Thank you for this video, I loved it! Although I still don't comprehend the last part of it when you talk about the principle of identity substitution.
A statement such as "a mouse is a mouse" is just a very obvious yet ambiguous statement. Statements such as "a mouse is a computer part" or "a mouse is a small rodent" are more specific. In the first sentence, your brain may choose whatever it wants to picture when it sees the word mouse. In the second sentence, the second sense gives you a definite established thing to picture when you see the word mouse.
Franco Miranda But that means that 'bachelor' is not identical to 'unmarried adult man' since one gives you something to think of, while the other does not. Therefore the law of identity fails. And I am worried about that idea to begin with, since it seems that if you know the meaning of bachelor, you have just as much information as if you know the meaning of the words 'unmarried adult man' and you have nothing to picture if you didn't know what the second set of words meant, as you would if you didn't know what bachelor meant.
Did Frege use the Word thought in stead of proposition or vice versa in this article ? Is there anyone to answer this question for me, because I found two translation of the article sense and reference, and ı can not figure out which one is true: thought or proposition? Thanks now.
You lost me on Principle of Identity substitution and I'm lost on the morning star and evening star part. What exactly does it denote? The morning star and evening star I know are maces from the medieval period.
Do you have any advice on understanding Michael Dummett's Truth (1959)? Really struggling to understand this one and I know he refers to Frege a few times in the paper. Thanks for all your videos.
This is an oversimplification. Frege clearly makes the distinction between sign, sense, and nominatum. You are mixing the definitions of sign and sense.
@@eapooda Hey, maybe you can help clarify this to me: I'm having trouble understanding what the "sense" actually is. I read the article, and watched this video. This video seems to suggest that the sense would simply be the "name". Frege calls the sense: "[that] wherein the mode of presentation is contained". But I'm having trouble really understanding what this mode of presentation actually consists of. The examples he gives seem to be very loose. When he talks about "the least rapidly convergent series" the sense would be something like the combination of the meaning of different concepts involved in the phrase, but when he talks about the "Morning Star", seems to me that it must be understood as something very similar to a reference (maybe what Frege later calls "the associated idea"). And it also seems to me that that's very different from the previous two meanings I mentioned. In short, it seems that he uses "sense" to refer to very different things, and the best way I can think of to describe what they have in common is something like: "Whatever is in the sign that contains information about the referent, other than the reference itself". Can you clarify this to me?
@@Imheretohelpnhavefun though highly controversial, look at sense as a description of a thing. Water has the referent H2O that is one way to define water, but there is also another definition which is a certain set of descriptions by which we associate with the term water such as "the colorless tasteless liquid that flows down mountains and rivers that we drink" water fits this description and this description is what we have in mind when we think of water. So reference is the object itself, and sense is a description we have in mind when we use or think of the term. Now there is debate about whether senses should be seen as descriptions, and there are other methods to determining whether something is a sense, and Id love to explain those if you'd like...
@@eapooda I had thought something very similar to what you're saying about water, and that's interesting, though I'm not sure it's enough to explain what he's calling sense... I reread the beginning of Sense and Referent, and he uses the analogy of someone looking at the moon using a telescope, where: Moon = Referent Moon's image in the telescope's mirror = sense Moon's image in the viewer's = idea And he defines sense as being basically the intermediate between the referent which is the object in the external world itself, and the idea we have of the object, which is subject to different personal experiences, and idiosyncrasies. That's interesting, but I can't see what would that actually be (as in, where can it be said to exist, and in what way it's objective), other than something like this: The sense would be a defined part of the idea that is shared by most people, basically the idea in a person's mind, stripped out of the more peculiar individual experiences people associate with that idea. Though this still does seem somewhat subjective, and I’m really not sure how Frege can escape that, since I can only assume which parts of my idea of an object are common to everyone and not idiosyncratic, this idea of sense would be subject to the same issues as Frege presents about ideas themselves. Either way, I don’t think an airtight definition of this is necessary for the rest of Frege’s ideas to make sense. It would only mean that sense is more of a social phenomena than Frege would seem to suggest. About the last part of your comment: > Now there is debate about whether senses should be seen as descriptions, and there are other methods to determining whether something is a sense, and Id love to explain those if you'd like… Sure, I’d love to read it
I have spent so much time trying to figure this out, you explained it in one minute and 5 seconds. Thank you, you legend.
I must agree, seriously one of the most productive minutes of my life!!
you got that write.... 2 hours of reading or a 2 minute video haha
Thank you for this video, I loved it! Although I still don't comprehend the last part of it when you talk about the principle of identity substitution.
+Holly Stone There's a video on exactly that subject coming out this Sunday.
A statement such as "a mouse is a mouse" is just a very obvious yet ambiguous statement. Statements such as "a mouse is a computer part" or "a mouse is a small rodent" are more specific. In the first sentence, your brain may choose whatever it wants to picture when it sees the word mouse. In the second sentence, the second sense gives you a definite established thing to picture when you see the word mouse.
