Why Japan Lost The South Pacific Air War
Vložit
- čas přidán 28. 06. 2024
- In this video Justin Pyke and I chat about the South Pacific Air War, a battle that raged for over two years and one that Japan ultimately lost in two massive events! But how did it come to this? Listen in and find out!
- Support
Patreon: / milavhistory
Channel Memberships: / @militaryaviationhistory
PayPal: www.paypal.me/BismarckYT
- Social Media
Twitter: / milavhistory
Instagram: / milaviationhistory
Facebook: / militaryaviationhistory
- Video on Lae-Salamaua Raid 1942
• The Forgotten Revenge ...
- Sources / Reading recommendations
Hiroyuki Shindo, Japanese air operations over New Guinea during the Second World War, Journal of the Australian War Memorial: www.awm.gov.au/articles/journ...
Eric Bergerud, Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific, Westview Press: www.amazon.com/Fire-Sky-Air-S...
Michael Claringbould & Peter Ingman, South Pacific Air War Volume 1-3, Avonmore Books: avonmorebooks.com.au/?page=3&...
Michael Claringbould & Luca Ruffato, Eagles of the Southern Sky, Avonmore Books: www.amazon.com/Eagles-Souther...
John Lundstrom, First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign, Naval Institute Press:
www.usni.org/press/books/firs...
Bruce Gamble, Target Rabaul, Zenith Press:
www.amazon.com/Target-Rabaul-...
- Timecodes
00:00 - Intro
00:59 - Source
01:36 - Key Phases
03:00 - Why Rabaul
04:55 - 1st Phase: Japan Strikes
09:55 - 2nd Phase: Stalemate?
15:07 - 3rd Phase: Here comes the Army
19:29 - 4th Phase: Unglamorous Defensive Campaign
21:43 - Conclusion
25:48 - Reading Recommendations
#militaryaviationhistory #japan #ww2
I really like the analogy of the kido butai hitting Rabaul as a "drive by". It was also interesting that that despite the fact that the IJA air forces didn't want to commit much and when they finally did it all got wiped so quickly.
That's basically why it happened, they did pretty much everything wrong at the top level so big surprise.
This was a fun one to record! The air war in the South Pacific is a fascinating campaign, and a very complex one. I hope this very brief summary is helpful! To clarify one thing I said in the video - when I mention "they lost the air war in a day" I don't literally mean combat ended, but instead that the IJAAS had attempted to build up enough serious strength to keep fighting offensively, but had the momentum so firmly reversed in a couple days of strikes against the Wewak area that while they kept fighting, they were forced up against the wall operationally. IJAAS losses on the ground were several times larger than those they suffered in the air. Both in the two major disasters mentioned in the video, but also in the numerous strikes that happened in between.
Did the IJAAS make a scapegoat of anyone for the massive loses or was it jus the "fortunes of war"?
@@legoeasycompany After the devastating strikes against Hollandia they apparently sacked the commander of 6th Air Division, chief of staff of Fourth Air Army, and others. In post-war reflections, the Japanese interviewed (both army and navy) tended to stress the logistical and engineering factors behind defeat in the South Pacific.
This was a really great summary, Justin and helped to partially fill in the black hole that 1943 in the Pacific had been in my knowledge until recently. It's really shocking how poorly this particular year was covered in the popular English language sources I grew up on, especially since it seems that 1943 is when attrition really grinds down the effectiveness of the IJNAS and IJAAS.
As far as you know, was 1943 a critical year in the quantitative and especially qualitative effectiveness of any other part of the Japanese war effort? I'm wondering about the merchant marine in particular (if not in terms of sinkings yet, then certainly in delays in anti-submarines efforts). The IJN surface and submarine fleets seem to have lasted as competent and potentially dangerous forces until Leyte in the former's case and later in the latter's, but I could be mistaken.
@@mensch1066 Hey Mensch,
I'm still trying to wrap my head around 1943. I think it was a critical year for the air services in particular. 1942 started to grind them down, but they bled white all the way through 1943 in hard-fought, grinding campaigns that are often skipped over or misunderstood. The fleet took a hammering in 1942 from which it never truly recovered, but the surface fleet in particular remained potent until Leyte. Linked to the air war, the carrier force's last action as an equal to the USN was Santa Cruz in 1942. However, plenty of good carrier air crews were used (or wasted) from land bases in Operations I-Go and Ro-Go in 1943. Often it will be assumed that Santa Cruz killed off the last of Japan's "First Team" carrier aviators but, as Tagaya Osamu noted, the quality of carrier aviators didn't really drop dramatically until 1944.
I'm less well read on the submarine force, though it was primarily expended in supply runs and transport missions through 1943-44. The Japanese Merchant Marine was smashed in 1944, but was definitely taking a beating in 1943 as well. I still have to read _
The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II_ by Parillo at some point. It is high on the list. The army's land forces were certainly taking it in 1943, but it was the least damaged branch of the Japanese military overall. It retained multiple first-rate formations all the way to the surrender.
