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How the Japanese Navy Planned to Win at Leyte Gulf
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- čas přidán 12. 08. 2024
- In October 1944, the Battle of the Leyte Gulf rages. In this video we look at how the Japanese Navy prepared to fight the battle, and whether it believed it could actually win.
Bibliography
Krause, Richard Lee. “The Iron and Steel Industry in Wartime Japan, 1931-1945.” Dissertation, East Central State College , 1968.
Laurier, Jim. The Philippine Sea 1944: The Last Great Carrier Battle. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2017.
O’Brien, Phillips Payson. How the War was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied victory in World War II. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022.
Prados, John. Storm Over Leyte: The Philippine Invasion and the Destruction of the Japanese Navy. NY, NY: NAL Caliber, 2016.
Woodward, C. Vann, Evan Thomas, and Ian W. Toll. The Battle for Leyte Gulf: The Incredible Story of World War II’s Largest Naval Battle. New York, NY: Skyhorse Publishing, 2017.
I wonder if the Japanese people wondered why their successes in battle kept occurring closer and closer to Japan.
Hahaha nice one. I love this type of humor 😂
Or even earlier.
IJN: Finally we have destroyed the entire US Aircraft Carrier force
Enterprise and Saratoga: That's odd. We're still here.
IJN: How are you still alive.
Enterprise: Pure vengence
Saratoga: Honestly your Torpedoes were more of a blessing than a curse.
IJN: No matter we defeated you once. We can do it again.
Enterprise: But before you do.
Saratoga: We bought some new friends
(Essex and Independence-Class carriers show up)
IJN: Uh Oh
Saratoga: Oh that's not the worst part. You remember my sister Lexington?
Enterprise: And my sisters Yorktown and Hornet. Along with my part sister Wasp?
IJN: Yeah, why?..... Oh no.
USS Pennsylvania: Remember me...or more importantly.....My sister.....Arizona. *boss music begins*
@@Deadxman616 USS Pennsylvania: you should have gone for the head.
I wonder how many Japanese people thought they would lose.
It’s worth mentioning that American submarines utterly gutted Japan’s sea lanes for supply. For an island nation, this is bad. Somehow, Japan never came to terms with the submarine threat. I think they consider it, nowadays. The point being: had they somehow rebuilt all of their carriers, air wing and all, the subs would still have choked them to death.
It was partly a case of them never having to deal with ASW before, while the British had extensive knowledge from WW1 (and promptly shared with America)
By the time American submarines had working Torpedoes it was too late
@@logion567and because the Mark14 was useless garbage, they hadn't even realized the gravity of the situation until it was too late. They never had any time to develop effective ASW procedures. In the early part of the war, before the USN tonnage became overwhelming, the torpedo situation hid how dangerous the submarine threat was. By the time the torpedoes were fixed, the absolutely overwhelming number of USN submarines in theater made it impossible to develop anything effective to counter them.
Don't forget the impact made by mines dropped from B-29's.
czcams.com/video/pNds7Z3EIag/video.htmlsi=PQCCxSJpdKt0RGia
@@rolltidered1641 US military "take an L without turning it into a W by accident" challenge (impossible)
I’m no expert, but I read that there was an institutional bias against submarines in the IJN. They saw ASW as “lacking in glory.” There was very little actual cooperation between the Japanese and the Nazis. German navy liaisons would have given them an earful on submarine warfare. All and still, neglecting the submarine threat is incredible negligence. It can be hard to believe that such fundamental “whoopsies” can happen at the highest level, but they do (lookin at you, all Americans behind the Iraq invasion).
By this point it really was a case of "And here's an analysis of our military situation, summed up in one rude word."
Love the Mitchell & Webb reference!
"You wouldn't mind just doing me a quick 'Heil, Doenitz,' would you? Just so I could say I had one?"
“The most the Japanese could hope for was a miracle.” This is consistent with Japanese culture. When they started the war, one Japanese leader (his name is escaping me) said it was like a leap off Mt. Tateyama. The only possible outcome was death and they knew it but their culture preferred that to any other course of action.
It is also worth mentioning the critical importance of the number of critical decisions in the build up to war that were made by people without both the clarity/ability to see the full picture and awareness of that shortcoming
@@JDBlack3347I would say that a lot of people started wars that way. Nazi Germany for one obvious example. Some of the wars with Israel according to what I have read. Desert storm. Etc. What do you think?
He (I have also forgotten his name!) said "to jump off the stage at Kiyomizu" which is a reference to an old belief that if you jumped off the elevated stage at that temple and survived, you'd be granted a wish. Before the practice was banned, a couple hundred people did it and MOST SURVIVED. He wasn't saying that war was suicidal, he was saying dangerous risks must be taken to gain great rewards.
It not as every Japanese wanted the same end as their soldiers.
@@jtadevichVietnam, Korea , Falkland Islands, Afghanistan ( both Russia and America ) Ukraine and what would appear Gaza .
There is a pattern it seems .
The Imperial Japanese Navy was really screwed by this point in 1944. Especially after the disaster of the Battle of the Philippine Sea in mid-1944. The expected American invasion of the Philippines *had* to be resisted. If the US took control there, then the shipping lanes for strategic materials in the Dutch East Indies would be cut off. They were forced to fight a battle that they knew they couldn't win. The US Navy in 1944 had grown into a gigantic monster. By the time WWII ended, the USN would be larger than all other navies in the world combined. It was nuts.
It truly is crazy to think the US at one point only had one operational carrier in the Pacific and just a short two years later would enter the Battle of Leyte Gulf with over 35 (even if half of those were escort carriers).
Not just larger than all other navies combined.
USN was 2 times larger than all other navies combined.
Yes true. That’s why the IJN blew it in 1942 at Midway.
