Air France 11 UPDATE BEA Preliminary Report
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- čas přidán 25. 07. 2024
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11:26 for pitch and roll 50lb are required, for yaw it's 12-15lb.
The system auto resets. You work against a spring. The spring basically keeps both sides together. Once you have overcome the spring force both sides can move independently. When the force applied decreases below the force of the spring, the system reconnects again. For the ailerons you can imagine it like a pair of hollow tubes one inside the other with a set of springs holding them together. When the force is high enough one tube can slide in or out of the other. Boeing themselves describe this as a pogo stick like device.
For the elevators it's a roller on a cam. The cam has a detent, more like a valley. Springs keep the roller in the valley. With enough force applied you can move the roller "uphill" along the cam against the spring force separating left and right. When the force decreases the roller will go back to the lowest point resynchronizing both sides.
Thanks for explaining. If the the 2 elevators can move separately can that turn the plane?
I’m just curious which side, left or right, actually has control when the two are broken free from one another? Or does it basically average out the two opposing inputs, one side pitching up and the other side pitching down so the net is no change?
@@GRosa250 Funny thing is they BOTH have control. They would cancel each other out. It most likely results in a turn.
@@pilotboy2612 I believe it's a split system, just like on an Airbus. The left controls operate the left control surfaces (left ailerons & elevator), and the right, the right control surfaces. Not sure how the rudder (controls the yaw) is affected. I very definitely could be wrong.
@@GRosa250 I just tried to look into this in the manuals. Never actually tried it.
I think in normal mode and secondary mode an average is calculated. In direct mode both sides are actually independent from each other.
Boeing does it differently to Airbus. There are position transducers and force transducers on the wheels, columns, and pedals. They send their readings to the actuator control electronics. There are four of those. The ACEs convert analog signals to digital signals and send them to the primary flight computers. There are three PFC, each containing three command lanes. Each lane is a separate circuit board with different hardware and the software is programmed in different programming languages.
The three PFC condition all incoming signals. Not only control inputs but also air data, auto pilot commands and more.
An average of the input signals is calculated and protection functions are applied (bank angle, TAC, Stall and so on). In each PFC one lane is actively doing the work, one is in standby in case the first one fails and the third lane monitors what the first one is doing. When all three PFC have come up with a proposed command output, they talk to each other, compare their values and if they closely match they send a middle value back to the ACEs.
The ACEs then convert these digital control commands from the PFC back to analog and send them to the power control units of the control surfaces.
It's basically the same in secondary mode, except the protection functions are not applied.
Only when we go into direct mode are the signals from the columns and wheels sent directly to the control surfaces (through the ACEs) without the detour through the PFC. Then each pilot would control different control surfaces independently. For example the captain would control the left elevator surface, the first officer would control the right elevator surface.
But I have to verify this the next time I'm at the aircraft. As I said I haven't tested this yet.
Good to see Lt Pete FO assisting the Captain. 👍
Good work Juan.
I feel sorry for the plane that was trying to do things correctly and along came these pilots 😟
French theme
lol - the little plane that could
HAL: I'm sorry I can't do that Dave 😳🤣🤣🤣
GIGO.
and people had the audacity calling the plane 'misbehaving' and 'not responding to commands'
“My controls” or “I have control” (response: “your controls”/“you have control”) is the standard phraseology in my 737 flying (and especially handy in my Luscombe 8E when teaching a friend tailwheel flying). It’s a keyword quibble, but fully direct and unmistakable vs. “my aircraft/airplane” in the heat of a stressful moment.
Following the AF447 accident a lot of people were quick to blame the airbus flight control system saying that it was the disconnection between the two sidesticks that made the pilots unaware of each other's inputs. This incident clearly illustrates that there is nothing wrong with either flight control system philosophy. It is simply a pilot training issue.
I saw an earlier report where the #3 pilot, who was apparently left at the controls for almost the entire descent, was pulling back on the stick. 30,000 feet of altitude and a basically properly functioning aircraft screaming "Stall! Stall!" and he was pulling back. Proper stall recovery is push forward, regain forward air speed, pull out. Been known for over a century.