@@justinpyke1756 The impression that I've always had - was that there was very serious damage done to the Japanese Naval Air Arm at Rabaul because of their attempts to conduct an air campaign against Guadalcanal in 1943.
The attacks through 1942 had at least had a purpose in that the Japanese were actively trying to take the island back but - once the Army pulled out of Guadalcanal - the further air operations taken against it accomplished nothing and began a serous degradation of their air power.
One factor here - was that they took their air groups off their carriers and committed them (I believe) to Rabaul. That - to me - was the beginning of the end of Japanese Naval Aviation - and it was expended in an utterly futile effort.
One of the factors I've read was that (as the Americans learned) light carrier aircraft used against ground targets were to vulnerable to AAA. These aircraft were just as vulnerable when committed against ships - but - trading aircraft for ships - was a very good trade. Losing an aircraft to put a hole in a runway ... was not ...
When the Americans hit the Japanese with Carrier Raids - they did so with over whelming force - and went after the ships in the harbor more than against the air fields. It was the Army with their multi engine aircraft that were able to maintain sustained air campaigns against enemy air fields.
.
It's probably significant that the USA was able to use B-24 strategic bombers that would be based out of range for anything the Japanese had. The B-24 is an underrated WW2 warplane.
More of those were built than the B-17.
Love the plane, dont get me wrong here, unpleasant stall on that narrow highly loaded wing, so battle damage could turn bad fast, and they were notorious for not surviving water pancakes as those bomb doors would rip away, opening the belly to 100 mph water. All well known to the crews, who flew them anyway, courage personified.
The Japanese put out a book that, in American, was called Zero. It was mentioned within that the Japanese considered the B-17 and the B-24 were the reasons that they lost in the Pacific. The B-17 and the longer ranged, but more delicate, B-24 were able to fly over any Japanese force virtually unopposed. Subaru Sakai said he was impressed by how much damage they could take. It was, supposedly his attack from above that gave the Japanese fighters hope of combating these giants. I would take his book Samurai with a grain of salt, but it is good reading. According to his narrative the Japanese pilots never lost because the American pilots got better, only their planes got better.
@@ThumperLust Not just that, but almost all Japanese pilots flew on and on without any sort of respite until they got shot down.
Problem is because of certain beliefs & philosophies (no pilot protection for the aircraft; plus the fact that Japanese pilots carried NO parachutes into combat), any shootdown of Japanese planes meant certain death for the pilots (this also lead to the loss of veterans whose skills were better suited for the higher quality planes the Japanese could only make available during the later stages of the war.)
@Swiss Army1386 - No, the B-24 was not the most produced aircraft of WWII. From Wikipedia: "At approximately 18,500 units - including 8,685 manufactured by Ford Motor Company - it holds records as the world's most produced bomber, heavy bomber, multi-engine aircraft, and American military aircraft in history." Some smaller aircraft were built in larger numbers, such as the Ilyushin Il-2, Messerschmitt Bf 109, Supermarine Spitfire/Seafire, and Focke-Wulf Fw 190. See the Wikipedia article: List of most-produced aircraft.
15:50 "50% attrition a month" ...huh. My flight sim squadron spent 6+ months recreating the Pacific War (playing both sides) and this is pretty close to what we experienced. We definitely felt the turning point with Guadalacanal and Japan starting to get steamrolled afterwards.
Nicely done! My Dad arrived just as all this was ending (July, 1944, with VF-19 aboard the 2nd Lexington [CV-16]). He missed the Turkey Shoot, but was actively involved in Leyte Gulf, flying an F6F.
I guess my time on the treadmill tomorrow with be 28 mins and 28 seconds.
I always listen to these at the gym haha, and I just finished your recent Catalina video. Great stuff!
Lol
So how did I go? Lol
@@camostorm Well, I'm still fat, but the video was awesome.
@@GregsAirplanesandAutomobiles Greg try to be more body positive, or you might be accused of fatshaming! Side note: I would never say that, LOVE your channel!
My Dad flew 30 missions tail gunning photographing in B25, I heard of all the places. Island hopping he called it. I wish he could have lived longer to listen to you men talk this history that he lived. I don't think he ever really got over it. A lot of near death experiences.
God bless him 🙏
Since I was a kid I could always find Rabaul on a map because it just kept on popping up in everything I would read about WWII, from some documentaries on the RAAF, to Combat Flight Simulator 2 which took place in the Pacific and finally with Black Sheep Squadron where Rabaul featured heavily, as well as other stuff here and there. This was another great video which contextualized a lot of the different phases of the South Pacific air war, and I definitely want to see more Pacific and South East Asia videos whenever you get the chance!
Thank you! Yes, Rabaul is one of those key locations that keeps coming back.
@@MilitaryAviationHistory
I'm sure it's been pointed out but Truk Lagoon is no where near Rabual
CFS 2!! Good old days...