Years ago a friend lent me a book about the aces of WW2. One of the things it talked about was the US policy of "retiring" pilots from active combat after the reached a certain number of hours and/or kills. They would then be shuffled back home to take part in training the next batch of pilots. This ensured that good pilots were able to pass on their skills and tactics to the new guys.
Contrarily, Germany and Japan tended to fly their pilots until they were killed, which did not give them as much time to pass on their knowledge to the raw recruits.
Also, I think Mitsuo Fuchida was one of the pilots who apologized for his actions at Pearl Harbor (perhaps the only one).
Yeah if you look at the records, Americans rarely surpassed 30 air victories.
American doctrine in the World Wars would rather have 10 good pilots than 1 Ace of Aces.
The old film Sergeant York about the legendary Alvin York who was awarded the MoH in World War I for single-handedly killing or capturing an entire German Company is the perfect example of this doctrine.
Even in Basic Training he was noted for being an excellent marksman, so what did the Drill Sergeants do? Immediately offer him an NCO position and become a marksmanship instructor.
The US was the most adaptable and logical fighting force, knowing that they started behind everyone else in both wars and knew they had to be the quickest in learning.
Torpedo bomber pilot Takeshi Maeda also apologized for bombing Pearl Harbor. Compare that to America's Vietnam veterans, not ONE who has gone to Vietnam and apologized for their complicity in that terrible crime.
Because not a war crime
Even if Japan (and Germany for that matter) had rotated skilled pilots back to instructor positions, there was still the issue of fuel and other resources, and the pressure of bombers not waiting for the next class of trainees to pass through a full fledged flight school.
HUGE ADVANTAGE!
It appears that Vice Admiral Ugaki still had not quite figured out how USS Washington (and the utterly invaluable Admiral Lee) had been able to *execute* IJN Kirishima without needing to turn searchlights on or anything, even two years later. Nor had he been able to figure out any of their other night losses that shouldn't have happened to a 'superior night fighting force.' It also appears that Ugaki hadn't been talking to the Germans or Italians much. The US Navy was extremely fortunate to have Admiral Lee and men like him - and the IJN got the Anti-Lee instead.
I think Vice admiral ugaki have severe case of boomerism
Just imagine if radars were not invented. thats my only wish so i could learn what type of battles would be the most confusing
Admiral "Ching" Lee was an Olympic quality gun nut. Nimitz deliberately chose him because he knew that Lee would devastate the Japanese with his dead eye gunnery, tactical intelligence, and agressiveness. And Adm Lee did just that.
@@c7042 Not to mention his uncanny understanding of radar, yes.
@@c7042 Damn, to find out he died not shortly after the war's end too.
Actually before the Marianas were taken (and for a number of months afterwards while the airstrips were being built) the issue of Japanese receiving the needed materials for production was due to the issues of the Mark 14 torpedo finally being solved and the US Submarine Fleet waging Unrestricted Warfare on the Japanese Merchant Fleet which unlike the US & UK never properly convoyed their ships.... until it was way beyond too late!
"The Japanese government announced to the public a major victory over the allies." Every totalitarian regime has its own version of Baghdad Bob.
Saw another user in this comments section who wondered if the Japanese people noticed that the 'victories' over the Allies were happening closer and closer to home
Spot on, which makes one wonder when the Biden Regime claimed that the pull out of Afghanistan was an overwhelming success, this sort of fits the mold 🙃
saw that too. ;-) @@tiagodecastro2929
The United States military continued to see a light at the end of the tunnel despite being stuck in a perpetual war of attrition during the Vietnam War.
@@SeattlePioneerThe Vietnam war was a huge shitshow for both sides
One thing I really love about these and "Operations Room" videos is that they show the incredible amount of math involved in war and battles. Lots of unsung war heros in dimly lit rooms armed with pencils, paper, slide rules and maps. Stuff like how much fuel to do such and such, and how little fuel to lower the weight of a plane and so on.
slide rule. What is slide rule ?
@@michaelmccarty3978 If you haven't found it yet; It's an older instrument that looks like a ruler but has a sliding section in the middle a "ruler-within-a- ruler" and sometimes called a "Slapstick" or mechanical computer/calculator. The top and bottom are marked with letters and numbers and the slider in the middle. They were used mainly for multiplication and division, not for addition or subtraction. They were also used by gunners to solve the problems of their shooting triangle, and Astronauts Neil Armstrong & Buzz Aldrin used Slide Rules on their moon missions.
"Naval officers were dumbfounded that Toyoda's plan was not predicated on doing battle with the enemy's strongest warships."
Japan really going all-in on the "my face is bleeding on your fist" school of combat, here.
TBF that makes sense at first glance.Crippling their offensive power gives you free reign.The problem was that the situation had deteriorated too much.
The Japanese had been planning for one big decisive battle for half a generation. Their entire naval officer corp grew up with the idea. The Long Lance torpedo, night fighting tactics, and naval composition was built on the idea.
Midway was supposed to be that decisive battle, and when it didn't work out they were in denial that the opportunity had passed.
@@RCAvhstape Everything was supposed to be that decisive battle and they had these overly complicated plans.
Midway was supposed to be the decisive battle, but Yamamoto splits his forces to draw off parts of the American fleet. This in spite of the fact that Japanese doctrine held that the larger the air group, the better.
And even that was useless because Americans only needed to hold on until their industry rolled out enough ships for it not to matter.
@@recoil53 And the Japanese knew that. They were gambling that if they beat the Americans bad enough in a decisive battle that the US would basically give up and decide the fight wasn't worth it. Miscalculation for the time, American society being what it was then.
I love this channel because it gives me a lot of perspective on the reasons for the apparently self-destructive decisions by the Japanese military late in the war. Deciding to gamble the entire navy on a single battle makes a lot more sense in the context of them knowing that failure to engage just about guaranteed the navy being rendered inoperable.
