How Analytic Philosophy has Failed Cognitive Science
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- čas přidán 27. 12. 2014
- This talk by Robert Brandom was given at Le Collège de France on 26 May 2009.
www.college-de-france.fr/site/...
Robert Brandom's webpage at The University of Pittsburgh Department of Philosophy website
www.pitt.edu/~brandom/multimed...
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Handout
www.ucd.ie/philosophy/normativ...
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5:33 I - Introduction
11:06 II - First Distinction: From Labeling to Describing
22:40 III - Ingredient vs. Free-Standing Content: Semantically Separating Content from Force
40:00 IV - Simple versus Complex Predicates
50:51 V - Conclusion
When the analytic philosopher cuts off the nominal variety, and the behavioral psychologist cuts off the logos, or when a liberal philosopher cuts off the Pre-Aristotelian classical tradition, I can't help but be skeptical. Especially when if denies the subject or the self as mere associations or unclear language. It seems possible that the people like it do so for political reasons, not for epistemic reasons. I believe the moral imperatives has been lost since these revolutions and we're facing a similar crisis that Plato did against the poets and physicists when he wrote the Timaeus.
The actual lecture starts at 5:33 .
31:38 great lay out on denial (kind of speech act) /negation (kind of content)
*Handout - How Analytic Philosophy Has Failed Cognitive Science?*
Concept-use is intrinsically stratified. It exhibits at least four basic layers, with each capacity to deploy concepts in a more sophisticated sense of ‘concept’ presupposing the capacities to use concepts in all of the more primitive senses. The three lessons that generate the structural hierarchy oblige us to distinguish between:
- concepts that only *label* and concepts that *describe*,
- the *content* of concepts and the *force* of applying them, and
- concepts expressible already by *simple* predicates and concepts expressible only by *complex* predicates.
AI researchers and cognitive, developmental, and animal psychologists need to take account of the different grades of conceptual content made visible by these distinctions.
Classification as the exercise of reliable differential responsive dispositions (however acquired) is not by itself yet a good candidate for conceptual classification, in the basic sense in which applying a concept to something is describing it.
It is only because the expressions in terms of which we describe objects, even such basic expressions as words for the perceptible characteristics of molar objects, locate these objects in a space of implications, that they describe at all, rather than merely label.
[p. 307 of Wilfrid Sellars: “Counterfactuals, Dispositions, and Causal Modalities” In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume II: Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem, ed. Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven, and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p.225-308.]
1] I will write a book about Hegel.
2] I foresee that I will write a book about Hegel.
...there are two ways in which the content of two judgments may differ; it may, or it may not, be the case that all inferences that can be drawn from the first judgment when combined with certain other ones can always also be drawn from the second when combined with the same other judgments…I call that part of the content that is the same in both the conceptual content [begriffliche Inhalt]. [Frege, Begriffsschrift (hereafter BGS), section 3.]
Discursive intentional phenomena (and their associated concepts), such as assertion, inference, judgment, experience, representation, perception, action, endorsement, and imagination typically involve what Sellars calls “the notorious ‘ing’/‘ed’ ambiguity.” For under these headings we may be talking about the act of asserting, inferring, judging, experiencing, representing, perceiving, doing, endorsing, and imagining, or we may be talking about the content that is asserted, inferred, judged, experienced, represented, perceived, done, endorsed, or imagined. ‘Description’ is one of these ambiguous terms (as is ‘classification’).
The inferential consequences of applying a classificatory concept, when doing that is describing and not merely labeling, can be either semantic consequences, which turn on the content of the concept being applied, or pragmatic consequences, which turn on the act one is performing in applying it.
3] If the Frege is correct, then conceptual content depends on inferential consequences.
4] If she is happy, then John should be glad.
5] If being trustworthy is good, then you have reason to be trustworthy.
6] Labeling is not describing.
7] I believe that labeling is not describing.
8] If labeling is not describing, then labeling is not describing.