@@mpetersen6 Truk was THE major staging port for IJN forces in the South Pacific. Rabaul might be considered not only a defensive bastion for Truk, but a forward staging base for operations against Australia.
@@MilitaryAviationHistory Rabaul has changed very little since its days as a Japanese stronghold. You can still see Japanese equipment hidden in the surrounding mountains. A trip to the Australian and empire cemetery is a must. It is a place of sadness, beauty and dignity. New Britain had been an Australian mandatory territory between the wars. The small garrison based in Rabaul was little more than a canary in a coal mine, without hope of resupply or rescue. My sympathies to the families of these men.
A fantastic and informative video. And Bis's "oof" when the IJN asked the Army for air support. 😂😂
thank you as an Australian amateur historian I thought I could hum the tune of the south pacific war I was surprised by how close it all was to Australia and it was all interconnected at the strategic level. (this is what happens when you only look at tactical maps) This video among many other from this channel will continue to help me write my AU fantasy World War Witch Series though Im not even close to 42 let alone 44 :) thank you once again for your efforts
In a nutshell, the Japanese never seriously considered the impossibility of logistically supplying all those island bases and how much US submarines could interdict supplies to those bases. Furthermore, the top brass really just seemed incompetent or stuck in the past. Aggressive when caution was necessary and timid when boldness was required. Attack plans that were overly complicated and which required excellent coordination, which the communications of the time wouldn't allow.
Yeah they are generals who never heard of logistics lol What they did there made perfect sense, but once they lost at midway it was game over. And midway itself made no sense at all, and pearl harbor made no sense unless they were going to follow through and occupy or at least totally wipe out pear harbor in which case there's nothing USA can even do for next couple years.
*_"In a nutshell, the Japanese never seriously considered the impossibility of logistically supplying all those island bases and how much US submarines could interdict supplies to those bases."_*
I'm reluctant to completely agree because in reality, things are almost never that simple. But what you're saying is certainly correct and if anyone needs a refresher on what _was_ achieved by the US submarine service, Clay Blair's book _"Silent Victory"_ is a good starting point. That said, submarine warfare was only one aspect of a much larger overall strategy.
For all of the arguments about the American contribution to victory in the war in Europe (and I'm not suggesting anything either way), the war in the Pacific was arguably America's most difficult and most successful theatre of operations. They learnt hard and they learnt fast and I think because they were the senior command in theatre - as opposed to Europe where success had so many fathers - the strategy was clearer. But from the simple point of view of size, the Pacific war was an 11/10 for difficulty.
@@LTPottenger That was the naval war. The Air war and the ground war - both of which were still very dependent on naval power - were less easy to understand and that's really what this video is about. The carrier fleet was Japan's striking arm, rather than her defensive arm. But even after four carriers were lost at Midway and the remaining carriers lost shortly after, Japan still retained a fairly formidable navy and land based air force, at least from the point of view of her ability to defend.
@@LTPottenger The Pearl Harbor attack was not as perfect as some movies suggest. Having got within striking distance, no 'loiter time' was incorporated, although a Sunday morning attack was a well-timed idea. Battleships were yesterday's power, as the sinking of HMS Repulse and PofW proved. Had the oil tanks, repair facilities and submarines been hit, the effect would have been less spectacular but ultimately more effective.
A few mines in the entrance would have been useful too. They should have bought delayed-action magnetic, acoustic and pressure mines from Germany.
Loiter time would have allowed maybe a day or two for the carriers to re-appear, never mind enough time to type out the final part of the message, which a competent typist would have kept confidential anyway
@@EllieMaes-Grandad The battleships could have leveled the whole harbor and anything in it, that is what they are designed for. Nagumo also had plenty more fuel and bombs to attack. If the US carriers had come (enterprise would be there next day) what will they do against 6 carriers waiting for them? Nothing, that's what.
Wish my University lectures were as half as interesting as these!!!
Wonderful video. Absolutely loved it!
Truk Lagoon is one of the best dive sites in the South Pacific. It is a Naval grave yard with many sunken wrecks.
Very good indeed to get your perspectives on this important battlefield.
(My father was in it)
Some ironies about the Bismark Sea.
Given the importance of Aircraft on both sides it would be good to mention Beauforts of No 100 Squadron RAAF and Beaufighters of No 30 Squadron RAAF made a significant contribution to the Allies success against the Japanese forces in the Bismark Sea.
Great discussion with a good delivery of facts.Thank you👍
This was awesome! You two rock! Thank you for the video.
Darn, another great offering. Really enjoyed this mix.
That's what I like! Two swift strikes and another subject is on the ground... done. Thank you guys, great work!
This is unbelievably high quality content
Excellent video!!!! Thanks guys!!!
Lots of details that are seldom explained. Good job.
