Lessons from the Paris Peace Conference - Michael Neiberg
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- čas přidán 19. 06. 2024
- “To bed, sick of life.” With these words, British diplomat Harold Nicolson ended the diary he kept at the Paris Peace Conference. This lecture will provide an introduction to the problems that Nicolson and many others saw in the Treaty of Versailles. Most people came away disillusioned, convinced that the treaty did not do enough to justify the sacrifices of the war or set a foundation for a future of peace. What lessons can we learn from the conference and the peace treaties it produced?
Presented during Modern Foundations: The Treaty of Versailles and American Philanthropy, a WWI Centennial Symposium at the Palace of Versailles on June 28, 2019.
For more information about the National WWI Museum and Memorial visit theworldwar.org
Love his lectures
I love this presentation. To paraphrase “ never in the field of human endeavor have so many great men done such a disservice to mankind while trying to do good”
Excellent talk! One conclusion that the end of WW I may have been 1989 was very interesting to ponder.
Ho Chi Minh was there to plead his case for Vietnamese self-determination. Don't think he got past the parking lot.
That was after WW2. Ho Chi Minh reached out to Truman for independence. France fell to shambles because of Germany so Japan invaded French colonial Vietnam.
Outstanding presentation, should be a “must see” for anyone learning/studying WWI..thank you sir.
Brilliant talk. Great speaker.
The David Llyoyd George part (at 17:54 ) is great. One of the highlights is "I don't think I did to badly, considering I was seated between Jesus Christ and Napoleon."
The so called Polish Corridor was mostly populated by Poles.
The Polish delegation to the conference presented that clearly. They showed German phone books from the region with majority of Polish names in them. Gdańsk was mostly populated by Germans. Hence it became a free city (for the second time in history btw.)
Not to mention, poles and other ethnicities than german have been threatened during all those postwar census.
But Poles have occasionnally been dicks after the independance as well.
The land given to Poland in the Polish Corridor was German land and should not have been handed to Poland. All it did was help foment one more reason for WW2.
Clémenceau did not just "care far less" than Lloyd George for the empire, he cared not at all as he was an avowed anti-imperialist.
I am reading Dance of the Furies. It is an excellent book.
Quite brilliant.
At the turn of the century (1900) the Ottoman Empire was "the sick man of Europe".
By the 1930s, the new "sick men" were London and Paris, desperately trying to hold on to empires, long after the days of "empires" were over.
It was a bed they made for themselves at Versailles, and in 1939 they had to sleep in it.
In 1919 there were 2 who were not invited, and in 1939 there were 2 (note, *two,* not one) who challenged "the system" set up at Versailles...
Stalin gave Hitler a "blank cheque" to invade Poland.
Hitler gave Stalin a "blank cheque" to invade Poland.
And there was another world war.
"By the 1930s, the new "sick men" were London and Paris, desperately trying to hold on to empires"
And of course Germany, not only clinging to her Empire, but actively seeking to expand it.
Factual error: 11:30 the map on the left pictures the Kingdom of Hungary (inside the Habsburg Monarchy) and only the left is a map of Romania.
great lecture and smart observations. I wonder if there would also be a section to discuss how both the French and British colonized the Middle East and grabbed the oil. it would be great is someone be honest about it for a change. as it stands, the blood shed in those parts is still going on. Thank you again.
1919: "Let's end all wars. Let's start by not inviting everybody..."
Yup, that'll satisfy them permanently.
Why was there such a military tradition in germanian countries vs. other countries?
The treaty was the biggest cock up in modern times!
No, it was intentional.
It was divide and rule.
A divide and rule strategy must be unfair, in order to divide people.
i understand the reason for the Polish Corridor because they had been screwed over so many times in the past. But I don't understand the stated justification of allowing Poland access to the Baltic. The Poles had no cultural tradition as a sea power. Also, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were not given access to the sea.
I think Czechoslovakia was just so far away from a sea that access was too unrealistic. And while Poland had some historical precedent of sea access in its previous history as a state, Bohemia, the historical predecessor of Czechoslovakia, did not.
As for Austria and Hungary, they were viewed by the Allies as belligerents and thus in some sense "punished" or at least not as actively catered to as the Poles or especially the Serbs, who were the greatest beneficiaries of the dismemberment of Austria Hungary as a result of the war. Hungary also had restrictions placed on its military similar to Germany with the Treaty of Trianon.
That's my layman's attempt at an explanation anyways.
Poland had no cultural tradition of sea power. But we understood the importance of free access to the Sea in order to export our products. As had been done by Poles between 1466 and 1772.