@@patwilson2546 i am guilty of ignoring the STALL warning during a sim session myself but it sounded just once ;p
The airbus control disagreement warning is makably bad. Way worse than any Boeing system only because there is next to zero physical indication.
@@josh8344 DUAL INPUT!
IDK what those particular armchair (or not) pilots that were commenting "it must be the plane's fault" were thinking, but I've personally made enough mistakes while playing video games and injured myself just doing DIY things around the house enough times to know one thing for certain:
Human beings are often the most failure-prone element in any system that contains them. And since human beings design all technological solutions that we know of to date, NOTHING is immune to "human error". From a certain point of view, if you find a fault in a design after an incident, that merely means a human error happened in the mind of the person or people who worked on the design's engineering.
I just LOVE this channel. Nothing comes from Juan’s analyses but solid facts. Very difficult to find anywhere else, even from the NTSB.
"Just the facts Mam. Just the facts."
Sgt. Joe Friday
aka Jack Webb 🙏
@@barrydysert2974 👍😃
JTSB
Juan Dan Gryder, and Scott Perdue are my favorites. I watch Juan the most
Yep, and they (CZcams) beat up on him in the sense of demonetizing of all of these types of awesome reports…
When AF 447 crashed, dual inputs were a factor. I don’t want to get into an Airbus vs Boeing argument but there was a lot of discussion regarding the uncoupled sidesticks. Folks were talking about whether or not that design resulted in a lack of situational awareness and hence the dual inputs during the high stress scenario the crew was in.
Fast forwarding to this incident, we have a Boeing 777 with coupled yokes. Despite this, dual inputs still occurred vs a positive handover of the controls between the 2 pilots.
The point I want to get at is this. I’m not favoring Airbus’s design over Boeing’s or vica verca. I think that there clearly is a much bigger issue at hand here that’s allowing this practice to continue and it’s not aircraft design: it has to do with something at Air France (training, pilot culture, combination?).
I really think that Air France needs to do a deep root cause analysis to understand why this dual input behavior is occurring within some of their crews. Once that occurs, solutions to prevent reoccurrence can then occur.
The dual inputs may have actually helped here.
Thanks for the clear and thoughtful comment. I recall discussion in the media of AF447 focusing on the sidestick vs. control column , but from the released VR there appeared at no point a definite MY AIRCRAFT or equivalent from the 1st officer. Instead they fought each other all the way down.
Stunning. When I first heard the "Stop It, Stop It" I assumed that one of the crew was yelling at the plane. Now it seems like the Captain was yelling at the FO.
Indeed, exactly. And me the same.
Yep!
I keep wondering if the communication in French instead of English is part of the problem. Are there any other commercial airlines using their own language instead of (highly standardized) English?
The very moment when Captain should have shouted "My Aircraft!".
@@travelbugse2829 Yes.
Always appreciate your explanation on those air incidents Juan. Easy for someone who doesn't know how to fly a plane understand. Appreciate that about your channel! Thank you.
Never worked on the 777, but when the elevator torque tube breakout mechanism appeared on the 737-700, I had another mechanic hold one column while I pulled on the other until the breakout mechanism released. The mechanism reengaged smoothly when the forces on the columns were reduced. The breakout mechanism is actually just an extension of the cam-and-roller technology used by Boeing to provide artificial feel and centering to boosted flight control systems for many decades. It is also similar in operation to the aileron force limiter used in early 737 autopilot systems.
This. It is actually footnoted in the original BEA report.
What I'd like to know is which pilot has control when the breakout kicks in.
@@Brommear Exactly what I wanted to ask. WTF !!! I would assume Left seat but if there’s a breakaway arm ? Whoever’s stronger ?
Same with the 777, done on Heavy Checks.
787 maintenance manual states it can take 90 lbs of force to fully separate the control columns. It would be the same for the 777
Was waiting patiently for your update on this his report Balncolirio. Thank you 😊
You’d have thought that AF would train this over and over again. as Juan mentioned, they lost an aircraft to this. You’d think it would be trained till muscle memory in their sims and line checks.
Yes. And then you´re faced with this incident.
