Marine electrician and long time subsriber here. Well done video Chief! This was a great explanation that anyone can follow and understand. I hope the internet algorithm gets this out to all of those who are following the story.
you're taking this guy's advice? last time he was popular on the internet he kept getting angry because people called him out when he kept incorrectly calling the Evergreen the "ever given" lol. It said Evergreen right on it. lolll
5/18/24..A+ on this your 2nd video re: MVDali vs Key Bridge collision. Chief, this video was much more understandable than several other YT reviews of the NTSB (preliminary?) report focusing on the Electrical layout. Much appreciated the time you have taken to pull up pictures of the different equipment 'boxes' & splice-in actual video of the engine room with close-ups of the various 'boxes'. Also you spent much time (editing) showing the chronology of the events as the flow path traveled from 1 box along its circut thru the safety circut overload 'breakers' then continuing along to lower voltage area then to the many needed areas....instantly!! So far several YT commentors all focus on this electrical schematic & emphasize the various flow Paths...but you are the only one who mentions the possible Cause...>like what feeds the big generators< ..# 1,2,3 & 4 which trigger everything that follows. As you say Chief, we all must wait for further info from NTSB...but I think you are on the right track! Thx Chief, 👍⚙️🔩👨🔧
@@BijaoCocerothe company that ran the Ever Given was (is?) Evergreen (Marine) ... Hence the large writing on the side of the ship. The ship's name (Ever Given) was on the stern (in much smaller writing Hope that helps ...
I'm an old Coast Guardsman, 75, who served on the Bridge but I would have been honored to serve under you. Fair winds and a following sea in your travels. 🌍🚢
Chief Makoi, there are two kinds of "engineers" to be found in a ship's engine room. There are those who know which way to rotate a wrench when making repairs, and there are those that understand the physical laws and principles that define a ship's systems and operation. You obviously fit the latter category by your excellent presentation of the Dali's systems and probable failure causes.
That's the difference that having 4 stripes on your uniform makes :) The cadets and oilers/wipers do most of the heavy physical work of turning large wrenches and cleaning up messes.
Yes Chief, I've been waiting for your comments on the NTSB report. Your explanation and diagram are excellent but in the end the preliminary report seems to raise more questions than it answers. I guess we'll have to wait for the final version and hope that the mysteries are solved.
I’m a retired ships pilot. Thank you so much for providing these detailed videos about this issue and shipping in general. There are so many CZcamsrs that only have a cursory knowledge of shipping and really don’t have much experience. It would have been nice to work with you when I was sailing. Keep up the good work!
Could you imagine that losing `propeller walk´ once main engine slows down and finally stops could cause some `compensation effect´ pushing stern to starboard then (opposite to active prop-walk pushing to port for right-handed propeller)? I wonder whether such thing could explain Dali veering to starboard and towards the pillar once the first blackout happened. However, just thinking from physics here, and thus I'm interested in feedback from experienced seafarers & pilots.
Sal from What's Going on With Shipping did a break down of this, but your chart/diagram makes it much clearer and makes your explanation easier to understand for us landlubbers. 😉 Thanks for the information and video!
As an electrician I can say that the overcurrent protections trip the circuit breakers when there are problems downstream to protect the upstream installation, the exception is the differential protection and the fact that both switches on transformer 1 are disconnected at the same time, this leads me to the idea that the differential protection worked i.e. somewhere in the installation there was an insulation defect that put one of the phases to ground, due to the fact that after the second disconnection the electrician connected transformer 2 makes me think that he suspected an insulation defect on transformer 1
Thank you. When I heard BOTH breakers tripped, I wondered. That function would absolutely be needed if Both transformers were on line and one had a ground fault. (Ex ET radar not a Electricians mate, but that did push my What The button)
Good thinking on this. I'm not familiar with vessels of this size, but electrical systems on ships are required to be fairly fault tolerant for exactly this reason. It is considered to be safer to have a warning of a fault and continue to have an operating ship, rather than an automatic disconnect. In this system there may be a setpoint at which a warning is not sufficient and disconnect is required to prevent catastrophic damage.
@@davidsutton9195 Transformer diff, bus diff, gen diff will all trip instantaneously. No delay, no warning and usually attempts to prevent a catastrophic failure of that component. Over current, under / over frequency, over / under voltage you will have a delay within certain parameters and can be instantaneous outside certain parameters. A differential works by comparing what current is coming in to what current is going out on that piece of equipment. Any "differential" between that and it will trip to limit the fault current and try to save the equipment. And yes, the relays are configured to account for the different voltages and respective currents and or phase shift depending on transformer configuration. When something trips on differential you normally do not ever just reset and re-energize without inspecting the device that just tripped. When a lockout rolls due to a differential, it's usually an oh shit moment. If lucky, it was some unlucky animal that got itself electrocuted and the equipment is usually OK. On land, snakes, raccoons, birds, rats and even iguanas (when I worked in S Florida) are the usual culprits. I'm sure on ships you can get snakes or rats as well. With a three phase delta distribution / feeder, you can have one phase fault to ground and continue to operate with a ground fault warning. But if another phase were to contact ground, now you have a phase to phase fault. But any ground or phase fault within a differential zone of protection, as mentioned above will trip instantaneously.
@@davidsutton9195 I think it's just a matter of procedure here, namely the two transformers TR1 and TR2 I'm sure are identical, so there wouldn't be any problem if during the critical port entry-exit periods both are connected in parallel, and the differential protection of each transformer could disconnect in case of fault the transformer that has problems and the other one remains online. Yes indeed, the differential protection simultaneously triggers both switches on the transformer and the high voltage input and the low voltage one, I have not worked on ships but in factories this is how it works
I worked for 35 years on large broadcast transmitter plant that had very similar split HV/LV busbars like on that ship (although in our case the HV was 11kV). In my experience, nearly every HV breaker feeding a transformer had intertripping that caused the LV breaker to trip out if the HV breaker tripped. This way, the transformer was completely disconnected from supply - especially backfeed from the LV bus bar which could exacerbate a transformer problem if that was the reason the HV breaker tripped. Thanks for your excellent explanation of the NTSB report - it will be interesting what the final report says. As you note, I find it strange they seem to have been doing maintenance on the only working generator when the inadvertent closure of an exhaust damper caused a blackout. There's a lot to come out yet! Smooth sailing, Chief!
Many thx, I was waiting for YOUR video about the report because you know what you are talking about and for me you are by far the most reliable source of information regarding this kind of thematic! 👍👍👍 Have a good time! 🥰
your explanation is clear and concise, adding color to the wiring schematic is very helpful, explaining the reverse order of piston firing explained what has been previously fumbled by others, and the system as a whole is less complex than one may have thought, in explanations I have seen so far. this presentation was both informative and educational to the non technician, there is nothing worse than you tubers rushing to get it out first, when they know little of what they are discussing. thank you. carry on and remain calm, as usual !!
Chief Makoi and SteamMan are both notable in that both are actual marine Chief Engineers, serving on similar design and sized ships. To say they "know their stuff" is a massive understatement. They live it every day.
I've seen walk-throughs of the NTSB report by a couple of other CZcamsrs... the NTSB's over-simplified graphics and CZcamsr explanations injected confusion and raised questions; your graphics and explanations cleared things up very nicely.
Good day Chief. Another excellent video, with your explanation which clears up all the misconceptions which arose from the too over-simplified schematic diagram put up by the NTSB report. I fully concurr with your statements that in normal operation all the bus tie breakers are closed. You have explained everything properly. Rgds, Richard (retired JRCS tech).
Your system diagram is head and shoulders above the NTSB release and makes the systems, and the report for that matter, more understandable to the less experienced viewer. Your coverage shows the difference between those that do, and those that are following along. You and a rare few are doing great work making all things seafaring interesting, enductional, and even fun to know about.