While the Japanese were scrounging every pound of steel and aluminum for ships and airplanes they could, the US Navy was sailing ice cream ships around to make sure every sailor had that little extra morale boost in a dry navy. If that doesn't capture the lopsided logistics of the late conflict, I don't know what does.
I can't be 100%, but one of the old WW2 movies (I think about the battle of the bulge) had a German general looking at captured US troop possessions and he made a comment along the similar lines regarding the shipping of Christmas comforts.
@@TheEvilmooseofdoomwasn’t that scene about them finding fresh birthday cake in a US supply truck?
They should've known the game was up when the US could casually build ice cream barges while fighting a two front total war.
“…and the Americans come over the ridge armed with flamethrowers and ice cream. *Maybe* you’re on the wrong side of that argument.”
- Fat Electrician, in his video covering the significance of ice cream in WW2
Who cares. Every country in this world has ice cream barges.
@@phantomship3935 for the ignorant and uninitiated in the crowd: no. Not every country’s military has barges specifically designed to produce ice cream for an entire theater of war. What makes this such a truly impressive feat is that the United States has the logistical capabilities to maintain a total war in every theater of WW2 whilst simultaneously supplying an entire theater with fresh ice cream 2000 miles from home. Meanwhile the Japanese are fighting on their own front doorstep and they’re having to ration every crumb and drop of water they can find.
@@Aredel How can you tell, when the Japanese invade South-East Asia with no problem? (even it’s bigger than the German did)
You look the Japanese down too much, their logistics is not bad as British, they even supplied any kinds at Guadalcanal. (The Fact is, the Americans captured an intact Japanese ice cream machine in some places)
@@phantomship3935 because if you open any kind of history book ever, read any first hand accounts / interviews from soldiers on the ground or in the command structure on both sides, or pick up any source whatsoever about the Pacific Theater, then you would know that Japan struggled throughout the entire war to maintain its logistics once the US was involved. Yes, they managed to invade southeastern Asia, but none of those islands were being defended by any significant naval forces, and were garrisoned by token militias and colonial divisions. Against an actual peer opponent, Japan was incredibly incompetent at protecting their supply lines and providing basic supplies and equipment to their garrisons and invading armies. There are countless reports of Japanese soldiers having to scavenge, pillage and steal food in the majority of their occupied islands once the Americans landed. Iwo Jima in particular is one of the worst instances, as the island had no freshwater sources and needed to import clean water from the mainland.
As far as British logistics were concerned, the UK maintained steady shipments of steel, aluminum and oil from their colonies across the entire world, enough to keep the RAF, the RN and the Royal Armies supplied through the entire war in every theater they fought in.
Any plan that didn't include Gojira wrecking the US Fleet was doomed to fail...
That plan couldn' t exist before Hiroshima y Nagasaki.
@@gn3441 So it was doomed from the beginning then.🙂
@@scottgiles7546They were doomed the moment they attacked pearl harbor and other nations such as Britain and Netherlands occupied areas they knew they NEVER stood a chance cause they were weak compare to western nations but they gambled by attacking the us and joining with Germany which gave them the confidence to attack.
The subtitles keep talking about admiral Toyota, so the brand's combat experience did not start with all those Hilux in the desert it seems
FYI: the Japanese surname is usually romanized as _Toyoda._ The family business Toyoda Industries was also spelled like this back when it started making automatic looms, but changed its name in the 1930s for good luck ("toyota" takes 8 brush strokes to write out, while "toyoda" takes 9), convenience ("toyota" is simpler to write and clearer to pronounce in Japanese), and marketing ("toyoda" means "fertile rice paddies," and they wanted to be associated with something more modern than rice farming).
(The admiral is unrelated to the car company, though.)
From the makers of the indestructible pickups 🛻
"I got a plan, John."
"You always got a plan Toyoda."
"This is a good one."
"I don't doubt it"
Ah... But is it a cunning one...?
TAHITI
You can't fight superior war production, you can't fight change
Even if Taffey 3 had not stopped the Center Force, the Americans still would have defeated the Japanese Fleet in the Philippines. The casualties would have been greater, but once Halsey realized what was happening, he would have circled his fleet carriers southward. Hundreds of naval aircraft would have then decimated the Japanese battleships and cruisers.
As it was the results of the overall battle were devestating (Musashi, so many cruisers, etc lost, all the survivors damaged..)
There needs to be a full documentary about Taffy 3
@@garysofko What do you consider a full documentary on Taffy 3? I have a feeling we'll get one in the next Operations Room video.
@ViktorBengtsson that would be good. I can't remember which history book that I read wherein Taffy 3 was mentioned, but it was a brief, very interesting short piece. Definitely worth an hour or two. Montemayor would be one to tackle it, his Pearl Harbor,Midway docs are extraordinary
@@garysofko If you enjoy watching multiple takes on it I would suggest searching for "Battle of Samar". I've seen Drachinifel's video on it, and when Taffy 3 was mentioned like a cliffhanger at the end of the last Operations Room video I got goosebumps in anticipation.
1 million on the main, and 200k on the support channel. Keep up the good work and many blessings to your family
"We have a new plan!" ~ Kuniaki Koiso, PM Japan
"Yeah, we know..." ~ Joe Rochefort, USN Pacific Fleet Radio Intellegence Unit
Do we have any postwar reactions from Japanese cipher vets regarding the declassification of the USN’s decoding of Japanese ciphers?
