Bismarck: Why its mission made sense!
Vložit
- čas přidán 19. 04. 2021
- Sponsored by World of Warships: Legends! Click here ► wo.ws/2Q3sMnm to check out the game on PlayStation®4, PlayStation®5 or Xbox One X, Xbox Series S and Xbox Series X.
Most of you know about the German battleship Bismarck, its initial battle with HMS Hood and Prince of Wales, its evasion of the British forces until its steering was hit by Swordfish Torpedo bombers from HMS Ark Royal and its ultimate demise. Yet, what rarely gets covered is the strategic and operational aspects behind sending out a battleship into the Atlantic.
»» GET OUR BOOK ««
» Army Regulation Medium Panzer Company 1941 - www.hdv470-7.com
»» SUPPORT MHV ««
» patreon - see videos early (adfree) - / mhv
» subscribe star - www.subscribestar.com/mhv
» paypal donation - paypal.me/mhvis
» CZcams Membership - / @militaryhistoryvisual...
»» MERCHANDISE ««
» teespring - teespring.com/stores/military...
» SOURCES «
BArch, RM 6/1957: Operationen und Taktik: Auswertung wichtiger Ereignisse des Seekrieges. Heft 3: Die Atlantikunternehmung der Kampfgruppe “Bismarck” - „Prinz Eugen“, Mai 1941. Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine: Berlin, Oktober 1942.
Garzke, William H.; Dulin Jr, Robert O.; Jurens, William: Battleship Bismarck: A Design and Operational History. Seaforth Publishing: Barnsley, UK, 2019.
Mawdsley, Evan: The War for the Seas: A Maritime History of World War II. Yale University Press: New Haven, Connecticut, USA, 2019.
Symonds, Craig L.: World War II at Sea. A Global History. Oxford University Press: New York, 2018.
German Extended Translation (used for this video)
Potter, E.B.; Nimitz, Ch. W.; Rohwer, Jürgen: Seemacht - Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart.
Kast, Bernhard (ed.); Bergs, Christoph (ed.): The Assault Platoon of the Grenadier-Company November 1944. German Army Pamphlet - Merkblatt 25a/16. Deutsch / English. Bernhard Kast: Linz, Austria, 2020.
#Sponsored #Bismarck #WhySendTheBismarck
Sponsored by World of Warships: Legends! Click here ► wo.ws/2Q3sMnm to check out the game on PlayStation®4, PlayStation®5 or Xbox One X, Xbox Series S and Xbox Series X.
Errors & Corrections:
at ~ 8:45 it should be "Überwasserstreitkräfte" (surface forces) instead of "Unterwasserstreitkräfte" (underwater forces), thanks to Patreon Volker and others for pointing this out.
Love your work man! I'm a somewhat overworked corrections officer who doesn't really have time to ay WoW, so I'll igjorenyour advertiser. Your videos are excellent though.
What people often forget the German Navy did pretty much the same thing late in WW1
9:06 there must be an error in both labels in the second line cause right now it makes NO sense cause Unterwasserstreitkräft und U-Boote are the same and there would be nothing new if those would fight in simultaneous operations. It should be "Über"wasserstreitkräfte and "subs" to make sense and therefore surface forces.
Interesting to see that a german "typo" went through the whole procedure into the english translation and also into the audio ... but in german there is not much difference (Über / Unterwasser) compared to the english surface / underwater forces. And in the second or third sentence it was right.
great video again
Thanks for clearing up this misconception about Bismarck's role and fateful voyage!
@Mialisus thanks, fixed.
They did so, because they believed that a Swedish band would ultimately make a song that would be so epic on it
Ah, yes, Primo Victoria, I get it now. 😁
That song had enough metal to build a couple of Bismarcks
Imagine listening to Sabaton
@@Kaarna5 Imagine getting the reference
Tirpitz is a better song
I just love the authentic German pronunciations. It’s like enjoying luxury chocolates.
Or like a video coming out on Hitler's birthday
What so it's not U-G-en?
@@GreenBlueWalkthrough actually it is more like "oygen" (with a hard "g") - not sure why MHV pronounced the word differently here. Drach usually has the pronounciation on point. It's a somewhat normal yet maybe a bit outdated surname in Germany. (Native speaker here)
@@christophb.9692 Does it sound the same in Austria too? MHV is from Austria right?
@@GreenBlueWalkthrough the Prinz part has a soft z so it's pronounced like Prince Oygen
It never ceases to amaze me just how much fascinating information you keep bringing us just by actually reading the primary sources.
You and Drach, two of the best martial history channels on this platform.
Agree 100 percent
Agreed. Wish more people watched their content.
Have you ever seen yamato30? he is a relatively small naval historian, 10k subs, He does really interesting topics, I think you might like to check him out, He is a good friend of mine, and the amount of stuff you can learn from his videos are amazing
@@musashi3036 He's your brother, right🤣? Seen some vids, quite good.
@@TheShrike616 Not my brother :) He is American I am British, Yes he is a good youtuber
After yesterday's 1 and a half hour video by Animarchy on the Bismarck this one is a very welcome surprise
And it's on Hitler's birthday
Literally the same, just ended the previous right now XD
4:45 - always good when you have a reason to quote your own publications :P
Saw that, along with Bismarck's name in there also.
6:38 best symbol for "sharing" fuel supplies
It's notable how much enemy forces an enemy that is _not_ engaging can still tie.
Something something about threat being more effective than actual use.
Tirpitz only shelled a shed.
Fleet in Being in a nutshell.
It is the idea behind "a fleet in being". The threat of action combined with not knowing where that action might take place obliges the opponent to guard many places. Not sure though whether that would still work today, with supposed 24/7 satellite observation.
Here's the actual picture from British Intel at the time (scenario). America is not in the war yet. If Bismarck makes it out with P.E., and starts hunting in open lanes, expect 20 or so U boats in operation areas. 1 convoy of say 30 cargo, 3 DD's, and a medium cruiser (for argument sakes here) get spotted by recon or subs. Bismarck and P.E. draw cruiser and 1 or 2 DD slightly away and engage. In those 15 minutes, how much damage can 5 to 10 subs inflict? Even if 2 subs help take out the cruiser in say 30 minutes, and 1 DD goes with it. The convoy is going to have a very very bad rest of engagement. Subs spot for Bismarck and P.E. at 5-7 mile range plunking cargo left and right while tying up remaining DD's. Main issue becomes, what do you do for the next 10 convoys? How do you protect them? And important here, how long can Britain hold on against the rest of the home issues with continual Bismarck/P.E. or later Tirpitz commerce raids similarly? It was already tenuous later that year. If Bismarck succeeded in making open water, different ballgame in 41. British forces had to get Bismarck. And they very well knew what was at stake.
@@crazylocha2515 Alternate history scenario: What if the Bismarck was not caught by the Royal Navy?