Except AF 447 was an A330. "Sully" has done a vid on why AF447 probably would not have been lost if it was a Boeing operating that flight. The controls on the Airbus are not interlinked.
This probably happens in all airlines at some point but is not reported because nothing bad happens to the the aircraft, in the case of the two AF flight a report had to be filed. The first one crashed, with dual control input being a contributing factor and in this case a report was issued because of a go around. Coincidences happen.
One of the BEA investigators spoke at the Royal Aeronautical Society in London a few years ago. I challenged her to make recommendations to stop pilots making opposing control inputs - but the BEA didn't seem to treat this as seriously as other issues.
I'm a big fan of the BEA, but I don't think they've been as forceful on this issue as they need to be.
Yeah. Gliders, Cubs, C150s, instruction, or with friends... only remember one or two instructors who didn't firmly say "MY AIRPLANE" and give the whee/stickl a shake to establish the fact. Under these circumstances I'd almost expect "MY [EXPLETIVE-ing] AIRPLANE [EXPLETIVE-it], but not saying it? "Inconceivable "
I so love the way you converge on important problems. There is no way I can thank you enough. So, thanks.
PS - I'm a 62 year old and you remind me of my father who worked in the 1970's as an airline pilot trying to make things safer. Good work man....
Greatly appreciate the prompt , comprehensive and professional update.
As I often used to teach (as flight instructor and training captain in UK) it's never a question of "Who has control" but "I have control".
It takes 50lbs of force to to break out the force limiters on the 777, for both the aileron and elevator systems. It takes 12-15 lbs at the pedal to cause a breakout for the rudder.
Great analysis as always. Staggering to see they still can’t grasp the “only one pilot is flying at any one time” concept.
Indeed. There have also been incidents with nobody flying. That is, where both thought the other was in control, so for some period of time (usually just a few seconds), nobody was on the controls.
@@theophrastus3.056 ironically having neither pilot controlling the aircraft is probably safer than both at once. It should at least maintain a generally stable attitude.
@@simontist True, especially if it’s on autopilot.
Nice job. I haven’t listened to you Iin a while, but now that I am retire, home to listen more. Your boy is getting big!!!
Thank you for the wonderfully presented and quality video. Always find them informative and educational. Thank you Cpt. Browne.
Excellent video Juan. As a retired FBO mechanic I wish we'd had something like this to show owners who complained about maintenance costs. On two occasions I was called to the manager's office when owners couldn't understand why their 'annual' was costing so much - both times I took them into the hangar to show how involved the rigging process was on their 310, especially if it had been badly rigged somewhere else. A day to check all the figures and 'pull off' loads etc, then another day if a lot of remedial rigging had to be done. This really opened their eyes as to what a mechanic's job involved..... we are not just 'grease monkeys'. A used high time Cessna 300 or 400 series airplane that is 50 or 60 years old might be cheap to buy for a very good reason - they are very expensive to maintain properly.
Reminds me of AF 447 one pilot with stick up the other down resulting in an avoidable crash
Yes, but here they managed it with a Boeing Control Yoke, not an Airbus Sidestick. Unbelievable.
It's always a great learning experience watching these analyses.
Good job petey, good job dad for keepin it light and fun!
Listening to this, working on my motorcycle oddly enough. This story reminds me of when my old boss and I were moving it out of his shed, he was moving and didn’t want to bring it with him. It was a 90° day, the tires were flat, it was stuck in gear with no clutch lever. As we started manhandling it out a normal service door I noticed it seemed extra heavy, like he was letting it fall. So I started pulling to pick up the slack and it just got heavier, we were both heaving and thinking it was about to fall. We put it on the kickstand and took a break once we saw sunlight, and promptly discovered we were fighting each other the entire time, thinking the other was dropping it. A simple miscommunication made a relatively straightforward process incredibly strenuous because neither wanted to speak up
Human factors, and a very good example. We teach that as a recurrent topic in Mtc.
Many years ago in UPT, we were briefed about an accident in which a T-38 crashed after the student and instructor both bailed out. They were fighting each other on the controls and thought they had frozen controls. Perfectly good airplane crashed. After that, there was an emphasis on transferring control and holding you hands up in the air when surrendering control and saying “your airplane.”