There seem to be serious questions that need to be answered about the competency of the NTSB people who released that report with such a deficient diagram that was incomplete, misleading and inaccurate. If that sort of thing is the basis upon which the NTSB conducts its business and investigations then there seem to be serious problems. Not the least of which being questions about their ability to even understand systems yet alone reach well reasoned and technically sound conclusions.
Thanks again Chief for your explanation. I would think that the ship did not respond to the rudder and in fact swung to starboard due to the still ebbing tide coming off the Curtis Bay channel which pushed the stern to port. My humble opinion as a long retired master mariner.
Excellent analytical chronological report on that NTSB electrical schematic & many YT comments. You go to 'what Feeds' the 4 main generators? FUEL. Appreciate all t time you spent grabbing pics of the equipment + engine room video showing these big 'boxes'...very big stuff! Thx again Chief for all your time spent assembling & editing your report to all we viewers. A+👍👍👍
His diagram and explanation are a perfect example of good engineering practice. Never put anything in your explanation you don't need to make your point.
Thank you Chief, this is the true and correct explanation of the NTSB report, as it is very clear in all details. I worked with 50 Hz generators and the breaker usually trips either because of a current overload, an under/over voltage, or because of an excessive frequency deviation, say below 45 Hertz or above 55 Hertz. The engine governor keeps the frequency in range by intervening on the fuel pump; if - as per your hypothesis - the fuel was tainted, the governor couldn't keep the speed, the frequency dropped, and the breaker tripped. This make sense for the second blackout, when the 6,600 Volt line was killed; the first blackout, very likely, was triggered by an under voltage condition, as the frequency alarm is designed to accept the temporary frequency drop which occur when an heavy load is suddenly applied. Thank you once more! Greetings from the UK, Anthony
Chief MAKOi, yourself and chief `Steam man´ are doing great job here by following up and providing comprehensive explanations & insights as best as can. Each with partly slightly different perspective, but everyone trying to be very objective and focussed on facts - highly appreciated! So carry on , please!
A good walkthrough, Eng. The more detailed one line diagram helps immensely by showing the vital bus, its generators, and the emergency bus tie breaker. Also, the normal lineup with the tie breakers shut. That ship’s loads were 480 V with 6600 V for cargo panels and bow thrusters was a big clarification. I share your suspicions about a 480 V fault and a SSDG fuel issue.
Chief - Thank you for your explanation, I was waiting for this. As a retired engineer who knows nothing about marine system design (but somewhat aircraft and industrial - I'm a mechanical guy) you filled in the blanks I was having to guess at with the NTSB report (not knocking them - I understand they are trying to communicate with all knowledge levels). I see some people talking about operating the system 'split' during critical maneuvering so if you lose half the system the other side keeps all systems functional, more akin to an aircraft layout. Would be interesting to hearing if that is ever done, pro and con, etc. Being retired from industry I also realize how cost enters into decisions many time - sometimes when it should not be a consideration. Enjoy getting your instructional course as you describe everything. Thanks for this effort, much appreciated.
Being one of the `some people´ 😅 (and even using allegory with 4-engine birds like B-747 or A380), let me share that basically my rationale when thinking about going for `split operation´ in confined waters comes from a safety approach; primarily targeting to avoid total loss of electrical power (due to full redundancy) but as fast as can be recovery at least. Reading other comments from chiefs & experienced seafarers, it appears to be common practice on ships to have both HR and LR cross-ties closed (but cutting one transformer path instead). Discussion also brought up `classic´ transformers (i.e. with coil windings) better should be kept online from HV-side (but switched off from LV bus, thus no further load) to have some heating to get rid of moisture plus avoiding strong initiate inrush currents. Keeping them connected to the HV bus would be possible for both scenarios. Generators need frequency synchronisation before switched to a common bus (some analogy from aviation is synchronisation of propeller engines to avoid the wings and fuselage build up oscillations due to the `beating´ frequencies coming from different RPM). Perhaps that syncing is slightly easier with HR cross-tie already connected, although the synchronisation control needs to be done by simple sensing of the frequencies already before generators are connected. For almost all cases, the approach with closed HR and LR cross-ties obviously worked fine so far, and there are also safety measures in place which are working fine if there’s sufficient time for emergency procedures. Such power switching does not happen instantaneously... Now comes probability from such an incident to happen in a location where every second counts… But we also have to wait for all details & findings of the investigation, of course. If there’s another, very central failure which causes the entire system to drown nevertheless, then splitting wouldn’t help either (but further reduce probability at least).
I've seen a couple of good reviews of the NTSB report (including Sal M's), but your version of the electrical diagram made a big difference in clarifying how things work and the sequence of events. Many thanks for providing your experienced view. You can't beat the opinion of an impartial professional who actually does the job. Thanks and best wishes from the UK.
The first impression I had from the NTSB report was the electrical schematics only showed the generators and transformers. Your schematics made it much easier to understand for this retired mechanical engineer. As you stated, a much more detailed analysis of all of the events on the Dali on that fateful day will be studied in greater detail before the NTSB will issue the final report. Your clarification in this video was greatly appreciated.
As Marine Engineer I appreciate your technical analysis of the NTSB report. But from all indication the The Dali had a competent Engine room crew board
Yes as a ex-chief electrical officer in the British merchant marine many years ago. I sure understand what you are saying in such a competent manner very much like the Chief engineers I sailed with. They understood their craft completely and in one case would only go to the engine room on entering or leaving port when he was legally obliged to. All other times he would call the second engineer and say go and check such and such. This was his ability to hear or feel by the sound or vibration the operation of the main engine and generators. I feel you are the same sort of chief though you will have in the cabin a lot of engine room monitoring gear. Many thanks, Chief Den
Thanks, excellant graphics and explanations. All said in done these "errors" cost 6 men there lives and over a billion dollars of damages. Inadequate crew training, neglect of testing emergency backup systems and lack of maintenance. This shipping company, not the US taxpayers, will be the damages, and paying for a new bridge.
Former Master and DPA /retd) in a small German company here. I've been following you for a while now Chief Makoi, and like many others am sure, I've been waiting for your analysis on the USCG/NTSB report - many many thanks! Of course you are right, without the prop wash, the rudder would've been ineffective! If they see your videos, I wouldn't be surprised if the USCG or NTSB ask you to join them😂
Great video Chief! Your breakdown of what happened was very informative explaining what happened when the ship lost power steering and being underway. Thank you sir and God Bless You and your family! Prayers for the families of those men that lost their lives when the bridge was hit and collapsed.
Great explanation Chief. I’ve watched a few of the other people covering this and they have done a great job but you nailed it on the engineering aspects of the report. Look forward to future comments when the final report comes out.
Well Done Chief, having watched your videos over the years I have a deep respect for you and your experience as a engineer, and later chief engineer on a variety of cargo ships. You did an excellent job of explaining the report and giving us your observations and thoughts on this accident. Well Done Sir.
Very interesting and detailed as usual. Who knows they may eventually come up with a plausible solution. That was an awful lot of black smoke. Doesn't sound like they have addressed that yet. Surely that must be coming from main engine. Not generators. Like trying to start up an old tractor or truck. Churn over and pump out smoke before they start. Whatever the real reason, the cost will be through the roof. And any insurance company will be playing pass the parcel. Trying to limit pay out.
@@ChiefMAKOi ain't seen one that I didn't like. As a heavy truck mechanic for over 30 years it's interesting to see the difference in the equipment. For the most part they are all the same. Same principles I guess you could say. They are all nuts and bolts. Anyway let me know when you are going to treat your team to something different and I will definitely kick in some doh. It's an honor to. There's so many channels to donate to but like anything else some are probably a bit sketchy as to what the money will go towards I have no doubt when I donate to you. Ty for the informative and relevant information I love it. I'm to old to change my path now so it's nice to be able to see what it's all about. Take care of yourself and your crew. On last thing. What is the closest you have been to Canada or have you been here and if so have you ever sailed on the great lakes. Sorry if sailed isn't the correct word. Also you hear stories about how they can be far dangerous then the ocean's. I've heard stories of people who spent their entire lives on the water and say no way not happening. Thanks again and sorry for the long comment. 👍🇨🇦🔧
Thank you, Some make assumptions about a situation that isn't fully supported by known facts. Or make statements from a desk that isn't supported by real world experience. Then being argumentive to those who ask questions or point out inconsistent statements made. In contrast you talk TO your audience, using your personal knowledge and experience to support your hypothesis. You do so in order to inform and educate your "crew". Showing leadership while still leaving room for discussion and input.