Lol @ Dracula symbol for refueling
My secretary is always hungry
Bismarck and Tirpitz had a golden opportunity to materially change the character of Operation Barbarossa. The key to the Russian resistance at Leningrad was Kronstadt, the fortified fleet base of the Soviet Baltic Fleet and the forts defending the approaches. Chief amongst the insurmountable obstacles was the Krasnaya Gorka fort, whose 10, 11 and 12-inch capital ship-grade guns maintained the Oranienbaum Bridgehead for the duration of the siege.
These same obstacles faced the Germans in 1917, and they reacted with Operation Albion, an October 1917 combined-arms offensive that threatened to put Petrograd under siege up until the Bolshevik Revolution led to the fall of Petrograd and Lenin negotiating the Brest-Litovsk treaty, conclusively handing the Germans victory on the Eastern Front. The key fighting was the Battle of Moon Sound, where one modern battle cruiser and 10 modern dreadnoughts of the High Seas Fleet ripped apart the Russian Baltic Fleet followed by three amphibious landings in the Moonsund Archipelago.
As Exercise Rhine was commencing with just over a month to go before the beginning of Barbarossa, canceling the commerce raid in favor of supporting the drive on Leningrad would have been prudent. Had Hitler realized that following the Albion precedent would have been advisable while drawing up plans for the invasion of the USSR, he could have called off Exercise Berlin before it became a disaster. Lutjens' January-March raid is often considered a success by historians, but this ignores how monumentally stupid it was to make for Brest. The French port is and was less than 150 NM from RAF St Mawgan and RAF St Eval, two major RAF Coastal Command airfields in Cornwall, and the RAF pounded both Scharnhorst and Gnesinau as a result. Why Lutjens did not make for Norway as Scheer had done in March 1941 is anyone's guess, but considering he made for Brest AGAIN before being killed on 27 May 1941, it might be because the man had little strategic sense.
Unfortunately for every following German general and admiral, Hindenburg and (especially) Ludendorff had no concept of naval operations either. Rather than using the High Seas Fleet in an Albion-esque operation out of Wilhelmshaven in support of the Spring 1918 Hail Mary Offensive, the junta allowed the German capital ships to sit at anchor while only the U-boats fought in the Channnel/North Sea/Atlantic Ocean despite a growing insurrectionist movement building in the fleet. Why the OHL thought unrestricted submarine warfare would work when Alfred von Tirpitz had warned prewar that no blockade of Britain would is debatable, but the consequence was the Kiel Mutiny spilling into the German Revolution in November 1918. Only in this way is it clear why Hitler never learned how to leverage the Albion success in the next war: Germany's leaders were as clueless in 1917-18 as the Fuhrer was in the 1940s.
Nevertheless, the most strategically sound use of German capital ships in 1941 would have sent Bismarck, Gnesinau, Scharnhorst and Tirpitz when the latter was ready, escorted by Lutzow and Scheer, to blast Krasnaya Gorka. Sixteen 380mm and thirty 280mm guns would probably have reduced the fort and the Oranienbaum Bridgehead to slag, especially if accompanied with infantry landings or attacks coming from landward. This would have facilitated taking or destroying Kronstadt, before raining German naval artillery on the Kirov Works (home of the KV-1), hopefully before it could be evacuated to Tankograd.
This of course would have required a combined-armed operation with the synergies the High Seas Fleet and Deutsches Heer managed in October-November 1917, but given the fact that Schwerer Gustav and Karl-Gerat in concert with air and ground attacks were needed to knock out the Maxim Gorky naval fortresses at Sevastopol, a combined air-land-sea assault against Leningrad would not have been beyond the realm of possibility in 1941-42 if the Kriegsmarine had not been wasting its surface fleet on futile convoy raiding missions. The strategic impact of a Soviet loss of Leningrad would have been immense--freeing up German forces for the drive on Moscow, fighting in Rhzev, or launching a combined Finn-German assault to try to take Murmansk and Arkhangelsk.
Employing German naval power wisely instead of wastefully would have prolonged the war, and had the Russian Arctic ports fallen the effects would have been worse than the Battle of France on the Allies. Here again German capital ships could have been instrumental, as a real blockade of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk with sixteen 15-inch and thirty 11-inch guns could have cut Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR by almost half. Granted the Royal Navy would have something to say about this, but forming a proper battle line of Bismarck, Gnesinau, Scharnhorst and Tirpitz certainly would have performed better than they did historically in the Battle of the Barents Sea, the Battle of the North Cape and Bismarck's nameless fight to her doom on 27 May 1941.
Thank you for this piece, great analysis.
@@outorgado2776 Thanks, though it's hard to come to any conclusion other than I'm wasting my time.
The fact that the Kriegsmarine had much better options for contributing to the German war effort in the six months prior to Barbarossa (and especially once Barbarossa kicked off) calls into question whether the Germans could ever get their act together, and eighty years later the myth that the Wehrmacht was ever competent after the fall of France and Denmark & Norway is still to pervasive.
It is totally out of bounds to point out that the idiots in command of the Kaiserliche Marine in 1918 let the insurrection fester until the Kiel Mutiny brought down the entire German state, and gutlessness for the last 103 years have prevented historians from pointing out loudly that Ludendorff created and nurtured the stab in the back myth starting in 1919 before being acquitted in the 1923 Munich Putsch and then standing for election in the 1924 Reichstag and 1925 German presidential election as a member of the Nazi party.
It's amazing these dipshits accomplished anything after Albion and Moon Sound, considering how sniveling the German state immediately became. Prussia ransomed Paris in 1871, and the French paid off the French indemnity in TWO YEARS. Yet the myth persists that Versailles was something out of the ordinary, rather than an excuse for the fact that Ludendorff steeped Hindenburg in the stab in the back myth and his fellow junta member chose Hitler as Chancellor but nearly turned the German state over to the Army as Hindenburg was dying of cancer in 1934--that is, until the Night of the Long Knives put Hitler into a position of trust with the 86-year old Hindenburg and made the vegetarian his heir-apparent.
This all flies in the face of conventional wisdom (i.e: German post Great War and Cold War propaganda). Yet basic operational realities were ignored for twenty years in the German military, and it showed. Raeder was in command of the Kriegsmarine for 13 years by the end of 1941, when such a position rarely was (or is even today) put in the hands of one man for more than four years. The German high command had become ossified and almost inert, as Keitel likewise was well past his prime once Barbarossa kicked off (in office for six years by Pearl Harbor).
Moreover, with the exception of Albion and Norway, the Germans were such creatures of habit prior to the 1950s that any change in operational, let alone strategic or policy-level change, made hash of their capabilities. Capturing Paris in 1940 was the third time since 1813 that Prussia/Germany had overrun the French capital: defeating Napoleon and taking the imperial city in 1814, defeating Napoleon III and taking the last French monarch's capital in 1871, and coming VERY close in 1914, except for the Marne. Everything else was a shambles when facing a peer opponent.
Under these extremely unfavorable military command and control circumstances, the Germans simply COULDN'T perform well in 1941. Only if American, British, or Japanese command and control had been dropped in place of the OKW could my scenario have worked: the Germans simply were incapable of thinking in such terms, as Ludendorff's organization for 1918 attests (completely ignoring the Albion precedent).
