with twin and nearly simultaneous defeats at Stalingrad and El Alamein. Analysts have usually assigned responsibility for the catastrophe to the amateurish strategy of Adolf Hitler, or to miscalculations on the part of the German General Staff, or to various mistakes by the field commanders at critical junctures. But what if we have misconstrued the true causes of the catastrophe? What if, in fact, the Wehrmacht failed in 1942 not because of fundamental problems within the classic "German way of war," a unique combination of doctrines, attitudes, and assumptions whose roots lay deep in the history of Prussia and Germany?
In Death of the Wehrmacht, military historian Robert Citino offers not only a detailed analysis of the German campaigns in the Soviet Union and North Africa, but also ties them into the traditional pattern of German operations extending back hundreds of years. In a major reevaluation of the campaigns of 1942, Citino shows how the German army's emerging woes were rooted as much in its addiction to the "war of movement" as they were in Hitler's deeply flawed management of the war. Citino examines how one of history's most powerful armies began to founder in its quest for world domination.
Length: 78 Minutes
Lecture Date: June 16, 2010
Being able to listen to a professor like this speak for over an hour about such a fascinating subject, while living on the other side of world in a country where I'd never have had the opportunity anyway, is one of the great strengths of CZcams, despite all the trash flooding it these days.
Was fortunate to have him as a professor at Eastern Michigan years ago. Very engaging, one of my best professors.
My sentiments exactly.
It is literally the only reason I am on here and the only "social media" I partake in.
I wondered why nobody was laughing at his great Britney Spears joke, then the camera pans back and reveals that the entire crowd consists of octogenarians. Oh
Octogenarians?
Ah! Boomers. I will add this term to my personal lexicanum.
@@ironstarofmordian7098 you're welcome
@@ironstarofmordian7098 Octogenarians, born before 1930, no , strictly not boomers. (lecture dated 2010)
You came out of an octogenarians ass
When
The professor always seems to be in such a good mood , enthusiastic, in all the lectures of him that I've watched... whatever that observation is worth to ya'll.
I got his "The German Way Of War" a month ago and it is an excellent and compelling work. I have heard him on other podcasts and he is not only educational, but entertaining with it, which is where he differs from other academics.
Do you happen to remember the name of those podcasts?
@@tommyvercetti5544 "We Have Ways Of Making You Talk"
@sydmccreath4554 Okay, tell me what campaigns or battles were fought in 1942 which the kreigsmarine or luftwaffe had a decisive win and thus disproves the subtitle of this talk?
Otherwise I suggest you keep your vitriol to yourself because no one cares.
I qq you 😮pp
Just got it...
with some hard work, the audio could have been worse.
@Uncle Joe in 2010 when this was shot, 4:3 aspect ratio was a standard for CZcams. 240p certainly wasn't.
This whole lecture is important and worthy of being made over with better audio and video quality.
No beats missed, for over an hour!
Prussian backstory, masterful.
Wow!!!
Great talk - thanks. (Yes, the audio was sub-par - probably need to get a German sound engineer to fix that.)
All the German sound engineers were sent to the eastern front in 43
OK....but don’t put them under too much pressure.....
In your view video was ok then?
Shortly after this video was recorded, the sound engineer was sent to Afghanistan..
Oh? Is that America´s Russian Front? :-D
Had the pleasure of having multiple classes taught by Dr. Citino at Eastern Michigan University. Fantastic professor & a brilliant mind.
having Rob Citino as your professor giving lectures. holy shit i cant even imagine how great that must be :D I envy you my friend
too dependent on unreliable and in fact downright false german sources
@sydmccreath4554 so what?
People say the "U.S. Military" when talking about the marine Corp or the Army all the time; do you often cry about that as well?
Loved this commentary! The Eastern front is where the war was decided. And to me, by far the most interesting part of WW2. Made cleaning the haus fly right by!😂
It's actually not forbidden under CZcams rules to upload Citino lectures with good audio.
I don’t believe you
The audio seems fine to me. The video is kind of blurry though. Maybe the poster changed the audio since you wrote this cuz I’m not having that issue.
I don't know why these professional organizations go to the trouble of bringing in excellent speakers like Dr. Citino and then not properly light or mic them. He's wearing a wireless mic, but the mic is too high up on his collar, causing the recorder to jack up the volume. So every russell becomes a boom. This talk should be re-recorded with a professional crew.
But I can barely hear it!
Fascinating. Thanks for uploading.
I like what he said in one of his lectures about the Herman Goring Parachute Panzer Division. He said that when he first read about the division he was a child and imagined tanks dropping from planes. He thought it was the coolest thing he ever read about. Dr. Citino is a great guy. I wish I had been able to take his classes when I was at UNT.
The Soviet Union droppe tanks out of airplanes. I can only find evidence of light tanks.
I would love to hear a serious analysis of whether the Axis Powers missed an opportunity by not invading Turkey in 1941.
Considering all the challenges of pushing back the Red Army in the Ukraine, would a thrust along the Turkey Black Sea coast have given Hitler and his partners another route to the Caucus oilfields?
From what I’ve read, Turkey’s army was in pretty poor state throughout the war.
Not to mention that control of the Dardanelles would have allowed the Italian navy to play a support role.
Most likely not if anything would have complicated and stretched their supply lines even further through rough terrain. Turkey was also a neutral barrier from the British in the middle east. The Soviets/British invaded Iran under the Caspian Sea to have another route to the caucuses so a frontal strike from the Ukraine was probably the Germans best option. TIK has a good video on this question though if interested czcams.com/video/8oAc2v3DWGw/video.html
Rare mineral supplier
Very, very impressive orator. Thank you for publishing this video. I look forward to exploring others in your collection.