Kurita had the fight in the bag and lost heart after his brawl with Taffy 3 off Samar. He had the ships, he had the fuel, the empty carrier fleet diversion force had done its job and pulled 5th fleet away chasing glory kills to stroke Halsey’s ego, he could have gone after the landing force and the supply transports and landed a blow that could have kept Japan in the war for at least another year. Instead he made the loss of Musashi, the carrier force, and half his cruiser screen worthless in retreat from an enemy that was already a spent quantity. It’s hard to judge when I wasn’t there and didn’t see the battle space from his perspective but it’s really hard to not be critical of his decisions considering that this was the fight Japan had been marshaling all its last available fuel, ammo and naval resources for and it was a one shot deal. Even if he had done all this though I don’t see how he would have gotten clear of TF34 and eventually Halseys carriers once they were done and word got out about what had happened. Halsey would have prioritized revenge at all costs in effort to mitigate the damage to his reputation and I doubt even a destroyer would have gotten back to Japan after.
No. Taffys 1 and 2 remained, McCain's TF was quickly getting into range, Oldendorf's TF had time to get into a blocking position, and the very large number of destroyers attached to the landing force would have launched a devastating torpedo attack. Any delay would have brought TF 34 into the Japanese rear. That is no "spent quantity." Kurita's ships, low on fuel and ammunition, might have done some damage in the process of being sunk but never would have reached the transports.
After the battle of Surigao Strait, the US Seventh Fleet was as close to the entrance of Leyte Gulf as Takagi and had a five-hour head start. Takagi would have had to get through six US battleships and eight cruisers all while being pummeled from land-based aircraft. The US battleships were low on ammunition at that point, but so were the Japanese.
Remember, he didn’t know where Halsey’s carriers were. His ships were being pounded by the planes off the 3 taffy small carrier forces! Radio silence made him blind and dumb.
@@Paul-zf8ob And they had to understand why the American destroyers and destroyer-escorts were fighting back with such determination instead of running away. They probably figured that the Americans were expecting to be rescued by a stronger force.
It was also not just about glory with Halsey. Sure hindsight tells us the Japanese carriers were just floating targets, but Halsey didn't know that. As far as he knew, they were an enemy force that was just as dangerous, if not more so, as Takeo's surface fleet. Not to mention Spruance had been criticized by a number of his subordinates for being too cautious at Philippine Sea and "letting the Japanese get away" so there's some argument that Halsey sought to avoid this same criticism. I will agree that he definitely over fixated on the carriers and got lucky that Taffy 3's sacrifice was sufficient to save the landing fleet. In his shoes, I might wind up doing the same thing. I'd say the biggest issue was Halsey's own prejudices against surface vessels and total belief in the superiority of aircraft carriers.
I have no idea why the Japanese never considered the idea the US might send more than one fleet….they lured away Halsey, but they never bothered to do anything about Kinkaid and that cost them dearly (not just at Surigao, the Standards would likely have intercepted Kurita during/right after Samar if he hadn’t turned around)
They would’ve been a speed bump because (IIRC) they used all their anti ship ammo on the southern force. I do think they would’ve held long enough to keep the center force in place long enough for Halsey’s ships to get into strike range.
Actually, the Southern Force was meant as a decoy force, Japanese High Command just never said that to Nagumo out loud.
@@thatoneguywhodoesthatthing913 Kinkaid was not out of AP ammo but he was low-one of his desperate pleas for Halsey points out that he was low on the necessary ammo to take on Kurita. The ship that had the most AP ammo was Pennsylvania, and her fire control was garbage-in fact the reason she had so much ammo was because her radar had screwed up at Surigao Strait and by the time she fired her first (and only) salvo the Southern Force was pulling back. The main obstacle for Kurita would not necessarily be Kinkaid's standards, but the fact that they would be fighting them while under fierce air attack by Taffy 2 and 1. And as you pointed out had Kurita dallied Halsey and eventually Lee would have arrived to cut them off at San Bernardino. However in the meanwhile the fight at the entrance to Leyte Gulf would be precarious, as the Japanese still had a powerful battleship and destroyer force spearheaded by Yamato. The whole thing could've been avoided and another Surigao-style victory could be expected if Halsey had just done his job and split his forces earlier rather than later.
@@Eboreg2 That is certainly how Nishimura felt about it (his last transmission was that he had completed his mission as promised despite his fleets' destruction), and it is thought Kurita split him off to the south to act as a decoy.
I shudder to think of the carnage that would've been unleash had the Standard battleships come up against both Yamato and Musashi (I know the latter was gone by the time Samar happened), ships specifically designed to engage and defeat a numerically superior force of Standards, while also being backed by three other battleships of semi-comparable strength
It's almost sad to watch the Japanese Navy go from a premier world-class fighting force to a husk with only a thin shell of strength. It's good because that meant less lives would be lost and the evil Empire would crumble but still.
Damn Japan was so dominant that they allowed the naval victories to be closer to the home island for better viewing. 😂😂😂
Thank you for your videos!
100%
Most incredible thing about it is that it actually worked, then failed because Admiral Kurita didn't believe that it worked.
Can you explain this a bit further?
@@impera8830 -- The entire _Sho_ plan was designed to draw Halsey's carriers away from the Leyte invasion force in Leyte Gulf. Strangely, _they did exactly that!_ The Japanese carrier force was a decoy. When Halsey failed to have the battleships of Task Force 34 guard the San Bernardino Straight, Kurita's Central Force surprised the U.S. invasion fleet in Leyte Gulf. The problem was that there was supposed to be a pincer. The Southern Force was supposed to go through Surigao Straight and both the Northern and Southern forces were supposed to converge on Leyte Gulf. But the southern force got wiped out because Admiral Oldendorf placed his battleships across Surigao Straight. He thought TF 34 was guarding San Bernardino Straight. So while the actual attack failed, because Kurita thought Halsey's carriers had not been decoyed away, the _strategy_ worked.
Thank you so much for your extensive explanation
@@OneHitWonder383
Lovely balance between the excellent content and the style with which it’s presented. Something to emulate, great stuff.
11:39 Good for them, finally becoming a modern navy, now they really can go toe-to-toe with any other naval force out there in a straight-up duel. Wait, what’s that? The time of ship-to-ship combat was over as of last year? Oh…
You mention the Battle of the Philippine Sea as background. I know the Operations Room has covered it, and honestly the graphics from that episode are my only real trigger to recall the context.