Watched a few of the other channels try to decipher the report, this is the best explanation yet. Black smoke on a diesel usually indicates an over fueling or rich fuel condition. I guess we will have to wait for the full report. This will take time as there is billions of dollars involved in the cleanup, rebuild, and commercial loss at stake here.
Agreed...there was commentary that this also happened while in port those few days prior to departing. Sounds like its coming down to inexperienced crew. Also, back in the day most "rudders" were called a wash plate because they didn't really function well without the "prop wash" pushing thrusts of water onto it. Our world is changing....not enough theory of operation and history is being given to education and training from my observations. Folks today seem to know very limited information about their jobs and have little references when things go wrong as to how to correct it or, more importantly, just get it done as a temporary fix until legitimate procedures can be restored. I've seen this happen more times than not with todays workers, experts and so forth.
Second this from experience in my field. Keyword - or shall I better call it buzz-word - is `specialisation´, paired with high workload such that it's more important to jump from one task to next rather than also building up more broad-band knowledge...
That is terrifying to me. I was navy operator in the steam plant on aircraft carriers. We had to understand the fundamentals of systems in the plant right down to the basic physics. And while I was a mechanic and thus ran the turbines and pumps and propulsion an generators (turbinenside) I had to understand the electrical and electronics well enough to know how they behaved and why. In our school if you didn't know why you could fail even if you got the short answer correct. I know not all systems and ships were as "big" or complex or redundant as a carrier but tonnage is tonnage. And keeping a ship running and maneuverable is paramount. Maintains safety margins, knowing immeaditae actions, reading the plant quickly and decisively so it can be restored is just necessary. You can't do that if you don't understand that. Specialization might be good for being good at the technical knowledge need for good maintenance but these guys are operators to and need to be proficient in those core knowledge skills and abilites too.
@@zionbrin1 At the end, to me it’s key to have a healthy, balanced mix. On the one hand, specialists being able to really get down to atomic (or even sub-atomic) level are needed to push limits of science & engineering. Same time, you need more `generalist experts´, who can follow the specialists of different fields and especially are able to understand & build the links in between the various disciplines. The more people you have with such broadband skills, the better of course. In case of aircraft carriers and submarines, it’s essential being able to fix things and overcome critical situations quickly with limited crew (and no other help being in around which one could call …). So no surprise to me there’s such selection and training of crew members to achieve resilience; paired with intense emergency `drill exercises´. In principle, same applies for civil maritime crews for same reasons, of course. Wrt industry, I already put my comment above. Like mentioned, it depends on individual attitude and partly on workload. But I also challenge mgmt. levels here; with quite some of them putting more focus on their own career instead of strengthening & building up resilient team (and unfortunately preventing talented people to climb up). To be clear: this comment is not intended as kind of assessing or even judging on Dali’ crew performance here.
Judging by all the mainstream comments, for some reason people think that ships can just slam it in to reverse and stop on a dime. Im certainly glad your videos are out there. 👍👍
thanks so much for your report as I am an apritance electrician in the reestural side I dont know about ship systems and your digram was great to help me understand ships systems and I found your throw Sal's youtube channel
Many thanks to you Chief, for this detailed but easy to understand explanation of how this disaster unfolded. I enjoy all of your videos and appreciate learning about life as a seaman. My career was in underground mining where high voltage equipment was in common use. Similar but different to your electrical systems. Safe travels and best regards from Australia.🇦🇺
I think you are right. The report did not talk about the smoke. That smoke looks like #6 fuel to me. I cannot understand how #2 could make that smoke. You are right about doing maintenance on a running system . I think they are using the testimony of the crew. I suspect some are not telling the truth. However, the full report will get to the truth. It may take a while, but they will get the the real causes.
Wow. Chief Makoi. Thanks for the explanation. Scary scenario for all crews to watch out for. Perhaps a day tank to gravity feed the generators needs to be added. 15 minutes of extra gravity fed fuel may have kept the generators running perhaps depending on design.
Thanks Chief between you and Sal, I understand what (not how) happened. Retired USn Interion Communications elect, that was qualified on 600lb. steam plant generator watch standing.
As an industrial electrical technician for almost 30 years. I appreciate the Chief detailed explanation. I will be awaiting any more videos especially when the final NTSB report is released. I do understand going thru alarms as I have troubleshoot failures on production lines to find the root cause of the line's shutdown. You have to figure out which specific alarm was the cause of the shutdown. You can only figure that out if you have a through understanding on how a particular system operates and how it can fail. Thank you, Chief.
It sounds as if the Chief is skeptical of some of the statements given to the NTSB by the crew, particularly about the incident that happened 10 days prior. It also sounds like the Chief has some questions about the procedures the crew executed during this casualty, and maybe even about the systems' functionality on this ship, aside from the obvious. I hope the NTSB gets to the bottom of what actually happened and doesn't try to sweep anything under the rug.
Master chief, Great new information on main generator issues. There was no mention why the ship turned towards the bridge peir. The rudder was amidship. So was ship going straight ahead or was it still turning at time of main engine failure and then continued to turn into peir? Why did ship not drift in a straight course when engine failed? There are 2 issues with this accident 1.Why engine failure? 2. Why ship turned into peir? Thank for best video on report yet! Cheers Warren
I have Noe experience, however am curious if not fascinated as to what could have caused this catastrophe. You explanation Chief was so clear and easy to follow. Thank you for the visuals as it was so helpful for a novice like me.
I've seen several explanations of the NTSB report. I thought they were good and helped me to understand what is known about the failure. With that said, your video provided better clarity. Thank You.
Thank you so much. More technical than other sites which is valuable for your audience. Yep lots of questions. I was in engineer on a Navy ship so am very interested in the procedures for loss of SSDG or other loss of power casualties. Keep up the good work and your dissection of the reports is most interesting and valuable.
Some shore people gave an interview that the "Dali" was having issues with the Reefers because of power outages..Can it be Reefer related..serious shorts that put a tremendous load on the generators hence creating breaker tripping.. Also this LSMGO fuel has different viscosities creating more internal leaks and might it also be the culprit for pressure drops in the fuel supply system...May be a combination of variables as is most probable the case.. breakers trip because of short only.. or are there other paramaters involved.. Anyway, thanks Chief, as usual an outstanding review..
The reports / this video show that the reefer containers (and other equipment / circuits) hang off the HV bus via their own transformer circuits so should not (?) have caused the decisive tripping of the LV transformer circuit… But there was definitely some funny stuff going on with the electrics in port…..
Many thanks, Chief Makoi for your highly informative insight into this very sad event. You're years of expertise, makes for an amazing educational experience. Always look forward to your vlogs. Be safe. Blessings. Sherry 🥰 🙏 💞 🚢
An interesting item is while the heavy smoke was present, according to AIS data the Dali was rapidly decelerating and turning to starboard - and only during the black smoke emission. AIS data is available every 10 seconds. From 1:25:00 when power was lost the first time until the smoke began at 1:26:09 the ship only slowed by 0.2 knots and COG changed to starboard by 1 degree. The ship was drifting. From 1:26:09 when the heavy smoke starts to 1:28:07 shortly before the smoke stopped, the ship slowed by 1.8 knots and COG went to starboard by 14 degrees. The ship was rapidly decelerating and turning. From 1:28:07 to just before impact with the bridge at 1:29:15 the ship only slowed by 0.2 knots and the COG changed to starboard by 2 degrees. The ship was drifting. It sure looks to me like the main propulsion engine was restarted after the first power failure and was running in full reverse for 2 minutes to cause the heavy black smoke and rapid deceleration, and prop walk caused the large starboard COG change which ultimately resulted in impact with the bridge. Nothing else explains the velocity and course change only while the heavy smoke was present.
