I believe Custer had every intention of leading a 2nd wave behind Reno. He told Reno he would be supported by the entire command, Reno believed Custer would follow him and there was no reason to keep Reno in the dark if Custer intended to attack from another direction. Custer was an experienced Civil War combat leader and knew the value of using his reserves. In this case, the Indians would react to Reno's attack without knowing Custer and 5 more companies were coming, and Custer could deploy those companies depending on how the Indians were responding. Cooke was Custer's right-hand man and Keogh led the larger of the 2 battalions currently with Custer. They were very valuable to Custer and their presence following behind Reno indicates Custer was coming that way too. And they didn't turn back to rejoin Custer until Gerard shared info with them which he had just learned from the scouts. I believe Custer dispatched those 2 very trusted officers to observe the Indians' response to Reno's attack and brief Custer when he arrived on the scene just before his "2nd wave" became visible to the Indians. In that way, he could deploy his 5 additional companies before the Indians could prepare for his attack. But Cooke and Keogh found Gerard's news too interesting to wait for Custer to arrive and turned back to inform him. The news changed Custer's mind and he did not follow Reno but rather rode to the north end of the village. That would make sense if he believed the bulk of the warriors were going toward Reno, leaving the village lightly defended. That would allow Custer to either capture the noncombatants to force the surrender of the warriors or else attack the warriors from behind when they focused on Reno to their front. But that would only work if Reno was keeping the Indians busy. That all changed when Reno retreated.
“Wow” is all I can say! I actually visited the battlefield last year, it was quite a treat for a hillbilly from ETN/WNC. I am living for this video series! I really enjoy in-depth videos like this. The amount of research and attention to detail is very impressive. Thank you and keep up the good work!
Your additionally added drone camera views are really very helpful for seeing much more details than from the ground and maps. I love the little big horn landscape. An ideal landscape for playin hide and seek in an area where a huge native village and an army was difficult to be found and seen.
I am an admirer of Capt. Beenteen as well. He survived. Should he have been more in a hurry to come to Custer's aid. My answer is "NO!" Following Custer could be more hazardous to your health than smoking cigarettes. Teeming up with Reno and more especially the supply trains was smart indeed. With the supply trains means you don't run out of ammunition which is likely what Custer's troops did. Note: My drill sergeant in 1976 told me he went out on combat patrol in Vietnam and followed instructions and took the eight clips of 20 rounds each. In a Vietnam fire fight this did not last 20 min. He asked others for some of their ammo. "F off was their reply." Be careful about following instructions.
After examining what had transpired during the Washita engagement and walking the ground, I came to the conclusion that Custer estimated that Reno would be faced with the delaying actions of the indians from the encampment, that this was a perfect time for him to flank the village and capture the women and children as he had done before. This time the Indians were effected by sitting bulls vision, in effect they believed that if they stood and fought they would win. This coupled with the fact that the Indian pony herds were to the north of the encampment placed a delaying force in the direct path of Custer's command. This allowed the Indians using interior lines to rapidly respond to Custers attempt to gain the camps rear. Based upon a very well conducted archeological examination of the battlefield and forensics of the shell casings, I was surprised at the number of repeating rifles the Indians had. Again Custer's estimate was only 800 braves and statistically that level of opposition would not have been armed so well. The fact that an excess of 2000 were available gave the Indians much more flexibility, especially since they were on the defensive. Custer gambled that with Reno drawing the bulk of the Indian braves to the south of the village he could gain the rear capture a significant number of the women and children, at which time the Indians would comply whit his instructions. He was not crazy, stupid but acted both consistently within his nature and the conditions. His gamble was based on an incorrect assessment of the size of the force he faced and that they had fundamentally changed tactics due to Sitting bulls vision. If you look at the little big horn in isolation you will not see what his intention actually was. What I can say is that Custer's opinion of his scouts and their information never seemed to sink in. I do not think it was arrogance or pride but experience that betrayed Custer, as nearly always the Indians broke camp upon contact.
One more thing the Indians showed great courage in standing and fighting considering they did not know the entire size of Custer's command. Had Custer been the vanguard of a much larger force The battle could have proven disastrous.
Having studied this campaign for 40 some years and read anything I could find on the subject, I completely agree with your assessment. The wildfire in the early 1990's cleared the area and allowed extensive, crime scene type archeological investigation. Custer's tactics (to his knowledge) were sound according to military doctrine at the time. The attack was possibly doomed from the start because of the forced march and fatigue of the 7th's men and horses. Reno's aborted attack on the village and retreat started the failure. Custer apparently tried to attach the middle of the village after splitting off Keogh's battalion but couldn't find a decent ford at Medicine Tail Coulee. There, probably Lt Algernon Smith was shot from his horse, not Custer. Subsequent movements would indicate Custer was still alive and in command. I've always belived Custer stationed Keogh's command to form a skirmish line to wait for Benteen, then went to find another ford to attack the rear of the village and capture non combatants. That was his tactic in the past. The Native Americans pushed Custer further from the river and the rest of his command. Keogh and Calhoun fought well but were outflanked and overrun, the survivors of Company I tried to run after Custer's command which had by that time lost the initiative and was hunkering down. The last part of the fight was probably over quickly with a lot of individual melee fighting.
Also, Benteen's action, while criticized, saved the remainder of the Regiment. Everything Custer knew about fighting Native Americans was fatally wrong that day.