9] If I believe that labeling is not describing, then labeling is not describing.
Any user of descriptive concepts who can also form compound sentences, paradigmatically conditionals, is in a position to distinguish what pertains to the semantic content of those descriptive concepts from what pertains to the act or pragmatic force of describing by applying those concepts. This capacity is a new, higher, more sophisticated level of concept use. It can be achieved only by looking at compound sentences in which other descriptive sentences can occur as unasserted components.
Descriptive concepts bring empirical properties into view. Embedding those concepts in conditionals brings the contents of those concepts into view. Creatures that can do that are functioning at a higher cognitive and conceptual level than those who can only apply descriptive concepts, just as those who can do that are functioning at a higher cognitive and conceptual level than those who can only classify things by reliable responsive discrimination.
10] It is nice here.
11] It is nice where I am.
12] It is _always_ nice here.
13] It is _always_ nice where I am.
Creatures that can not merely label, but describe are rational, in the minimal sense that they are able to treat one classification as providing a reason for or against another. If they can use conditionals, they can distinguish inferences that depend on the content of the concept they are applying from those that depend on what they are doing in classifying something as falling under that concept. But the capacity to use conditionals gives them more than just that ability. For conditionals let them say what is a reason for what, say that an inference is a good one. Creatures that can use this sort of sentential compounding operator are not just rational, but logical creatures. They are capable of a distinctive kind of conceptual self-consciousness. For they can describe the rational relations that make their classifications into descriptions in the first place, hence be conscious or aware of them in the sense in which descriptive concepts allow them to be aware of empirical features of their world.
14] If someone is loved by everyone, then everyone loves someone.
15] If everyone loves someone, then someone is loved by everyone.
Our first grip on the notion of a predicate is as a component of sentences.
16] Kant admired Rousseau.
17] Rousseau admired Rousseau.
18] Kant admired Kant.
19] Someone admired himself.
20] If someone admires himself then someone admires someone.
21] If someone admires someone then someone admires himself.
What [17] and [18] share that distinguishes them from [16] is not a component, but a pattern. More specifically, it is a pattern of cross-identification of the singular terms that two-place predicate applies to. The repeatable expression-kind ‘admires’ is a simple predicate. It occurs as a component in sentences built up by concatenating it appropriately with a pair of singular terms. ‘x admires x’ is a complex predicate. A number of different complex predicates are associated with any multi-place simple predicate.
22] John enjoys music recorded by Mark and books recommended by Bob.
Complex concepts can be thought of as formed by a four-stage process.
First, put together simple predicates and singular terms, to form a set of sentences, say {Rab,Sbc,Tacd}.
Then apply sentential compounding operators to form more complex sentences, say {Rab -> Sbc, Sbc&Tacd}.
Then substitute variables for some of the singular terms (individual constants), to form complex predicates, say {Rax -> Sxy, Sxy&Tayz}.
Finally, apply quantifiers to bind some of these variables, to form new complex predicates, for instance the one-place predicates (in y and z) {Ex[Rax -> Sxy], AxEy[Sxy&Tayz]}.
The result of all these considerations, which have been in play since the dawn of analytic philosophy, well over a century ago, is a four-stage hierarchy of ever more demanding senses of “concept” and “concept use”:
A) At the bottom are concepts as reliably differentially applied, possibly learned, labels or classifications.
B) At the next level, concepts as descriptions emerge when merely classifying concepts come to stand in inferential, evidential, justificatory relations to one another-when the propriety of one sort of classification has the practical significance of making others appropriate or inappropriate, in the sense of serving as reasons for them.
C) Building on the capacity to use inferentially articulated descriptive concepts to make propositionally contentful judgments or claims, the capacity to form sentential compounds-paradigmatically conditionals, which make endorsements of material inferences relating descriptive concept applications propositionally explicit, and negations, which make endorsements of material incompatibilities relating descriptive concept applications propositionally explicit-brings with it the capacity to deploy a further, more sophisticated, kind of conceptual content: ingredient (as opposed to free-standing) content. Conceptual content of this sort is to be understood in terms of the contribution it makes to the content of compound judgments in which it occurs, and only thereby, indirectly, to the force or pragmatic significance of endorsing that content. Ingredient conceptual content is what can be negated, or conditionalized.