Great video update! Thanks for the analysis. Can you do a video on the status of the crew? I understand they are still aboard the ship and have not gone ashore at any time. How do they get food? How do they get fresh water? Are they getting paid? What has been their interaction with the NTSB? How do you think they are doing? Thanks!
I've managed to get a farm tractor engine running backwards. Climbing on a pile of silage with too low throttle, the engine stalled and the tractor started rolling backwards and the engine came back to life. With gear still on and clutch not pressed, I accidentally did a hill start in reverse with a forward gear on. Now the forward gear moved the tractor backwards! After a few moments of fun to verify the gears were really the wrong way and the engine must be running backwards too, I restarted the tractor and all was right again. Probably water pumps and lubrication work better with the engine running the intended way! :^)
While you can start a vehicle engine in reverse (diesel) it has nothing to do with the Dali engine, it runs in reverse deliberately. Pumps are all totally independent and nothing to do with engine rotation. .
I wish you end up in an education position somewhere in your carrier. I had a few really good teachers I am always thankful, and you could be this teacher for a lot lot of people.
Great presentation Chief, as an Electrical Engineer and sometime instructor I appreciate your diagrams and clarity of description of the ship's electrical power and connection to pumps, steering and main engine. It sounds like their was a problem in the electrical system or an operator procedural problem while the ship was in port. The cause of the failure should have been isolated and fixed before the ship was allowed to get underway with its cargo. I guess we will find out as the NTSB does its review of the accident.
Thanks, Chief. Take care and fair winds I thought the black smoke was the engine doing a reset exhaust expulsion as they attempted a restart. Clearing out the pipes as they say.
Excellent analysis Chief Makoi, especially the elaboration of the simplified NTSB circuit diagram. My conjecture - immediately after the crash - was a fuel related one. Possibly excessive paraffins, the wax of which will clog the low-micron sintered filters, which cannot easily be removed in the auto filter self cleaning operation. The suspected and alleged blackouts, when alongside, led me up that path. Search me, how could they even think of closing the dampers of a running generator? Isn’t this the domain of a senior engineer? (I’ve had this - choking of filters - happen to me twice, when we were, crazily, changing over filters while maneuvering, until we went to an older and different Diesel Oil source. The wax in the paraffins of Diesel Oil will choke the filters quickly. The same wax in the paraffins in Heavy Fuel Oil will not choke the low micron sintered filters as the HFO is heated to around +130 deg C. The melting point of these paraffins is from 45 to 60 deg C). The only way to clean these (choked) sintered filters is either to ‘steam’ them or use a light flame, the steaming being preferable. But the NTSB Preliminary Report is inclined towards malfunction of HR1 and LR1, normally very reliable, especially if they are Terasaki. If fuel related, loss of speed of the Generators 3 and 4, would have triggered the ‘Low Voltage’ or ‘Low Frequency’ alarms in the Generator Starting Circuit, which would have tripped DGR3 and DGR4, not HR1or LR1. Even as they were tripping (DGR3 / 4), Generators 1 or 2, or both, would have started automatically and come on load, as they would have been on ‘Auto Standby’. The total load on the switchboard would have lessened, as the ‘Non Essentials’ - including Reefer Containers and Domestic Systems - would have tripped. So, even one Generator would have been capable of taking the ship’s load, as the Bow Thruster would have tripped and would need to be reset before starting. (Although, I expect that they would have switched off the BT even before the blackouts near the Bridge - worth examining when did they switch off the BT). Noting the heavy black smoke after the black out, it could be from one or both the ‘Standby’ Generators starting up. In the ‘comments’ section, I read one comment that ‘Low Insulation’ of the HV Switchboard could have tripped this breaker HR 1. In this kind of an HV setup, it will be reasonable to expect heavy protection in the form of alarms, indication on meters, auto-tripping of minor breakers etc. in case of ‘Low Insulation’. If an HV Breaker were to trip due to Low Insulation, would it not have caused a heavy spark at some place or the other? Unless there was a problem with the breaker HR 1 / LR 1 itself. But why would the malfunction of one of them trip the other? Only one breaker should trip, not both. The irony is that, whatever took place, if it had taken place a few minutes later, it would have resulted in either grounding or drifting, no more. I do not want to speculate further, as the investigation is still on. But, we have not seen the end of it…..AR
The black smoke was cause by lack of fuel on the generators. The generators had been running on “gravity” fuel with no load. The fuel filters were probably close to empty when the crew restored power to the main bus. The sudden load caused generators to underspeed as the generators could not supply need power with low fuel supply. The breakers for the generators tripped when generators undersped on low voltage right after that.
Markoi. Thank you very much for the facts at this point in time. As more in-depth investigation moves forward along, we then place facts in place to see why this failure occurred. Again, Engineer Markoi, thank you for the clear life experiences thinking. Please take care.👍👀
Great diagram and explanation! Although it makes me wonder why TR1 and TR2 are not _both_ permanently connected to the 440 volt line for redundancy, so that if one trips, the other will still supply power. Sounds like that would have prevented the problem from ever occurring.
Chief Makoi, I am also a Ship Electrician for almost 27 years in ocean going vessels mostly Container Ships. You are one of the best Filipino Chief Engineer. Your explanation is so clear and very Professional. Mabuhay...
Marine electrician and long time subsriber here. Well done video Chief! This was a great explanation that anyone can follow and understand. I hope the internet algorithm gets this out to all of those who are following the story.
Much appreciated
you're taking this guy's advice? last time he was popular on the internet he kept getting angry because people called him out when he kept incorrectly calling the Evergreen the "ever given" lol. It said Evergreen right on it. lolll
5/18/24..A+ on this your 2nd video re: MVDali vs Key Bridge collision. Chief, this video was much more understandable than several other YT reviews of the NTSB (preliminary?) report focusing on the Electrical layout. Much appreciated the time you have taken to pull up pictures of the different equipment 'boxes' & splice-in actual video of the engine room with close-ups of the various 'boxes'. Also you spent much time (editing) showing the chronology of the events as the flow path traveled from 1 box along its circut thru the safety circut overload 'breakers' then continuing along to lower voltage area then to the many needed areas....instantly!!
So far several YT commentors all focus on this electrical schematic & emphasize the various flow Paths...but you are the only one who mentions the possible Cause...>like what feeds the big generators< ..# 1,2,3 & 4 which trigger everything that follows.
As you say Chief, we all must wait for further info from NTSB...but I think you are on the right track! Thx Chief, 👍⚙️🔩👨🔧
@@BijaoCocerothe company that ran the Ever Given was (is?) Evergreen (Marine) ... Hence the large writing on the side of the ship. The ship's name (Ever Given) was on the stern (in much smaller writing
Hope that helps ...
@@BijaoCocero seriously???
I'm an old Coast Guardsman, 75, who served on the Bridge but I would have been honored to serve under you. Fair winds and a following sea in your travels. 🌍🚢
Chief Makoi, there are two kinds of "engineers" to be found in a ship's engine room. There are those who know which way to rotate a wrench when making repairs, and there are those that understand the physical laws and principles that define a ship's systems and operation. You obviously fit the latter category by your excellent presentation of the Dali's systems and probable failure causes.
Right tighty lefty loosy 😂
That's the difference that having 4 stripes on your uniform makes :) The cadets and oilers/wipers do most of the heavy physical work of turning large wrenches and cleaning up messes.
Chief, thank you for your input on this report. You stated matters so clear, and your charts made it easy to follow. Thank you!
I appreciate that!
Yes Chief, I've been waiting for your comments on the NTSB report. Your explanation and diagram are excellent but in the end the preliminary report seems to raise more questions than it answers. I guess we'll have to wait for the final version and hope that the mysteries are solved.