" unfortunately, "
Lol wasn't expecting such a strong presence of facists in the comments but I guess it makes sense.
@@BoleDaPole Well, we never know if the things happen, gemany will win or no
@@canthi109 No, we certainly know how the war would have turned out--Germany was going to lose...badly. The Wehrmacht was powered by gasoline, not diesel like the British and Red Armies were. No matter what, the Germans were going to run out of gas.
The Wehrmacht was so short on fuel that the major objective of Operation Watch on the Rhine was capturing American fuel stocks, only to be thwarted in the Battle of the Bulge. Considering the U.S. represented 63% of the entire planet's oil production in 1940 (a percentage and tonnage that rose precipitously in the four years that followed) the Germans somehow saw stealing gasoline from the American armies as their last hope, rather than a marker of how hopeless their struggle had been from the start.
The USSR had immense difficulty producing gasoline, and the Soviets considered 74 octane as high-performance aviation fuel. The Americans had to ship over two million TONS (yes TONS, not barrels or gallons) of avgas and other high octane fuels to power Lend-Lease vehicles and the Red Air Force as a whole. Capturing Soviet oil fields would do little to fuel the German army unless that oil could be shipped back to Germany and Romania to be refined.
The Wehrmacht plan for taking Maikop, Grozny and Baku took this into account, bringing along massive quantities of oil pipeline to ship Soviet oil westward, which was handy for the USSR's oil engineers to use to patch up Maikop and Grozny after Fall Blau failed. The only way Case Blue could have been successful would have required the Soviets to capitulate simultaneously with the loss of Baku (without the Azerbaijani capital and oil fields, the German fuel tanks would have run dry regardless).
This wasn’t in the cards, as U.S. assistance to the USSR included a massive industrialization program, including a railway network to power it. The Americans shipped thousands of locomotives, and provided the supplies that built 58% of Soviet rail tracks constructed during the war. The result led to "Tankograd," which along with hundreds of thousands of American-supplied Studebaker trucks ran over the Germans like a steamroller. Short of seizing control of ALL of the Soviet Union's borders and (more importantly) seaports, the U.S./USSR program was going to crush the Wehrmacht like a tin can.
But what if Stalin had capitulated anyway? Even if that was in the cards (it wasn't) the armistice wouldn't last long. The issue then is the 10th Army and Eisenhower's forces.
The British 10th Army sat south of the Soviet border, defending British oil production in the Middle East and protecting the Persian Gulf Lend-Lease supply route through Persia to Baku to Stalingrad (via the Caspian Sea and Volga River). Operation Torch did not commerce until November 1942, a month after the Luftwaffe began blasting Grozny when their ground forces failed to advance on the Chechen capital. Eisenhower's forces would have gone into Baku if the heart of the Soviet oil industry had been threatened, and together with the British 10th Army would have staged another Stalingrad, except Allied amphibious assault prowess would have enabled the Western Allies to cut off the German Army Group as the Wehrmacht's supply lines would have been pinned between the Caspian Sea and Caucasus Mountains. In all likelihood a German drive on Baku would have resulted in a faster defeat of the Third Reich, as the effect would be similar to Operation Bagration, only in late-1942/early-1943.
Of course no one has a crystal ball to know precisely how an alternative set of circumstances would have turned out, but the fact remains a German capture of Baku as many historians claim would have enabled the Wehrmacht to fight on indefinitely would NOT have occurred so simply. Even without an opposing army a German victory in Baku was fraught with danger. The German "plan" was to ship Soviet oil over 1500 miles round-trip from oil field to refinery back to the Wehrmacht in the field. Cutting these pipelines would have been child’s play for bombers, fighters and Soviet partisans, meaning the risk that Army Group South (yes, this formation was split in two and renamed Army Groups A & B, but these two were nowhere near the size of proper army groups in their own right) Army Group South could become trapped anyway, pinned next to the Caucasus Mountains when their fuel tanks would run dry due to very little force applied by the Allies. This was always a recipe for disaster, not victory.
Realistically, Germany's only hope for winning the war was if Hitler had been able to convince the Americans to join the Axis against Britain and the USSR. That never was in the cards, so neither was any prospect of a German victory.
In this context the appropriate translation of "Schwerpunkt" would - in my opinion - most likely be "focal point".
That's good. The word that usually is used in US-English interpretation of Clausewitz is "concentration." Not a literal translation, but fitting.
Translation is so difficult. Nobody is really great at both languages simultaneously. Then some words can't be translated. They can be like one word in one context but be more like another word in a different context. There is often not a 1 to 1 relationship between words in different languages.
@@Arigator2 I wholeheartedly agree. Matters get even more complicated when certain technical terminology first develops in one language and then needs to be mapped to the existing terminology of that field in another language. Whatever translation you come up with, the tendency is that it never feels quite right
My grandfather told my dad about the operation reihnübung and how they thought that it was stupid to try a breakout without Tirpitz, Schanhorst, Gneisenau...
He was a gunnery officer on the Prinz Eugen and fought on her till about mai 1944.
It was, the whole thing was to convince Hitler to fund the KM.
Ironically after the event, hitler had lost all hopes in surface ships of KM
The surface fleet of the Kriegsmarine stud never a chance against the Royal navy but back then they realy believed that they would win like the army in france, poland or the beginning in russia
I’m glad your grandpa survived the war...it was brutal what happened to her at the end...used in the Bikini Atoll nuclear tests...she survived both blasts!
@@mamavswild im thankfull to altough i never met him,
He survived by pure luck.
In 1944 he was transferd to the costal battery in cherbourge and was burried alive by warspite and texas for 4 days and was captured by the americans.
He never saw her again.
The only thing wrong with the German plan was the Admiral in charge on the Bismark. When you know the whole British navy is hunting for you, it's better to keep radio silence.
If you think they know where you are anyways, it doesn't really matter if you keep radio silence (overestimated British radar range)
Either he dont think that british radar will intercept it or think that the birtish already know where he was. From what i read he radio to the luftwaffe for an extra air support while returing to german he did aware how powerful aircraft carrier was even with bi planes
Coincidentally, I'm just now nearing the launch of the Bismarck in Churchill's semi-autobiography about WW2 (volume 3 the Grand Alliance). His opinion was that they should have waited for Tirpitz to launch with it. He regarded the launch of both of them in a mutually supporting hunter group (like the Scharn/Gniese pair) as a nightmare that he had no clear idea yet how to stop. (This was before carrier air power had been clearly demonstrated for anti-ship warfare, of course, which the fate of the Bismarck highlighted.)
The dispersion of force necessary for even incomplete coverage against the Scharn/Gniese group and other raiders, made it so that the Home Fleet at one point had only one battleship remaining in hand.
Also, as I recall from his notes, on information captured after the war, Churchill said that the Scharn/Gniese group DID have orders to go after escorted convoys. Their orders against, involved refusing battle if any convoy had a ship with 15-inch guns, otherwise fine pick them apart at superior range.