Thank for for sharing this!
Wow what a great lecture. The USAHEC has reorganized my brain about the whole doctrine of ww2, from all the history books I started reading in junior high! Phenomenal.
I recommend The Second World Wars by Victor Davis Hanson.
The more I learn about that fiasco in the East, the more I realize what a no-win situation it was. With all of the problems the Wehrmacht faced, it's a wonder they did as well as they did. On a lighter note, based on what he said about the Wehrmacht's tactics, Patton would've made a good German, especially serving under Frederick the Great...
@Syd McCreath So what? You can still say was Wehrmacht faced those problems. It wasn't like the army had these huge problems and the air was just playing poker. It still was Wehrmacht. What's the problem here?
@Syd McCreath Bless your heart....
@Syd McCreath Well, then! Just repeat it over and over. Is this the best thing you can contribute to the discussion? Just asking.
@Syd McCreath It was still the army as well, the Lecturer said it that way because it is correct. No one said the Kreigsmarine in Stalingrad, no one said this did not include the Luftwaffe- you are being absurdly pedantic, since no one said anything that even had said anything which I intimated they somehow had misunderstood or misused the word in the first place.
NO, Patton wouldn't have made a good Prussian general. He was not a huge strategist, but rather a man of action.
Some below noted the audio was low. I also found this to be true. I fixed it by increasing the volume control by sliding it to the right. Hope this helps.
thanks for the update but maybe not so much technical jargon.
You lost me at audio
On my iPad you can’t slide it indefinitely in that direction. Perhaps I need your model.
I keep reading pithy comments about sound quality. But i have just listened to the whole thing and I heard it all fine.
It’s not about hearing it fine, it’s about a comfortable experience. But yeah, it didn’t even bother me until I read the comments lmao
So much enthusiasm for this rather macabre subject.
My father was a paratrooper throughout the war. He avoided being sent to Russia. He had explained that he couldn't withstand the harsh climate. He was sent to Reims, capital of the Champagne region in France, instead. He never unpacked his parachute which was put to good use after the war as an evening dress for the director of the Argentinian national circus.
It was that easy to get out of being sent to fight in the Eastern front? Was that in the beginning when everyone was optimistic? Although it was probably secret at that early stage. Reims was where Jodl surrendered to Eisenhower's chief of staff wasn't it? Ike snubbed the German delegation because by that point he was fully aware of the horrors that were the results of the war and offspring like the Holocaust. I am glad that your father was able to skip taking part in something as awful as the German/Soviet war and got to live a full life with both his body and his soul intact. I'm also glad that you have your memories.
@@johnjarpe9055 My father didn't stay in Reims the entire war. At some stage he was in the Netherlands. Then he went for special "air control" training to Greifswald. On his return trip he met my mother on the train and they got married in December 1944. So he sent himself to Cologne. There are a train service from my mother's hometown to his "unit".
At that stage my father had worked out that there wouldn't be to happy an ending to this war. British raids on Cologne increased in frequency. So he decided to send himslef to Bad Reichenhall since he was convinced that this part of Bavaria was safe from Soviet invasion and would be taken either by the Americans or the French.
He was right. The Yanks came and he swiftly surrendered and remained a prisoner of war for a total of 2 hours. Though later he said that he should have waited until after lunch.
But his pregnant wife was waiting for him.
Shortly afterwards he and my pregnant mother made their way to Northern Germany and he found himself a job in Hamlin in the British Zone (or sector)... not as a rat-catcher but as a public servant ... His still virgin silk parachute ended up being converted into long gala-dress for the director of a circus who took it to Argentina where the family started the a new show which they named "National Circus of Argentina".
As a child I liked that story ... I didn't know that I would have children with a woman born in San Carlos de Bariloche, Patagonia whose father ended up in the place because of his personal war story.
@@KarlDMarx thank you for the wonderful story and I have seen photos of the destruction of Cologne and it's a miracle that the Dome wasn't leveled. I say miracle because post-war analysis showed that the concept of prisision bombing was a myth whereas almost all of the ordinance that the United States has in its inventory are "smart" bombs and missiles that in many cases have a smaller amount of explosives which combined with the extreme accuracy allow them to take out only the target and leave everything else alone. There's also the new hellfire R9X missile which has no explosive charge at all but deploys six sharp blades in a bicycle spoke pattern right before impact that allows the drone to hit, for example the passenger side of a car and leave the driver unmolested. Obama ordered the Pentagon to come up with something to reduce civilian casualties because we were killing too many civilians. I'm sorry I kind of drifted far away from the simple thanks for the story that I had intended to write.
@@johnjarpe9055 No worries ... I did a fair bit of drifting ... I was born on 1954, bur war stories were still very much part of Sunday "high coffee" conversations.
When my parents started building a house in 1960 near the train line connection to Cologne, excavation had to be halted after a few minutes when the excavator shovel hit a bomb.
My playground were the remnants of a house that had been entirely destroyed in 1945 by a bomb. In another bomb crater surrounded by blackberry bushes we caught newts. this crater was less than 20m from the railway tracks.
Well, the major employer in this town, Troisdorf, was called "Dynamit Nobel AG". You can imagine that this company wasn't manufacturing lingerie.
A nazi who fled to south america after the war. Shocking.