Perhaps include so graphics from their episodes if relevant, it would really help.
The flaws of the leaders of all of the Axis powers lead to each of them over-reaching and expending valuable resources without realistic estimations of what the actions they were order would involve. Japan in Leyte is an excellent example of this.
Super fascinating and great narration. Thanks as always!
The often overlooked factor in the Axis plans was the perceived USA focus on finances. America would give up not from a lack of victory, but a lack of profit.
In the first world war, the United States was content to sit back selling weapons and materials to Europe - only becoming involved when that economy was threatened. In the scheme of things, the loss of life on the Lusitania was pretty insignificant, but the threat of submarines to trade was not. Mexico was still recovering from a civil war and few thought it could actually be a threat to the US - but disruptions of the rail links to California or shipping in the gulf would be noteworthy.
Thus the idea in the second world war is that the US would only go where the money is. Tiny islands most people couldn't find on a map like Tarawa, Savo, or Midway had no importance in terms of export or imports, and the cost of staging a WWI type of battle on tiny bits of land where you can't bypass defenses just seemed very high. Merchant ships might be a better target for submarine warfare, but are by nature a fraction of the cost of a warship.
They misread the US mindset in several ways big and small. Then again that sorta thing was common among all sides. :)
@@TheEvilmooseofdoom That is quite true. There is also the matter that the US tended to design military around doing the opposite of everyone else. Why make a bomber that is faster than fighters when you can make ones that fly at high altitudes where the enemy is slower? Everyone else has break thrugh tanks - so make turreted tank destroyers. Rather than independent commerce raiders, submarines are supposed to sail alongside the battleships.
I always learn something new!
Excellent collection of rare footage showing what life was like back in the day for the IJN
YAY A NEW VID!
Solid video. Good research and narration.
I very much enjoyed your video and I gave it a Thumbs Up
Fuel shortages were interlocked with pilot training for Japan and Germany. Priority for avgas went to combat squadron
This was very interesting. Especially the bit about Kurita. I've always felt he wasn't that enthusiastic about attacking transports. When, to his surprise, he ran into the Taffys he must have been delighted to be able to attack the enemy fleet instead, only to find his success in this was limited. The thought of taking his already battered force into Leyte Gulf -- not knowing what exactly he would find there (I still don't know this, either) probably seemed like throwing his fleet away for nothing.
Like Halsey, Kurita worked in a clause that would allow him to concentrate his efforts on an enemy task force if he encountered one. He did not know Ozawa had been successful In drawing off Halsey so he assumed Taffy 3 was one of Halsey's fleet groups. He knew the landings had been going on for 5 days and that most valuable supplies were already ashore, so an attack on the shipping in the gulf was pointless. Had he proceeded he would have met Kinkaid's battle force coming up from Surigao, suffered heavy losses, and then have been destroyed by Halsey and Lee racing south.
@@thenumbah1birdman EXCEPT that some of 7th Fleet was still involved to the south and some ships were low on ammunition. I know USS Pennsylvania was waiting in the gulf as, without the latest radar, she had hardly been engaged at Surigao. But what other ships were actually there? And were there any destroyers left with torpedoes?
Nishimura really had done the job assigned to him.
@@MakeMeThinkAgain Kinkaid was running north with everything he had by the time Kurita made the order to pull back and regroup. Kinkaid would've been short a few cruisers and destroyers as they had the furthest to run due to their pursuit of Shima, but the battleships would've met Kurita shortly before/right as/just after he appeared at the gulf and would've engaged him. Of course they were low on ammo, but they could still bloody Kurita's nose and would've slowed him enough that TF34, by that point running south would've met Kurita as he retreated to San Bernardino strait.
@@thenumbah1birdman From the Japanese perspective, it would have been entirely worth it, even at the cost of Kurita's entire force. Kurita had exactly the opportunity that Japanese planners had been dreaming of, for which they sacrificed the Northern grouping as a decoy. During the remainder of the war, none of the ships that Kurita saved at Leyte accomplished anything of merit for the Japanese cause beyond burning fuel and lives. Yamato in particular committed 'honorable' suicide in the middle of the Pacific ocean without ever having the opportunity to fire her big guns at anything other than airplanes. Why not expend that 'honorable' suicide when it would have actually counted for something?
This channel is awesome!
Good video. It filled in much information that I had to speculate. This is the first video that truly explains the why and how Japan made made practical decisions and how hubris was their true failing.
Very informative, excellent!
Thank you for of the content you guys make! I love it and you guys all rock! God bless and keep up the great work the Intel and operation room youtube team! ;)
Wanted to avoid indignity.
Sends 10 000s of young men to their deaths.
Ahh dignity maintained.
The IJN.
It came down to industrial strength. The strongest industry wins the war. Yamamoto knew that the American industrial strength could not be put produced….
In the battle of the Philippines sea, the Japanese went from losing World War II to realizing they were losing World War II.
This reminded me of "letters from Iwo Jima" The Japanese admiralty and most generals were competent, professional soldiers, very well aware that the whole business of the war against the US was totally absurd.
Knowing quite well that no matter what they did, they were basically doomed. They did their best against unsurmountable odds. They were no idiots, or suicidal fanatics, they simply were soldiers and sailors, and carried out what they thought was their duty, to full capacity.
Basically the US Navy was, and is still today, the most powerful military force on the planet. No one would face it and prevail over the course of a war.
If that is your understanding of the Japanese high command in the Pacific war you have a lot more research and reading ahead of you.
The Japanese military was notorious for it's back biting, infighting, self sabotage, and general incompetence/indecisiveness. Especially between rival factions in the Imperial Army and Navy.