The lack of German carrier fighters against torpedo bombers contrasts with the Japanese at Midway. Swordfish would work against Germans but not against the Japanese.
@@givenfirstnamefamilyfirstn3935 True, and by contrast Churchill was pressing hard for every escort and cargo ship possible to carry a catapult launched (or anything launched) Hurricane seaplane, to fight off German bomber patrols.
@@jasonpratt5126 ...Hurricane landplane, for a single last flight.
"Royal Navy is the largest navy in terms of numbers at that time"
*America side eyeing Britain*
I mean it is true. It was only in 1944-1945 that the USN became the biggest navy on earth...
@@axelpatrickb.pingol3228 You got to remember the Commonwealth Navies (Canada, Australia, India, South Africa and New Zealand) were listed separately, BUT they were effectively under the command of RN.
That is a correct statement. By 1943 it was the other way around. By 1945, the RN officers were writing back to London saying that the USN had ECLIPSED them in skill, capabilities, and numbers.
@@drinksnapple8997 Nothing is in the archives that even comes close to RN officers writing back to London about the USN skill. Especially how you use the word 'eclipse'. The Royal Navy had been fighting six years constantly on the seas across the world. Their are letters of praise from the USN for RN's Fleet Air Arm providing crucial top cover against kamikazes (The FAA had better aircraft to deal with the kamikaze's at higher altitude; IE: the Japanese bombers that carried their suicide rocket, the Ohka.) So wrong about the capabilities too, as the USN was impressed with how the RN managed to put together the BPF in such a short time and was concerned that the British might actually get some claims in at the end of the war. The Royal Navy was built to fight in the Atlantic, the USN in the Pacific, to that end you'll find the RN ships are vastly more capable in the North Atlantic compared to their US counterparts whilst the USN ships are superior fighting in the calm waters of the Atlantic. (Iowa literally only had two advantages, 1. It had better guns than the Vanguard, but even that was very marginal. 2. It was faster in calm seas.)
Both sides respected one another's skill on the waves a helluva lot and I think you even saying that is a grave insult to them considering it's fictitious.
@@MrNigzy23 which navy actually fought the third largest navy in the world and killed it? Right not the Royal Navy, the USN did eclipse it
Yes. The operation with the Bismarck was not intended as a suicide operation at all.
The Germans had up to that point - achieved some real success with their Commerce Raiding and had reason to believe that doing so with a ship like the _Bismarck_ would be successful.
Their problem was that the the British were aware of the operation from the start and the RN made a dedicated effort to detecting and stopping it. IF the operation could have gotten underway without being detected - things could have been very different. If the Germans had gotten into the Atlantic before the British knew they were out - they would have been vastly more difficult to find.
Because the RN knew from the start that the operation was underway - they deployed their ships to detect the Germans through any of the routes they might use to break out into the Atlantic. They had enough ships to cover these choke points and were able to detect and engage the Germans because of that. Here - one of the things that was happening was that the British were improving their ability to search large areas over what it had been when the earlier Commerce Raiding missions were successful.
Even though the _Hood_ was destroyed and the _Prince of Wales_ damaged, becoming engaged at this point ended any hope for the _Bismarck's_ operation. She took damage from a hit that impacted her fuel reserves. At this point the Germans chose to detach _Prinz Eugen_ in hopes she might continue the mission but the _Bismarck_ had to go home.
Here we come to a major flaw in the Germans thinking. Battleships are to big and to valuable to go swanning about on their own - without an escort. Had _Prinz Eugen_ stayed with the _Bismarck_ she might have been able to take it under tow when it suffered a steering hit and it might not have been lost.
Another factor in this - is that while the RN had destroyers escorting it's capital ships - the Germans had none. It is a comment on the sad state of the German Surface forces that this was so. Sending Capital ships out without any destroyers as escorts - is just stupid. If they didn't send them because they couldn't do it - then they SHOULD have been able to do it.
Of course - a lot of that comes down to why you don't use Battleships as Commerce Raiders.
As it was - _Prinz Eugen_ had engine problems that required it to return and the _Bismarck_ was lost for nothing.
Now - the original plan - for the German Surface Fleet to all come out at the same time - might well have met with more success.
The real lesson though is that Commerce Raiding by Surface Forces was something that was becoming undone by aircraft and radios. Back in the Age of Sail - when you had to send a Messenger Ship to send a message - Commerce Raiding worked much, much better - and yet - still ... a lot of the Commerce Raiders of history - met with a sad end when they were eventually caught.
Modern Anti-Maritime measures were better taken care of by subs and planes.
.
Very good analysis, always a breather to expand not just about firepower and armour
Sails into the middle of 2 RN fleets and numerous task groups.
RN sends those fleets and task groups.
Bismarck; Surprise Pikachu face.
Those who sent it out might not have thought it was a one way ticket to Davy Jones locker, but that didn't mean it was almost certainly so.
Admiral Luytjens knew he would not be coming back and told his colleagues and family so...they simply didn’t have a chance to break into the Atlantic with that small of a configuration.
@@mamavswild dude can you spell his name right please? Lmao
@@mamavswild and also, Bismarck would've made it back 100% if they kept Prinz Eugen around and the 4 DD's that were escorting them. Sending Eugen and the DD's home and continuing was a bad idea because later when he decided to go back to France Eugen and the other 4 weren't there to help provide additional AA cover. I really doubt the Swordfish would've scored that one in a million hit if they were there for two reasons
1- additional AA would make it harder to get close and line up a shot.
2- Bismarck would more than likely be covered by an escorting DD and not have to maneuver possibly.
@@duckygaming3536 That is doubtful. A group of ships is easier to spot than one ship, and though the Bismarck might have made it, there almost certainly would have been heavy losses on the escorts, which would slow down the flotilla and allow them to be caught by other Task Forces. By splitting up the escorts were safe from fire and Bismarck had a chance of slipping away, which it managed to do for a couple of days before it got spotted by a seaplane. And if not for the rudder hit, Bismarck would probably have eluded the British battleships, it had the speed to do so at least.
I think the German navy's designation of Hood as a battleship is correct. It had the armor and firepower of a battleship. Drach calls it a 'fast battleship' and that sounds about right.
On paper she is very similar to Bismarck although with her age and overuse she was in a sad state
@@snebbywebby2587 Yes, Hood was badly in need of basic maintenance. Decrepit is probably too strong a word for its state, but not by much.
@Military History Visualized Thanks for putting a spotlight on and being a beacon of knowledge in this complex topic. Together with Drachinifels and also Aviation History channel it gives a bigger picture. Some people still do not seem to grasp reality even if it stands right in front of them and blinds them.
Alistair Mclain's retelling in the book "the cruel sea" is marvelous and untainted with nostalgia
Cruel Sea was written by Nicholas Monserrat.
@@neilbuckley1613 forgive me you are correct its "the lonely sea", its been 20 years since i read it, i should have checked.
Bismarck: I fear no man. But that THING (Swordfish Torpedo Bomber)--It SCARES me!