Citino is worth listening to, every word. I grew up during Vietnam, son of a guy who was just a year too young for WW2, a year too old for Korea, with brothers, cousins, and buddies in both. I've spent a lot of (unnecessary, if not useless) time studying war, more than porno. Citino is always got interesting things to say, about any battle, not just opinions, even details. No armchair general (buck private) should miss it.
I concentrated more on the porn. You can ask me anything.
Getting older, I'm more and more interested in war history and strategy.
Great presentation! Could you please increase the volume on your future uploads, this one was very low for me. Thanks!!
Fascinating lecture. Prob learned more in ww2 just than the 10 years prior
Speaking of Italian Army jokes, I like what Napoleon said of them: "Habillez-les en rouge, habillez-les en vert, ils foutent toujours le camp." ["Derss them in red, dress them in green, they alweays flee."] :D
Dr Citino is always worth watching. Thanks for another excellent presentation, and to USAHEC for making it available.
he is too dependent on german sources who lied
@@sitting_nut If you read his books, you'll see he's well aware of the problems with German sources, especially memoirs and oral histories. He makes extensive use of German sources because he's writing about German operational and strategic culture, which means he has to look at how the Germans themselves understood what they were trying to do.
@@marchuvfulz he is certainly not expressing his caveats well, or at all, here.. being objective and parroting without qualifications are two different things. also inside sources about a subject should be tested with external facts.
and his understanding of "german operational and strategic culture," seems to be aimed at making excuses for his sources.
Excellent presentation, thank you!
Very interesting particularly the influence of past campaigns, before German unification.
Well knowing where the enemy us by far more important in the modern warfare than knowing how strong the enemy is, because the most difficult task in the modern assimetrical warfare is actually finding the enemy and force it fight rather than thinking On how to defeat the located enemy
Bob Citino does a great presentation.
The author makes a good point regarding the German stripping and focusing of resources to make offensive operations possible, it is in itself an indicator that they were punching above their weight, and even in 1941, this had become the means to an end, e.g. their diversion of resources away from Army Group North and the relocation of troops from centre ( Heading for Moscow) in the attack on Kiev. (All of which then had to be reorientated to resume the advance on Moscow).
The German Army never did logistics in an organised manner, along with intelligence it was another Achilles heel. (They had several).
There was also a tendency when the weaker Allies contributed troops this gave the Germans an inflated sense of confidence, strength, and ability, gambling that they had the time to seek and win the ever " elusive" decisive battle that "would win the war", destroying the last Russian reserves - ( reference their intelligence failures).
The "Blaming of Hitler" in post-war years often came from the same officers who enabled him and rarely if ever opposed him.
Excellent talk, thank you, Professor Citino. ( I hope all your girls are now through university). :)
great lecture, did you find out about the statue and "1904"?
I’d argue on the underestimations of Russian tank & aircraft strengths, the Gernan intelligence knew Hitler well enough to give him numbers HE would accept. There’s plenty of instances when he was presented truer figures, he was apt to fly into a rage over the unpleasant truths. Goering, Himmler, Keitel and others regularly told him what he wanted to hear.
yeah dude listen to him&Mannerheim talking about the RedArmy.
@@blazodeolireta is that the one where he says they defeated 20 or 30 thousand tanks?
@@SpenserRoger more exactly, it is where he confessed that if "they" had known that the Russians had more than 30,000 tanks they would never have attacked
I love this stuff
Vintage Citino and as good as gets for those interested in WWII.
As good as it gets? It's difficult to listen to Citino. Look up Anthony Beevor...
The term 'Blitzkrieg' was coined by a journalist for the London Correspondent 1944. I do not know his name but it could now be looked up. The Germans never used the term 'Blitzkrieg', instead they used the term 'Bewegungskrieg' - war of movement.
Wrong. 1939. Not 1944.
The word did appear in a couple of German military journals in the 1930s but were never really explained.
@@DannyBoy777777 No they didn't they used the phrase 'Bewegungskrieg' - to describe the' War of movement' in WW2. Despite being common in German and English language Journalism The Wehrmacht never used it as an official military term.
The blitz, and krieg meaning war. Makes sense a Brit would come up with it, though I’m too lazy to google it right now.
Why are the event video production values so poor? Bad audio, bad lighting. The video export compression is also very bad.
One weakness I see in the German generals was insufficient planning for logistics. Hitler lacked that appreciation, too, it appears. Perhaps if Hitler took the advice of certain general, delayed the attack on Russia until April 1942, and built thousands more truck,tanks & planes, they would have been better off. Waiting until April 1942 would have given Germany two extra months of good weather for attacking Russia.
And would Russia just sit on its hands while the Germans prepared? Every month that went by the gap in power narrowed, not widened
They didn’t have oil. Waiting till 42 would’ve only exacerbated the oil issue especially if you added more vehicles into that mix.
Citino is always worth listening to, but I wish the sound was better on this.
Tremendous lecture. Mr Citino is the best!
There's a colossal problem with going into defence mode; the USSR was getting stronger by the month and the Reich knew it. Even the best fortifications wouldn't stop the power with superior manpower as well as superior military production and the advantage of resources. So the Reich needed to defeat or at least maim the USSR, by cutting off its vital transport lines and industry before the USSR are capable of outproducing them.
The best option was for the Reich to secure a favorable peace treaty with the USSR in early 1942 while it was still in a position of strength!
@@jem5231 there is no option for peace treaty in Vernichtungskrieg - war of anihilation. Racist policies were grave mistake.