For example the battle of the Philippine Sea referenced in this video saw the main Japanese carrier force sail right into a trap because the Army garrison commander in the Marianas lied to the Admiral about his air forces capabilities and the damage he inflicted on the enemy to save face.
Then there's the battle of Imphal in Burma which the British won because the Japanese commander refused to take more than a weeks supplies with him for an extended campaign. He essentially starved his own army to death and caused one of his subordinate generals to abandon the mission and take his troops home.
Even earlier at Guadalcanal troops, supplies, and precious fuel were wasted in supplying and carrying out futile human wave attacks in a battle that just couldn't be won.
Make no mistake General Kobayashi from Iwo Jima is the exception to the rule when it comes to Japanese leadership, and he was only sent there to die by hard liners who saw him as a "coward" and "defeatist" because he told high command the war could not be won and needed a negotiated end.
Even after two atomic bombs, the Russian invasion of Manchuria, and the Emperor's surrender the military didn't want to end the war going so far as to make an attempted coup to kidnap the Emperor "for his own good."
@@renegadeleader1 Well, one never stops learning. Many Thanks for your notes
@@marcocatano554 No problem. I've spent years studying the subject and one of the most fascinating things I've found is that once you peel back the myths and legends surrounding the Japanese military that pop culture has built up you are left with one of the worst led, worst trained, worst equipped, worst supplied forces of the entire war that committed atrocities equal to the Germans with the only difference being the Japanese were indiscriminate in who they killed rather than targeting one specific people or group.
Their biggest successes of the war came from pouring all their available resources into sucker punching two European countries Great Britain and the Netherlands whose Pacific garrisons and fleets were depleted by the war in Europe as well as hitting but not fatally crippling the US fleet at Pearl Harbor.
From there they largely squandered their initiative shuttling troops around the Pacific letting the US fleet have time to recover until the Doolittle raid happened which started the chain of events that led to Midway and the Japanese slowly backpedaling toward defeat.
@@renegadeleader1how can moving troops be a waste of time ? They werr targeting all of the south pacific
@@potato88872 The whole point of the raid on Pearl Harbor was the elimination of the entire US Pacific fleet and the destruction of port facilities that would render the base inoperable for ships.
They failed in both counts, but grossly overestimated how much damage they did inflict leading to them surrendering the initiative and becoming subservient to the Imperial Army's troop deployments and land grabbing leading to an overextended defensive ring with overstretched supply lines that were difficult to protect, man, and reach.
It wasn't until the Doolittle Raid on the home islands in April of 1942 made it clear to the Imperial war council that US Naval power was still a threat that needed to be dealt with that the Navy faction was allowed to go on the offensive again leading to Coral Sea and Midway.
Five and half months of time squandered on escort duty with little to no action for what could have been used to finish off the US fleet, render Pearl Harbor in operable, or hit the Panama canal forcing US Naval ships and supplies to take even longer to reach the Pacific.
By not maintaining the initiative in early 1942 they let their opponent lick their wounds, heal, and prepare for a battle on their terms sealing the Japanese Navy's fate.
My Father Kenneth McLaughlin served on USS Gambier Bay CVE-73. Sunk in the Battle of Samar during the Leyte Action.
My Uncle Jim was was with Carriar Aircraft Service Unit 44 (CASU-44), stationed on Tinian after it was captured. He told me how B-29's would fly off Tinian to fire bomb Japan. And many B-29's overload with avgas and bombs crashed into the sea trying to take off. He also watched Enola Gay and Bock'sCar, The Great Artiste, among other B-29's, weather planes ,photo planes, and such, deliver the A Bombs to Japan.
love this stuff. If we comment and like more, it will help out the YT algorithms, keep YT from demonetizing their videos, and make patreon less necessary for this channel. I don't mine being a patron myself because it's worth it to me, like wikipedia as well. But all the help they can get is good.
Yt can rig the system. If yt decides history channels are not worth it you can comment 1000 times in a row. The channel gets buried. They make the rules but they can break them. You're trying to appease Big Brother forgetting the rules have no value for it.
@@florinivan6907I know of another guys who's more recent history video was being taken down. After several uploads and lots of comments and likes, YT left the video alone. I'm not sure if you are arguing that lots of good attention to this channel here won't work, but unless you have sure evidence that it won't, I say it's worth a shot. Likes and short comments doesn't take much effort.
It should be mentioned many capable ijn commanders that in touch with reality were already sidelined. One example the leader of tokyo express that manage to lead ijn destroyers through gauntlet of far superior allied naval and airpower in Guadalcanal.
Great thanks
you the best joe shmoe iever met
Where did you find all the motion picture film footage of the IJN? A lot of it in this video I have never seen before.
'they formed a war council that refused to accept defeat, here's how they solved the problems faced by the navy... they realised there was no way to solve the problems faced by the navy.'
That last sentence...
The attempt to rationally utilize of what is the dwindling remains...
...against what is insurmountable
I have a hard time believing the steel production figure you cite at 4:58. Great video though
..why?
@@TheEvilmooseofdoom because it is about the same as the total global steel production from 2022 (and they say it was just for the first quarter of 1944)
Some of the Japanese militaries attempts to fix their inherent problems are respectable. But it's obvious that most of their attempts fell short.
Japanese Navy: “And I would have won at Leyte Gulf to if it hadn’t been for those meddling DDs of Taffy 3.”
On a serious note though, the Japanese Strategy for Leyte Gulf was literally a smart one. By 1944 everyone knew the aircraft carrier had come of age and were the primary targets through and through, the battleships were primary targets also, but not number one on the list.
Keep putting out the hits.
lets go, im never leyte
Noice
nice
Joke only works if you pronounce it as "late".