I’m a retired ships pilot. Thank you so much for providing these detailed videos about this issue and shipping in general. There are so many CZcamsrs that only have a cursory knowledge of shipping and really don’t have much experience. It would have been nice to work with you when I was sailing. Keep up the good work!
Could you imagine that losing `propeller walk´ once main engine slows down and finally stops could cause some `compensation effect´ pushing stern to starboard then (opposite to active prop-walk pushing to port for right-handed propeller)? I wonder whether such thing could explain Dali veering to starboard and towards the pillar once the first blackout happened. However, just thinking from physics here, and thus I'm interested in feedback from experienced seafarers & pilots.
Sal from What's Going on With Shipping did a break down of this, but your chart/diagram makes it much clearer and makes your explanation easier to understand for us landlubbers. 😉 Thanks for the information and video!
My pleasure! 😊
As an electrician I can say that the overcurrent protections trip the circuit breakers when there are problems downstream to protect the upstream installation, the exception is the differential protection and the fact that both switches on transformer 1 are disconnected at the same time, this leads me to the idea that the differential protection worked i.e. somewhere in the installation there was an insulation defect that put one of the phases to ground, due to the fact that after the second disconnection the electrician connected transformer 2 makes me think that he suspected an insulation defect on transformer 1
That's a very likely possibility.
Thank you. When I heard BOTH breakers tripped, I wondered. That function would absolutely be needed if Both transformers were on line and one had a ground fault. (Ex ET radar not a Electricians mate, but that did push my What The button)
Good thinking on this. I'm not familiar with vessels of this size, but electrical systems on ships are required to be fairly fault tolerant for exactly this reason. It is considered to be safer to have a warning of a fault and continue to have an operating ship, rather than an automatic disconnect. In this system there may be a setpoint at which a warning is not sufficient and disconnect is required to prevent catastrophic damage.
@@davidsutton9195 Transformer diff, bus diff, gen diff will all trip instantaneously. No delay, no warning and usually attempts to prevent a catastrophic failure of that component. Over current, under / over frequency, over / under voltage you will have a delay within certain parameters and can be instantaneous outside certain parameters. A differential works by comparing what current is coming in to what current is going out on that piece of equipment. Any "differential" between that and it will trip to limit the fault current and try to save the equipment. And yes, the relays are configured to account for the different voltages and respective currents and or phase shift depending on transformer configuration. When something trips on differential you normally do not ever just reset and re-energize without inspecting the device that just tripped. When a lockout rolls due to a differential, it's usually an oh shit moment. If lucky, it was some unlucky animal that got itself electrocuted and the equipment is usually OK. On land, snakes, raccoons, birds, rats and even iguanas (when I worked in S Florida) are the usual culprits. I'm sure on ships you can get snakes or rats as well.
With a three phase delta distribution / feeder, you can have one phase fault to ground and continue to operate with a ground fault warning. But if another phase were to contact ground, now you have a phase to phase fault. But any ground or phase fault within a differential zone of protection, as mentioned above will trip instantaneously.
@@davidsutton9195 I think it's just a matter of procedure here, namely the two transformers TR1 and TR2 I'm sure are identical, so there wouldn't be any problem if during the critical port entry-exit periods both are connected in parallel, and the differential protection of each transformer could disconnect in case of fault the transformer that has problems and the other one remains online. Yes indeed, the differential protection simultaneously triggers both switches on the transformer and the high voltage input and the low voltage one, I have not worked on ships but in factories this is how it works
I worked for 35 years on large broadcast transmitter plant that had very similar split HV/LV busbars like on that ship (although in our case the HV was 11kV). In my experience, nearly every HV breaker feeding a transformer had intertripping that caused the LV breaker to trip out if the HV breaker tripped. This way, the transformer was completely disconnected from supply - especially backfeed from the LV bus bar which could exacerbate a transformer problem if that was the reason the HV breaker tripped. Thanks for your excellent explanation of the NTSB report - it will be interesting what the final report says. As you note, I find it strange they seem to have been doing maintenance on the only working generator when the inadvertent closure of an exhaust damper caused a blackout. There's a lot to come out yet! Smooth sailing, Chief!
Many thx, I was waiting for YOUR video about the report because you know what you are talking about and for me you are by far the most reliable source of information regarding this kind of thematic! 👍👍👍
Have a good time! 🥰
You are very welcome.
your explanation is clear and concise, adding color to the wiring schematic is very helpful, explaining the reverse order of piston firing explained what has been previously fumbled by others, and the system as a whole is less complex than one may have thought, in explanations I have seen so far. this presentation was both informative and educational to the non technician, there is nothing worse than you tubers rushing to get it out first, when they know little of what they are discussing. thank you. carry on and remain calm, as usual !!
I try my best. Thanks 😊
Chief Makoi and SteamMan are both notable in that both are actual marine Chief Engineers, serving on similar design and sized ships.
To say they "know their stuff" is a massive understatement. They live it every day.
So nice to hear someone say "from my experience" when talking about a subject.
To the Chief & commenters THANK YOU
2:45 A frakking beautiful work of art. I love info-graphics and yours is sublime for its content and simplicity.
Glad you enjoy it!
@@ChiefMAKOi I did indeed enjoy your video. Keep up the good work. What did you use to create the infographic?
I've seen walk-throughs of the NTSB report by a couple of other CZcamsrs... the NTSB's over-simplified graphics and CZcamsr explanations injected confusion and raised questions; your graphics and explanations cleared things up very nicely.
THIS is why it's not worth the brain space to have little patience waiting on the Chief.
Good day Chief. Another excellent video, with your explanation which clears up all the misconceptions which arose from the too over-simplified schematic diagram put up by the NTSB report. I fully concurr with your statements that in normal operation all the bus tie breakers are closed. You have explained everything properly. Rgds, Richard (retired JRCS tech).
Thanks Richard.
Your system diagram is head and shoulders above the NTSB release and makes the systems, and the report for that matter, more understandable to the less experienced viewer. Your coverage shows the difference between those that do, and those that are following along. You and a rare few are doing great work making all things seafaring interesting, enductional, and even fun to know about.
There seem to be serious questions that need to be answered about the competency of the NTSB people who released that report with such a deficient diagram that was incomplete, misleading and inaccurate.
If that sort of thing is the basis upon which the NTSB conducts its business and investigations then there seem to be serious problems. Not the least of which being questions about their ability to even understand systems yet alone reach well reasoned and technically sound conclusions.
I believe the first diagram is the original. It's called schematic diagram.
Thanks again Chief for your explanation. I would think that the ship did not respond to the rudder and in fact swung to starboard due to the still ebbing tide coming off the Curtis Bay channel which pushed the stern to port. My humble opinion as a long retired master mariner.
I actually defer to Master Mariners when it comes to these topics. 😁 That's a good explanation.
General Curtis LeMay had a saying I'm fond of: "I find it hard to tell the difference between the unfortunate, and the incompetent".
Incompetents don't listen and ignore repeated warnings (Stockton for example).
Excellent analytical chronological report on that NTSB electrical schematic & many YT comments. You go to 'what Feeds' the 4 main generators? FUEL. Appreciate all t time you spent grabbing pics of the equipment + engine room video showing these big 'boxes'...very big stuff!
Thx again Chief for all your time spent assembling & editing your report to all we viewers. A+👍👍👍
Chief Makoi, you rule!!! As Electrical Engineer I enjoyed the crystal clear - though simplified - way you explained the entire timeline of events!
His diagram and explanation are a perfect example of good engineering practice. Never put anything in your explanation you don't need to make your point.
Thank you Chief, this is the true and correct explanation of the NTSB report, as it is very clear in all details.
