Learning War - Combat Information Center
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- čas přidán 10. 11. 2018
- Talk with Trent Hone the Author of Learning War - The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945 about the Combat Information Center (CIC). Disclaimer: I received a complimentary copy of the book by Naval Institute Press for content production.
Hone, Trent: Learning War - The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945
www.usni.org/store/books/spri...
Link to Podcast: shows.pippa.io/military-histo...
Follow Trent on twitter @Honer_CUT - / honer_cut
trenthone.com
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Military History NOT Visualized is a support channel to Military History Visualized with a focus personal accounts, answering questions that arose on the main channel and showcasing events like visiting museums, using equipment or military hardware.
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Hone, Trent: Learning War - The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945
www.usni.org/store/books/spri...
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Song: Ethan Meixsell - Demilitarized Zone
#ww2 #podcast #usnavy
"Germany has a tendency to start many front wars to prevent two front wars." I'll remember that.
Finally a place to learn about war; I have always wondered what all that shooting was about.
lol
Really enjoyed this. I just read “Learning War” and am glad to see you have done an interview with Trent Hone.
I got it! "Military History Verbalized"!
When I used to play around writing in reverse, after a while my backwards handwriting was easier to read than regular. Maybe because you take more care in the writing.
In the Battle of Tassafaranga the US Navy salvoed off 24 torpedoes after the IJN had passed them, but the Torpedoes either, ran too deep, missed, but in any case did not explode when they bored into the beaches of Guadalcanal. Admiral Wright who claimed a fantastic tactical victory in spite of only sinking one destroyer would later command the 'Port of Chicago' prior to the disaster there and would preside over the scapegoating and mutiny prosecution of Black sailors that struck due to the unsafe work conditions at the weapons depot.
Amazing conversation, excellent interview, awesome guest!
This was a great interview. it was both informative and very pleasant. I wrote U-Boat Assault on America: Why the US was Unprepared for War in the Atlantic. I focus a substantial amount of attention on the consequence of doctrinal assumptions and training had an impact on how the US defended (poorly) the East Coast of the US in 1942.
The statement here concerning how WWII battles showed that access from the bridge to CIC (and vice-versa) in a quick manner to solve developing problems ASAP required that the two areas be very close to one-another and, if at all possible, on the same deck level, since going up and down ladders slows things down significantly, suddenly range a big gong in my mind!!! This comment suddenly made an experience with the now-decommissioned US Navy guided-missile cruiser USS FOX (CG33) which had a TERRIER long-range guided missile dual battery in the bow, a 5"/54 automatic gun in the stern, a single 3"/50 AA gun on each side amidships, and a triple-tube ASW (small) torpedo launcher on each side amidships as its weapon suite (it also had a helicopter pad on the stern, also for ASW use if necessary). It was the first US Navy ship that I was ever on as a US Navy civilian employee learning TERRIER shipboard maintenance and operations on a post-overhaul Ship's Qualification/Training sea trail ("SQUAT"). I had been informed about the typical TERRIER warships (there were to large classes plus several odd-ball ships that also had TERRIR on board (three aircraft carriers, for example -- a BIG mistake!), of which the group containing FOX was the largest and best overall design. I learned a lot and had some "interesting" experiences (oh yeah!). I also noticed when going through the ship prior to the SQUAT at-sea several days (great!!), that the hatch that in other FOX class ships was a direct access aft from the open (windowed) bridge to the CIC just behind it (they really did take that comment about closeness to heart) was COMPLETELY blocked by a mass of huge data and power cables going up to the two huge TERRIER tracking radars above and just behind the bridge/CIC unit and, I assumed (correctly), to all other weapon launching and communication and target tracking systems. The people in charge of this overhaul at the West Coast facility that had done the work had simply decided not to cut any new holes in the bulkheads and deck to route those cables, as was done in all other US Navy ships, to my knowledge, and thought, here was a big hole already cut so we'll just use it and to hell with the access -- the path to the CIC from the bridge on this ship only now required going outside of the bridge (into inclement weather) on either side and then back to a hatch in the side superstructure and then down a ladder and then back the distance to aft end of the CIC and then up another ladder and then, finally, enter the CIC from its aft hatch -- A LONG WAY! What this did was totally and completely violate what the WWII standard for CIC/bridge personal movement communication won by hard experience. At the time I thought it was an inconvenience, but NOW I know it could possibly have been more than that in a bad situation! Damn those overhaul people!
The book JAPANESE DESTROYER CAPTAIN is a MUST READ for anyone interested in WWII naval warfare!! There is no substitute for this. It completely (I think from its contents) sums up the major good and bad points of the Japanese Navy (and in some respects Japanese overall culture during WWII) concisely. Eye opening.