@Uncle Joe but why would Soviets agree to any peace while war was lost for Germany in Dec 1941? Time was working in their favour, they achieved limited successes in 1942's counteroffensives. Germany could not won World War Two, actually Imperial Germany has beaten Russia and they've lost. Peace treaty on the east did not stop Americans from arriving in Europe.
One thing I think is very often forgotten is that the Soviet Union also faced manpower issues in 1942, they just were able to handle it being on the defensive for awhile
@ Misiulo And the United States was not only gearing up for war, but supping vital martial to the Soviet Union. Dr. Citino ignores the impact of the war in the west to the German 1942 debacle. www.histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/air/eur/sbc/eco/sbc-gie.html
This was awesome, I watched this for the third time I guess, by now. At the end of each time, I regretted not having taken notes but not this time.
Excellent historical analysis. Lousy modern day audio.
2010 audio.
It’s got nothing to do with modern audio, which is better. It’s cheaply done audio with little care, but a main problem is that the channel is broadcast too low.
Fantastic lecture
Doomed from the start vs Ineptitude from the top down *and* the bottom up
Send your sound engineer to 6 army in Stalingrad first train tomorrow!
All very interesting but where the f*** is the microphone?
sportkaru , good question
The persistent black line on the left side of his shirt(the right relative to us) seems to indicate a clip mic, but it is a good question.
@ 13:25- Friedrich Wilhelm, Elector of Brandenburg and Duke of Prussia patents Prussia's new flagship export product: "shock and awe". Hilarity ensues-
Great talk.
Re mechanisation, if the German army relied mostly on horse-drawn transport throughout the war, why does it matter that it had cut back on motorised transport for Operation Blau?
Re scraping the manpower barrel, didn't all combatants send all their 18 year olds into battle? Was the Wehrmacht particularly reliant on them in 1942?
How could have the Germans gone on the defensive in 42? What would have been the results of such a decision? Possibly large scale Soviet attacks like the operations Mars and Uranus with horrendous Soviet losses into prepared German positions. Would it have been possible to bleed the Soviets dry and force them to terms? Because that is the only alternative for German victory at this point. Baku and the oil fields were no small prize - that was the largest oil producing region in the world at the time. Taking them made sense theoretically in a war of attrition, not only would that solve Germany's severe oil problem but also would have ham-stringed the Soviets into a possible stalemate. Had the Germans taken the oil fields without any regard to Stalingrad and then switched to a defensive position after that securing the flanks of their oil production to the north (Volga river, outskirts of Stalingrad and the Ukrainian steppe allowing for maneuver warfare and counterattacks), they might have achieved that. The battle of egos in Stalingrad is what destroyed this otherwise logical plan that had a slim chance of succeeding even with all German resources committed to it. El Alamein was another huge mistake by extending unsustainable logistic lines, a defense of Tobruk and Malta would have anchored the North African campaign for a longer holdout. Also, finding oil in Libya at Sirte ... but that's another hypothetical question.
Your conjecture was pretty much Manstein's war plan after Stalingrad. The Red Army would launch an offensive, Mainstein would give ground, but he'd outflank them and kill tens of thousands of Soviet troops before the front stabilized for a while. Hitler's orders for no retreating meant very little in the way of defensive works were made and far more casualties were sustained than needed to happen. If Hitler allowed the army to be more flexible, then Soviet offensives could have been far more costly.
The prize at El Alamein was very tempting - if the Axis could permanently close the Suez canal, they would have complete control of the Eastern Mediterranean, and have plenty of space to capture the oil fields of Mesopotamia, Persia and maybe Arabia, as well as link up with their lovely new oil fields in the Caucases and Baku.
@@Septimus_ii El Alamein is at the end of Axis logistics capabilities. There was no way to go any further. The real game changer would have been the oil in Libya ... they missed it in the 1930s by a very small margin. That would have been a game changer.
Defense wasn't an option. The USSR was growing stronger every day.
@@juanpaz5124 that is why defense was the only option. Trade space for inflicting very high casualties. Pressure the Finnish and Japanese to close the Murmansk and the Vladivostok supply routes (75% of land-lease). Start building more Stugs instead of fantasy designs, go to total war mobilization in all Europe.
The Soviets almost bled dry as it was. One thing land-lease could never supply is more manpower.
Wish we had more videos of robert citino
There are
CZcams search his name
He needs to be conscious that he is not holding a conversation with someone 3 feet away. When he lowers the volume on his voice, it is inaudible. If you turn up the volume he then gets excited and the volume rattles the glass in your windows. A more even delivery would help. I spent more time fiddling withe the volume than listening.
12:02 Plugging one of your books in the middle of a lecture to pay for your daughter's college. That's a real Historian move right there.
Great lecture! My kind of educational material.
Thanks for sharing!
Dr Citino is the best.
@1:04:35 i don’t know why he says there were german armoured cars 30 min from Suez during the battle of Alam El Halfa. It was still well over 200km from the nearest location on the Suez Canal.
Calling your enemy a subhuman is a recipe for disaster.
Same tactics when some call their adversaries "deplorable".
@IK-so2bm Calling enemies' names isn't what lost them the war.