@@jefffranklin4789 No the one astonishing thing he did not know was that the natives had 800 repeating firearms. Once that fact sinks in the fight at custers last stand was short and there is a reason it was so. Benteen did not save the rest of the command, the indian decision to move the camp did, had the Indians decided to make a real fight of it Benteen's command could have been surrounded and dispatched. Walk the ground. If the indians had moved down the reverse slope to the east of Beenteen and come in from the behind (east) the hill top was completely exposed. 10-20 men with repeating rifles could have decimated them. The western slope of the ridge lines are steep on the west and long and shallow on the eastern slope. Native Americans were excelelnt hunters and knew where Benteen was exactly. What they rightly did not know was if there were any other enemy columns in the area.
@@mikekarns5286 I'm not sure we disagree on this. The Native Americans had a variety of weapons including a large number of repeating rifles as evidenced by the archeological finds after the 1990s wildfire. The recovery of spent shell casings showed investigators alot about how the battle flowed and that Custer was indeed outgunned. I also agree that had the Native Americans wanted to press the attack on the Benteen/Reno position, that part of the 7th Cavalry would have been wiped out also. My comment about Benteen's decision is the belief that if Benteen had ridden to Custer, Benteen's battalion would have met the same fate. I agree the Native Americans decided to leave the area, therefore sparing the Benteen/Reno command. The 7th had been soundly defeated and the Benteen/Reno group was in no condition for further fighting. You are correct, they were fortunate the Native Americans left. My son and I are planning a trip there in summer 2024.
Great video, great maps and photos. Hey, I am glad a messenger did NOT go to Custer at the last minute................... it would have been a fatal trip !!!!
What of the possibility that Custer didn't have enough confidence in the "gumption" of Reno, or lack thereof, and had Cooke & Keogh follow a bit to make sure Reno did in fact launch the attack on the village? It was just a few days prior that Custer brought up that Reno made the "mistake of his life" or something to that effect in not following the trail aggressively enough and launching an attack on the Indians. Just a thought. I don't subscribe to the thinking that if someone hates you then you blindly overlook their hatred towards you and proceed to act as if their hatred does not exist. That's a bad thing to have to overcome in a combat situation; office politics to the extreme on the boardgame of life or death on a hot, humid Sunday afternoon. Benteen, Reno and Custer were smart enough to know that they all disliked each other. I think Custer finally realized how much they despised him about twenty minutes before he drew his last breath. They could have made more of an effort to assist Custer, or at least try to draw away some attackers.......they really did nothing, and the Reno case in Chicago oozed of a cover-up the way testimonies were so slanted towards protecting Reno, and thus the Army in general. It wasn't all Custer's fault, contrary to what knee-jerk historians dole-out with their Anti-Custer Prescriptions dressed up as legitimate scholarship. Reno was drunk to some degree at the battle, and this didn't help his lower-percentage of courage required to undertake the task before him. Funny how he wanted to go right away to get Hodgson's body, etc., even expecting others to risk life and limb in the process, yet showed nowhere near that verve-and-vinegar when it came to trying to bail out Ol' Iron Butt. Benteen? He was just a really brave man, a great fighter, and could inspire those around him with his physical courage, but damn, he hated Custer more than the Devil himself, and that hatred clouded what he knew they should have done militarily, which was to at least make a real effort to find out what was going on over there where the gunfire was coming from. His following Weir on the little tiptoe through the tulips jaunt doesn't pass muster compared to what he knew they should have done. No one, other than my former mother-in-law, could hold a grudge to the extreme like Benteen. To really know a man, one must read his innermost thoughts.....in lieu of mind-reading, then letters suffice. To know Benteen, read the Benteen-Goldin letters. There is a treasure-trove of insight into his mentality and the battle itself. Yes, Custer fucked up on many levels, but he did not have the 100% support of two of his key subalterns. That, my friends, is a recipe for disaster on any battlefield. Both Reno & Benteen led basically really tragic, hard lives afterwards, and I think that part of that is due to the deep regret that they knew, deep down, that they didn't do their best on that day in 1876. And it ate them alive. Reno peeking into the Sturgis girl's room, Benteen in Utah, relieving himself on the tent exterior whilst two ladies were standing right inside the tent, etc. Surviving is not always a blessing.
The existence of the standard tactic of attacking an enemy's rear should be enough to make it a plausible explanation of Custer's movements. That is, Custer may have simply intended to attack the warrior force gathering against Reno from the rear. This would explain (as much as seeking non-combatant hostages) Custer's reluctance to become decisively engaged at Medicine Tail ford.
Custer's experience was that the Indians would always try to flee. He wanted to prevent this. He did NOT believe they would stand and fight. But that was Custer's nature during the ENTIRE time during the Civil War as well. Many times he would go charging too far and nearly get cut off and surrounded by Confederate Cavalry. Custer knew ONLY attack and boldness ! Unfortunately it was the wrong approach when the Indians had such numbers and were not going to flee but stand and fight!
I don't think Custer wanted to prevent the natives from fleeing. I think the expectation was that they would flee, but the only avenue would lead into Terry'/Gibbon column. In other words, fleeing Indians was the plan.
Great video! I don't agree with the criticism of Benteen for not sending a courier to Custer when he completed his scout. If Custer thought the update of Benteen's scouting was going to be significant he would have included in his orders that Benteenneeded to send a scout back on the status of the scouting. Custer did not do this. As far as Benteen taking it upon himself to send a courier, there was no significant change to Battle Plan to warrant a courier being sent back. Benteen was following his orders to a "T" in that he turned his command around and proceeded towards Custer’s backtrail. In summary, there was nothing “new” to report other than "I am still following your orders.".
Agree. I’d think it’s possible to find out if it was some Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) or doctrine at the time for scouting parties to always send messages back like that, like it appears to be doctrine now/today from the video (at 5:54), or if discretion is allowed. Agree it wouldn’t have impacted the outcome of the day.