The first step was from merely discriminating classification to rational classification (‘rational’ because inferentially articulated, according to which classifications provide reasons for others). The second step is to synthetic logical concept formation, in which concepts are formed by logical compounding operators, paradigmatically conditionals and negation. The final step is to analytical concept formation, in which the sentential compounds formed at the third stage are decomposed by noting invariants under substitution.
D) Systematically assimilating sentences into various equivalence classes accordingly as they can be regarded as substitutional variants of one another is a distinctive kind of analysis of those compound sentences, as involving the application of concepts that were not components out of which they were originally constructed. Concepts formed by this sort of analysis are substantially and in principle more expressively powerful than those available at earlier stages in the hierarchy of conceptual complexity.
This hierarchy is not a psychological one, but a logical and semantic one. Concepts at the higher levels of complexity presuppose those at lower levels not because creatures of a certain kind cannot in practice, as a matter of fact, deploy the more complex kinds unless they can deploy the simpler ones, but because in principle it is impossible to do so. Nothing could count as grasping or deploying the kinds of concepts that populate the upper reaches of the hierarchy without also grasping or deploying those drawn from its lower levels. The dependencies involved are not empirical, but (meta)conceptual.
www.ucd.ie/philosophy/normativityconference/resources/Handout_How_Analytic_Philosophy_Has_Failed_Cognitive_Science.pdf
1] I will write a book about Hegel.
2] I foresee that I will write a book about Hegel.
3] If Frege is correct, then conceptual content depends on inferential consequences.
4] If she is happy, then John should be glad.
5] If being trustworthy is good, then you have reason to be trustworthy.
6] Labeling is not describing.
7] I believe that labeling is not describing.
8] If labeling is not describing, then labeling is not describing.
9] If I believe that labeling is not describing, then labeling is not describing.
10] It is nice here.
11] It is nice where I am.
12] It is always nice here.
13] It is always nice where I am.
14] If someone is loved by everyone, then everyone loves someone.
15] If everyone loves someone, then someone is loved by everyone.
16] Kant admired Rousseau.
17] Rousseau admired Rousseau.
18] Kant admired Kant.
19] Someone admired himself.
20] If someone admires himself then someone admires someone.
21] If someone admires someone then someone admires himself.
22] John enjoys music recorded by Mark and books recommended by Bob.
But conditionals are not compound sentences, i.e. are not comprised of independent clauses that can occur on their own. They are complex sentences in that the consequent and the antecedent cannot be separated without changing the semantic content of the sentence, particularly in the antecedent which is wholly dependent on the main clause, which is the consequent. Further it is difficult to see how such statements usher in a new kind of thinking, as conditional statements are very common in ancient Babylonian that most certainly predate Aristotle. I also think his use of the term "Speech-Act" is misleading, if by which he means Performative Utterances in the sense of Austin (i.e. doing something by saying something "I promise..." "I nominate...", etc), rather he seems to say a speech act is a description, which seems strange to me. Also, concerning Frege; he was famous for (among many things) for dividing semantics into reference and sense; reference referring to how concepts apply to the world and its objects, and sense, referring to how concepts apply to one another. What then is he talking about with stating the creation of a "whole new class of concepts?" It seems to me that he is inferring a sort of conceptual evolution that builds on the increasing complexity of concepts, based on compounding of analytical statements. Maybe I'm missing something, but it's difficult to tell because he is so obscure and layers his content with terms and references that don't seem necessary, and his mentioning of logical operators and terms seems rather basic and unconnected from what his apparent goals are. I can't imagine this will have much impact on cognitive science.
he cud have def done with a few slides on powerpoint
@James Hames this has to be a joke
Brandom is one of the most influential analytic philosopher of language, and he lectured on his philosophy in the country which has been the most bad at analytic philosophy... French philosophers in any country have been the worst at both formal philosophy and ordinary linguistics.