I worked with 50 Hz generators and the breaker usually trips either because of a current overload, an under/over voltage, or because of an excessive frequency deviation, say below 45 Hertz or above 55 Hertz. The engine governor keeps the frequency in range by intervening on the fuel pump; if - as per your hypothesis - the fuel was tainted, the governor couldn't keep the speed, the frequency dropped, and the breaker tripped. This make sense for the second blackout, when the 6,600 Volt line was killed; the first blackout, very likely, was triggered by an under voltage condition, as the frequency alarm is designed to accept the temporary frequency drop which occur when an heavy load is suddenly applied.
Thank you once more!
Greetings from the UK,
Anthony
Well xplain. I use to be a tester of gen - set tester. 😊
Excellent report Chief. I was waiting to hear your take and you did not disappoint.
Chief MAKOi, yourself and chief `Steam man´ are doing great job here by following up and providing comprehensive explanations & insights as best as can. Each with partly slightly different perspective, but everyone trying to be very objective and focussed on facts - highly appreciated! So carry on , please!
Thanks Sal! 😊
A good walkthrough, Eng. The more detailed one line diagram helps immensely by showing the vital bus, its generators, and the emergency bus tie breaker. Also, the normal lineup with the tie breakers shut. That ship’s loads were 480 V with 6600 V for cargo panels and bow thrusters was a big clarification. I share your suspicions about a 480 V fault and a SSDG fuel issue.
Chief - Thank you for your explanation, I was waiting for this. As a retired engineer who knows nothing about marine system design (but somewhat aircraft and industrial - I'm a mechanical guy) you filled in the blanks I was having to guess at with the NTSB report (not knocking them - I understand they are trying to communicate with all knowledge levels). I see some people talking about operating the system 'split' during critical maneuvering so if you lose half the system the other side keeps all systems functional, more akin to an aircraft layout. Would be interesting to hearing if that is ever done, pro and con, etc. Being retired from industry I also realize how cost enters into decisions many time - sometimes when it should not be a consideration. Enjoy getting your instructional course as you describe everything. Thanks for this effort, much appreciated.
Being one of the `some people´ 😅 (and even using allegory with 4-engine birds like B-747 or A380), let me share that basically my rationale when thinking about going for `split operation´ in confined waters comes from a safety approach; primarily targeting to avoid total loss of electrical power (due to full redundancy) but as fast as can be recovery at least.
Reading other comments from chiefs & experienced seafarers, it appears to be common practice on ships to have both HR and LR cross-ties closed (but cutting one transformer path instead).
Discussion also brought up `classic´ transformers (i.e. with coil windings) better should be kept online from HV-side (but switched off from LV bus, thus no further load) to have some heating to get rid of moisture plus avoiding strong initiate inrush currents. Keeping them connected to the HV bus would be possible for both scenarios.
Generators need frequency synchronisation before switched to a common bus (some analogy from aviation is synchronisation of propeller engines to avoid the wings and fuselage build up oscillations due to the `beating´ frequencies coming from different RPM). Perhaps that syncing is slightly easier with HR cross-tie already connected, although the synchronisation control needs to be done by simple sensing of the frequencies already before generators are connected.
For almost all cases, the approach with closed HR and LR cross-ties obviously worked fine so far, and there are also safety measures in place which are working fine if there’s sufficient time for emergency procedures. Such power switching does not happen instantaneously... Now comes probability from such an incident to happen in a location where every second counts…
But we also have to wait for all details & findings of the investigation, of course. If there’s another, very central failure which causes the entire system to drown nevertheless, then splitting wouldn’t help either (but further reduce probability at least).
I've seen a couple of good reviews of the NTSB report (including Sal M's), but your version of the electrical diagram made a big difference in clarifying how things work and the sequence of events. Many thanks for providing your experienced view. You can't beat the opinion of an impartial professional who actually does the job. Thanks and best wishes from the UK.
yes as i am an apritnace ele on house hold 220 and 110 uthe digram made more since since I dont know ships ele systems
Pure logic reporting (if somewhat above my previous knowledge), but put in a very clear chronological order, accompanied by a clear, precise diagram..
The first impression I had from the NTSB report was the electrical schematics only showed the generators and transformers. Your schematics made it much easier to understand for this retired mechanical engineer. As you stated, a much more detailed analysis of all of the events on the Dali on that fateful day will be studied in greater detail before the NTSB will issue the final report. Your clarification in this video was greatly appreciated.
As Marine Engineer I appreciate your technical analysis of the NTSB report.
But from all indication the The Dali had a competent Engine room crew board
Yes as a ex-chief electrical officer in the British merchant marine many years ago. I sure understand what you are saying in such a competent manner very much like the Chief engineers I sailed with.
They understood their craft completely and in one case would only go to the engine room on entering or leaving port when he was legally obliged to.
All other times he would call the second engineer and say go and check such and such.
This was his ability to hear or feel by the sound or vibration the operation of the main engine and generators.
I feel you are the same sort of chief though you will have in the cabin a lot of engine room monitoring gear.
Many thanks, Chief Den
Thanks, excellant graphics and explanations. All said in done these "errors" cost 6 men there lives and over a billion dollars of damages. Inadequate crew training, neglect of testing emergency backup systems and lack of maintenance. This shipping company, not the US taxpayers, will be the damages, and paying for a new bridge.
Excellent explanation of the NTSB report! Thanks Chief!
Former Master and DPA /retd) in a small German company here. I've been following you for a while now Chief Makoi, and like many others am sure, I've been waiting for your analysis on the USCG/NTSB report - many many thanks! Of course you are right, without the prop wash, the rudder would've been ineffective! If they see your videos, I wouldn't be surprised if the USCG or NTSB ask you to join them😂
Thanks for being knowledgable and explaining so a layman can undwestand
My pleasure
Your words are very confident.. I like to listen to your words.. cheers from Vietnam
Thanks and welcome
Thanks and welcome
I have learnt a lot from this elaborate analysis. Thank you Chief!!
Thanks, Chief! I love your electrical diagram, it makes sense of a long and wordy report.
Glad it was helpful!
Great video Chief! Your breakdown of what happened was very informative explaining what happened when the ship lost power steering and being underway. Thank you sir and God Bless You and your family! Prayers for the families of those men that lost their lives when the bridge was hit and collapsed.
Great explanation Chief. I’ve watched a few of the other people covering this and they have done a great job but you nailed it on the engineering aspects of the report. Look forward to future comments when the final report comes out.
Always appreciate your analysis, Chief. Very clear as usual.
Much appreciated.
Well Done Chief, having watched your videos over the years I have a deep respect for you and your experience as a engineer, and later chief engineer on a variety of cargo ships. You did an excellent job of explaining the report and giving us your observations and thoughts on this accident.
Well Done Sir.
Very interesting and detailed as usual. Who knows they may eventually come up with a plausible solution. That was an awful lot of black smoke. Doesn't sound like they have addressed that yet. Surely that must be coming from main engine. Not generators. Like trying to start up an old tractor or truck. Churn over and pump out smoke before they start. Whatever the real reason, the cost will be through the roof. And any insurance company will be playing pass the parcel. Trying to limit pay out.
Hey Chief it's great to get your Saturday videos. It's a great start to the weekend 👍🇨🇦
Glad you like them!
@@ChiefMAKOi ain't seen one that I didn't like. As a heavy truck mechanic for over 30 years it's interesting to see the difference in the equipment. For the most part they are all the same. Same principles I guess you could say. They are all nuts and bolts. Anyway let me know when you are going to treat your team to something different and I will definitely kick in some doh. It's an honor to. There's so many channels to donate to but like anything else some are probably a bit sketchy as to what the money will go towards I have no doubt when I donate to you. Ty for the informative and relevant information I love it. I'm to old to change my path now so it's nice to be able to see what it's all about. Take care of yourself and your crew. On last thing. What is the closest you have been to Canada or have you been here and if so have you ever sailed on the great lakes. Sorry if sailed isn't the correct word. Also you hear stories about how they can be far dangerous then the ocean's. I've heard stories of people who spent their entire lives on the water and say no way not happening. Thanks again and sorry for the long comment. 👍🇨🇦🔧
Thank you, Some make assumptions about a situation that isn't fully supported by known facts. Or make statements from a desk that isn't supported by real world experience. Then being argumentive to those who ask questions or point out inconsistent statements made. In contrast you talk TO your audience, using your personal knowledge and experience to support your hypothesis. You do so in order to inform and educate your "crew". Showing leadership while still leaving room for discussion and input.