This is an interesting debate and we were talking about it at work. It seems like the rule in the military where you report all checkpoints or phase lines regardless of contact is in my mind.
@@MilitaryHistory317 Custer told Benteen to report if he made contact with hostiles which makes sense since Custer would want to know if there were enemy forces to his rear but there was no benefit to getting a report back with information of no importance. Benteen and Custer were separated by 3 to 4 miles when Custer sent his message to Benteen. Neither commander was in visual sight of the other. Benteen had no way of knowing where Custer, or Reno for that matter, were until Custer's messenger made contact with Benteen. Custer had no idea how long the message was going to take because he did not know the exact location of Benteen or if Benteen had made contact and was engaging "hostiles" per his orders. Custer would have had no idea where he was going to be by the time Benteen would arrive which was going to much later because he was instructed to bring the packs. The packs moved about five miles and hour, otherwise known as a fast walking pace. Custer had no idea where he was going to be because he was on the offensive at that time which meant he was in full pursuit of the hostiles. Retired Army NCO here so will add my two cents about rules in the military. I would agree in modern warfare there is a lot more communication due to radios, satellites and networks so situational updates are common practice but when you had mobile units on horseback back then that certainly was not the case. Communication on the battlefield were limited to flags, bugle calls and messengers.
Good video; the communication between the commanders was so bad that this attack was doomed before it started. The recon was almost non existent, the plan was never explained to anyone as Custer was "winging it" so the attack was never going to work. If you follow the distances between the 3 battalions and packs, who arrived at Reno hill around 3pm, and the time it took to ride . Custer and his group were mostly all dead before the Weir movement at 5 pm.
@@daviddougan6961 Absolutely! The battle lasted less than three hours. Benteen had the pack mules. If anyone has ever seen pack mules on riding trips, etc.. you will understand quickly they are the most unwieldly things ever. If Benteen had somehow got immersed in Custer's riding around all over the place, the 120 men with him, the mules and equipment would have been swallowed up by the horde of Indians. Another point along with this is if Reno had ridden another 100 yds. in his charge, he would have been surrounded and those men lost. As there was not defensive position to fall back to, it was all just ride and shoot (or be shot) by all the groups going at the same time. The two groups under Reno and Benteen were extremely lucky that day!
Custer was offered 4 more coys of cavalry that he turned down The scouts urged either an immediate attack probably with the full reg Custer refused One of the scouts said if we are probably all going to die if you attack, Custer ignored him Benteen said "let's keep the reg together" Custer shooed him away The only other commanding officer to make these many mistakes was MacArthur.
Beware the delusion of superior intellect, you may be acting on incomplete or deceptive information. Custer made mistakes, but his action on the east cavalry field at gettysburg disrupted General Lees plan for the 3rd day and the complete campaign. And when you listen to detractors of MacArthur, you betray that your perception and understanding are limited. There is always much much more to any historical event. You miss the actual strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese. To say Custer was dumb degrades the actual native american leaders. No one could have predicted that the indians would have 800 repeating rifles in their camp.
Great job!! U are tops. :) I fault GAC sending Benteen off on his scout, he should have just sent 2 scouts and not divided his command at that point, especially in light of the Washita encampments and how a small command that went off was wiped out. I also fault GAC for not taking the extra Cav. company's he was offered, as well as the Gatling guns. Of course Crook takes a huge hit for going on vacation and never sending out scouts to inform GAC of the situation. I also have to condemn the practice during this action by the 7th to defile all Indian Graves they came upon, bad JuJu. Kudos to your fine work. :)
Hi Jay. I am going to insert a "What would General Crook have done" into one of the vids. I firmly believe Crook would not have turned down any firepower.
Those Gatling guns were not machine guns, but were as heavy and unwieldy as cannons, the limber heavy to match. Imagine hauling those up and down the ridges and valleys around the LBH, which was already hard work. In fact a cavalry patrol just previously had had terrible trouble with Gatling guns in similar terrain, at one point a gun carriage having got out of control rolled over and injured two or three troopers, and on another occasion the limbers had to be dismantled and the guns hauled up on ropes.
I bumped heads with Wagner, on a forum, decades ago. Regardless, I still highly recommend his book The Strategy of Defeat at LBH. The book adds so much to the discussion. Our dispute concerned Custer not being supported by the 2 subordinate wings. I think I took the side of the wings not having the ability to assist. Probably. Can't remember. Excellent book nevertheless. Bit advanced. Get the basic stuff first SOTMS, etc then Fred's book.
Wagner seemed full of himself and unanswerable, but if he referenced the book and map shown in this video as a source then you can understand that the BIg Bugs just dont get it. Just sad.
Thus, Capt. Benteen, with a little over 120 men and separated from Custer's force , was to search for - and 'pitch into' - an enemy force of undetermined size which could have included hundreds of warriors. In the event Benteen was attacked, the valleys and increasing distance between Benteen and Custer likely would have masked any sound of firing. Custer would not even have been aware that Benteen was in combat and that he would have needed assistance. As a result, Custer would have lost about one-quarter of his forces.
True, And my opinion is that George had no interest in what might happen to Benteen. Custer was interested in what Custer wanted, an outcome of his desires, and should not have been there until his Commander arrived in the area.
@@user-kt8yd6we4e Online, one can read the proceedings of the Inquiry into the battle of the LBH. Major Reno requested the Army to conduct it in order to clear his name.
Hello sir, I really enjoy your videos on Battle of little big horn. What type of program did you use to create the list of soldiers? I am viewing on an iPhone and cannot copy the link from my phone to find it. Was it excel or something else. Thank you for the videos!