Of course it made sense, like sending Hood to intercept made sense. It just didn't work out as planned.
Nice, a video on WW2 Germany that doesn't just declare German operations "Insane Hitler". Thanks! Your fair treatment of History as History is one of the reasons I stay subscribed to your excellent content. Thanks!
I've been waiting on a 1-350 scale of Bismarck for months damn thing was on a container ship which had an accident........this video got me even more hyped.
That was good days when only one container ship was delayed
9:06 there must be an error in both labels in the second line cause right now it makes NO sense cause Unterwasserstreitkräft und U-Boote are the same and there would be nothing new if those would fight in simultaneous operations. It should be "Über"wasserstreitkräfte and "subs" to make sense and therefore surface forces.
Interesting to see that a german "typo" went through the whole procedure into the english translation and also into the audio ... but in german there is not much difference (Über / Unterwasser) compared to the english surface / underwater forces. And in the second or third sentence it was right.
great video again - thanks a lot
The more interesting question might be if the error was in his paraphrasing of the original source, or if the error was actually in the original source document.
Great video, nice details on the journey of the Bismarck. As it is often the point with complex things there are different things to consider.
Strange, under the concept of Prince Eugen refueling from Bismarck, and Bismarck did NOT fully tank up when they had the chance.
Yes, I noticed that, but see TIK on his comments about the problems that the Germans had with oil. One has to wonder how things might have turned out if Hitler had given Rommel two more panzer divisions at the beginning, but the British had made significant efforts to minimize the information they had on Mideast oil reserves, both where they knew such were and just how much there was thought to exist at those locations.
@@thomasjamison2050 The German and Italian tanks and vehicles would suffer even more fuel shortages if more armored/mechanized divisions were sent.
The idea is still good.
If you fill your Battleship from a tanker with 8400ts of oil, the Cruiser with 2000ts... and the cruiser need 1800ts and your BB needs 5000ts, then the BB can give 1000ts to the cruiser and has still enough in the bunkers to reach the wanted destination.
Thank you for another video about Bismarck and well done on the World of Warships Legends sponsorship.
I think a mission can still make seen while still being suicidal, the two are not mortally exclusive. Charging head long into the Royal Navy like does do that. Having said that, this was a nice analysis and thank you for being clear minded in that regard.
Bravo! Very well done. Interesting, informative and very suggestive. Thank you for your efforts!
Yet another invaluable enlightening on World War 2 stras and events. Vielen Danke @Military History Vissualized!
always interesting to get a new perspektive on these topics
By bringing the actual German viewpoint to the fore by using German military records changes the understanding of what was happening in the war. When viewing other military history channels which use only footage and military material from the US or Allied side, it sometimes makes the actions of the Germans seem illogical or unsound. By learning what the Germans viewpoint was, it makes much clearer what the Germans were trying to accomplish by their actions.
It may have made internal sense to Raeder but it was still a nonsensical strategy.
Great video. The cruise of the Admiral Scheer was I think one of the most under rated achievements of the Kriegsmarine. That and operation Berlin were most disruptive to British plans. The Royal Navy could not ignore these threats and had to dissipate its stregth in attempting to track them down.
The German armed merchant raiders ( Hilfskreuzer ) were even more successful, and on a lot less resources devoted to them. Atlantis, Thor and Pinguin were the most successful of these underrated ships.
@@simonpitt8145 The merchant raiders were MUCH more effective than the German capital ships.
Another great video! One suggestion: at 5:36, "uebersehen" would probably be better translated as "foreseen".
I have listened to Bismarck 5 times today.....time for repeat
Great video as always.
Oh boy correctly cited sources…. A whole bibliography… young man I wish I could shake your hand
Finally, a MHV upload!
Wait, MHV talking positively about German WW2 decisions? Tis a rare day -- another great video, thanks for the work and time put in!
5:00 This Berhnard Kast guy really seems to know something about WW 2
Yes, it made sense. The Home Fleet needed a target
Ultimately though, the main reason for sending Bismarck out when they did was the approach of Operation Barbarossa that would take the lion's share of resources in the following year.
iirc, near the 'end' they tried to link her up with both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and then make another breakthrow with the 4 ships (the 3 + Prinz Eugen) - why couldnt they do that move from the getgo?
Because Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were both in Brest and not seaworthy because of major repairs. Scharnhorst had suffered machine damage and Gneisenau got hit several times by british air raids.
Yes exactly.. more ambition needed !!!!... planning too ( they shouldn’t have ended up in different ports)..... one of the primary ambitions of any military strategist is to contrive to get your enemy to divide their forces.... the Germans gifted that one to the Brits
Tanks and Battleships are similar in their design and construction. Their mission is to kill or be killed and both are beautiful their own ways.
When comes to the Bismarck and her maiden and final voyage, she was dealt a bad hand. Now it's easy to say now she shouldn't have gone when she did, but hindsight is 2020 in the year 2021.
Awesome video!
The Kriegsmarine might not have thought about the Bismarck's sortie as a suicide mission but operationally that is what it was. If not for a lucky hit on the Hood it might have ended at the Battle of the Denmark Straits. If you don't believe this then you ought to look at the engagement between USS Washington and IJN Kirishima. The later took 20 16" Mk 8 rounds without a magazine explosion. She was armored to a HMS Tiger level of protection. The Hood was armored to the Queen Elizabeth protection standard. The Mark 8 round was 1000 lbs heavier the the German 15" Even with the loss of the Hood a single hit forward to the Bismarck from Prince of Wales reduced the Bismarck's top speed to 27 knots and put 2000 tons of war into the ship. It was only a matter of time before she would be caught and destroyed.
Yes and no.
Denmark straits was a sucide mission - for the Royal Navy.
PoW was not green, but a mailfunctional ship. It had more time at sea as Bismarck at that time (often forgotten), it was just a shit designed ship, also all follow up-ships struggeled with the 4-gun-turrets, as the Richelieu and Strassbourgs too.
Hood was outdated and helpless, if engaging B.
But you are true in one aspect - if B gets damaged, seriously (not so light as in Denmark straits) he is doomed. Loosing speed means death.
Even after Denmark straits, loosing fueltanks full of oil meant death.
B could not go full speed, otherwise he would have been deep into german air cover in the time of the Swordfish attacks. But L hurried up, did not top his fuel tanks (so the original damage was esp. unlucky, it hit full tanks that were contaminated and so the range was dramatically reduced.
Mission kill versus destroying a ship is the key.
The Engagement between Kirishima and Washington is not useful... that was a close infight with K having only HE-shells (mostly), Washington used AP-shells.
But - with space and speed, Hood WAS doomed. B was to good shooting, each hit increase the risks...
If you read the informations here, you listen that B - in opposition to S and G should engage the old R-class that protected the convoys.. because they knew that B would easily sink them (lack of range, speed, easy to sink) - the R-class was superiorly protected compared to the QE-class or Hood. Only the belt of Hood was good protected, but the other parts - not.