I almost always get hit by old people when I'm already in the round about and they are trying to get in
Our town put two in a few years ago and the results were exciting for several months.
Great chat!
Awesome!
We call "traffic circles" *roundabouts* in Australia, if I'm not mistaken, they call them the same in both New Zealand and the UK.
You are not mistaken for UK ^^
The only people who call them "traffic circles" are those who don't use them possibly?
Hell, that's what we call them over here in the US of A.
I believe traffic circles and roundabouts are specific things. The former is a circular road with traffic lights at each intersection; the latter is a circular road where at each intersection there are yield signs for traffic entering the circle, while the traffic in the circle has right of way. Traffic circles are awful, and roundabouts are relatively wonderful.
@@Exploder11 No, at least in the US, they aren't. described as such. Well, basically that's from looking at engineering texts, federal, state and local design and maintenance manuals. The only real place that traffic circles/roundabouts (a game that I've seldom seen in engineering and or roadway manuals from any other English-speaking nation) that complicates the traffic device is the UL, where there seems to be a perverse effort to complicate traffic interchanges.
The real 'push' toward utilization of traffic circles in the US has been two-fold; to move traffic through intersections at a reasonable rate and 'traffic calming'.
Really interesting!
What a nice guy
Somebody once claimed that Sci-fi author E.E. "Doc" Smith invented the CIC in his Lensman novels and the US Navy unofficially borrowed the concept. Whether or not this is true, his novels "Grey Lensman", "Second Stage Lensmen" and "Children of the Lens" were first published during and shortly after the war and offer a very well drafted picture of a dedicated command ship (initially featured in Grey Lensman and mostly unchanged thereafter) which collates all info and summarises it for the fleet commander to give the necessary orders through a reliable and rapid communication network. In the books, Z9M9Z's three-dimensional CIC model is SEVEN HUNDRED FEET ACROSS and the CIC staff are all brilliant telepaths; the Fleet Admiral has a summarised ten-foot version with which he gives global orders at the task-force level, but the main CIC hall can handle individual ships.
Yup.
John W. Campbell, Jr., E.E. “Doc” Smith, and the Combat Information Center
Edward Wysocki
Science Fiction Studies
Vol. 38, No. 3 (November 2011), pp. 558-562
Sadly the article is paywalled in JSTOR
Is it on amazon kindle? I am to lazy to check
It is
I think it might be good to look at the CIC as part of a revolution but not a revolution unto itself as the military brought it's communications and information systems up to the speed of light ( radio communication, electrical communication and radar information collection ) from the older systems that operated at the speed of people. Part of this can be seen in the evolution of gun-laying towards what would ultimately be Tachymetric systems but this is also obviously seen in the CIC, even earlier things like centralized fire control started to use computers and electrics to compile and calculate data. Fighter direction with Radar over Britain and British Carriers is another variation on this theme which would evolve further towards the linked network information sharing of today's fighter aircraft.
hi, what ship is that?
CL Cleveland
Thanks for asking
had the same question
Nishimura at Suragao Strait is a poor example of IJN capability.
Hara is either a good or bad example as, I believe, he was not in a high status officer trajectory so no one would be interested in his opinion. They would be more likely to listen to Tanaka except that he was saying things they didn't want to hear so they sent him to Burma. The curious thing about the Pacific War was that the Japanese were less interested in winning than in fighting the war. This is true of the army as well. Until you accept this fact the history of the war is just confusing.
Nimitz and Spruance (often Nimitz's Chief of Staff) deserve a fair amount of credit for what the USN did right in the Pacific. My favorite example of this was the alternating command of the 3rd and 5th Fleets. I'm not aware of any other military force that switched off command like this.
The Long Lance was the game changer in 1942.
I would think the Royal Navy would develop something like the CIC for organizing convoy defense against U-boats.
The Royal Navy had the Action Information Centre.
@@geoffreymowbray6789 Do you know if it started on ships guarding convoys?
@@geoffreymowbray6789 see. the lindybeige channel he did an excellent video about it.
czcams.com/video/fVet82IUAqQ/video.html
Can't be the guy in the center if you aren't blamed for 2 world wars.
This guy has the voice of a computer
I find his voice strangely fascinating, in almost an ASMRish way.
Perfect answer to the "revolution/evolution" question. I am so fed up of people using the sentence "it wasn't revolution but evolution". This is a non-sensincal sentence. Evolution is nothing else then the condensed sum of all past revolutions. Or to put it in other words: evolution moves forward through revolutions.