I used a software called R. It can be a bit of a hassle to see the Dashboard on a mobile device. If you have a desktop or laptop give it a try. I do need to investigate adding mobile capability!
I find this confusion between divided troops and the troops separated. The Big Bugs got it wrong. Custer as an experienced balloonist from the potomac while fighting in the Civil War knew how to assess terrain from heights, this along with all his other combat skills and ability to assess the situation would not send Benteen off to a scout at the top of the mountains. Go to the Crows Nest and see the divides and realize that Custer could assess the terrain much better than that. Benteen lied about distances, where he separated and the lone tipis. even that is located so far away that no man could say "there is your Indians running like devils" from the location speculated at. These Big Bugs did not have satellite nor Google Earth to assess distances and terrains. This desire to use books written by someone that was not there to reference is silly. People forget that Custer gave the lead at the division of troops to whoever got their part of the command prepared first. Benteen turned around after a few steps and claimed the advance by proclaiming his troops were ready. Custer went twice to Benteen to slow the pace. Where is this referenced in the visual aid? The Division of troops and the separation of troops are two different things. You will see that the morass and tipi are much closer to the bottoms and the separation closer to Reno Crossing. Not so hard to do because everyone at the RCOI gave testimony describing the location of lone tipi from Reno Crossing and also in that you will find the morass as well as the Camp notes give a better map of the Morass and tipi location and neither are represented in this video.
Good answer! Hmmm...why does no one ever mention that there was a clearly visible trail leading off to the Southwest from the lone tepee/Crook/ Rosebud fight village campsite ( the tribes did not cross the lbh where Reno did but at a better Ford to the Southwest) see Wooden Leg and Marquis maps. Hmm, and Terry's report of the battle dated June 27 states that Benteen was 2 miles TO THe LEFT of Reno when the fight started. Food for thought.
With all of the firing, how many rounds would the troopers have exhausted versus what they normally carried? Were they ever resupplied? Was Custer out of ammunition and overwhelmed? Were any weapons found and if so did they still contain ammunition?
50 carbine rounds on their person and another 50 in the saddlebags. There are some who say that ammunition shortage led to the collapse, but that seems speculative at best.
@@MilitaryHistory317 Same excuse that was used at Isandlwana, even though the evidence for it was anecdotal. It's also interesting that both in Custer's and Lord Chelmsfords experiences suggested that "native forces" would not fight, but would try to melt away, and how that might have prejudiced their decisions.
Hey Datamiester, Love ur videos. Where, who are the people in your photo at time 10:47? At the lower right corner there is a man with an injured jaw. That might be a picture of Crazy Horse. There are no known pictures of him, but it's known that his jaw was shot thru at one point after an angry husband found him in bed with his wife. :)
If you start out confused about the Battalion being divided and the Divisions being separated you have skewed your whole entire video and premise. Benteen at the RCOI, as well as most others that were at the battle, state at the Crows Nest when Custer came down it was then that Benteen got the advance. After 8 miles with the advance, after getting to a place in the valley that provided protection by the bluffs of prying eyes, it was then that the Divison and separation was made of companies. This is within four and a half miles from the valley by measurement. The two references you use, the book and the III are inaccurate. Starting with skewed information Big Bugs keep white washing the entire thing. As Utley was lazy in saying Custer lost because Indians won. What a crock of arrogance by them Big Bugs. We see that the RCOI is a coverup in just the fact of Benteen's testimony. It is fourteen miles from Crows Nest to Reno Crossing and yet Benteen says that him and Reno were probably separated by fourteen miles at the greatest. So he also says that if you add up his miles, 8 to separation point from Crows Nest, an unspecified distance to morass, then 5 miles to lone tipi and two and a half to where he received message from Martini and then two more to Reno Crossing for .... 18 miles ... Then we can just end his lies with the packs. Join pack or bring pack... He says the packs were 7 miles back but his message said to bring or join pack. He knew they were safe... but a man that can protect a pack train 7 miles away is to be elevated to a world of wonderment. He knew more than everyone and he accepts no blame. Darling and Wagner the III's map that you use is hogwash. I can break out some crayons and make a more accurate map. Keep that book reference out of print. You miss the point that Benteen also said at the RCOI that his first message was from Custer at about a mile and then the second message he was another mile. ALL THE TIME BENTEEN SAYS HE COULD SEE THE GRAY HORSE COMPANY.. AND MOVING AT A TROT. You have the first line of bluffs which are two miles, you skip over the Benteen remark of second line of bluffs at another mile past...all while still seeing Custers command- Godfrey backs up this testimony of always seeing the Gray Horse company- It was after the second bluffs and messages at a total of two miles that a valley was to occur. This is so frustrating watching this video ridge B is 4 3/4 miles from Reno Creek point. Nothing matches up with giving testimony, the might be and the could be and such... start over please.
I believe Custer had every intention of leading a 2nd wave behind Reno. He told Reno he would be supported by the entire command, Reno believed Custer would follow him and there was no reason to keep Reno in the dark if Custer intended to attack from another direction. Custer was an experienced Civil War combat leader and knew the value of using his reserves. In this case, the Indians would react to Reno's attack without knowing Custer and 5 more companies were coming, and Custer could deploy those companies depending on how the Indians were responding. Cooke was Custer's right-hand man and Keogh led the larger of the 2 battalions currently with Custer. They were very valuable to Custer and their presence following behind Reno indicates Custer was coming that way too. And they didn't turn back to rejoin Custer until Gerard shared info with them which he had just learned from the scouts.