@@steffenjonda8283 The poinr about Kirishima was to compare damage and not type of engagement. Kirishima was a modified Lion class Battlecruiser design with protection against WWI 11" guns. She did not have a catastrophic explosion despite being hit with 20 AP rounds that were 50% heavier than the round that hit the Hood. Luck plays a role in battle. The Bismarck got lucky with one round and that changes the outcome. Without the magazine hit Bismarck may still sink Hood but she would be in far shape after the engagement.
@@johnshepherd8687 The type of engagement is important. The kind of ammo handling in a british bb and a japanese one, is important. Luck is important, unfortunatley PoW did not blow up, the DUD was extremly lucks.
IJN Kirishima was modernized, but no match for any BB... still she could have done more damage, if the turrets had not been loaded with tons of HE-shells (some stupid decision)
B did not got lucky, he had the range and more hits hurted Hood... she was doomed the moment she attacked. Some golden hit from her may have saved her fate, but the outcome of denmark straits is in 95-98% better for the germans, or maybe PE get some devasting hits that cripples/sinks him/her, but for Hood she is toast.
@@steffenjonda8283 Kirishima scored multiple AP hits on South Dakota. None of them penetrated.
The reason Bismarck was sunk is captain incompetence, same as Graf Spee. It seems to be a common thread in German navy at the time (minus u-boots)
Disagree with the bit about the Graf Spee
Rheinubung made a lot of sense. Defending a number of mandates (aka convoys) takes far more resources than attacking one particular one. The addition of Tirpitz would have really increased the odds of success.
However, the problem would be in defending the lair. If dealing with a superior raiding force (that can evade you after messing up your freight delivery plans) is too difficult at sea, then the plan would be to make every and any port a very bad place to dock. The RAF would have dropped enough Tall boys on St. Nazaire and any other battlewagon pier to turn them into moonscapes.
Still, the mere presence of a capable commerce busting squadron would tie up lots of resources, and, a real toll on morale. You may not sink a lot of tonnage, but you make your opponent expend a lot of efforts trying to be all places at all times.
This is all part of why the gloves had to come off in September of 39. Waiting for the realization of the Z-Plan would have given taken away a lot of the numerical superiority of heavy units from the RN. Then again, the G3’s might actually been built, and aside from Yama-To, those would very useful even against realistic H class vessels (not the fantasy H-44 ones).
Of course, Nelson could have probably defeated 20 Bismarcks with a rowboat… just because he was that gutsy… ;-)
This video feels like the first part in a series later investigating the actual operation and British views on the matter.
The chief weapon of commerce for the Germains was the U boat.
The chief weapon against U boats was destroyers and aircraft both of which were stationed and refueled in Iceland.
The mission of the Bismarck and Prince Eugan should have been bombing of Icelandic ports, refuelling stations for ships, aircraft hangers and landing strips.
After that their mission could have been commerce raiding.
There is a good deal of information to suggest that Adm. Raeder was politically motivated to send Bismarck without waiting for Tirpitz. Raeder was aware of the upcoming offensive Operation Barbarosa for which the german navy had virtually no role. Raeder wanted a major success to impress Hitler before Barbarosa out of concern that the Wehrmacht would get all if not most of scarce resources once Barbarosa got started.
Diverting larger numbers of enemy ships with a single vessel to create a potential opportunity for other navy forces seems reasonable enough, but my question is if it would have been better to never mess with battleships in the first place when more U-boats or cruisers/carriers/destroyers could have been built instead, especially given that the primary objective of the Kriegsmarine was trade interdiction, not direct engagements.
I'm not even an armchair historian though I just like HoI and am trying to write not stupid combat fiction.
Glad to have discovered this channel content seems dope.
Using a BB a commerce raider was plain stupid. Graf Spee made sense to a degree - but she got cornered, slapped, hid for a bit and then scuttled. Bismarck was a huge amount of resources expended - to go on one way trip and be gang-banged out of existence.
Heh, I thought the first quote at 3:08 sounded familiar. I literally read that passage from that book yesterday night.
Love the vampire teeth when talking about leeching blo, eh, fuel from the Bismarck :D
Without air cover; at least a pocket aircraft carrier - the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen were 100% absolutely doomed to failure.
A huge lesson of World War II was that battleships, no matter how epic (see the Yamoto super-battleship) were completely vulnerable to torpedo bombers and dive bombers.
Even though the Bismarck had massive amounts of anti-aircraft batteries, they could do nothing against the British torpedo bombers.
Not necessarily. Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Hipper and Scheer succeeded in breaking out into the Atlantic without any air cover. None of them were caught. The Bismarck pursuit is only so high profile specifically because she was caught. If she hadn't been ( and let's face it, she was only just caught ) it would have been equally as low profile as those other break - outs. Basically the British milked the victory for propaganda reasons as there was precious little else going right for them in the war at that time. We saw a rare chance to gloat and took it.
The Germans had justifiable reasons to send the two vessels out when they did. As the aforementioned ships had managed it, there was every reason to think the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen would make it too. Besides, carrier borne aircraft are a lot less effective in the rough waters and grey skies of the North Atlantic with reduced visibility than compared to the more peaceful Indian or Pacific oceans.
The obsevations listed above made by the SKL were based on operations that had taken place immediately before the technological giant strides then being made by the British, such as more and more reliable and efficient radar sets being fitted to more and more RN ships (This had been commented upon by Lütjens in his "after action" report on his experiences during "Operation Berlin", and was again recognised by him early on during "Exercise Rhine"), as well as an increase in the number of "Y service" listening stations to give more precise radio location of enemy units in the vast swathes of the Atlantic, in addition to the slightly later introduction of shipborne high frequency Direction finding (Huff-Duff) equipment. The ever increasing numbers of RN aircraft carriers was also largely overlooked, and proved decisive as was demonstrated in "Rhineübung". And all of this is even before we start talking about "ULTRA" and the British breakthroughs made into Kriegsmarine radio encryption which saw the destruction of Germany's network of surface supply ships shortly after the failure of Exercise Rhine.
The door had been slammed in the face of the KM surface fleet by early to mid 1941...... they just hadn't recognised it yet. That all changed on 27th May 1941.
While the rationale seems to have internally consistent logic, this grand strategy may look to other navies as going to great lengths to build huge ships and then send them out for an operation of limited value from which they may not return.
I wish there was a strategy game that focuses on the battle of the Atlantic.
The closest is HOI, but that covers the whole war, and most players ignore the naval aspects of the game.
If you really want to get a taste of some WW2 north Atlantic naval strategy why not look at "board gaming" options? Yes it requires a player to learn the rules, but so do the likes of HOI. "Atlantic Chase" by GMT gaming, would not be a bad starting point.
Check Atlantic Fleet
I finally unlocked the Bismark in world of warships.
A high quality video on something I am interested in and I am early? Don´t mind if I do!