The term "it is not revolution but evolution" is simply something brought firward by people with certain political views, i.e. people who don't like the term "revolution".
Of course the changes introduced by the Wehrmacht before and at the beginning of the 2. WW were a revolution for warfare. This is basically the only topic where I not only strongly disagree with Bernhard but actually acuse him of losing his own track of trying to make an integrational non-controcersial position. That the Wehrmacht in the end simply tried to realize a concept of war they had followed since Frederick the Great is not at all an argument for the notion that it wasn't a revolutionary development. It is one thing to want something in a general and quite another to do something in a very specific way. Nor the fact that there were other officers in other armies advocating similar ideas. Because otherwise the French Revolution would not be a revolution, because in other countries there were people advocating the execution of the king. To have some guy advocating something and to implement something on a large scale are two very different things. Finally that the term "Blitzkrieg" was a propaganda-term does not change the fact that how the Wehrmacht conducted warfare was actually a revolutionary change.
I strongly disagree with your your view that: "Evolution is nothing else then the condensed sum of all past revolutions." Evolution is the sum of many changes and adaptions over time, whereas a Revolution is one or more radical changes in a very condensed amount of time.
Additionally, you might consider the aspect that for quite some time there was the constant buzz about "revolution in military affairs", from your name I assume you are German, Austrian or Swiss. As far as I remember that buzzword didn't really reach our language to a substantial amount, but others were so not "grateful". Not to mention that some many people noted that Stoßtrupptaktik and other stuff was "so revolutionary", whereas basically everything happened long before (see Ralf Rath's thesis on the topic, quoted in my video on it). The issue is the "revolutionary" aspect implies sudden change usually in combination with a "genius" vs. "idiots", whereas in reality it took usually quite some time and many small steps.
Not to mention that in History most revolutions end with bloodshed as well.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized
When you say that evolution is the sum of the adaptations and changes over time, you basically repeat what I said. With evolution we refere to the sum of the radical changes. But those changes were at the time a radical change that happened in a condensed amount of time. Some evolutionary changes happen over long amounts of time, but many actually happen within a very short time. In paleontoligical hindsight they appear as a peacefull and organic growth. There are also the slow paced changes, but also many which happen in a very short amount of time.
Do most revolutions end in bloodshed? That is a very controversial thesis. I can name at least three peaceful revoltions from the top of my head: the glorious revolution, the German revolution from 1918 and the "Wende" (the overthrow of the SED-regime for non-German-speaking people following). But I think we won't settle this question in a YT-comments section. Maybe it is enough to point out that revolutions usually end a bloodshed, while sometimes/often they begin another.
Now to the topic of the buzzword (I think you want to say that other people were not so lucky). Ok there you definetely have a point. I agree that it was overused. Yet, one should not make the mistake of running into the opposite of simply denying that there are revolutions in warfare and that everything is an evolution, because then we are simply making buzzword-politics instead of historical discussion and science.
One last thing: That a certain change was developed over years is not a counter argument for something being a revolution. I think we (in the German speaking world) generally rely on a very caricaturistic notion of revolution as a spontaneus outburst of violence. This is a oversimplified understanding. For example: the French Revolution had been prepared over decades if not centuries. It took a very long time for the bourgeosie to form as a political power that was actually able to overthrow the ancien regime. I would compare revolutions to a thunderstorm. Yes there is the outburst of lighting and thunder. But there is a long time in which the electrical charge builds up with slow and gradual changes. This build up of the thunderstorm has to be looked at if one wants to understand the thunderstorm. Just like one has to look at the entire build-up of the thunderstorm, one needs to look at the entire development of revolutions in order to understand them. And the build ups are just as part of the phenomenon as is the lightning. Then having this in mind I totally would agree with the compromise-notion that the revlutionary changes of maneuvre-warfare of the Wehrmacht did not just happen over night and they were not the result of a central planning, but rather the culminating effect of different people working on different levels on different concepts, tactics, doctines and so on. The impact was that of an revoltution, because the enemies had to rethink lots of things in order to adapt and it took them many years to do so.
I think we have very different definitions of revolution and evolution.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized
Yes, this appears to be the case. I simply follow Darwin's understanding of evolution. And I have a sensitivity towards the buzzword (or rather buzz-expression) of 'it is not revolution but evolution'. I heared it in so many different places and occassions and think it has been widely over- and misused. Mostly it is absolutely nonsensical or it is a way to avoid giving the word 'revolution' a positive conotation. While you seem to be sensitive to the use of the word 'revolution'.
First!
First