What are you talking about? Historically, Poland had had access to the Baltic Sea for about 700 years. Before they lost it during the Polish partitions.
21:50-forgot Schleswig-Holstein?
Le Tigre said describing Woody, "God only had 10."....... hahahahahahahahahah
Wiki: "Article 231 was one of the most controversial points of the treaty. It specified: 'The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected *as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.' (end of)"*
The pathetic intention behind the highlighted clause is an obvious attempt by those powers who did not avoid the war, at "washing own hands in innocence".
The clause highlighed sorta sounds like "poor innocent little us had a war forced upon poor innocent us, which was totally and wholy unexpectedly", even though it was a war of choice (aka "preventive war") allround, for all the great powers.
*There were no innocents amongst any of the major powers.*
Although the article doesn't mention the word "guilt", the fact that it stated "imposed upon (us)" without acknowledging own responsibility, means that by exclusion they might have well have stated "it's all your fault".
Today, the formulation usually found acceptable for the new post-2000 generation of historians re. "Who started it?" is "No one nation is entirely at fault for WW1" (with the added "although Germany bears more guilt than others" sometimes added).
*If that is as close to the truth as one can get today, it was also true in 1914.*
The way the "winners" tried to absolve themselves "per signature" in 1919 was truly cowardly.
An exercise in "washing hands in innocence" at a time those in power knew what they had done (enter into preventive war, either by declaration, or deceit).
They had sent millions to their deaths, and were not wiling to accept any responsibility themselves.
Suggestion: Stay away from such leaders. Support of such "pass the buck"-turncoats and opportunists will do nobody any good.
Lesson learnt?
I fear not.
Article 231 was arguably not clearly written and was considered by revisionists as an offensive moral judgment which was NOT its intent. The US delegates (Norman Davis and J Foster Dulles) who drafted the article as an introduction to the section on reparations considered it as a pure technicality, yet it was not clear whether they drew from civil responsibility or tort law. A perhaps not so subtle difference but with undue consequences.
The only material question, that was included in Wilson's 14 points and which most German's accepted in principle, was that something had to be done to provide reparations for Belgium and France where most fighting had taken place.
In the end, IMHO, the tragic side of the debate was that this "guilt" question was used efficiently to finesse away from the payment of reparations. So France (and Belgium) is left with all the damages and the only issue apparently is to pity Germany because its ego is bruised.
The separation between mainland Germany and East Prussia with the Polish corridor was the surest way to guarantee another war in the near future, was it intentional? Probably.
Around 14:30 ....the old "poor France" narrative.
[From wiki]
"In 1913, it had been announced that Poincaré would visit St. Petersburg in July 1914 to meet Tsar Nicholas II. Accompanied by Premier René Viviani, Poincaré went to Russia for the second time (but for the first time as president) to reinforce the Franco-Russian Alliance. On 15 July, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Leopold von Berchtold, informed foreign countries through a back-channel of Austria-Hungary's intention to present an ultimatum to Serbia.[24] When Poincaré arrived in St. Petersburg on 20 July, the Russians told him by 21 July of the Austrian ultimatum and German support for Austria.[24] Although Prime Minister Viviani was supposed to be in charge of French foreign policy, *Poincaré promised the Tsar unconditional French military backing for Russia against Austria-Hungary and Germany.[25]"*
Yup, sounds like a "blank cheque" to me...
[Continued]
*"In his discussions with Nicholas II, Poincaré talked openly of winning an eventual war, not avoiding one.[21]"*
So much for the "we just want peace" narrative...
[Continued]
*"Later, he attempted to hide his role in the outbreak of military conflict and denied having promised Russia anything.[21]"*
Yup. Straight out denial.
[From wiki]
The leaders of France could have avoided the developing "3rd Balkan War" from turning into the "Continental European War"-phase, by declaring their neutrality. Note, without endangering their own population, or security interests.
Just like in 1908, they could have stayed out of Balkan issues.
They didn't want to.
So they got the war they wanted.
And Germany could have (/should have?) told Austria-Hungary to deal with it on their own. There would be no further story to tell following that simple little decision.
Edit : Those two got the war they wanted ... (plus some)
"So much for the "we just want peace" narrative...
"
Which states were in favour of the proposed peaceful mediation of the crisis, and which states were opposed to it? (Hint : 2 states were opposed to peaceful mediation)
France didn't want peace. They wanted Revanche.
Trees hiding the forest.
WW1 and WW2 are caused by german militarism. Both of them.
Punctum.