And if not for a lucky hit to a big fuel tank that they kinda needed, they would have made it... nevermind the lucky torpedo jamming the rudder on the way back too. I've always found it kinda funny how those big maritime battles involving massive build efforts and crews were resolved by a roll of the dice ultimately
Great content
Bismarck: The Final Days of Germany's Greatest Battleship by Michael Tamelander and Niklas Zetterling covers the German doctrine of "Crusier Warfare" and Operation Rheinübung very well. Highly recommend
Maybe I missed a portion of the clip, but how much were these sorties based on greater confidence stemming from having more "coastline" to operate from? Both from occupied countries, like France and Norway, but also from the prospect of having on hand resources based in friendly neutral countries, like Spain or even Portugal. Given this was all in the spring of 1941, before the invasion of the Soviet Union - which Germany was uneasily cooperating with at the time - the map maybe looked a little more positive for the Kriegsmarine, giving a boost in confidence to attempt various operations?
Very nice video
This is what Karl Doenitz states.
The difficulty of the Icelandic passage did not prevent the battleship Bismarck and the cruiser Prinz Eugen from being sent into the Atlantic in May 1941 after the completion of their working up and according to the strategic dispositions already mentioned. After the sinking of
the battle cruiser Hood, which proved the outstanding fighting power of the new German battleship, the unit was able to shake off contact with the English once more, but on the next day she was contacted again by an enemy aircraft. In a hard struggle the Bismarck fell victim to the English battleships and formations of aircraft, assembled together from the whole of the North Atlantic. Our own aircraft sent out from western France could not, unfortunately, bring her any effective help because of the great distance. Prinz Eugen succeeded in escaping, and entered Brest in good condition.
The sinking of the Bismarck was a grave loss for the navy, even though the leaders, as already mentioned, in their bold and unusual methods of conducting the war, had reckoned with such reverses. In this operation it seems that radio location from ships played a decisive part for the first time. It afterwards became more and more apparent that the enemy had a definite superiority over us in this direction. This superiority was one of the reasons which caused the units of the German Fleet and later the armed merchant cruisers to succumb outside home waters. On the other hand, the strong reaction of English naval forces proved that the strategic object had succeeded - that of keeping the English Fleet busy, added to the direct success attained by sinkings. At this time the English convoys were guarded partly by single battleships, partly by groups of battleships.
The intention of the leaders to continue the Atlantic operations with the remaining ships was interrupted by the great threat to the Biscay ports from the air. While the U-boats could be protected against it by the building of strong pens, there was no such possibility for ships. In spite of the strongest air defense measures in Brest, the enemy succeeded in getting various bomb hits on the ships, which prevented them from further operations in the Atlantic.
Drach sent me, I approve :)
"constant changes in his own methods of warfare and largescale changes in the areas of operation..." kinda contrary to what Cpt. Hara experienced/described during the Solomon campaign.
One remark on the translation of 'Schwerpunkt' (I am going with NATO doctrine here as in my point of view this is the best common denominator for military terminology in English):
The German 'Schwerpunkt' is translated to 'focal point' as the point in space and time where the main effort of the operation is.
'Centre of gravity' on the other hand is the 'main source of power' that enables one to operate and thus is the thing to be defeated in an opponent.
A 'decision point' is an pre-planned point in space and time where a specific decision has to be made.
The mistake was to build all the battleships in the first place when the resources could have been used for more destroyers and cruisers and submarines. Or not building naval planes to attavk convoys, despite them being more effective.
Germany should have used large numbers of navel planes to sink British ships. Hit hard enough in the beginning England may have entered peace talks
@@jimrtoner7673
They didn't have an effective air-dropped Torpedo nor an effective Naval Bomber until 1942.
Which, at that point, attempting such a plan would have been suicide.
I think you underestimate Nazi Germany's need for the prestige of capital ships.
Wow...I've just finished watching "sink the Bismarck" and this video came out...what's the odds???
I do think it was a suicide mission because of the size of the force, which made it too easy for the British to force an engagement.
Had they had the larger force which was initially planned, then it becomes exponentially more difficult for the British to force an engagement since the British would be forced to have stronger fleets hunting them and therefore fewer fleets hunting them.
(although it may have worked out better for the British since they probably would not have challenged that larger force with the Hood and Prince of Wales alone and got spanked)
Will you ever cover Cordite vs gunpowder? Reason I ask is because of its role in the "One-Shot" of the HMS Hood
Unlikely, something for Drachinifel
In the original plan, the other major German surface ships were supposed to sally forth into the Atlantic at the same time as the Bismarck, but they got damaged or for other reasons weren't able to do so. Given the problems the RN had just tracking down a single ship, and also that the Bismarck got so close to getting back safely (within a day's sail of supporting air power etc), it is interesting to speculate what might have happened if the plan had happened as originally intended. Poor co-ordination with the U-Boat arm and the Luftwaffe were probably major contributors to the failure of the operation. U-boats couldn't keep up with battleships but what if they had arranged to meet at a certain point in the Atlantic and use the Bismarck as bait for the U-boats? There are amazing reports of U-boat what-ifs e.g. the one with a British aircraft carrier in its sights (the one that torpedoed Bismarck) but no torpedoes to fire, etc. Perhaps that indicates a lack of proper co-ordination as, if it had been ordered to concentrate on warships and help the Bismarck operation, instead of its usual mission, there might have been a different result.
There were TWO u-boat traps as you suggest incorporated into operation Rheinübung. One was positioned south of Greenland, the other a few hundred miles to the west of Brittany. The major problem with that is again the slow speed of U-boats. If the planned route for the surface ships has to change (for instance because you get hit in an excahnge of gunfire and lose a large proportion of your fuel, and have to head back to France), then the assembled u-boat line will find it near impossible to relocate in time to cover the new track of the surface ships.
Yes
As a final addendum, I imagine you could officially call it a "suicide mission", when Lütjens reported that the ship was unmaneuverable and would fight to the end, after the vital attack from Ark Royal. Though I guess at that point Bismarck had already been mission killed long ago, as she had to return to a friendly port for repair and refuel after the damage she sustained at the Denmark Straits.
07:07 Well, that order eventually doomed Bismarck during the battle with Hood and Prince of Wales, for as Lutjens stalled with returning fire, Prince of Wales was given extra salvos to score hits on her. Hits that led to her downfall.
Not really. Bismarck was firing at Hood.
It would have been interesting to see what would have happened if the German surface fleet had put to see in the Noth Atlantic en masse, Bismark, Tirpitz along with all their cruisers/pocket battleships together with a large U boat screen.
Interesting, but the outcome would never be in doubt. A major loss for the kriegsmarine.
The British empire could withstand the loss of its colonies (as it did after the war) if it really had to. RN assets from the Indian Ocean and far east would have been withdrawn to protect any "en masse" attack at the North Atlantic, which was Britains No1. priority. At NO point in the war did the Kriegsmarine have the potential to seriously challenge the RN. The Germans were very much primarily a land force, Britain by the very nature of her empire was primarily a naval superpower.
Wow. I didn't know Military Aviation History was that old...
Good video
Bismarck was a huge overkill for destroying merchant convoys. As lecture says, it’s very power made it a clear target, which would tie up British ships. However, one (or even two) capital ships against the whole British Royal Navy was always going to lose. Air power even slow biplanes proved pivotal.
but they did not knew that... that is 20/20... and in better weather that is also not clear.