@@pvt.potato1943 depends on the accent bro, ask Eminem or Snoop Dogg, you can make anything rhyme if you want to. think of Scar from Lion King, saying "letsss gewwww, im nevarrrrrr leyteeeee"
Well, they eventually got their kantai kessen decisive battle…but not with the decision they wanted🤷♂️
It had already happened. Just go looking for it a couple hundred miles from Midway island...
Thank you for the video. I'd say the plan worked. Halsey took the bait and went North and the Yamato and friends could get into arms reach of the enemy.
can you make up to date playlists of all your video series for both this channel and Operations Room ?
A comparison between the UK and Japan could be another thing to touch on. Naval island nations, desperate, etc.
Were they really planning to win, or were they planning to just do their best or die trying? Such as, maybe, Ganbaru?
While listening about Toyoda's plans of how best to utilize the remaining IJN ships, it occurred that their best use was what happened, artificial marine habitats😊
Going after the supply lines is a solid strategy.
Japanese battle plans were always too elaborate, and usually assumed that a best case scenario would unfold in Japan's favor.
The plan to draw Admiral Halsey away from his mission to protect the landing forces was successful. Halsey took the bait and went after the sacrificial carriers.
That decision nearly cost the US the battle.
Wars are ultimately won by logistics. Who can maintain a well supplied and well trained fighting force longer.
Can we talk about how badly Kurita screwed up the golden opportunity purchased with the lives of his peers in the North and South groups? I mean, he made it to the transports and was shelling the escort carriers, then just got discouraged and sailed away. None of those warships played any material role in the remainder of the war and it would have been worth the sacrifice of Kurita's entire force to inflict a grievous loss on US forces at Leyte. Yamato in particular did nothing more than commit 'honorable' suicide in Ten-Go. Why not expend that 'honorable' suicide when it would have actually counted for something?
We are fortunate for his colossal blunder of timidity.
I seriously doubt that such an excellent commander like Ozawa would 'love' the idea of using his carriers as decoy.
A carrier without an air wing is just a glorified barge. At least this way his ships could do something for the country.
@@dirtyblueshirt he would have considered a necessary sacrifice. I dont think he would 'love' the idea.
@@augustosolari7721Ozawa thought the plan was a competent one based on what he had but was unhappy that he was commanding a toothless force that was sure to be lost, especially after Kusaka had activated SHO-2 the week before and got most of the retrained Japanese carrier pilots shot up near Formosa in piecemeal engagements.
There is a lot to unpack here. I have watched this video twice now and understand much better why the IJN acted as it did. The irony is that the plan nearly succeeded.
What do you do when the "defeatists" are right and the only rational response is to give up? Realistically Japan's cause was hopeless after the Guadalcanal campaign, they threw everything the could at Ironbottom sound and still lost. Nothing was changing in their favour.
4:54 1.4 BILLON metric tons down to 800 MILLON? You're numbers would seem to off by a factor of a 1000, that would be in the ballpark of the entire WORLD WIDE production of steel TODAY.
the primary part of decoying Halsey worked. But it was too late for it to make any difference anyway
How long are you going to continue fighting a war that ended nearly 75 years ago?
Oh this is a good one
USS Johnston has joined the chat
The Allies retook the Philippines because of MacArthur. The submarine fleet had pretty well choked off supplies from the Dutch East Indies and SE Asia.
No the United States took back the Philippines in spite of the intervention of Douglas MacArthur. Sensibly Nimitz and the USN kept him out of the majority of the planning and control of the Pacific campaign, especially in control of where forces would be deployed- if you think anything else you have been reading the wrong books.
@steveclarke6257 What do you mean in spite of the intervention of Douglas MacArthur? Didn't Nimitz want to go straight to Okinawa and bypass the Philippines entirely, while MacArthur's influence led to an invasion of the Philippines? So wouldn't that mean OP's comment was accurate? It's been awhile since I've learned that in college and I may be misremembering.
@@avakiin6614 no you are correct, all because MacArthur had enough political clout to keep his "I will return" quote ...however the navy did not use all the resources they had available and when he asked for more support Halsey and Nimitz said no.
It's a lot easier to cut a supply line when you can base your subs a thousand miles closer to them.
@@steveclarke6257 Oh ok. Just wanted to be sure since I remember being infuriated that all the death and destruction (particularly of Manila City) caused by the invasion was really unnecessary when I learned about that piece of info. Especially when Filipino guerrillas were already doing enough against the Japanese (I mean, Leyte was essentially liberated by the time the Americans arrived, hence why they landed there in the first place).
🇺🇸
Nice to include the extra fitting of more AAA on all the ships because they knew air supremacy was lost.
Leyte gulf was Japan’s, “Hail Mary”.
Lessons to people.
Don't let madmen drag you to war.
Could have moved pilot training to "Southern Resource Area" as well.
Why have you used 2:07 this image of the Versailles Treaty meeting, 1919, to represent the IJN command?
i love that edited fuso thumbnail lmao
Edited?
@@dylandarnell3657He thinks Fuso didnt actually have an insanely tall superstructure, but in truth it was an insane ~6-8 story building stood on top of a battleship's hull!
@@MainMite06 i swear the first time I saw the thumbnail, it actually looked like the fuso meme that's been around. and of course people know how absurd fuso's superstructure is.
@@paulgullible969In the game, Kancolle, The Fuso twins are humanized as miko twins wearing their superstructures as miniature conical hats on their heads!
Iowas turrets begin turning
*Epic Guitar Riffs Begin Playing*
Around 6:34
What even is "light steel" ?
You can't change the density of steel alloys that mutch. You would have to alloy it with significant amount of less denser elements and probably worsen some of the mechanical characteristics.
You roll it thinner. Stainless was an honest competitor with aluminum for metal aircraft as it could be rolled very thin without rusting overnight. Needs to be strong too.
@@scottgiles7546thanks, but that would be cold rolled steel and not "light steel". I forgott about that you can improve the mech. characteristict with cold rolling. And yes its a fair competion to aluminium since you need less steel for the same applied stress.
