Robert Brandom - What is Philosophy?
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- čas přidán 4. 05. 2023
- What is the task of philosophical investigation? How is it different from the inquiries pursued in the natural sciences, the social sciences, and other humanistic disciplines?
Robert Brandom is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the British Academy. His books on the philosophy of language include Making It Explicit (Harvard, 1994) and Between Saying and Doing (Oxford, 2008). His books on German Idealism include A Spirit of Trust (Harvard, 2019), and Pragmatism and Idealism (Oxford, 2022).
Brandom research is a great syntesis between classical pragmatism and a soft idea of RATIONALISM
I prefer Rorty's "hard" pragmatism which is only can be considered like a true pragmatism.
The clearest articulation of Brandom’s metaphilosophy I’ve seen.
I want to dig deeper into two things:
His business of depsychologising/desociologising/ structurally rehistoricising- this enterprise of instilling understanding of the primacy of conceptual analysis into the literature of a field. Where does he think is ripe for depsychologisation? Are we at the philosophical end of history?
Secondly, how his dummetian, not-purely-logical conceptual analysis breaks or works with the categorical imperative. He doesn’t think there’s a magic map to right action, is he talking about CI, or just inferences in general. Does the self conscious applier of concepts not entitle themselves to at least a sense of their own moral rectitude?
Any Pitsburgians in the comments?
I don't think we are at the end of history since other disciplines would still keep making progress and any paradigmatic shift would require re-conceptualization and it is a back and forth between the disciplines. The depsychologising is about delineate the boundaries better and make explicit what was already implicit in the psychological vocabulary use. As far as i understand it, brandom is talking about philosophy as a discipline where the primacy is to do conceptual analysis. it would not be pragmatic to make the conceptual analysis the main focus in any given field. After depsychologising, it doesn't mean that the psychological questions about logic use are moot/unhelpful. it is about bringing clarity.
categorical imperatives makes sense if you are working within Kantian framework and don't take the Hegelian turn. He thinks that history of a concept cannot be divorced from its use in inferences. Although, he does say that you ought not to explicitly hold materially incompatible commitments.
I am not sure how moral rectitude would fit into the inferential picture anyway other than maybe some phycological benefits.
As long as it is understood that rationality is not the only basis for the application of concepts.