Another good read on this topic is "Air Combat at 20 Feet: Selected Missions from A Strafer Pilot's Diary" by Garrett Middlebrook
Great video, guys! Many of the IJAAF's aircraft that were destroyed in the attacks were already suffering from very low serviceablity rates due to understaffed, undertrained and physically ill and underfed maintenance crews. The Aichi-built copies of the DB 601 engines in the Ki. 61 fighters exhibited numerous problems in that environment. Logistics and supply were especially sporadic and poor in those remote regions as well.
The traditional Japanese ethos with its emphasis on offense and individual fighting prowess led to a lack of understanding or appreciation of the importance of non-combat supportive operational functions and roles in modern warfare. Their literature reveals that they were often just glad that they even got as many planes from the factories out to the combat zones so many thousands of miles away from the home islands as they did. Food, gas, spare parts, etc. were another thing entirely. The Americans after mid-1943 were in an entirely different league altogether.
Excellent summation. I've ordered the South Pacific Airwar trilogy and look forward to diving into it.
As always, thank you for sharing.
Steve
great topic and discussion. thank you
Thanks, guys. Good discussion. What I love about you guys is how you recommend sources so those inclined can do further reading. As a former history teacher I approve. Good work, and cheers.
Awesome, Interesting, well presented.
Please don't stop!
That was a very nice summation of a complex topic.
Thank you
this man has his own Sea, respect!
@Edgar Miller Bismark sea
Always interesting, thank you.
Great content as usual!
Great video
Nicely done
Very interesting topic, thanks
Wow, Ive always loved reading about WW2, but I did not know much about this campaign.
Your first ten minutes and the maps are very interesting and well done.
Good stuff. Thank you
Eric Bergerud's book is excellent for covering the Australian perspectives on the south Pacific theater, something I have never read about here in America
I was hoping you’d do a collaboration with Justin sometime, I might have to put this video on a repeating loop for about a WEEK.
quite insightful.
Hi guys... that was a great video. I am a big fan of the way you did this. Very detailed and informative. It forms a nice companion piece to the video that Drach did a while ago on the naval campaign in the Solomon Islands and it is very interesting to compare the differences of experiences of navy vs air power.
I must say, your knowledge of the history of this area of operations during the war impresses me. Thank you.
I recall reading Saburo Sakai's book 'Samurai" when I was young, not all that long after the war, and a great deal of what you men are saying here tallys with what I remember from the book.
As an old Navy vet, and a naval and Pacific War history junkie, I really appreciate your channel. I'll subscribe.
Well done, men! Carry on.
Sakai was knocked out of the war very early in the South Pacific August 42 I believe! Everything he referred to in his book was second hand information about that time !
Loved this interview/ discussion between you two. Very listenable and very informative, and yes, I’ve gone straight to the AWM website to read Shindo’s article.
As an Australian I’m loving the recent focus on the South Pacific theatre of WW2, and yes, I watched your attack on Lae video too.
Excellent video! Side note, I love these photos you found of TBD Devastators being useful. Such beautiful aircraft, and were the most advanced torpedo bombers in the world when introduced. But woefully obsolete by 1941, and only really famous these days for being slaughtered at Midway.
Thank you for another great video!
I can give one more reading recommendation: John R.Bruning's - Jungle ace. This is a book about 5th Air Force 49th FG ace Gerald Johnson's adventures. Many events you talking about in this video is described in "Jungle ace", such as bombing of Wewak and many 5th AF raids on Rabaul. Really great book!
My father flew with Johnson in the 9th Fighter Squadron, and recalls him as a great CO. That he flew as Johnson's wingman on many of his early missions, and that the two of them enjoyed flying formation aerobatics for fun. My father also has brief mention in Bruning's book. Another 9th FS ace, Grover Fanning is my Godfather.
Well done 👍
First video of 2021! Hope you all have a fantastic year and *THANK YOU* for all your time and feedback in 2020!
If you love the content and want to support, now might be the best time: *-15% discount OFF on an annual membership* > www.patreon.com/join/Bismarck
Great start 👏 and looking forward to your new 2021 content!
Now that you have done this special I would love for you to do a special about the RAAF .... cheers
Speaking of the Pacific theater, do you know the story of the Australian Boomerang ersatz fighter, and how it got designed by a Heinkel engineer who had been doing work for Mitsubishi ?
The Japanese aircraft engines were underpowered and the 20 mm cannon was slow
You da greatest European military aviation historian in world history Chris!!!!! Thanks for this killer video!!!!!!
I really appreciate the photos; many are pretty hard to find online.
My dad was in on some of this in one of the first three low level parafrag bomb groups as an A20 and A26 gunner. Compared to the carnage endured by 8th AF Bomb crews, particularly early on, he said they were relatively much safer missions with very good P38 escort service. He said they'd be in there and out before the IJA knew what hit 'em. Pictures will show, as your guest says, parachuted ordinance falling on very accessible scantily camouflaged targeted aircraft (often already in a state of disrepair) on hastilly prepared rudimentary airstrips and with the exception of West New Guinea not much in the way of antiaircraft defenses until getting much closer to the home Islands.