Thankyou Chief. You are a real expert who can give an unbiased viewpoint on these big ships. Backed by experience and your job as a Chief Engineer.
Chief, thanks for clearing the air about this event. Lots of armchair Captains and Engineers just got their little theories shot down.
Watched a few of the other channels try to decipher the report, this is the best explanation yet. Black smoke on a diesel usually indicates an over fueling or rich fuel condition. I guess we will have to wait for the full report. This will take time as there is billions of dollars involved in the cleanup, rebuild, and commercial loss at stake here.
Agreed...there was commentary that this also happened while in port those few days prior to departing. Sounds like its coming down to inexperienced crew.
Also, back in the day most "rudders" were called a wash plate because they didn't really function well without the "prop wash" pushing thrusts of water onto it.
Our world is changing....not enough theory of operation and history is being given to education and training from my observations. Folks today seem to know very limited information about their jobs and have little references when things go wrong as to how to correct it or, more importantly, just get it done as a temporary fix until legitimate procedures can be restored. I've seen this happen more times than not with todays workers, experts and so forth.
Second this from experience in my field. Keyword - or shall I better call it buzz-word - is `specialisation´, paired with high workload such that it's more important to jump from one task to next rather than also building up more broad-band knowledge...
That is terrifying to me. I was navy operator in the steam plant on aircraft carriers. We had to understand the fundamentals of systems in the plant right down to the basic physics. And while I was a mechanic and thus ran the turbines and pumps and propulsion an generators (turbinenside) I had to understand the electrical and electronics well enough to know how they behaved and why. In our school if you didn't know why you could fail even if you got the short answer correct. I know not all systems and ships were as "big" or complex or redundant as a carrier but tonnage is tonnage. And keeping a ship running and maneuverable is paramount. Maintains safety margins, knowing immeaditae actions, reading the plant quickly and decisively so it can be restored is just necessary. You can't do that if you don't understand that. Specialization might be good for being good at the technical knowledge need for good maintenance but these guys are operators to and need to be proficient in those core knowledge skills and abilites too.
@@zionbrin1 At the end, to me it’s key to have a healthy, balanced mix. On the one hand, specialists being able to really get down to atomic (or even sub-atomic) level are needed to push limits of science & engineering. Same time, you need more `generalist experts´, who can follow the specialists of different fields and especially are able to understand & build the links in between the various disciplines. The more people you have with such broadband skills, the better of course.
In case of aircraft carriers and submarines, it’s essential being able to fix things and overcome critical situations quickly with limited crew (and no other help being in around which one could call …). So no surprise to me there’s such selection and training of crew members to achieve resilience; paired with intense emergency `drill exercises´. In principle, same applies for civil maritime crews for same reasons, of course. Wrt industry, I already put my comment above. Like mentioned, it depends on individual attitude and partly on workload. But I also challenge mgmt. levels here; with quite some of them putting more focus on their own career instead of strengthening & building up resilient team (and unfortunately preventing talented people to climb up). To be clear: this comment is not intended as kind of assessing or even judging on Dali’ crew performance here.
Judging by all the mainstream comments, for some reason people think that ships can just slam it in to reverse and stop on a dime. Im certainly glad your videos are out there. 👍👍
thanks so much for your report as I am an apritance electrician in the reestural side I dont know about ship systems and your digram was great to help me understand ships systems and I found your throw Sal's youtube channel
chief eng. in a small factory, excellent video, nice to hear a report from someone who knows what they are talking about
Omg, sir, I'm so thrilled to finally see your take on this!
Hope you enjoyed it!
Many thanks to you Chief, for this detailed but easy to understand explanation of how this disaster unfolded.
I enjoy all of your videos and appreciate learning about life as a seaman. My career was in underground mining where high voltage equipment was in common use. Similar but different to your electrical systems.
Safe travels and best regards from Australia.🇦🇺
Excellent summary! Take care...
I think you are right. The report did not talk about the smoke. That smoke looks like #6 fuel to me. I cannot understand how #2 could make that smoke.
You are right about doing maintenance on a running system . I think they are using the testimony of the crew. I suspect some are not telling the truth. However, the full report will get to the truth. It may take a while, but they will get the the real causes.
Wow. Chief Makoi. Thanks for the explanation. Scary scenario for all crews to watch out for. Perhaps a day tank to gravity feed the generators needs to be added. 15 minutes of extra gravity fed fuel may have kept the generators running perhaps depending on design.
Thanks for the wonderful explanation that a non-technical person like me could understand.
Thanks Chief between you and Sal, I understand what (not how) happened. Retired USn Interion Communications elect, that was qualified on 600lb. steam plant generator watch standing.
As an industrial electrical technician for almost 30 years. I appreciate the Chief detailed explanation. I will be awaiting any more videos especially when the final NTSB report is released. I do understand going thru alarms as I have troubleshoot failures on production lines to find the root cause of the line's shutdown. You have to figure out which specific alarm was the cause of the shutdown. You can only figure that out if you have a through understanding on how a particular system operates and how it can fail. Thank you, Chief.
Retired industrial electrician. Thank you for the explanations. Good to see you, Chief.
Thank you for the detailed report and bringing it down to street smart levels of knowledge. Learned a lot.
Glad it was helpful!
It sounds as if the Chief is skeptical of some of the statements given to the NTSB by the crew, particularly about the incident that happened 10 days prior. It also sounds like the Chief has some questions about the procedures the crew executed during this casualty, and maybe even about the systems' functionality on this ship, aside from the obvious.
I hope the NTSB gets to the bottom of what actually happened and doesn't try to sweep anything under the rug.
Hey up mate your drawing and words is the first time this report has made some sense, thank you very much
Glad it helped
Master chief, Great new information on main generator issues.
There was no mention why the ship turned towards the bridge peir. The rudder was amidship. So was ship going straight ahead or was it still turning at time of main engine failure and then continued to turn into peir?
Why did ship not drift in a straight course when engine failed?
There are 2 issues with this accident
1.Why engine failure?
2. Why ship turned into peir?
Thank for best video on report yet!
Cheers Warren
Your explanation is very clear and makes sense to me.
I have Noe experience, however am curious if not fascinated as to what could have caused this catastrophe. You explanation Chief was so clear and easy to follow. Thank you for the visuals as it was so helpful for a novice like me.
Your hand drawn diagrams were great with their clarity and giving immediate understanding to me. A nice breakdown by you. Thanks.
I've seen several explanations of the NTSB report. I thought they were good and helped me to understand what is known about the failure. With that said, your video provided better clarity. Thank You.
Thank you so much. More technical than other sites which is valuable for your audience. Yep lots of questions. I was in engineer on a Navy ship so am very interested in the procedures for loss of SSDG or other loss of power casualties. Keep up the good work and your dissection of the reports is most interesting and valuable.
Thanks Chief. Another great video as always. I:m sure they will be sorting this out for quite a while and I look forward to your insights.
Some shore people gave an interview that the "Dali" was having issues with the Reefers because of power outages..Can it be Reefer related..serious shorts that put a tremendous load on the generators hence creating breaker tripping..
Also this LSMGO fuel has different viscosities creating more internal leaks and might it also be the culprit for pressure drops in the fuel supply system...May be a combination of variables as is most probable the case.. breakers trip because of short only.. or are there other paramaters involved..
Anyway, thanks Chief, as usual an outstanding review..
The reports / this video show that the reefer containers (and other equipment / circuits) hang off the HV bus via their own transformer circuits so should not (?) have caused the decisive tripping of the LV transformer circuit…
But there was definitely some funny stuff going on with the electrics in port…..