It technically did if the Nazis reigned in their views on the slavs they probably have a less stronger red army due to more defections but the germans decided to give the Soviets the will to fight due to fear of there families beginning executed or enslaved@@DannyBoy777777
Hitler greatly miscalculated in believing the US would prioritize the Asian theatre, and especially in thinking the Japanese would attack the USSR in Manchuria and Siberia. The Japanese failure to declare war on the Soviets allowed Stalin to transfer some Siberian divisions to successfuly defend Moscow and begin the counter-offensive. His other great failure in the East, apart from second guessing his generals, was not prioritizing the capture of the Caucasus in 1941.
Halder!
@@alexhayden2303, yes. Hitler wanted to take Caucasus in 1941 but Halder failed him.
I love this lecturer, he gives me Jeff Goldblum vibes haha
Well when he speakc about germans alies support at 9:13 he kinda forgeting Slovaks, actualy there was joke about Hitler asking Tiso(Slovak president at that time ) to send air support to the eastern front, reply was would u like 1, 2 or all 3 aircrafts,...
Love that joke. It makes sense why all those allies were in the east. Afraid of Russia
Nice joke!! ;)))
@@WarReport. But please check the names of Slovak pilots in Eastern Front. Jan Reznak or Izidor Kovarik with 32 and 28 confirmed shots of enemy aircraft. This is actually a very good record of a Slovak Air Force on Eastern Front.
@@pedroprague for sure, I figured the joke was merely meant to point out to Hitler the Slovak air force isnt too large. I'm sure they had some solid aces as you point out.
@@WarReport. Txs
BTW interesting is also the history of Slovak Uprising in 1944 where a Slovak/Czechoslovak air fleet has landed with soviet planes (Mostly Czech pilots veterants from battle of England) inside of Slovak territory and for more than 40 days controled airspace of Slovakia destroing a lot of german planes and equipment. Airfield deep in German ocupied territory. At the end they had to return to soviet controled Poland but it was incredible achievement..;)
Great lecture 😄👍
The Nazi's firmly believed in their racial superiority and that the Slavs were subhuman. This blinded them to the military facts they were actually facing. They believed they could take huge risks and bite off more than they could chew since they were superior and would have an answer to every problem.
Casting the net too far wide. It is debatable just what percentage of the OKW and the Wehrmacht's field commanders actually believed that.
The short, sharp wars by winning decisive victories at about 14:30 reminds me of the Imperial Japanese Navy view of trying to repeat Tsushima. Pearl Harbor and Midway were supposed to be those battles in their case. It's just interesting that both the major Axis combatants who started WW2 had this same mindset and had failed to plan for a longer war in any meaningful way.
The ussr won for 1 reason. As evil as Hit was, he could never guess that stalin would be willing to send millions of kids to die in stalingrad. He could never be prepared for all those kids flooding the city, if it was army on army the game was won in 41, sadly it was again another genocide from the ussr mustache man
It isn't they hadn't thought about it. They couldn't win a long war. That's the point. And so they tried the only way that offered a chance of victory, no matter how small.
Great translated 🫡 greetings from Germany
volume up please...
Buy a speaker
@@pauljames5379 You're overlooking the fact that there are genuine audio problems in the recording. You can't blame the viewer for not having the means to compensate on their end.
Gerbils audio makes this audio look sick.
@52:53 "the German panzer armies converged at Millerovo and they didn't converge on much of anything... The Germans took 40,000 prisoners. Yet people act like the US losing 58,000 men over ten years of combat is a staggering loss. Obviously it's not a good thing, but compared to many previous wars, losing the equivalent of the murder rate in New Orleans is not that bad.
@26:12 'Blucher once said "it was all a matter of will" '.
In 1935, Leni Riefenstahl directed, produced, edited and co-wrote "Triumph des Willens" - the triumph of the will. Clearly the thread ran deep in certain parts of the German psyche. Or maybe that should be Prussian, as she was born in Berlin, capital of Prussia between 1701 and 1947 (with a brief gap in 1806).
"Its not southern Russia, as any Ukrainian will be quick to remind you". Well put. Rings especially true today.
Sadly, Poor sound quality ruined the lecture
No doubt you wanted 4K as well? Idiot
When you look into the numbers, the Soviets actually didn't have that many men. When looking at mobilization statistics as well as take into consideration that most of the densest and most urbanized regions in the USSR had fallen under German control, the Soviets really didn't have that much of a superiority in industry, weapons and manpower. They were also desperately short on food.
Ikr his statics are very wrong for everything such as the Russians having 24000 tanks in 1942 and so many other statics.
Even if that's the case Russian war doctrine assumed massive initial casualties. They were prepared (in theory😉) to replace 100% of its fighting force within 10 weeks.
@@xxcxpl yep
That’s why I say US is why the Soviets survived, was the food shortages
What you say is largely true, but note that the Germans only began to break into the Russian ethnic heartland and was driven out as a result of the Soviet counter offensive (December 1941). The Siviets did of course have a larger manpower potential. What they did not have was an industrial superiority. This is often ignored as Dr. Citino does here. The Germans had much more heavy industry than the Soviets. Citinio just ignores the fact that the Ostheer was mostly on foot. And why. A major part of the answer is the War in the West. www.histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/air/eur/sbc/eco/sbc-gie.html
His argument that the Soviets just ran away when Case Blue was launched is now known to be a fiction, one the Soviets created to make themselves look better than they really did. In fact, they were smashed repeatedly and took great amounts of damage, but their continuous attacks in the face of the German advance did wear down the Germans and set them up for being destroyed that winter. For more information look up David Glantz's work in this regard.
where was such an attempt to make Soviets look better? All Soviet history books and fiction on the period emphasizes order 227, this was an extremely hard fought and determined campaign by the RKKA, where a commander retreating without an order from high up would instantly get courtmartialed and sent to a penal batallion. It was likely Germans' excuse for being unable to achieve a decisive victory. Most of the captured Soviet numbers were exaggerated as well by at least a third, there is lots of competent current Russian research on that topic, starting from the fact that every male older than 15 on the captured territory was counted as a POW and take to the concentration camps and so on.