Absolutely loving the channel. It'd be interesting to see a vid of what the allies thought of the later gen Japanese fighters like the George and Frank.
Excellent👍
I can finally put a face to Justin's voice. Great information about the Pacific theater. I'm looking forward to being less ignorant.
Thanks Chris & Justin excellent summary. Can recommend 'Flying Buccaneers' by Steve Birdsall, a history of the 5th Air Force operations in the area from the USAAF perspective.
Love when you talk about Japanese Aviation
WhY?
Cool video. I did an undergrad paper on this topic.
P-38 Lightning, F4U Corsair and F6F Hellcat was the Answer.
Danke!
Vielen Dank!
The Imperial Japanese failures were a fundamental & Systematic collapse of Tactical/Strategic Doctrine AND Logistics. BOTH the Japanese AND Allied(American) forces were at the tail end of a MONSTEROUSLY Long Logistical chain(Australia did provide a secure Logistical Hub for the Allies, but it still was a gigantic strain to move supplies from the US/Commonwealth TO Australia)which made EVERYTHING harder, but Japan failed to maintain a secure supply chain AND failed to understand how vulnerable the bases were & in doing so failed to provide sufficient structural defenses for the tip of their Offensive Spear. They essentially placed all of their "Eggs" in a single small doggie bag & allowed Allies forces stroll over & smash that "Bag" with a wrecking ball REPEATDLLY. As long as Japan was unable to strangle Logistics to Allied Air/Ground forces, the outcome was an inevitable conclusion. They Could NOT Win, under ANY circumstances.
I really hope people give up on that ridiculous trope "the outcome was inevitable." Just keep in mind that no one in the world expected Germany to roll over France. And they would not have except for the complete command breakdown. Wars are POLITICAL actions, and in politics, things could have gone in any extreme direction.
@@princeofcupspoc9073 Well that is a bit different, France did have a better army, yet they still used a very similar command structure to WWI. The allies were in a bad logistical spot not because of their numbers but do the to refugees coming toward their armies from the Benelux, and the horrible command structure in France, the failure in French command to recognize the importance of reconnaissance and that is should be taken seriously. And you have to remember France capitulated in around 45 days, unlike the Japanese who were suffering from attrition, and lack of strength in their army, the French encirclement is different than island hoping in many ways, it was one large blow France took that destroyed two of France’s best armies and the BEF forces.
I have been reading on the air war on the eastern and western fronts for 20 years. Yet I never really studied the pacific air war. Very neat facts here. Similar in some ways to the German situation in Russia. At least logistics wise. It's always logistics that win or lose wars it seems.
@@princeofcupspoc9073 The problem is that a "Political" Victory was Japans ONLY hope. Every other outcome ended in a Japanese Defeat, & once it appeared (& was pushed as) a "Sucker Punch" first attack instead of a Diplomatic SNAFU AND the evidence of mistreatment of both western combatants & noncombatants, the American public would not & the Politicians could not accept ANYTHING but a crushing of their opponent. If the Atomic bombs weren't developed & the US invaded the home islands that blood letting WOULD have had a significant impact on morale & opinions in the US, but this was still at a time that had a mindset of "Finish What You Start" & US policy would STILL have led to Massive Casualties on both sides before the end. The only real hope that Imperial Japan EVER had was if Roosevelt could be intimidated, or his successors could be intimidated & that was not going to happen. The Man in the High Castle scenario was an impossibility & would never had happened. To paraphrase Commander Adama in BSG 2003, "Rolling a Hard Eight" as your ONLY diplomatic hope does not a Foreign Policy make. US population numbers, natural resources & excess industrial capacity stacked EVERY other factor & variable AGAINST a successful Japanese final victory except a political one & that is just too long odds to place a bet that could burn your country down around you on.
Americans have always been... adaptable. Guys at the pointy end have always been willing to throw doctrine out the window and shrug off any consequences that might come. One of the things that comes to mind is that a lot of B-25 mods like the nose with 8 .50s or the version mounting the 75mm version came from field mods created in-theater by aircrews. Completely unauthorized (initially), "but what are they gonna do? Send me to North Africa??"
Another interesting video.
One vid I would like to see from you at some point is a detailed look at the Burma air campaign, I've read plenty of individual accounts (although all British no Japanese, and mostly from '44/45) but not an overview of the whole campaign.
I looked things up as you went along. I have now noticed that you have links to sources in the description. It is a conundrum that people who want to know more will pause and look it up. People who are going to disagree will disagree regardless.
Good job lads. :-)
I think I've read 75% of the books covering the Air War in Europe. Lately I've read "Race of Aces" and Don Hampton's "Operation Vengeance" covering parts of the Pacific campaign. I'm trying to get a copy of "Fabulous Fifteen" to keep the streak going. Really enjoyed your video.