Many thanks, Chief Makoi for your highly informative insight into this very sad event. You're years of expertise, makes for an amazing educational experience. Always look forward to your vlogs. Be safe. Blessings. Sherry 🥰 🙏 💞 🚢
Glad you enjoyed it!
A very clear explanation. Thanks Chief.
Very welcome
An interesting item is while the heavy smoke was present, according to AIS data the Dali was rapidly decelerating and turning to starboard - and only during the black smoke emission. AIS data is available every 10 seconds.
From 1:25:00 when power was lost the first time until the smoke began at 1:26:09 the ship only slowed by 0.2 knots and COG changed to starboard by 1 degree. The ship was drifting.
From 1:26:09 when the heavy smoke starts to 1:28:07 shortly before the smoke stopped, the ship slowed by 1.8 knots and COG went to starboard by 14 degrees. The ship was rapidly decelerating and turning.
From 1:28:07 to just before impact with the bridge at 1:29:15 the ship only slowed by 0.2 knots and the COG changed to starboard by 2 degrees. The ship was drifting.
It sure looks to me like the main propulsion engine was restarted after the first power failure and was running in full reverse for 2 minutes to cause the heavy black smoke and rapid deceleration, and prop walk caused the large starboard COG change which ultimately resulted in impact with the bridge. Nothing else explains the velocity and course change only while the heavy smoke was present.
An excellent presentation and analysis of the NTSB report. I like the fact that Chief will not speculate.
Thank you Chief! Great explanation !!!
Thank you! This was very clear, and I appreciate you just stating the facts and staying on stuff you are an expert in.
Another comprehensive excellent video Chief!
A simple and understandable explanation of the system. Thank you Chief.
Great video update!
Thanks for the analysis.
Can you do a video on the status of the crew? I understand they are still aboard the ship and have not gone ashore at any time. How do they get food? How do they get fresh water? Are they getting paid? What has been their interaction with the NTSB? How do you think they are doing?
Thanks!
I've managed to get a farm tractor engine running backwards. Climbing on a pile of silage with too low throttle, the engine stalled and the tractor started rolling backwards and the engine came back to life. With gear still on and clutch not pressed, I accidentally did a hill start in reverse with a forward gear on. Now the forward gear moved the tractor backwards! After a few moments of fun to verify the gears were really the wrong way and the engine must be running backwards too, I restarted the tractor and all was right again. Probably water pumps and lubrication work better with the engine running the intended way! :^)
While you can start a vehicle engine in reverse (diesel) it has nothing to do with the Dali engine, it runs in reverse deliberately. Pumps are all totally independent and nothing to do with engine rotation. .
I wish you end up in an education position somewhere in your carrier. I had a few really good teachers I am always thankful, and you could be this teacher for a lot lot of people.
I believe Chief Makoi has said he teaches on a Simulator at times and he has released video of working towards a training certificate.
Great presentation Chief, as an Electrical Engineer and sometime instructor I appreciate your diagrams and clarity of description of the ship's electrical power and connection to pumps, steering and main engine. It sounds like their was a problem in the electrical system or an operator procedural problem while the ship was in port. The cause of the failure should have been isolated and fixed before the ship was allowed to get underway with its cargo. I guess we will find out as the NTSB does its review of the accident.
Thanks, Chief. Take care and fair winds
I thought the black smoke was the engine doing a reset exhaust expulsion as they attempted a restart. Clearing out the pipes as they say.
Thanks Chief. Your plain language translation of the report is appreciated.
You're welcome. 😊
Thanks much. Clarified everything. A standard multiple genset 100% redundancy configuration.
I appreciate the attention you put into this and clarifying the report.
probably there was so much panic that they missed turning on the pumps.
waiting for your analysis of the report, you laid it out clearly
Way to go Chief. Im Not a Mariner and. I fully understand what you said.
Excellent analysis Chief Makoi, especially the elaboration of the simplified NTSB circuit diagram.
My conjecture - immediately after the crash - was a fuel related one. Possibly excessive paraffins, the wax of which will clog the low-micron sintered filters, which cannot easily be removed in the auto filter self cleaning operation.
The suspected and alleged blackouts, when alongside, led me up that path. Search me, how could they even think of closing the dampers of a running generator? Isn’t this the domain of a senior engineer?
(I’ve had this - choking of filters - happen to me twice, when we were, crazily, changing over filters while maneuvering, until we went to an older and different Diesel Oil source. The wax in the paraffins of Diesel Oil will choke the filters quickly. The same wax in the paraffins in Heavy Fuel Oil will not choke the low micron sintered filters as the HFO is heated to around +130 deg C. The melting point of these paraffins is from 45 to 60 deg C).
The only way to clean these (choked) sintered filters is either to ‘steam’ them or use a light flame, the steaming being preferable.
But the NTSB Preliminary Report is inclined towards malfunction of HR1 and LR1, normally very reliable, especially if they are Terasaki.
If fuel related, loss of speed of the Generators 3 and 4, would have triggered the ‘Low Voltage’ or ‘Low Frequency’ alarms in the Generator Starting Circuit, which would have tripped DGR3 and DGR4, not HR1or LR1.
Even as they were tripping (DGR3 / 4), Generators 1 or 2, or both, would have started automatically and come on load, as they would have been on ‘Auto Standby’.
The total load on the switchboard would have lessened, as the ‘Non Essentials’ - including Reefer Containers and Domestic Systems - would have tripped.
So, even one Generator would have been capable of taking the ship’s load, as the Bow Thruster would have tripped and would need to be reset before starting. (Although, I expect that they would have switched off the BT even before the blackouts near the Bridge - worth examining when did they switch off the BT).
Noting the heavy black smoke after the black out, it could be from one or both the ‘Standby’ Generators starting up.
In the ‘comments’ section, I read one comment that ‘Low Insulation’ of the HV Switchboard could have tripped this breaker HR 1. In this kind of an HV setup, it will be reasonable to expect heavy protection in the form of alarms, indication on meters, auto-tripping of minor breakers etc. in case of ‘Low Insulation’. If an HV Breaker were to trip due to Low Insulation, would it not have caused a heavy spark at some place or the other?
Unless there was a problem with the breaker HR 1 / LR 1 itself.
But why would the malfunction of one of them trip the other? Only one breaker should trip, not both.
The irony is that, whatever took place, if it had taken place a few minutes later, it would have resulted in either grounding or drifting, no more.
I do not want to speculate further, as the investigation is still on. But, we have not seen the end of it…..AR
The black smoke was cause by lack of fuel on the generators. The generators had been running on “gravity” fuel with no load. The fuel filters were probably close to empty when the crew restored power to the main bus. The sudden load caused generators to underspeed as the generators could not supply need power with low fuel supply. The breakers for the generators tripped when generators undersped on low voltage right after that.
Great job adding that the lube oil pumps operate on 440v power, Refrigerated cargo supply is also 440v power
Excellent, clear, concise, and illuminating. Bravo!
You are top notch with your knowledge.
Best video out here Chief, as retired ch/eng i have great pleasure to follow you
Markoi.
Thank you very much for the facts at this point in time. As more in-depth investigation moves forward along, we then place facts in place to see why this failure occurred.
Again, Engineer Markoi, thank you for the clear life experiences thinking.
Please take care.👍👀
Thank you Chief for another timely update and analysis.
Great diagram and explanation! Although it makes me wonder why TR1 and TR2 are not _both_ permanently connected to the 440 volt line for redundancy, so that if one trips, the other will still supply power. Sounds like that would have prevented the problem from ever occurring.
Excellent job Chief. Thanks for your detailed interpretation of events
Chief Makoi, I am also a Ship Electrician for almost 27 years in ocean going vessels mostly Container Ships. You are one of the best Filipino Chief Engineer. Your explanation is so clear and very Professional. Mabuhay...
Looking forward to your view on this Chief