I have listened to many of Quentin's conversations and lectures on CZcams this is however arguably the best .... loved the Hobbesian take on theatre and socio-political life.
52:22 "I think if the truth be told, my motivations have never been historical. They have always been moralistic." This statement of Dr. Skinner reminded me of one of the beliefs, of the author of 'The Making of Early Kashmir' historian Dr. Shonaleeka Kaul, about Rājataraṅgiṇī: "Hence, I believe, the tendency to moralize is the leading thrust of the Rājataraṅgiṇī..." (Kaul 2018:44)
So very pleased with this brilliant conversation -- thank you, Professor Jennings and CSGS! As much as I admire Professor Skinner's moralist motivations, I also wonder how this affects the way he looks into Western political philosophy traditions. Skinner rightly explains that the past -- without inclinations to vindicate or demolish it -- could offer insights into what we face at present. Is not this precisely why scholars must avoid 'moralist motivations'? It appears that we have a good lesson in Machiavelli. In Discourses, M seemed to have been motivated by the notion of liberty. Effectually-speaking -- to use an idiom M would appreciate -- the Italian Renaissance icon was trapped into was considered important in 15th century Italy and Florence. In other words, M could not escape the concerns of his days. This obliged him to speak of a construct of liberty that would serve as the 'lesser evil'. When this is contrasted with The Prince, we see a different image. No blueprint could be followed by any ruler to acquire virtú -- they either have it or not. With Discourses M was being pragmatic of course, but I would just argue that he was also part of a political game -- favouring one view over another. Therein lies the problematic of knowledge. It seems that could be a thread into Skinner's new investigation about the 'forces' that changed the meaning of liberty.
@Glen Newell Of course, you can trace changes in meaning throughout centuries. The declaration, however, that this is morally motivated ushers in all sorts of questions about direction. For instance, I could ask why start with Hobbes if we tracing 'Western' political thinking? This point seems arbitrary in light of a moralist view, don't you think? We are talking about the conscious level -- let alone the unconscious. But then I wonder why this moral position, which delineates your attempts to understand before you even embark on your research. You try to prove that a certain reading of intellectual history is correct but, really, you're erasing other points of view as 'immoral'. This is a political move par excellence. That said, I must admit that I find great benefits in the lectures and works of Professor Skinner. I find his work illuminating regarding the state and liberty in the Western conception.
If anyone sees this, it’s coming from someone not trained in political theory but interested… When Skinner talks about freedom in the sense of “independance”, my question is: how is anyone EVER independant of anything or anyone? I suspect that the answers and grey shades to my question could be endless…
if you're looking for another great piece on Quentin Skinner, I'd really recommend this book I found recently called 'Quest for Freedom' which is based on an interview with him. I really enjoyed it and I think anyone else interested in his ideas would too! I'd totally recommend it
The discussion of Hobbes condenses the thrust of "Hobbes and Republican Liberty." He's arguably the most methodologically rigorous intellectual historian and his work is really useful to me. I just tend to think he exemplifies a few problems in the field. If philosophers are almost entirely disinterested in context, his ""interventions in discursive contexts" approach tends to be almost entirely disinterested in the ideas themselves. Just to pick on two: Firstly, his insistence on the eschewal of influence, particularly philosophical influence - therefore, we cannot say Plato influenced some philosophers millennia later as that's disembodying them from the immediate context, except where we have knock-down textual support. But often philosophers make oblique references to past influence, especially in the form of aphorisms and epigraphs. Secondly, certain ideas in philosophy are perennial, and everyone would recognize them when they read them as a reiteration of Aristotle, Lucretius, Liebniz, whoever, etc. He's the best we have in the choices of Hegel, Strauss, or the completely unsystematic work of Isaiah Berlin.
I have listened to many of Quentin's conversations and lectures on CZcams this is however arguably the best .... loved the Hobbesian take on theatre and socio-political life.