New Britain, Kokopo and Rabaul, absolutley stunning place to visit. Incredibly beautiful and welcoming to visitors. Had a great time there in 2016 also seeing the memorials and museums about ww1 and ww2.
anything on the day to day that Japanese garrison did when they were cut off and under segie for 2 years
@@seanmac1793 its not a wealthy country but the memorials are well kept. the meuseums are more collections of artifacts, less reaserched story presentations. You can go into Yamamoto's command Bunker for example.
@@sanguma ah okay thanks for the info
Wah, double Sensei-Combo! Me likes!
Can't wait for that vertical slice ;)
Veeewy honorabru 🏯
Where's my damn task force admiral huh?
Hi,
have you read 'The Miraculous Torpedo Squadron" by Mori Juzo, translated from the Japanese by Nicholas Voge, and available on Kindle?
Juzo-san participated in the attack on Pearl Harbour and survived the war!
I found this to be a great read, from an interesting perspective.
My uncle-in-law flew with the 499th squadron/ 345th bomb group (b-25 straffers). I have closely read the official history of the 345th and would note that ground and ship borne flak was significant in some target areas (Wewak, Rabaul, Truk, Hollandia) and accounted for the large majority of operational losses. Based on the official history and records, air-to-air combat losses were a relatively low proportion of the total that did include training and non-combat mechanical failures.
Worth noting 5th Air Force was the red haired stepchild for the US. It was on the bottom of the totem poll for supplies, air frames & pilots/air crews
the guys in Alaska and CBI would beg to differ.
In the pecking order it was probably CBI, Aluetians, SW Pacific with CBI at the bottom. CBI was really more of a British operational area. The Aluetians. Cold and wet. SW Pacific. Hot and wetter. Next up the food chain would be Italy.
Great video! There's just one thing wrong. It has recently been found that English speaking people have been mispronouncing the name Truk for years. It's not pronounced, "truck", it's actually pronounced, "trook", where the double "o" sounds the same as it sounds in "roof".
I missed why no mention of the great sea battles, Midway, Coral sea, Pearl Harbor. Japanese wiped out our planes on the ground at Pearl Harbor and the Phillipines (more than 100 near 200 at Pearl). Also, in '42 our army fighters were low altitude and we needed marine Wildcats to intercept bombers.
I appreciated the quick mention of Eric Bergerud’s work. I’ve spotted his book Fire in the Sky on your bookshelf, and highly recommend it. And Lundstrom’s work is groundbreaking.
good job ... interesting to see the thirst we humans have for war ... and blood and destruction ...
My favourite theatre since playing Aces of the Pacific.
There is a book on the complete history of the Japanese zero from the AM56 Claude through every version to the AM65 Zero including descriptions of individual combat. Martin Caidin. Zero Fighter. Introduction by Saburo Sakai. Purnell's history of the second word war. Weapons volume 9. It has the designer of the zero talking about every version and the problems encountered that led to versions not being built and the failures as a combat aircraft as the allies got better aircraft. It has allied and Japanese pilots telling their stories and dozens of photos.
I came for the War Thunder thumbnail, stayed for the content.
I just started reading Invasion: Rabaul. It looks pretty good so far.
Let me guess: Logistics, logistics, and logistics.
With a side order of
I N D U S T R I A L
C A P A C I T Y
Stupidity, stupidity, stupidity. They made an unneeded attack on midway otherwise US would have let them have free reign for at least 2 years.
The answer is simple. A relatively small country like japan or germany cant win against all the other countrys.
These kinds of answers are the worst
@@LTPottenger The idea on Midway was they knew they had to cease the American will to fight and would not win in a prolong engagement and so they needed to bait the carriers into a decisive battle. The only issue is they had poor intelligence and so the Americans laid a trap and annihilated them.
Holy hell Justin Pyke I would not have expected us to have the same haircut. Cheers guys
The Japanese Army Air Service major war experience was in China. Where they barely needed to protect their airfields from Chinese air attack. They were behind the power curve dealing with the Australians and Americans
19:06 Solved that lack of fresh water problem for you.
After that video i would like to see a video about airfields. How are they constructed, run, defend etc. and is there a difference between us, uk, japan, german and russian airfields?
This sorta sounds like a good MHV video though. Maybe a bit of a colab?
Also the concept of "conservation of force", because once the allied forces struggled past the early days of what were, essentially, suicide missions (both in France in 1940 and in the Malaya/South West Pacific in early 1942) they took great care not to fritter away their air forces. Commit enough to hold the line, sure, but not at the expense of building up/concentrating your forces for Battles Yet To Come. Also, of course, the massive commitment to saving downed pilots. Submarines are themselves extremely valuable, but would be put at great risk to save a single downed pilot. Important stuff, but seldom discussed.