My understanding of why they were able to avoid the losses of 1941 in 1942 was because in 1941, Stalin repeatedly ordered large counter attacks, which just made it easier for the Germans to make large scale encirclements. In 1942, upon the commencement of Blau, they more fought in a style of engaging and falling back. If you look at the prisoner amounts taken by the Germans in 1942 vs 1941, you see that they are very minimal, proving their effectiveness in avoiding encirclement.
@@sgberta actually there is a strong argument that those counterattacks were the only thing that didn't allow the soviet union to go the way of France, which kept gathering forces for one deciseve counter attacks and ran out of time and space. In fact considerable amount of German primary sources prove just that. Remember that germans counted any male over the age of 15 as a POW, once they would occupy the land. Also 1942 unlike 1941 lacked the element of strategic surprise with all due consequences, inlcuding the POWs.
@@dmitriyosmantsev7603 Good point about the element of surprise aspect. Adding to that, wasn't it also the case that the Soviets had a very large amount of troops near the borders at the start of Barbarossa, which I'm sure made encirclements easier for the Germans.
@@sgberta the is quite incorrect actually, and stems from works of Victor Suvorov a pen name for the trator of a GRU officer who defected to UK in the 70s, and got paid to write all kinds of lies about the USSR during the Cold War. It was actually quite the opposite, the Red Army was split into three echelons each about 300-350 kilometers from each other, and they were defeated in detail. Stalin was hesitant to concentrate them at the border, cause he remembered what led to WWI, and was in the midst or rearming and reorginizing the Red Army, so he was trying everything to delay the war as much as he could... Wish you'd understand Russian I could have directed you to some really nice online lectures on the topic.
Yup, never mind Stalingrad and the Eastern Front, Operation Torch started in November of 1942. The Germans had the seas though until we got their enigma machine.
Curious of what would and could have happened if the Germans did end up making it to the oil fields in the Caucasus. Yes theyd have the oil fields but was there any way to refine and distribute the oil???
Does anybody have a link to download his books? I have 'The Wehrmacht's Last Stand: 1944-1945' in Epub, and it's amazing, but i really need to read the others
Libgen.is
Buy them.
Prussian military traditions date to the Baltic crusades. Some families had officers in the Teutonic order and in the WWII!
And we can be sure that the Prussian nobility comes from the Germanic nobility, a very much militarized elite of a warrior nation.
They are our Zulus
A bunch of servil peasants commanded by rancid oligarchs.
truly
So basically the Wermacht went to the East assuming it would be like France or Poland with maybe a couple of extra weeks to spare, with no plan B and relying on the Aryan Menschen to do all the trucking almost to the Urals, besides not bothering to do any real assessment of how much manpower awaited them at every turn from the untermenschen slavs. What can possibly go wrong?
It would appear that Fremde Heer Ost weren't doing their jobs.
The fact that the Red Army was even able to retreat tells us something: that the Luftwaffe and paratroopers hadn't made it impossible for the Soviets to make large scale movements by day. Also, the fact that the Germans were surprised to not find the main body of the Red Army every time they converged tells us about their intelligence failures: the failed to spot massive retreats. I never appreciated that before. In France during Overlord, the Allies had 25 to 1 air supremacy, 3 divisions of paratroopers, and tons of air dropped caltrops on roads and highways, as well as having wrecked the railroad and bridge networks. That combined with the French resistance, ment that it took the 2nd SS panzer division 14 days to travel about 150 miles through their own territory to get to Normandy. Now obviously the Soviet Union didn't have a comparable railroad and bridge network, and the Red Army wasn't constantly ambushed by anti-Soviet insurgents, but imagine if Germany controled the air and deployed significant numbers of paratroopers at key road junctions and river crossings. The Red Army may have had a much more difficult and slow retreat, allowing the Panzer armies to outrun them. Again, the fact that the Red Army could move east as fast as, or faster than the Panzer amries, and the fact that the Panzer armies didn't know they were converging only on a few rearguard units says volumes about their overall lack of combat power and effective intelligence.
If the Africa Corps had never been deployed there, but instead was employed with Army Group Center in Operation Barbarossa would Moscow and its' central railroad locus been within reach of the Wermacht?
Shoot your sound man ASAP
Ordzhonikidze is a fantastic place at the foot of the mountains
Audio is TERRIBLE.
Really poor!
give a man a map smh
Dr. Citino questions the fighting quality of Germany's Axis allies. He may be correct about this, but surely he should mention how poorly equipped they were. When the Soviets struck in November, these armies did not have any modern tanks or anti-tank guns. This is where the War in the West comes in. The bulk of German industry was being used to fight the war in the West. The Deutsche Ostheer was mostly unmotorized infantry moving east on foot with horse-drawn carts. And not properly equipping their own units, equipping their allies was out of the question.