I believe Custer dispatched those 2 very trusted officers to observe the Indians' response to Reno's attack and brief Custer when he arrived on the scene just before his "2nd wave" became visible to the Indians. In that way, he could deploy his 5 additional companies before the Indians could prepare for his attack. But Cooke and Keogh found Gerard's news too interesting to wait for Custer to arrive and turned back to inform him. The news changed Custer's mind and he did not follow Reno but rather rode to the north end of the village. That would make sense if he believed the bulk of the warriors were going toward Reno, leaving the village lightly defended. That would allow Custer to either capture the noncombatants to force the surrender of the warriors or else attack the warriors from behind when they focused on Reno to their front. But that would only work if Reno was keeping the Indians busy. That all changed when Reno retreated.
“Wow” is all I can say! I actually visited the battlefield last year, it was quite a treat for a hillbilly from ETN/WNC. I am living for this video series! I really enjoy in-depth videos like this. The amount of research and attention to detail is very impressive. Thank you and keep up the good work!
Your additionally added drone camera views are really very helpful for seeing much more details than from the ground and maps.
I love the little big horn landscape. An ideal landscape for playin hide and seek in an area where a huge native village and an army was difficult to be found and seen.
The scout said, "We are traveling a road we do not know."
I am an admirer of Capt. Beenteen as well. He survived. Should he have been more in a hurry to come to Custer's aid. My answer is "NO!" Following Custer could be more hazardous to your health than smoking cigarettes. Teeming up with Reno and more especially the supply trains was smart indeed. With the supply trains means you don't run out of ammunition which is likely what Custer's troops did. Note: My drill sergeant in 1976 told me he went out on combat patrol in Vietnam and followed instructions and took the eight clips of 20 rounds each. In a Vietnam fire fight this did not last 20 min. He asked others for some of their ammo. "F off was their reply." Be careful about following instructions.
Somebody had to take the blame for the defeat. Thus the two officers Reno and Benteen who survived, had to take the blame and the acquisitions.
After examining what had transpired during the Washita engagement and walking the ground, I came to the conclusion that Custer estimated that Reno would be faced with the delaying actions of the indians from the encampment, that this was a perfect time for him to flank the village and capture the women and children as he had done before. This time the Indians were effected by sitting bulls vision, in effect they believed that if they stood and fought they would win. This coupled with the fact that the Indian pony herds were to the north of the encampment placed a delaying force in the direct path of Custer's command. This allowed the Indians using interior lines to rapidly respond to Custers attempt to gain the camps rear. Based upon a very well conducted archeological examination of the battlefield and forensics of the shell casings, I was surprised at the number of repeating rifles the Indians had. Again Custer's estimate was only 800 braves and statistically that level of opposition would not have been armed so well. The fact that an excess of 2000 were available gave the Indians much more flexibility, especially since they were on the defensive. Custer gambled that with Reno drawing the bulk of the Indian braves to the south of the village he could gain the rear capture a significant number of the women and children, at which time the Indians would comply whit his instructions. He was not crazy, stupid but acted both consistently within his nature and the conditions. His gamble was based on an incorrect assessment of the size of the force he faced and that they had fundamentally changed tactics due to Sitting bulls vision. If you look at the little big horn in isolation you will not see what his intention actually was. What I can say is that Custer's opinion of his scouts and their information never seemed to sink in. I do not think it was arrogance or pride but experience that betrayed Custer, as nearly always the Indians broke camp upon contact.
One more thing the Indians showed great courage in standing and fighting considering they did not know the entire size of Custer's command. Had Custer been the vanguard of a much larger force The battle could have proven disastrous.
Having studied this campaign for 40 some years and read anything I could find on the subject, I completely agree with your assessment. The wildfire in the early 1990's cleared the area and allowed extensive, crime scene type archeological investigation. Custer's tactics (to his knowledge) were sound according to military doctrine at the time. The attack was possibly doomed from the start because of the forced march and fatigue of the 7th's men and horses. Reno's aborted attack on the village and retreat started the failure. Custer apparently tried to attach the middle of the village after splitting off Keogh's battalion but couldn't find a decent ford at Medicine Tail Coulee. There, probably Lt Algernon Smith was shot from his horse, not Custer. Subsequent movements would indicate Custer was still alive and in command. I've always belived Custer stationed Keogh's command to form a skirmish line to wait for Benteen, then went to find another ford to attack the rear of the village and capture non combatants. That was his tactic in the past. The Native Americans pushed Custer further from the river and the rest of his command. Keogh and Calhoun fought well but were outflanked and overrun, the survivors of Company I tried to run after Custer's command which had by that time lost the initiative and was hunkering down. The last part of the fight was probably over quickly with a lot of individual melee fighting.
Also, Benteen's action, while criticized, saved the remainder of the Regiment. Everything Custer knew about fighting Native Americans was fatally wrong that day.
@@jefffranklin4789 No the one astonishing thing he did not know was that the natives had 800 repeating firearms. Once that fact sinks in the fight at custers last stand was short and there is a reason it was so. Benteen did not save the rest of the command, the indian decision to move the camp did, had the Indians decided to make a real fight of it Benteen's command could have been surrounded and dispatched. Walk the ground. If the indians had moved down the reverse slope to the east of Beenteen and come in from the behind (east) the hill top was completely exposed. 10-20 men with repeating rifles could have decimated them. The western slope of the ridge lines are steep on the west and long and shallow on the eastern slope. Native Americans were excelelnt hunters and knew where Benteen was exactly. What they rightly did not know was if there were any other enemy columns in the area.