52:22 "I think if the truth be told, my motivations have never been historical. They have always been moralistic." This statement of Dr. Skinner reminded me of one of the beliefs, of the author of 'The Making of Early Kashmir' historian Dr. Shonaleeka Kaul, about Rājataraṅgiṇī: "Hence, I believe, the tendency to moralize is the leading thrust of the Rājataraṅgiṇī..." (Kaul 2018:44)
Thank you for making this available!
So very pleased with this brilliant conversation -- thank you, Professor Jennings and CSGS!
As much as I admire Professor Skinner's moralist motivations, I also wonder how this affects the way he looks into Western political philosophy traditions. Skinner rightly explains that the past -- without inclinations to vindicate or demolish it -- could offer insights into what we face at present. Is not this precisely why scholars must avoid 'moralist motivations'? It appears that we have a good lesson in Machiavelli. In Discourses, M seemed to have been motivated by the notion of liberty. Effectually-speaking -- to use an idiom M would appreciate -- the Italian Renaissance icon was trapped into was considered important in 15th century Italy and Florence. In other words, M could not escape the concerns of his days. This obliged him to speak of a construct of liberty that would serve as the 'lesser evil'. When this is contrasted with The Prince, we see a different image. No blueprint could be followed by any ruler to acquire virtú -- they either have it or not. With Discourses M was being pragmatic of course, but I would just argue that he was also part of a political game -- favouring one view over another. Therein lies the problematic of knowledge. It seems that could be a thread into Skinner's new investigation about the 'forces' that changed the meaning of liberty.
Some very astute observations but isn't the 'Cambridge' methodology designed to explore changes in meaning?
@Glen Newell Of course, you can trace changes in meaning throughout centuries. The declaration, however, that this is morally motivated ushers in all sorts of questions about direction. For instance, I could ask why start with Hobbes if we tracing 'Western' political thinking? This point seems arbitrary in light of a moralist view, don't you think?
We are talking about the conscious level -- let alone the unconscious. But then I wonder why this moral position, which delineates your attempts to understand before you even embark on your research. You try to prove that a certain reading of intellectual history is correct but, really, you're erasing other points of view as 'immoral'. This is a political move par excellence.
That said, I must admit that I find great benefits in the lectures and works of Professor Skinner. I find his work illuminating regarding the state and liberty in the Western conception.
If anyone sees this, it’s coming from someone not trained in political theory but interested…
When Skinner talks about freedom in the sense of “independance”, my question is: how is anyone EVER independant of anything or anyone? I suspect that the answers and grey shades to my question could be endless…
if you're looking for another great piece on Quentin Skinner, I'd really recommend this book I found recently called 'Quest for Freedom' which is based on an interview with him. I really enjoyed it and I think anyone else interested in his ideas would too! I'd totally recommend it
Despite its being clearly a dialogue, one gets a glimpse of what Quentin Skinner may be like as a tutor, and it's all good.
The discussion of Hobbes condenses the thrust of "Hobbes and Republican Liberty." He's arguably the most methodologically rigorous intellectual historian and his work is really useful to me. I just tend to think he exemplifies a few problems in the field. If philosophers are almost entirely disinterested in context, his ""interventions in discursive contexts" approach tends to be almost entirely disinterested in the ideas themselves. Just to pick on two: Firstly, his insistence on the eschewal of influence, particularly philosophical influence - therefore, we cannot say Plato influenced some philosophers millennia later as that's disembodying them from the immediate context, except where we have knock-down textual support. But often philosophers make oblique references to past influence, especially in the form of aphorisms and epigraphs. Secondly, certain ideas in philosophy are perennial, and everyone would recognize them when they read them as a reiteration of Aristotle, Lucretius, Liebniz, whoever, etc. He's the best we have in the choices of Hegel, Strauss, or the completely unsystematic work of Isaiah Berlin.
Amazing apart from the mumbling
mhmmhm yes mhmhmh yesyes mhmhmh ye mhmhmhmhm
Why isn’t this on Spotify?