We all forget, that the Swordfishes attacked in terrible weather, think about them attacking a group of US carriers in 1943, they would have hit them, too. Because, you need to see em to shoot em down (only in 44 this changed). And a plane that is the clouds, that are so low that they nearly enter the water, you see nothing. Still, B lacked good AA. But in better weather? Think about Tirpitz early in 42, also very bad weather, but nailed a few british bombers and damaged many more. If these try to land on a carrier in that bad weather... byebye...
Kriegsmarine was designed to be the little guy that makes the big guy - RN chase after him until he is tired and gives up.
No Serban, it was built just as a show piece and it was a mistake
@@chrislambert9435 those guys need to earn a salary as well :)
The Bismarck in my view was a Death Ship, it represented as like a "Symbol of the entire State of Germany" Whatever expertise, Cash, hardwork or brilliance they put into the War they were doomed, they could never win, the Nazi Government and Military leaders knew this very well and put their own people to Death in a War which once started they could never Win. All those Germans on the Bismarck were put to Death by the German Leadership, just like all the Germans in the Villages and Towns all over Germany they had no chance
@@chrislambert9435 I mean... every single battleship were death ships, obsolete the second they slid off the shipyard, only the lucky few managed to survive (e.g all of the Iowa-class battleships)
Pride of a nation a beast made of steel,
Bismarck in motion,
the king of the ocean
He was made to rule the waves
across the seven seas!
Sorry i had to
johnny horton has the better song
The terror of the seas
The Bismarck and the Kriegsmarine
So with Hood being rated as a fast Battleship was the situation the same for the Renown's?
from what I saw at least in this document there were only battleships no battle cruisers; I guess it is one way to "address" the battleship vs. battle cruiser debate ;)
@@MilitaryHistoryVisualized You may address it but you'll never end it. Not for a lack of trying haha
I'd argue against that. Hood was way better protected than the Renowns, with a 12" belt, while the Renowns only had 9". A 3" difference might not seem like a lot, but it's pretty much the difference between stopping or slowing down a 14-15" shell and not doing so. And in my opinion a battleship needs to have the armour to stop shells of other battleships at range. That said, Japan considered its Kongou-class "fast battleships" and they had a comparable armour.
As for Hood herself, some consider her a battlecruiser, I think that's fine as that's what she was built as, but she has the guns, speed and armour to be classified as a fast battleship, which is what I'd call her.
In the end, there's no clear cut for something to be a battleship, fast battleship, battlecruiser, or large cruiser and it's up for debate. See the debate around the Scharnhorst-class and the Alaska-class.
Hood was comparable to a fast battleship, which she was listed as. she had the armor and guns of a battleship but the speed of a cruiser. A battlecruiser is really only supposed to combat cruisers and heavy cruisers ideally, but Hood was more than capable to hunt battleships. So her classification as a Fast battleship is quite valid.
The Hood You mean HMS Tuberculosis?? 🤣
Honestly, I would have figured that the Germans would have been more reluctant to risk surface assets after the loss of the Graf Spee.
You just got PUNKED- er, I mean Schewrpunkt
I like it when you cover naval topics.
I also watch Drachinifel and I like his vast knowledge and his videos, but sometimes his point of view seems to be a little bit biased (just a feeling, I'm definately not the one to judge this); anyhow it's always good to watch videos from other history channels like yours to get more opinions. Thank you.
When you just love Trade interdiction doctrine to much 😂😀😄
2000 man and 50 thousand tons of steel, set a course for the Atlantic
Ah yes, to beat a glass cannon you need even more brittle glass cannon.
Hey can you make a Video about supressive Fire in WW2 vs Modern Warfare ??
Very well presented, my good man.
The vast majority of anointed establishment "historians"/propagandists are incapable/unwilling/ prohibited by editors, publishers, or university heads from presenting history from its contemporary perspective, and default to pontificating with historical hindsight or current policy/p.c.
Most such historians couldn't tote the testicles of the actual historical characters, anyway - much less do as well, or better than the original participants.
Hats off to you, sir.
I appreciate u
The mobile game (World of Warship: Blitz) is pretty bad ass. Although the gneisenau is wrong. They have a 6 (3x2) gun version. From what I saw the original one was an 8 (4x2) gun and the second one was a 9 (3x3) gun.
Can you make a video about Vietnam War era Fortifications?
Germany needed the Graf Zeppelin carrier to be operational by the time the Bismarck set sail
So to sum up:
Based on prior experience it was reasonable to assume that _Bismarck_ would have a good chance of completing its mission and returning safely to a friendly port; but all that went out the window when _Bismarck's_ sailing prompted a *much* stronger reaction from the Allies than previous similar actions.
Seems like I've heard something like that before... (cough-InvasionOfPoland-coughcough)
Underestimating their enemies? The two (fleet) Carriers and the shore based search flying boats shrank what had previously been the huge hiding space. Time had caught up with the battleship.
After their little spat with Graf Spee, I doubt the RN would let that happen again...
It doesn’t really make sense to consider it a suicide mission. The hardest part would have been evading detection in the North and arctic seas where the Royal Navy had significant monitoring, but once in the Atlantic, the Bismarck could have reasonably been expected to essentially disappear into the vastness of the ocean, peeping out to do damage before steaming back into the wide open void. Plenty of German merchant raiders did more or less just that.
Indeed the interference of the Admiral and two mistakes done by the captain sealed the fate of the Bismarck. First they did not refuel with the Altmark for some reason even though they could have before exiting the Denmark Strait and second of all a when the Bismarck was on a run it did radio back to Berlin which gave away its position to the British Search Parties. Without those grave mistakes even though damaged it could've made its way to the coast South America atleast or sneaked back to the coast of France which Prinz Eugen managed to do. The damage to the rudder was a freak accident. Drachinifels hourlong and minute accurate retelling of the events happend is pretty gripe.
@@kleinerprinz99 oh yeah, I’ve seen that. I love his three-part Jutland series, especially the sniping at Beaty and the wonderful depiction of the German admirals by this very video maker.
Major warships loose in the Atlantic would have brought the entire British fleet out. As indeed it did. They would only need to catch them once, as German battleships could find no reasonable resupply anywhere except France or Germany itself. At best, they'd get one convoy.
@@lamwen03 I’m not sure I agree with that assessment, given the success of other German raiders. But really all I was initially arguing was that it wasn’t a divide mission. Even if they were stopped after just one convoy, odds were they could have escaped fairly easily. They almost did.
@@Anglomachian
The previous Surface Raiders took on lightly defended Convoys and ran when shot at by something bigger than the 8" guns of a Cruiser.
They ran when HMS Renown shot at them, before finding a smaller Convoy to shoot at. Bismarck would have been, eventually, damaged if it risked those heavier Convoys and forced to retreat or, potentially, sunk all together.
Either way, the Bismarck doesn't have high chances even IF it escaped into the Atlantic.