@@mikekarns5286 I'm not sure we disagree on this. The Native Americans had a variety of weapons including a large number of repeating rifles as evidenced by the archeological finds after the 1990s wildfire. The recovery of spent shell casings showed investigators alot about how the battle flowed and that Custer was indeed outgunned. I also agree that had the Native Americans wanted to press the attack on the Benteen/Reno position, that part of the 7th Cavalry would have been wiped out also. My comment about Benteen's decision is the belief that if Benteen had ridden to Custer, Benteen's battalion would have met the same fate. I agree the Native Americans decided to leave the area, therefore sparing the Benteen/Reno command. The 7th had been soundly defeated and the Benteen/Reno group was in no condition for further fighting. You are correct, they were fortunate the Native Americans left. My son and I are planning a trip there in summer 2024.
Great video, great maps and photos. Hey, I am glad a messenger did NOT go to Custer at the last minute................... it would have been a fatal trip !!!!
What of the possibility that Custer didn't have enough confidence in the "gumption" of Reno, or lack thereof, and had Cooke & Keogh follow a bit to make sure Reno did in fact launch the attack on the village? It was just a few days prior that Custer brought up that Reno made the "mistake of his life" or something to that effect in not following the trail aggressively enough and launching an attack on the Indians. Just a thought. I don't subscribe to the thinking that if someone hates you then you blindly overlook their hatred towards you and proceed to act as if their hatred does not exist. That's a bad thing to have to overcome in a combat situation; office politics to the extreme on the boardgame of life or death on a hot, humid Sunday afternoon. Benteen, Reno and Custer were smart enough to know that they all disliked each other. I think Custer finally realized how much they despised him about twenty minutes before he drew his last breath. They could have made more of an effort to assist Custer, or at least try to draw away some attackers.......they really did nothing, and the Reno case in Chicago oozed of a cover-up the way testimonies were so slanted towards protecting Reno, and thus the Army in general. It wasn't all Custer's fault, contrary to what knee-jerk historians dole-out with their Anti-Custer Prescriptions dressed up as legitimate scholarship. Reno was drunk to some degree at the battle, and this didn't help his lower-percentage of courage required to undertake the task before him. Funny how he wanted to go right away to get Hodgson's body, etc., even expecting others to risk life and limb in the process, yet showed nowhere near that verve-and-vinegar when it came to trying to bail out Ol' Iron Butt. Benteen? He was just a really brave man, a great fighter, and could inspire those around him with his physical courage, but damn, he hated Custer more than the Devil himself, and that hatred clouded what he knew they should have done militarily, which was to at least make a real effort to find out what was going on over there where the gunfire was coming from. His following Weir on the little tiptoe through the tulips jaunt doesn't pass muster compared to what he knew they should have done. No one, other than my former mother-in-law, could hold a grudge to the extreme like Benteen. To really know a man, one must read his innermost thoughts.....in lieu of mind-reading, then letters suffice. To know Benteen, read the Benteen-Goldin letters. There is a treasure-trove of insight into his mentality and the battle itself. Yes, Custer fucked up on many levels, but he did not have the 100% support of two of his key subalterns. That, my friends, is a recipe for disaster on any battlefield. Both Reno & Benteen led basically really tragic, hard lives afterwards, and I think that part of that is due to the deep regret that they knew, deep down, that they didn't do their best on that day in 1876. And it ate them alive. Reno peeking into the Sturgis girl's room, Benteen in Utah, relieving himself on the tent exterior whilst two ladies were standing right inside the tent, etc. Surviving is not always a blessing.
The existence of the standard tactic of attacking an enemy's rear should be enough to make it a plausible explanation of Custer's movements. That is, Custer may have simply intended to attack the warrior force gathering against Reno from the rear. This would explain (as much as seeking non-combatant hostages) Custer's reluctance to become decisively engaged at Medicine Tail ford.
Basically, he stil did not believe the size of the Souix and Cheyanne camp. Yup.
6:15 I admire how Benteen handled his task, had he sent a messenger towards Custer, I'm not so sure that man would've got through
That lone tpee was a family funeral visitation. At least that is what I believe
Custer had attempted Lee's maneuver at Chancellorsville, it did not work this time
Sitting Bull was no Joe Hooker.
IMAGINE....surviving the little big horn only to be shot to death by your own 7th calvary men
1891 Wounded Knee
Truth is stranger than fiction.
great heads up on book I have never heard of, and trying to find them , Many Thanks
Custer's experience was that the Indians would always try to flee. He wanted to prevent this. He did NOT believe they would stand and fight. But that was Custer's nature during the ENTIRE time during the Civil War as well. Many times he would go charging too far and nearly get cut off and surrounded by Confederate Cavalry. Custer knew ONLY attack and boldness ! Unfortunately it was the wrong approach when the Indians had such numbers and were not going to flee but stand and fight!
I don't think Custer wanted to prevent the natives from fleeing. I think the expectation was that they would flee, but the only avenue would lead into Terry'/Gibbon column. In other words, fleeing Indians was the plan.
Great video! I don't agree with the criticism of Benteen for not sending a courier to Custer when he completed his scout. If Custer thought the update of Benteen's scouting was going to be significant he would have included in his orders that Benteenneeded to send a scout back on the status of the scouting. Custer did not do this. As far as Benteen taking it upon himself to send a courier, there was no significant change to Battle Plan to warrant a courier being sent back. Benteen was following his orders to a "T" in that he turned his command around and proceeded towards Custer’s backtrail. In summary, there was nothing “new” to report other than "I am still following your orders.".
Agree. I’d think it’s possible to find out if it was some Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) or doctrine at the time for scouting parties to always send messages back like that, like it appears to be doctrine now/today from the video (at 5:54), or if discretion is allowed. Agree it wouldn’t have impacted the outcome of the day.