@@richardm3023 Well, truth be told of all your list the US airfields are the ones least likely to came under sustained air attack. Certainly not in the European theatre of war (except for Operation Bodenplatte), and apart from the Philippines and Guadalcanal seldom in the Pacific. It's much easier to construct airfields when you aren't stuck in a slit trench. I'm pretty certain that Henderson Field wasn't a pristine example of US airfield construction until after the Japanese conceded the campaign to retake the island.
The Americans could build an airfield in a matter of days which amazed the japanese
Japan lost the war because:
the entire GNP of Japan in 1941 was smaller than the GNP of New Jersey a single state of the USA !
Japans booming economy paled but they were buoyed by 1905 war and the success against china/manchuria...The nasty surprise at The japanese received at khalkin gol/nomonhan prevented them from assisting their german allies at the outset of Barbarossa If they could not beat the crippled 3rd rate combined arms forces of the industrial peasantry of the USSR things were not looking good.The Pearl Harbour gambit-.They literally needed a fast knock out blow...against an advanced state with a resilient economy ...they should have never rolled the dice
I thought the same when looking at the title of this youtube. Though the Japanese made a show of it out of sheer willpower in the early going, in the absence of the "sucker punch" that Yamato was hoping for, they were totally overmatched. The US easily, and I say that understanding the incredible sacrifice of the people involved, but on a national level defeated the Japanese using maybe 25% of it's resources.
The Zero used at Pearl Harbor only had a 1,000 hp engine , max later was 1,100 hp , 20 mm cannon was kind of slow
@@lexchaotica190 we are skirting the what-if scenarios here but the Japanese invasion of USSR in assistance of the Wehrmacht is 99% unlikely. Japanese had doubts of Germans being successful by winter 1941 and due to most of their army being tied down in their primary focus - China - which just grew in complexity and resource requirements even as an alternative to PH USSR was never an option. More men, trucks, tanks, and logistics for the land push past Vladivostok they didn't have - but a longshot with a powerful navy was there.
In other words, the Japanese lost their capacity to produce and update their war machines.
I read Fire in the Sky on my Kindle. Great book.
5th USAAF had some unique tactics for vertical envelopment. Pioneers were air dropped on a good spot for an airstrip high on a mountainous island behind the Japanese. Natives were hired to cut the tall grass. Engineers flew in with heavy equipment. 2 1/2 ton trucks were cut in half and flown in on two C-47s then welded back together. In a few days a rough fighter strip was ready and then expanded from there.
One factor that I recall clearly from Fire In the Sky were the details on how abysmal the Japanese aircraft maintenance and repair facilities and capabilities were throughout the campaign and the devastating affect they had on in-service rates. It explained all the photos of captured Japanese airfields littered with dozens unservicable aircraft.( many of which were later quickly repaired by allied troops) The allies easily repaired their own aircraft when seemingly simple, easily repaired damage and mechanical problems resulted in Japanese planes being pushed off to the edge of the fields and were never repaired.
That's because Toyota didn't build those planes.....
PLEASE CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE JAPANESE CODE WAS KNOWN TO THE US MILITARIES SINCE MIDWAY ( JUNE 1942 ). SO MANY US OPERATIONS WERE SUCCESSFUL , INCLUDING MIDWAY AND THE HITTING OF ADMIRAL YAMAMOTO'S PLANE ON APRIL 18 , 1943 .... AND MUCH MORE. THE JAPANESE WERE VERY BRAVE BUT THEY HAD NO CHANCE WINNING AGAINST THE AMERICANS.
Knowing the the code is irrelevant unless we were risking discovery targeting logistics first.
Thanks for getting around to the SW Pacific. My father joined the USAAF 49th Fighter Group, 9th Fighter Squadron in 1943 at Dobodura, New Guinea, initially flying P-47D. In late 1943 the 9th FS switched back to P-38L's. He moved to various airfields through the advance up the NG coast. He was then part of the Leyte invasion with his squadron being the first tactical unit into Tacloban, Leyte in October 1944.
He the took part in the Okinawa Campaign, and was one of the escort pilots for the Japanese "Surrender Betties" from Japan to Ishima. He is now 97.
I have the Rabaul trilogy on Kindle. Excellent books. The Rabaul air campaign was a long and bloody battle of attrition - gradually grinding the Japanese air power into dust. A battle of endurance and logistics that the allies won.
I think that a discussion about the Japanese anti aircraft capabilities or lack of would being an interesting subject. Some discussion has been had regarding the low success on the naval ships but their inability to defend their bases even when they knew attacks were coming and certain bases had been identified as "must have" the Japanese could not muster enough AA to scare anyone and very few allied aircraft seem to have been lost compared to other theaters. Just a thought
19:43 - Truk is in the Caroline Islands, not the Carolina Islands.