Germany declared war first against Russia at a time when Russia had not even declared War on Austria-Hungary. Germany also declared War on France first and invaded neutral Belgium and Luxembourg. So even if France had really given a "blank cheque" to Russia it would 't matter since Germany was the one who declared war first against everybody.
The idiotic idea of giving Poland the Polish Corridor so it could survive by access to the sea was short sighted. If the Poles couldn't survive without access to the sea, which they didn't previously have anyway, they should have ceased to exist.
to guess if the treaty of Versailles is deemed good or bad you have the look the last name of the historian talking,
if it has a German origin guess what...The treaty was terrible and the allies are guilty of stupidity and responsible for WW2
The problem was not the Versailles treaty by the fact two of the main three designers of the treaty did not care about enforcing it.
Actually there is some younger German historiography that argues the Versailles Treaty was if anything *too mild*
The Allies should have driven all the way to Berlin and divided and occupied Germany like they did the second time, and that's the real failure of the Treaty of Versailles.
Easier said than done. We saw time after time that offensives floundered due to the the logistical difficulties caused by extended supply lines. Perhaps the US could have provided the resources but how much appetite was there to spend more American blood and treasure. As it was we lost 100k lives in a brief few months in the European meat grinder. Sadly the tragedy of WW1
and the aftermath could have been avoided in 1914. After that events overtook the sense of the societies at large. Madness. Industrial scale madness.
The German army was collapsing. Hunter Ligget thought it was a few weeks from vanishing entirely - so a push to Berlin would have been possible.
The allies were not capable of that. Germany was never miltary defeated! They signed an armistice in Nov 1918 7 months later they wakeup one morning to learn they accepted the Versaille doctrine onto an entire nation!
@@CJ87317 No, not at all. The U.S. was ousted by Germany in reality. Great Britan was actually almost finished in 1917. France was defeated. It was only the U.S. economic resources amd fighting men that prevented an all out German victory!
The real failure of the treaty of Versailles was that there had been no such World War before and therefore no prior treaty with so vast a scope!
Clemenceau wanted a reverse of the 1970 peace treaty with Germany (he was thirty when this latter treaty was signed); Wilson was obsessed with principles (his 14 points and the SdN); Lloyd George was navigating between his electorate and pragmatism, with an eye on Empire; Orlando was bent on aggrandizing Italian territory. None of the big four, and their entourage was bent on helping Germany reconstruct itself - and actually Germany was not destructed, she was broke!
As has been noted in other comments, the real failure was not the Treaty itself but what has been done with it in the following years.
The French were not bent on revenge: they had achieved it; but they believed, mistakenly, that Germany could be put down in the future as a dominant military power; and after pushing for a treaty aiming to achieve that, they tried to implement it.
The British, as soon as the peace Treaty was signed, went back to their equilibrium game and to propping up Germany as a counterweight to France in the European theater.
The Americans, having been severely burnt dipping their toes in the 1918 cauldron (50'000 KIA, 200'000 WIA, and another 60'000 dead from other causes including Spanish flu), decided not to ratify the 1919 Treaty of Guarantee - washing their hands from implementation of the Versailles Treaty and leaving French foreign policy in the lurch for the next twenty years. In addition, the British took the opportunity to escape from this Treaty of Guarantee, although they had ratified it.
The German economy recovered quickly after the war, and it has been demonstrated that it could have repaid the war reparations over a reasonable number of years. The French had insisted for reparations in kind - expecting to wreck the German economy - which was definitely a wrong move since the Germans did replace obsolete equipment with brand new, obtained from loans through US and UK banks!
If reparations had been focused on repairing the war damages, instead of being purportedly a 'punishment' of the Germans for their 'guilt', the burden of reparations would have been more palatable to German public opinion. As it was, reparations - which British public opinion had required as stridently as the French - were hated and were to poison implementation of the Treaty.
In 1870, the heavy reparations required by the Prussians had been repaid by the French within two years, through a National Call for Bonds subscribed by private citizens. But, in 1919, the German private citizen's fortunes had presumably been invested over four years of National Calls into War Bonds, now worthless: this solution was impossible!
The mystery for me - and I wish a good book could dissipate it - is Gustav Stresemann. Has he been a true believer in a cooperation with the French (Briand) to further the cause of peace, but thwarted by Poincaré? Or, on the contrary, has he been a 'finassierer' (trickster) aiming to dismantle at all costs the Versailles treaty and in particular organizing (with H. Schacht) an insolvency of Germany, at the risk of paving the way to the Nazis?
More qualified historians that I am may give an answer.