This is an interesting debate and we were talking about it at work. It seems like the rule in the military where you report all checkpoints or phase lines regardless of contact is in my mind.
@@MilitaryHistory317 Custer told Benteen to report if he made contact with hostiles which makes sense since Custer would want to know if there were enemy forces to his rear but there was no benefit to getting a report back with information of no importance. Benteen and Custer were separated by 3 to 4 miles when Custer sent his message to Benteen. Neither commander was in visual sight of the other. Benteen had no way of knowing where Custer, or Reno for that matter, were until Custer's messenger made contact with Benteen. Custer had no idea how long the message was going to take because he did not know the exact location of Benteen or if Benteen had made contact and was engaging "hostiles" per his orders. Custer would have had no idea where he was going to be by the time Benteen would arrive which was going to much later because he was instructed to bring the packs. The packs moved about five miles and hour, otherwise known as a fast walking pace. Custer had no idea where he was going to be because he was on the offensive at that time which meant he was in full pursuit of the hostiles. Retired Army NCO here so will add my two cents about rules in the military. I would agree in modern warfare there is a lot more communication due to radios, satellites and networks so situational updates are common practice but when you had mobile units on horseback back then that certainly was not the case. Communication on the battlefield were limited to flags, bugle calls and messengers.
Good video; the communication between the commanders was so bad that this attack was doomed before it started. The recon was almost non existent, the plan was never explained to anyone as Custer was "winging it" so the attack was never going to work. If you follow the distances between the 3 battalions and packs, who arrived at Reno hill around 3pm, and the time it took to ride . Custer and his group were mostly all dead before the Weir movement at 5 pm.
@@daviddougan6961 Absolutely! The battle lasted less than three hours. Benteen had the pack mules. If anyone has ever seen pack mules on riding trips, etc.. you will understand quickly they are the most unwieldly things ever. If Benteen had somehow got immersed in Custer's riding around all over the place, the 120 men with him, the mules and equipment would have been swallowed up by the horde of Indians. Another point along with this is if Reno had ridden another 100 yds. in his charge, he would have been surrounded and those men lost. As there was not defensive position to fall back to, it was all just ride and shoot (or be shot) by all the groups going at the same time. The two groups under Reno and Benteen were extremely lucky that day!
Custer was offered 4 more coys of cavalry that he turned down
The scouts urged either an immediate attack probably with the full reg Custer refused
One of the scouts said if we are probably all going to die if you attack, Custer ignored him
Benteen said "let's keep the reg together" Custer shooed him away
The only other commanding officer to make these many mistakes was MacArthur.
Custer's point of view seemed to have been, "Whatever I don't know couldn't be knowledge.""
Beware the delusion of superior intellect, you may be acting on incomplete or deceptive information. Custer made mistakes, but his action on the east cavalry field at gettysburg disrupted General Lees plan for the 3rd day and the complete campaign. And when you listen to detractors of MacArthur, you betray that your perception and understanding are limited. There is always much much more to any historical event. You miss the actual strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese. To say Custer was dumb degrades the actual native american leaders. No one could have predicted that the indians would have 800 repeating rifles in their camp.
Great job!! U are tops. :) I fault GAC sending Benteen off on his scout, he should have just sent 2 scouts and not divided his command at that point, especially in light of the Washita encampments and how a small command that went off was wiped out. I also fault GAC for not taking the extra Cav. company's he was offered, as well as the Gatling guns. Of course Crook takes a huge hit for going on vacation and never sending out scouts to inform GAC of the situation. I also have to condemn the practice during this action by the 7th to defile all Indian Graves they came upon, bad JuJu. Kudos to your fine work. :)
Hi Jay. I am going to insert a "What would General Crook have done" into one of the vids. I firmly believe Crook would not have turned down any firepower.
Those Gatling guns were not machine guns, but were as heavy and unwieldy as cannons, the limber heavy to match. Imagine hauling those up and down the ridges and valleys around the LBH, which was already hard work. In fact a cavalry patrol just previously had had terrible trouble with Gatling guns in similar terrain, at one point a gun carriage having got out of control rolled over and injured two or three troopers, and on another occasion the limbers had to be dismantled and the guns hauled up on ropes.
@@drstrangelove4998 That is all true.:)
Thank you for this video .
I bumped heads with Wagner, on a forum, decades ago. Regardless, I still highly recommend his book The Strategy of Defeat at LBH. The book adds so much to the discussion.
Our dispute concerned Custer not being supported by the 2 subordinate wings. I think I took the side of the wings not having the ability to assist. Probably. Can't remember.
Excellent book nevertheless. Bit advanced. Get the basic stuff first SOTMS, etc then Fred's book.
Wagner seemed full of himself and unanswerable, but if he referenced the book and map shown in this video as a source then you can understand that the BIg Bugs just dont get it. Just sad.
Thus, Capt. Benteen, with a little over 120 men and separated from Custer's force , was to search for - and 'pitch into' - an enemy force of undetermined size which could have included hundreds of warriors. In the event Benteen was attacked, the valleys and increasing distance between Benteen and Custer likely would have masked any sound of firing. Custer would not even have been aware that Benteen was in combat and that he would have needed assistance. As a result, Custer would have lost about one-quarter of his forces.
True, And my opinion is that George had no interest in what might happen to Benteen. Custer was interested in what Custer wanted, an outcome of his desires, and should not have been there until his Commander arrived in the area.
@@user-kt8yd6we4e Online, one can read the proceedings of the Inquiry into the battle of the LBH. Major Reno requested the Army to conduct it in order to clear his name.