4/30/22...another detail analysis of how a small problem can get human twisted into a (controllable) resumption of normal cockpit operations, proceed with missed approach procedures & land safely.
Lots of indepth reporting on this incident Juan. It's another great job informing all viewers of complexity flying these wonderful flying machines! 👍👍👍😊✈
Great analysis Juan. Love that you’ve got Pete there helping.
I learned this senario some 30 years ago when doing initial training with my primary flight instructor, when CFI says "MY AIRPLANE" & you are confused, he is about to save your life. Used it latter myself twice flying with a CAP friend. Once as instrument safety pilot when PIC was over confident in attempting to fly a practice approach down to 50 feet of touchdown. He wasn't as hot of a pilot as he thought. As we were flying directly at a 75 foot tower, I said "MY AIRPLANE- LOOK UP" (he was using foggles to restrict his vision) as I safely banked 30 degrees right adding power and pulled up to go around he saw the tower pass under our left wing. It helped his humility to become less of a BOLD PILOT. (Remember: There are old pilots & there are bold pilots, but there are NO old-bold pilots!)
Later flying with same friend, him PIC, upon landing at night after rain showers on the field we were taxiing straight towards another airplane, I asked "you got the 210?"(cessna), he replied "what?", & I stated "MY AIRPLANE" again & pivoted the nose 45 Degrees Right & stopped. He then was able to see through to glare of raindrops on the windscreen to spot the invisible to him, tried down airplane directly in front of our intended path. Would have made a terrible mess.
Thankfully there was never disagreement whenever "MY AIRPLANE" was spoken.
your friend should not be flying 😕
@lolbot, Armchair quarterbacking in aviation is called "hanger flying" and is a great source of teaching. A really great qoute from my primary CFI "Learn from the mistakes of others; you won't live long enough to make them all yourself". There is of course no such thing as a perfect pilot. Teachable moments come through accepting humility. Everyone make mistakes, including pilots, & that's why the rules dictate safety pilots are required during training & bringing extra pilot eyes along to help in bad visual conditions is just a really great idea!
My friend did both of these and lived several more decades because he accepted the humiliation life's lessons gave him and learned.
@@michaelamick8295 My wife’s catch-phrase from when she taught gliding is “Help stamp out old age. Fly low and slow” 😉
@@johnhay1033 Great Line! Will put it into my bag of favorite qoutes.
Juan, after the Cali accident, we added "speed brake stowed" to the Go-Around sequence. (This was also true for "Terrain", and "Windshear"). If the aircraft was not tracking the localizer one might have to add "heading, select". With the second TOGA push the aircraft would have likely gone into altitude capture fairly quickly so a "speed" input would also be required. They likely stayed at flaps 20 to slow things down to reorient themselves. After the first incident I would not have turned the aircraft back to the F/O as I would have been concerned that there might have been a problem with his flight controls.
Great analysis. Thanks so much for the info. WoW! Don't fight over control of aircraft!!!!
Excellent review and explanation. Thanks for your time.
It’s me again. Always with the same conclusion: airline pilots lack manual flying skills. Not completely their fault. Company SOP in many airlines simply forbid it. I have a friend that had 6000 hrs as captain in my company. He left for a FO position to Air France. When I met him again last summer (he flies the 777) he told me that out of 50 captains only one or two allow manual flying during descend below 10.000 feet. Now, there is a time and a place for manual flying of course. Is a cloud base of 300 feet with 3 km vis a good idea? Yes, when you are proficient. No, when you only handfly once a month. Get confident in VMC conditions, build it up to IMC. Tanks Juan for another top notch analysis.
It seems to me that the modern emphasis of immediately turning on the autopilot and monitoring systems for hours, then turning off the autopilot on the final few minutes means that there is little time for the pilots to actually get a feel for the conditions.
Why not manually fly for some time longer manually, at each end of the flight, that way the pilots have more practice of how it feels.
I think that management needs to address that and also really crew CRM.
On the other hand…they wouldn’t be in this mess if they’d just left the autopilot in until visual.