@Daria Tikholoz There is no embarrassment here. Any factual study of the war shows that the war in the west diverted huge quantities of Germany's industrial output from supporting the Ostkrieg. (notice you present no facts in your post, only an insult.) it is absolutely true that most of Germany's MANPOWER was committed to the Ostkrieg. And the casualties were sustained there. But manpower is only one factor of warfare. If it was, China would have won the War. Germany's iINDUSTRIAL power was mostly committed to the war in the West. This is part of the reason the Ostheer failed. These are factual matters which can be researched. I have worked up the data. YT does not permit hot links. but just google "German Industrial Effort: Concentration on the War in the West" and "histclo.com".
@Daria Tikholoz Listen, I believe that the Ostkrieg was the decisive battle of the War and it was the Red Army that tore the heart out of the Wehrmacht. I absolutely believe this is the case.
My point is that the Germans failed not only because of the Red Army's magnificent performance which I do not mean to denigrate but because of the War in the West. A central fact in the German defeat was that the Deutsche Ostheer was 80 percent UNMOTTORIZED infantry moving east on foot with horse-drawn carts. The reason for this is that:
1) The War in the West prevented the Germans from importing oil
2) Much of the German industrial output supported the war in the West rather than the Ostkrieg.
I have pointed out my work on both points with actual data and sources. All you add to the conversation is saying my information is false. That is now how educated people discuss history. You have not provided one single fact. And just what information I have provided is false? I would be more than happy to provide factual data to support my statements in you want to discuss FACTS.
As for D-Day. Interesting that instead of asking my opinion, you think you are a mind reader. I do believe it was crucial, but more because it saved Western Europe from Stalin and the Red Army. But a lot of Russians are alive today because it weakened the ability of the Germans to fight in the East. I will also point out that the great Soviet victory in 1944 (Bagration) was achieved not only because there were two ground fronts on the continent, but because the Red Army now exceeded the Germans in mobility. And a major factor here was American Lend-Lease trucks.
This is an important issue. Why not discuss the facts, rather than just saying I am wrong without one single fact?
Call me a weirdo, but I choose this sort of stuff to go to sleep to. I'm not saying it's boring, really interesting tbh, just that it sends me off!
It would have been politically unacceptable for Germany to shift into strategic defense starting with 1942. Someone from the German high command would have conjured up pretty much the same set of very ambitious operations.
According to David M. Glantz, no retreats were ordered by Stalin in the wake of Operation Blau. The Soviets were crushed, but the Germans could not bag enough of them, unlike in 1941: the Germans did not have enough infantry to bag numerous cut-off Soviet formations. As a result, many Soviet stragglers made back to their side of the line. So, these Soviet retreats were not in any way carried out in an orderly fashion nor under organized plans.
Glantz puts the most emphasis on the set of Soviet counterattacks on Voronezh, then along the Don bend, then the norther flank of Stalingrad. While the Soviets suffered horrendous losses, these attacks helped to blunt Operation Blau and set the stage for the meatgrinder at Stalingrad.
Thomas Glantz talks as if he knows WWII but doubt those who speak with overconfidence.
Yes, it is often stated that Case Blue was a more orderly retreat than Barbarossa due to the lack of prisoners taken, but I have also heard it was another rout like in 1941, as the Germans retained operational superiority in the open. So the point that the Soviets escaped due to a lack of German manpower makes sense.
The big point Glantz makes about Barbarossa is that the decision to turn aside from the advance towards Moscow in August 1941 in order to deal with Kiev was not a mistake but strategically necessary, and therefore the possibility that the Germans could have reached Moscow on schedule and captured it becomes impossible, therefore guaranteeing the failure of Barbarossa. (Whether the Soviet Union would actually have collapsed even if Moscow fell is highly controversial, but anyway.) So he shares your opinion that the invasion was insane as far as I am aware.
I value Glantz's even-handed assessment, because he was able to compare both the German and the Soviet primary sources.
One of the major themes from Glantz's studies is a matter of German strategic intelligence. It was awful. The Germans did not have a good handle on how much the Soviets could mobilize and hammer out war production.
If it was "It would have been politically unacceptable for Germany to shift into strategic defense starting with 1942." Unacceptable to whom? Hitler was not going to be impeached and in 1942 most if not all German Generals supported the invasion of Russia Guederian wanted to take Moscow. When they tried the Wiermacht met its first serious resistance and were surprised the the infererior Slavs built the great T-34, better than any panzer for 2 years, and in huge numbers.
Is Carl con Clausewitz a well known general in the U.S.?
Amongst military and historical minded people I'd say yes, he's one of the more famous generals because of his book on war.
From one Citino to another. Hello.
😮1942 campaign repeated 1941 campaign. Lack of focus on 1 area. 3 thrusts in 1941. 2 muddled thrusts in 1942. Germans did get some oil from maikop. It wasn't much and was used locally.
I am not a military person, however it should be noted that the 200,000 strong Hungarian force had the responsibility to guard 200 kilometres in the Don river region. This force did not match the capabilities of the Soviet Army. It only had light armour and equipment, compared to the German or Russian forces. The Germans promised to supply heavy armour, tanks, aeroplanes and other heavy equipment, as soon as they arrived at their destination. This promise was never fulfilled. Whilst Hungary paid for some of the equipment to Germany, they never delivered and for this reason they had to buy inferior equipment from the Italians which was no match against the Russians. This issue and many other questions were not addressed in the lecture .
That is because this lecture deals with the *German* way of war, not the Hungarian way of war. It is about the Wehrmacht, not the Hungarian Army.
Jonathan House has a lecture called "Last Victories", there he adress the rough deal the Hungarians, Italians and Romanians had; to face the Red Army with inadequate equipment. If you want Minor Axis Allies, watch that.