I don't think this video gets to the heart of the matter. I may be unduly influenced by Kenney's memoir, but the United States won by New Guinea by exploiting intelligence, seizing the initiative, and developing a number of innovative new tactics like skip bombing and parachute fragmentation bombs. For me the essential question is why Japan did none of these things first? Is it a failure of conception? Is it inter-service rivalry? Is it limited resources? Certainly the latter two were factors, as you note, but it's entirely unclear to me whether the Japanese understood the depth and breadth of the air campaign against them, and if they did exactly how they attempted to counter it.
Because Japanese culture is primarily one of seeing something good and making improvements to it after copying it. American culture is primarily one of "hold my beer." The top-down vs bottom-up work ethic in evidence.
@@immikeurnot Bad leadership number one factor. Starting with entering into war in the first place. Top-down control rather than leadership, no decentralized leadership or responsibility, and obviously no training or explanation of commander's intent to facilitate any of these things. Thus, the importance of things actually critical to mission success on the front lines was never grasped. And sort of overriding in all of this, no value seen in the actual human beings fighting the war.
My late childhood neighbour was an RAAF air gunner in GAF Blenheims flying over New Guinea, and in his experience it was primarily Japanese groundfire that he encountered, and he only saw one Japanese airplane in the sky, so that was after the Wewak disaster.
The other point that needs emphasising is that the SW Pacific Area, especially New Guinea, is extremely wet and humid, and not really conducive to maintaining aircraft easily, and that is without considering the inability of Japan to adequately maintain a supply system to its forces in the SW Pacific. The Allies at least had access to supply and repair facilities in Australia, Japan lacked a suitably endowed location close by. ( I am aware that "close" is a relative concept here. )
By necessity, the RAAF / USAAF ran airplane maintenance pools to keep as many aircraft as serviceable as possible, and in this regard the P40s were found to be a rugged and maintainable airplane in what are inhospitable conditions.
In other videos, comment has been made about the combination of factors that impinge on the value of a particular airplane type, and I think this is particularly true of the SW Pacific where the geographic location just made airplane operations so much more difficult than elsewhere. I would venture that carrier based aircraft, especially after the Central Pacific Carrier Task Forces got into their stride were a lot easier to keep up to strength than was the case in the SW Pacific.
Contrast my neighbours experience with a retired workmates experience of being an air gunner in RAAF / NEI B25 Mitchells, which regularly did missions over what was then the Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia, where Japanese air interception was a regular occurrence.
Great video, and very informative.
Great discussion 👍. Maybe getting into the specifics that kept the Japanese combined air forces from maintaining a high percentage of "operational" aircraft. A discussion about fuel issues, repair and general maintenance issues, and pilot training etc. One of you mentioned that only 50% were available at certain times and logistics was brought up. An in-depth discussion of what was causing these issues would be interesting 🤔. Can it be said that allied submarines were starting to take a toll on fuel and supplies? How much was the allied naval aircraft attacks affecting the logistics? Its well known that the attacks on the bases directly as well as air to air combat was taking a toll on experienced pilots but how about attacks on the logical aspects? Great discussion and Im only thinking of what could be added or where do you go from here. Keep it up👍
GREAT STUFF!
In short the Japanese were caught with their tobi pants down at their airfields.
I am also interested to hear about the Dutch efforts in this region. After all, that area was controlled by the Dutch (Dutch East Indies, DEI). Their contribution was not insignificant, but not know how much in total.
No mention of Operation Vengeance-the aerial assasination of Admiral Yamamoto?
Good point! They have a "Admiral Yamamoto bunker" marked if you look at Google maps for Rafael. He was right there and probably the best mind they had. All downhill after he was assassinated
What about Gen Allisons history of the air war when he was McAuthor's air commander?
Great detailed analysis...really enjoy this video. I have a grand scale view and some specific battle knowledge but not a breakdown like this...thanks so much for the posting (an old U.S. Marine vet. and Ph.D. Aerospace/Computer Engineer who recently retired from a large American defense contractor's Aero company.
Two items:
1. IIRC the New Guinea campaign took place in the Southwest Pacific theater of operations. The South Pacific theater was different. But you know that.
2. I may be mistaken, but I do not recall that you two once mentioned General George Kenney. He commanded the USAAF in the Southwest Pacific. He made the most of his resources.
I have heard that US artillery support was key to overcoming Japanese attacks on Guadalcanal. I would love to see a deep dive on this subject.
Thank you for the comprehensive video about the Air War in the South Pacific. It makes me wonder if it wasn't arrogance on the Japanese part, due to all the success they achieved prior to these campaigns, that they didn't think anyone could hurt their air fields? It seems kind of basic in retrospect, but hind sight is always 20/20. Thanks again.
Let me guess...
Hellcat spam
The answer might surprise you
I was going to go with "because the BR system is broken"
@@TLTeo Sounds better! Imagine having to attack a B-25 in your Ki-43.
@@MilitaryAviationHistory It certainly did. Learned something new today, thanks!
Thanks for watching :)
You forget the batlle of Milne Bay, that was the first victory before Guadacanal. The RAAF of 76 sq made that possible!