Very well said sir. Thank you
When flying the 777, with flight directors and autothrottle, you literally follow the FD’s. You don’t really even look outside. You could get a child to do it, in fact they’d be good at it with all the games they play.
I don’t think a lack of hand flying is to blame, and I don’t think it’s that much of a big deal. I do, however, think that understanding the automation and the ability to monitor are far more important things in the modern aircraft. “I have control” is something you learn on your first flight with an instructor. How such a basic thing can be lost with these AF pilots suggests that there is something truely amiss within the AF training system.
Hand flying below 10,000 feet will load up the pilot monitoring unless it’s a very quiet airport. Not many like that on 777 routes.
It looks like the Captain (pm) jumped on the controls unannounced, starting the tug-o-war, it looks like the FO (pf) figured that out and let go of the controls in time to avoid impact. Fatigue on Final. . .
I think you are right - the graphs show when the controls were completely separate, but not when there was force that each pilot was exerting possibly against one another. The captain probably didn't like how the approach was going, was trying to "help" the FO by nudging the controls without talking to him, and triggered this incident. I recall an instructor many years ago doing this to me and it was very annoying.
Hand flying is a hand-eye coordination skill, and requires a lot of practice to do it correctly. The typical airline flight has 2-10 hours of flight on AP/flight director, and about 2 minutes of hand flying - this is not enough to become or remain proficient. Required and expensive simulator time is spent handling emergencies, not "just flying around", getting the feel of the controls and doing a lot of landings. I've read stories from some check airmen in Asia that the Asian airlines have decided that they can't consistently teach their pilots this motor skill, so they "force" them to use the AP until flare. Probably wise unless the poor pilot actually needs to fly some time in their career, like the SFO Asiana crash. ☹
@@dermick Why would the captain be nudging the controls if they were on AP?
@@rkan2 They were on AP until the last few seconds, that's when the FO started hand flying. The Captain was possibly trying to help the FO by nudging the controls, or perhaps trying to dampen the FO's inputs that were causing PIO. If this is what happened, then the Captain needs more training - he should let the FO fly and give verbal hints, or take full control. This is a perfect example of why you can't have two pilots on the controls at the same time. The other pilot won't know if the aircraft is doing something due to external forces on the aircraft, or if it's the other pilot.
@@rkan2 because at that point they weren’t on auto pilot. Having said that if the captain wasn’t happy then a clearly annunciated I’m taking control should have happened.
JUAN, GREAT JOB, GREAT VIDEO...
Juan, I just love your presentations. Very clear. . . Very understandable -- for anyone! This was definitely interesting to hear about. Will be interesting to learn what, if anything, was done to rectify this. Thanks and God bless. . . 👍✈✈👍
I am a retired airline pilot. In all my years of flying transport category aircraft (Last flight B-767) I never would have imagined that PIO's almost caused an accident. PIO's were always somewhat of a laugh when a pilot .ot into the maneuver . "What caused that turbulence?. You did!" Just happy it all ended well.
I had been wondering about this flight. Thanks for making this video. I assumed there was more to the story. I'm not surprised the less experience pilot was doing that rocking motion. I see it constantly on CZcams videos of landings. As soon as the AP is disconnected, they start chasing the FD. in IMC, I imagine it is much worse.
Sthanks for the info ! regards liz ,
Great analysis Juan
So hyperactive right seat led to leftward deviation that forced the go around.
Left seater never claimed control and authority by stating “my aircraft” but fought his right seater anyway.
In the melee both guys flying (or attempting to) no one did the go around immediate actions correctly.
"Communication breakdown, it's always the same. Having a nervous breakdown, drive me insane!!!!!!!!!" Thanks Juan for making what was going on in the cockpit clear. I had a feeling something stupid was happening. I think Led Zeppelin completes the thought nicely.
Guess the pilots were dazed and confused.
Funny, I was thinking Roy Orbison's Comm Breakdown ;-D
"When it's right, it's so right
When it's wrong, it's so wrong
When it's gone, it's all gone
It's too late
Communication breakdown, Communication breakdown
I can tell* that it's over now
Communication breakdown"
* (sung as te-eh-ell)
Great explanation Juan!
Juan, heads up, straight on analysis. Thanks.