@@PalleRasmussen Thank you for your advice. Of Course Rumania invested more than a million man against Russia because they wanted "Greater Rumania" whereas Hungary had no land claims against the Soviets.
@@hunguy3280 I see in your reply that the century old enmity between Hungary and Romania still exists in some people's minds...
@@PalleRasmussen It is a very unfortunate story and you may not be aware of the circumstances . Rumania ofcourse did change sides and joined the Soviet Alliance. Hungary also tried to extricate itself from the War but it did not change sides. The crux of the problem is Transylvania . The Soviets did recommend that the whole of Transylvania should be returned to Rumania and the Anglo Saxons did agree. This left more than 3 million hungarians in a very unfriendly Rumania. Initially Rumania became the friendliest Ally of the Soviets etc . But now they again switched sides as they always do, and are aiming nuclear Weapons against Russia etc ..Because of their lies against us the relationship is getting worse by the decades Transylvania was Hungarian for more than a thousand years and it was never part of Rumania it was only gifted to them after their loss against us after World War 1 by the Anglo Saxons. Are you American? I would like to hear your response thank you . You seem to be a reasonable person.
@@PalleRasmussen OOps I understand you are Danish. Sorry but I would still be interested to hear from you .Regards
German army was not structured to manage the wast areas. They did so many slaughters of the innocent people in the occupied areas. That army was structured to fight the immobile armies, but once they become the immobile they start loosing. And yes, they lacked the air support for their overstretched ground troops.
@ ddze It needs to be mentioned that Luftwaffe coverage in 1941 was inadequate in part because of losses during the Battle of Britain. In 1942 squadrons began to be withdrawn because of escalating British bombing (they now had Lancs) and the air offensive against Malta. This is important to mention because too many authors dismiss the War in the West.www.histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/air/eur/sbc/eco/sbc-gie.html
@@dennisweidner288I agree it is a significiant contribution. Also Hitler misjudged the soviet forces especially he wrongfully judged the soviet campaign against the Finland in 1940. Poor performance of the soviet army against the Finland led him to call for the action. So many things contributed to his defeat. Without attacking the Soviet Russia everything would last longer but not much longer from the dates of nukes dropped on Japan.
@@damirdze Absolutely. I don't mean to minimize the huge Soviet contribution. It was critical. I just object to the many voices (from Russians and left-wing Westerners) who seek to minimamizxe the Western contribution.
@Digital Communist When I hear someone say that Hitler had no chance of winning the War, I find it difficult to take them seriously. The German decisively defeated everyone in their way for 2 years. They smashed well-armed Soviet armies and got to Mosco in 5 months. You from the vantage point of history can say they had no chance of winning the war. The 0% statement I am sure of is that no one at the time thought that the Germans could not win the War. In fact, the consensus was that was the Soviets could not hold out. I know of no competent military historians who claim that the Germans had 0 % chance of winning the war. Can you name one that said that?
@Digital Communist I have read some of Glantz's work. Where did he say that Germany had a 0 percent chance of winning the War?
On German intelligence: I think their biggest blunder of all was overlooking the 2 years of mandatory service for all Soviet men back in the 30s. This meant that every man called up in 1942 had already gotten some military training. They went from civilian life to the mustering depots and then directly to the front. No boot camp needed. When the Germans captured vast amounts of Soviet troops in 1941 they thought they had gotten most of the Soviet strength. Not realizing there was yet another, larger, host of manpower available to the Soviets in 1942.
And the non aggression pact with Japan freed up experienced divisions that were able to be redeployed.
@@ssgus3682 Non agression pacts were meaningless. Much more helpful was the intelligence that the Japanese had no intention of invading. The Japanese in 1942 could have just walked into the Soviet Union, brushed aside a few divisions and took the Transsiberian railway to the Eastern Front. Ok, slight overexaggeration but they could've caused the Soviet Union to actually collapse if they had committed their armies to fighting it.
The attacker always needs way more than the defender
@ ENLIGHTENED WARRIOR I suggest you study thev1940 German Westerm offensive., not to mntion Alexander's campaigns.
I started studying at age 4. I would lay on the couch watching the world at war series with my dad like I said the attacker always needs more than the defender at least a 3 to 1 attacking a entrenched enemy
@@dennisweidner288 I've studied the whole Barbarossa campaign all the way until the fall of Berlin. What does that have to do with my statement ? Every time a red army was defeated another one was sent forward a endless supply of troops and material. The Germans weakened and the Russians were able to keep on reinforcing their front not to mention the Germans over extending
@@enlightenedwarrior7119 Now you re adding a new factor. Entrenchment. Here you are on firmer grounds, But much of World War Ii did not evolve a well entrenched defending force.
@@dennisweidner288 kursk ?
So many motherfucking long ass comments.
Germany could have waited until 1942 before launching Barbarosa.
Understanding the logistics in such a huge country with dirt/ mud roads was ignored due to victory disease
The objectives shifted during the assaults, no heavy bombers or large cargo aircraft, surplus of rolling stock, and especially no appreciation for the Russian soldier.
They couldn't, they wouldn't have the resources to move all three army groups at the same time
The hard charging generals: Guderian, Rommel, Manstein and Model!!!!
And Patton
I don't recall anyone talking about Hitler writing from Prison that the master race, the great German People needed living space so the plan was to politically dominate the Italians, Romanians, and Hungarians enough that they would just give that wide space out east to Germany. By 1942 that is what it seems was afoot however.
All that walking around must keep you slim.