Burning the tepee, caused great anger to the natives
Very good video.
I talked to Custer yesterday morning. He said he fucked up.
😂😂--He say anything about apologizing to the scout for dismissing his advice to stick together?
@@THINKincessantly nothing
Hello sir, I really enjoy your videos on Battle of little big horn. What type of program did you use to create the list of soldiers? I am viewing on an iPhone and cannot copy the link from my phone to find it. Was it excel or something else. Thank you for the videos!
I used a software called R. It can be a bit of a hassle to see the Dashboard on a mobile device. If you have a desktop or laptop give it a try. I do need to investigate adding mobile capability!
I find this confusion between divided troops and the troops separated. The Big Bugs got it wrong. Custer as an experienced balloonist from the potomac while fighting in the Civil War knew how to assess terrain from heights, this along with all his other combat skills and ability to assess the situation would not send Benteen off to a scout at the top of the mountains. Go to the Crows Nest and see the divides and realize that Custer could assess the terrain much better than that. Benteen lied about distances, where he separated and the lone tipis. even that is located so far away that no man could say "there is your Indians running like devils" from the location speculated at. These Big Bugs did not have satellite nor Google Earth to assess distances and terrains. This desire to use books written by someone that was not there to reference is silly. People forget that Custer gave the lead at the division of troops to whoever got their part of the command prepared first. Benteen turned around after a few steps and claimed the advance by proclaiming his troops were ready. Custer went twice to Benteen to slow the pace. Where is this referenced in the visual aid? The Division of troops and the separation of troops are two different things. You will see that the morass and tipi are much closer to the bottoms and the separation closer to Reno Crossing. Not so hard to do because everyone at the RCOI gave testimony describing the location of lone tipi from Reno Crossing and also in that you will find the morass as well as the Camp notes give a better map of the Morass and tipi location and neither are represented in this video.
Good answer! Hmmm...why does no one ever mention that there was a clearly visible trail leading off to the Southwest from the lone tepee/Crook/ Rosebud fight village campsite ( the tribes did not cross the lbh where Reno did but at a better Ford to the Southwest) see Wooden Leg and Marquis maps. Hmm, and Terry's report of the battle dated June 27 states that Benteen was 2 miles TO THe LEFT of Reno when the fight started.
Food for thought.
What???
Where is episode #4?
MMM.... Where is the Data Base? Nice presentation.
With all of the firing, how many rounds would the troopers have exhausted versus what they normally carried? Were they ever resupplied? Was Custer out of ammunition and overwhelmed? Were any weapons found and if so did they still contain ammunition?
50 carbine rounds on their person and another 50 in the saddlebags. There are some who say that ammunition shortage led to the collapse, but that seems speculative at best.
@@MilitaryHistory317
Same excuse that was used at Isandlwana, even though the evidence for it was anecdotal.
It's also interesting that both in Custer's and Lord Chelmsfords experiences suggested that "native forces" would not fight, but would try to melt away, and how that might have prejudiced their decisions.
@@richardcowling7381 Re Custer and Lord Chelmsford, everything they "knew" about fighting "natives" was wrong in their respective defeats.
Hey Datamiester, Love ur videos. Where, who are the people in your photo at time 10:47? At the lower right corner there is a man with an injured jaw. That might be a picture of Crazy Horse. There are no known pictures of him, but it's known that his jaw was shot thru at one point after an angry husband found him in bed with his wife. :)
Lt George Daniel Wallace
If you start out confused about the Battalion being divided and the Divisions being separated you have skewed your whole entire video and premise. Benteen at the RCOI, as well as most others that were at the battle, state at the Crows Nest when Custer came down it was then that Benteen got the advance.
After 8 miles with the advance, after getting to a place in the valley that provided protection by the bluffs of prying eyes, it was then that the Divison and separation was made of companies. This is within four and a half miles from the valley by measurement.
The two references you use, the book and the III are inaccurate. Starting with skewed information Big Bugs keep white washing the entire thing. As Utley was lazy in saying Custer lost because Indians won. What a crock of arrogance by them Big Bugs. We see that the RCOI is a coverup in just the fact of Benteen's testimony. It is fourteen miles from Crows Nest to Reno Crossing and yet Benteen says that him and Reno were probably separated by fourteen miles at the greatest. So he also says that if you add up his miles, 8 to separation point from Crows Nest, an unspecified distance to morass, then 5 miles to lone tipi and two and a half to where he received message from Martini and then two more to Reno Crossing for .... 18 miles ... Then we can just end his lies with the packs. Join pack or bring pack... He says the packs were 7 miles back but his message said to bring or join pack. He knew they were safe... but a man that can protect a pack train 7 miles away is to be elevated to a world of wonderment. He knew more than everyone and he accepts no blame. Darling and Wagner the III's map that you use is hogwash. I can break out some crayons and make a more accurate map. Keep that book reference out of print.
You miss the point that Benteen also said at the RCOI that his first message was from Custer at about a mile and then the second message he was another mile. ALL THE TIME BENTEEN SAYS HE COULD SEE THE GRAY HORSE COMPANY.. AND MOVING AT A TROT.
You have the first line of bluffs which are two miles, you skip over the Benteen remark of second line of bluffs at another mile past...all while still seeing Custers command- Godfrey backs up this testimony of always seeing the Gray Horse company- It was after the second bluffs and messages at a total of two miles that a valley was to occur.
This is so frustrating watching this video ridge B is 4 3/4 miles from Reno Creek point. Nothing matches up with giving testimony, the might be and the could be and such... start over please.