You carry on the wonderful tradition of Paul Harvey and give us "the rest of the story." :-)
No , I can guarantee you that they won't be dismissed from the company.
Its almost impossible to get dismissed from AF ( pilot or ground personnel) , unless you deliberately run an aircraft in a terminal ....once you are inside the company , its for life.
Excellent video , easy to understand. Great teacher
Good Job, Pete!
The force required for the breakout mechanism is 50 lbs (23kg) (I use to be a production test pilot on the Triple)
Thanks! Does it snap back in place if you line 'em back up?
@@blancolirio The wheel cable drums are cast assemblies. The right and left drums are not the same. Both drums have attachment points for the upper force limiter, which is part of the wheel jam breakout mechanism.
The left drum has an additional attachment point for the wheel force transducer. The left drum is bearing mounted on a sleeve which is spline mounted on the left shaft assembly. If there is a failure, the sleeve and left drum can connect through a lost motion device. The lost motion device permits connection after a control wheel rotation of 7.8 degrees in either direction.
The right drum is bearing mounted on the right shaft assembly. The right drum has a peg on the bottom side which is part of the lost motion device. If there is a failure, the lost motion device lets the right drum connect to the right shaft assembly after a control wheel rotation of 2.9 degrees in either direction.
Hope this helps...
Excellent analysis and background info, Juan! Agreed regarding the eery similarities with AF 447. This is getting scary! Companies need to revisit the training regimen a little bit and make sure that pilots actually understand how a plane flies, not just how a computer flies.
Such an excellent point! That way the pilots understand exactly what's happening and why in relation to what the computers are doing on board the airplane! I'd be willing to bet that many pilots still don't completely understand the physics of a plane and how they function!
I agree to all points ...
Air France is getting a reputation with pilot incompetence: Air France Flight 296 Mulhausen, Air France Flight 358 Toronto, Air France 447 Atlantic
@@expansionone since they where folded into Air France only a couple of years later, I think you can include Air Inter 148 in that list!
Crazy! First day of training, “I have control” is emphasized. In the end, complacency is what will get you every time.
Yes that's the one I was referring to but yes thanks for explaining that to me makes a lot of sense good video my friend and God bless👍👍👍🙏🛩
Juan, young Pete is a carbon copy of you, you are blessed! Capt GB Slagle. MIA 777 Retired
At the end of a normal T-38 single-ship training sortie at UPT, we were being vectored in the weather for an arrival back to base. The instructor was flying from the back seat (so I thought) and I was the student in the front (tandem seating). Our heading began to drift and roll started to increase. When it hit about 15 degrees, I said something like "your heading is off". At which point the instructor exclaimed: "Oh, crap! My controls! I thought you were flying!" I didn't recall being given the airplane, or acknowledging it, as you're taught from Day 1, and as Juan pointed out. Nor was I lambasted by the instructor, either then or after we landed, so I assumed he had made the error. (BTW: It was pretty normal for the instructors to get a bit of "stick time" by flying the last approach & landing.) All he said after the flight was, with a grin: "Well, let's say we call that an 'unplanned demonstration' [air quotes] of why a positive change of controls is so important." He wasn't wrong! And I had several great flights with him afterwards. [Also: I only tell the stories where somebody else screwed up.]
Juan. I’ve been sending these videos to my dad. He was the engineer in charge of certification and testing for the 777. He’s got a lot of knowledge of 777 systems. He does enjoy your videos. ✌️
Great explanation, thanks!
Sounds like Air France needs to really work on their transfer of control training. Having another plane crash due to similar circumstances and now this? ugh.
No, it's the BEA that needs to do their job. This is the cause of the lethal AF447 crash and their hypocritical garbling about this "hopefully" being a one off makes me want to puke.
@@DrewNorthup would an audible warning of "opposite input" have prevented the AF447 crash? Yes.
I’m just a passenger, but I can follow what you’re saying. Just got back from Vegas and it was VERY gusty on approach. I did feel that little bit of shaky as we were landing when you said they usual;y disengage the autopilot. But the pilots on my flight just kept it steady and we floated in without problems.