Light gauge, as in thinner.
After WWII, the great air tactician, Fushida, after reading the Bible for himself, became a Christian.
Ugaki had a point. Japanese radar was not precise enough to land shells on target. American radar was.
The decline in transportation (shipping) was due more to American submarines than bombers (aircraft).
The United States really should have done two major things starting in 1936 with the Spanish Civil War, and especially after the Japanese invasion of China in 1937:
1. The Pacific fleet should have been moved to the Atlantic, including all battleships, for modern refit on the East Coast. The US Navy should have dusted of old Royal Navy ASW doctrine from the First World War to build a large naval air corps with experiments on building small jeep carriers for convoy escort. The US Navy should have started working closely with the British and Canadians on hemispheric defense and norrth Atlantic convoy defense. The US Navy should have focused intensely on war games with ASW and convoy escort with intense focus. These statements include putting naval armed guards on all US merchant marine vessels with intensive training programs.
2. The US Navy in the Pacific should have focused primarily on building a 100 Gato class submarines in the late 1930's with 200 more Gato class submarines to be rapidly built in wartime. All older S-boat submarines would have been completely modernized for training and combat operations in Alaska and Australia. This program of submarine construction would have included intensive training of submarine crews in unrestricted submarine warfare doctrine on enemy merchant shipping with regular live torpedo firings. First World War Imperial German U-boat history would be intensely studied and analyzed. The US Navy submarine fleet would become experts at night surface warfare with emphasis on maximizing aggressive maneuvers to sink as many enemy ships as possible. All American submarines should have had 5 inch deck guns plus the latest electronic aids and night vision gear possible. German U-boat doctrine from the First World War should have been the guiding beacon for American unrestricted submarine warfare
3. The Philippines and other undefendable places in the Pacific should have been abandoned by the United States with a guarantee of an American declaration of war should these territories be invaded or attacked by an enemy. Maximum effort should have been made to defend Australia and New Zealand using these countries as American forward bases.
4. The US Navy starts a massive construction program to build carriers, heavy and light cruisers, destroyers to match and surpass the Japanese in the early 1940's with emphasis on air power. The U.S. needed to emphasize air power and fighter planes. The Army gets expanded to ten combat divsions with modern tanks and mechanized units with a very large Air Corps. The National Guard should have been called in phases in 1937 for active service. Pay for all military servicemen should have been greatly increased to encourage volunteers with a modern GI bill for college. Women volunteers should have been encouraged for all the military services for administrative duty and more to free up every able bodied men for infantry service or service at sea. Conscription should have been started in 1938 or 1939.
The U.S. could have done all of these actions in 1936 rather than letting isolationists leave us at the mercy of Axis bullies in 1941. Once Japan invaded China in 1937 war in Asia and the Pacific was inevitable. Fascist Italy and Germany aiding Franco's Nationalists in Spain a two ocean world war in Asia and Europe was just around the bend for the United States. These mobilization efforts would have been difficult in the 1930's during the Great Depression. However, the worst outcome is to be unprepared for defense when aggressive well armed militaristic enemies decide war against your country is their policy.
Basically the USA basically is just OP
You forgot a major key in why *the Allies* won WW2:
USA wasnt working this whole war alone: They had Britain, French Resistence, Dutch Resistence, Chinese Resistence, and for the European theater alone: Soviet Union.
Imperial Japan had no friends and their "friends" the Axis powers were stationed in Europe, with the furthest extent being the Vichy French-occupied asian territories who didnt aid Japan at all.
USA had the insane industrial power that no other nation could match in WW2, but that power means nothing if you dont have friends in foreign places:
Think about the European naval wars where the USN ships could dock in UK territories and blend forces with Royal Navy ships during every mission
Strange that the nation that used fleet and army airpower to achieve brilliant victories in the beginning, believed it could go up against the same with only surface ships as its main weapon. Group think at its finest?
When the only tool you have is a hammer...
Humans are not rational. They are rationalizing.
not groupthink but difference in available resources: because by the late part of the war, all their aircraft and aviation fuel supplies had been destroyed or rendered combat-incapable by 1000lb bombs and torpedoes and such.
you can't launch an unrefueled aircraft any better than you can launch a totally destroyed aircraft.
the ijn was just working with what little it still had: a couple of surface combatants from the prior era. many of their surviving ships were stuck in port, unable to provision for anything like a deployment.
The IJN had lost the luxury of fighting the war they wanted, and instead were forced to fight with what they had - They couldn't use naval air doctrine because they simply didn't have the naval airpower to fight with - Yamato and Musashi were essentially the last remaining bit of real strength the IJN had at Leyte Gulf.
The plan involved using IJA aircraft to cover the ships. The Navy was out of pilots, but the Army still (on paper) had reasonable numbers of pilots and aircraft. And of course, plenty of airfields in the Philippines to operate from.
There were two main issues with this plan. One of course being the famously bad relations between the IJN and IJA. The 2nd was that in 3-4 days leading up to Leyte, the IJA had lost hundreds of planes attacking the American Forces.
The fact that the JN25 Naval Code had been cracked years before didn't help matters.
5:28 There were 7 fleet carriers recently completed or under construction at that point (plus 1 light and 2 escort carriers), only 1 of which was converted from a battleship. I assume you were counting Ise and Hyuuga as "carriers" for your count, but those aviation battleships definitely were not true carriers.
“Everybody has a plan, until they get punched in the face.” - Mike Tyson
They knew they had no chances. All they aimed for was to use the ships they had to inflict as much damage as possible, knowing they will be sacrificed in the process. Saving the fleets honor so to say but in reality it was just a big waste of human lifes for nothing.
4:53. Million, not billion. That would make Japanese steel production in the first quarter of 1944 almost as large as the global production for an entire year in 2023 (1.9 billion tonnes).