@@christopherbolhuis8748 Why?
"Contents that can be used as labels such as that expressed for instance by pictures. My young son once complained about a park sign consisting of a silhouette of what looked like a Scottish Terrier (a race of dogs), surrounded by a red circle with a slash through it; familiar with the force of prohibition associated with signs of this general form, he wanted to know, does this mean no Scotties allowed?, or no dogs allowed? or no animals allowed? or no pets allowed? Indeed, with pictures one has no way of indicating the degree of generality intended. A creature that can understand a claim like if the red light is on, then there’s a biscuit in the drawer, without disagreeing when the light is not on and no biscuit is present or immediately looking for the biscuit regardless of how it is with the light; the creature has learned to distinguish between the content of descriptive concepts and the force of applying them, and as a result can entertain and explore those concepts and their connections with each other without necessarily applying them in the sense of endorsing their applicability to anything present. The capacity in this way to free oneself from the bonds of here-and-now is a distinctive kind of conceptual achievement.
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If this is one of the hierarchy distinctions that cognitive science ignores, it is a false claim to say of cognitive scientists that they ignore it. This is actually one of the distinctions that is made explicitly in dual-process theories.
41:11 His alone. [Uncommon - despite what you think]
i really enjoyed the seminar. i found it a departure from more functionalist-minded views of brandom in his earlier works (a lot of focus on semantics!). but one ironic thing is that there is no way a cognitive scientist could follow the exegetical work he does here.
and is it just me or he exchanged the importance of sociality for intentionality? maybe burge could help here.
What's the 6 pages paper that refuted moral expressivism?
p sure it’s Geach, Imperative and Deontic Logic, 1958
this was dry as dirt.
analytic philosophy is dry
@@hamonteiro but serious
Show me a philosopher that doesn’t bend the knee to science.
Aristotle was right.
"this conception was...common to everyone... in the period leading up to Kant...."
False. aquinas did not draw this classifying system out of aristotle. see Bernard Lonergan's book Verbum: the inner word in Aquinas. also his Insight.
OMG i literally hate philosophy... why do I have to learn this😭
😂😈
This is one branch of one style of philosophy delivered in one format - other philosophy is different, and this video is only interesting to those both familiar and interested in these particular topics!
Analytic failed everything
This should rather be called logic, which I admit can be interesting in linguistic analysis. It fails as a philosophical methodology in front of structuralism, which has more pertinent notions of what philosophy is really interested in, signified and signifier. This is why I think analytic school has almost died out, with only their style of writing left (whose lucidity I think is necessary for just all philosophies), with their disciples keeping rediscovering thoughts and methodology that continental philosophy has already criticised.
They refuse to admit the intrinsic malleability and dynamics of languages and want to establish everything from scratch and this everything being rigid and stable and never changing. This end can never be achieved beyond the notion of signifiers and is doomed to fail for its staticity. They bring up some non-intuitive binaries/multi-naries to complexify their theory, but the more their theory become complex, the more it is prone to errors and overfitting, the less it is interesting in terms of philosophy.
They restrict thoughts to be sequences that conform to grammars of natural languages, blind to rules of other subject matters, such as arts and ethics. Instead of discovering new ways of thinking, they pride in putting evident things into pretty formats and tidy systems. Thus, they cannot inspire science and maths either, as they only recollect what science and maths have already discovered.
You wrote so much, yet I couldn’t determine a single concrete thing you were criticising about analytic philosophy. Written like a true continental philosopher, I guess.
A lucid exposition of Frege, critical of analytic philosophy only for not being more evangelical. Well worth hearing, but look elsewhere for a critique of the narrow scope of the analytical school.