Franco Miranda But that means that 'bachelor' is not identical to 'unmarried adult man' since one gives you something to think of, while the other does not. Therefore the law of identity fails. And I am worried about that idea to begin with, since it seems that if you know the meaning of bachelor, you have just as much information as if you know the meaning of the words 'unmarried adult man' and you have nothing to picture if you didn't know what the second set of words meant, as you would if you didn't know what bachelor meant.
This is why the casual theory of reference is insane, though, I haven't read anything recent on how they interpret sense.
holy shit you saved me on my mandatory college philosophy class
+Chanwu Oh Awesome! I"m glad to hlep.
im here because of that too lol
Simply amazing!
Why did Russell have a problem with Frege’s theory of sense?
What is the difference between intensional and extensional contexts?
Did Frege use the Word thought in stead of proposition or vice versa in this article ? Is there anyone to answer this question for me, because I found two translation of the article sense and reference, and ı can not figure out which one is true: thought or proposition? Thanks now.
You lost me on Principle of Identity substitution
and I'm lost on the morning star and evening star part. What exactly does it denote? The morning star and evening star I know are maces from the medieval period.
It seems to me that sense, connotation, and intention are the same thing, are they?
Thank you! So much better than my teacher
Glad to help! :)
Do you have any advice on understanding Michael Dummett's Truth (1959)? Really struggling to understand this one and I know he refers to Frege a few times in the paper. Thanks for all your videos.
I am not exceptionally familiar with Dummett's work, but here's a useful IEP article on the subject: www.iep.utm.edu/dummett/#SH2c
What is Frege’s argument that linguistic expressions must have what he calls “sense” in
addition to reference?
Simply, there is no other way to explain why Knowing that the morning star is Venus doe snot imply that you know that the evening star is Venus.
3:30 bookmark
Is that John Green's voice? lol
This is an oversimplification. Frege clearly makes the distinction between sign, sense, and nominatum. You are mixing the definitions of sign and sense.
Noticed that in the first minute LOL. He confuses signs and senses.
@@eapooda Hey, maybe you can help clarify this to me: I'm having trouble understanding what the "sense" actually is. I read the article, and watched this video. This video seems to suggest that the sense would simply be the "name". Frege calls the sense: "[that] wherein the mode of presentation is contained". But I'm having trouble really understanding what this mode of presentation actually consists of. The examples he gives seem to be very loose.
When he talks about "the least rapidly convergent series" the sense would be something like the combination of the meaning of different concepts involved in the phrase, but when he talks about the "Morning Star", seems to me that it must be understood as something very similar to a reference (maybe what Frege later calls "the associated idea"). And it also seems to me that that's very different from the previous two meanings I mentioned.
In short, it seems that he uses "sense" to refer to very different things, and the best way I can think of to describe what they have in common is something like: "Whatever is in the sign that contains information about the referent, other than the reference itself". Can you clarify this to me?
@@Imheretohelpnhavefun though highly controversial, look at sense as a description of a thing. Water has the referent H2O that is one way to define water, but there is also another definition which is a certain set of descriptions by which we associate with the term water such as "the colorless tasteless liquid that flows down mountains and rivers that we drink" water fits this description and this description is what we have in mind when we think of water. So reference is the object itself, and sense is a description we have in mind when we use or think of the term. Now there is debate about whether senses should be seen as descriptions, and there are other methods to determining whether something is a sense, and Id love to explain those if you'd like...
@@eapooda I had thought something very similar to what you're saying about water, and that's interesting, though I'm not sure it's enough to explain what he's calling sense...
I reread the beginning of Sense and Referent, and he uses the analogy of someone looking at the moon using a telescope, where:
Moon = Referent
Moon's image in the telescope's mirror = sense
Moon's image in the viewer's = idea
And he defines sense as being basically the intermediate between the referent which is the object in the external world itself, and the idea we have of the object, which is subject to different personal experiences, and idiosyncrasies.
That's interesting, but I can't see what would that actually be (as in, where can it be said to exist, and in what way it's objective), other than something like this: The sense would be a defined part of the idea that is shared by most people, basically the idea in a person's mind, stripped out of the more peculiar individual experiences people associate with that idea.
Though this still does seem somewhat subjective, and I’m really not sure how Frege can escape that, since I can only assume which parts of my idea of an object are common to everyone and not idiosyncratic, this idea of sense would be subject to the same issues as Frege presents about ideas themselves. Either way, I don’t think an airtight definition of this is necessary for the rest of Frege’s ideas to make sense. It would only mean that sense is more of a social phenomena than Frege would seem to suggest.
About the last part of your comment:
> Now there is debate about whether senses should be seen as descriptions, and there are other methods to determining whether something is a sense, and Id love to explain those if you'd like…
Sure, I’d love to read it
Like
bad class,bad presentation