Because some pilots are amazing at what they do, and others suck. But social issues are driving hiring and training. It’s not nice to tell people that they suck, so nobody wants to rock the boat.
@@markg7963 Lol, you got all that from an anecdotal post? Calm down mildred, you're scaring yourself with yet another replacement trope
Very informative. Fly safe everyone!🐾🚁✌️
Very good report. Thank You.
I can remember having the phrase "positive transfer of control" pounded into my head at the school house. It does get tedious but this IS the reason why it's necessary. Also I've been out of the 737 for 9 months on LTD (new knees) and I can still spit out the go around litany.
I'm pretty sure we demo'd the jammed control mechanism in the sim during initial as I recall it felt like I had to be Arnold Schwarzenegger to overcome the locks.
That’s probably about right Gerry. I think Juan mentioned that the disconnect release is at about 40 pounds. On a yoke that would be a lot of pulling or pushing. Hope your knees get better. I went out LTD for cardio issue (congestive heart failure) after my AME sent me to the cardiologist across the hall. Surprise! 3 X 33mm DES stent in my left anterior descending (LAD) artery. Just when I thought I could get a Class 3 to fly my 1947 Cessna 120 I bought when I was 14…Kidney cancer struck. Still trying to beg and plead for a S.I. From the FAA. So far, so good. Take care and get better soon. Todd, AA Capt., Ret. 727; MD-80; USAF Capt. Ret. T-37; T-38; C-130; OV-10.
Can you say your airline Gerry? Just curious if you know any of my pilot peeps now on 737’s.
@@toddcitron7869 American Airlines. Based in BOS.
@@toddcitron7869 I'm a colon cancer survivor. Knees gave out last June. Requal mid May(upcoming)(swell). 3.5 til they kick me out.
Heck, even playing volleyball I was taught to yell "MINE" when going for the ball.
"My aircraft", or in some countries "I have control" should be the call when the captain wants to take control of the aircraft. It must be very clear who is flying the aircraft. How many times do we have to review incidents like this before this message gets home!
At my company, the callout was "I have the aircraft". Same difference. In my freighter days, my boss let me fly a lot, he was a mess and a good guy. He knew how to push my buttons. He would say, "this is getting scary, I might have to take it". Ha, I would be duly insulted!
With just about every airline other than AF that’s normal procedure.
I’m at the point that I’d never fly on AF unless I was desperate. AF stuff up again, and again, and again.
Your aircraft Pete. Great analysis as always.
Couldn't wait to hear your "take" on the follow-up to this incident. Sounds like these guys almost screwed the pooch on this one. Great analysis as usual sir.
In our 737 is toga, flaps 15, positive rate gear up, 400ft lnav, 1000ft vnav and flaps retraction on schedule. Missed approach altitude is set upon glide slope capture. Nice video juanas always.
I can still spit out those words instantly after being retired for 4 years. But in the sim, you know it's coming.
@@paulwilson8367 - the plane will climb perfectly with just TOGA and pitch up to follow the FD’s. Let your brain catch up then complete the go around procedure.
Allo Juan the break out mec. that you call it, is a torque limiter and can be made different ways in this set-up it will reengage by itself
Thank you for the video.
Pete will remember these fun instructional days for the rest of his life. And his kids will hear about it. Cheers
Excellent analysis as always, Juan. Two comments: 1) A single push of TOGA gives a climb rate of 2,000 fpm. 2) You didn't speculate on the reason for the go-around in the first place. It seems to me that the FO was in a PIO condition in roll. I saw this from time to time on both the 747 and the 777. I think that it was a characteristic of the 1960s design of the 747 wing that for unknown reasons was carried over into the fly-by-wire model for the 777 wing.
Holy CRM Batman! “Take a chance fly Air France”. Those pax had a nice little aerobatic ride. Who taught these guys how to fly?
Sounds like you missed a great opportunity.
Derek Johnson. Did miss a thing and ever will I go there. Been to several European countries though. Like Switzerland, Portugal, Greece, Italy and Turkey. Portugal was the best. Switzerland is so very expensive. With my sailboat Portugal has several great marinas. My girl friend is Ukraine and loves there.
If Pete can't remember, I don't have a prayer! 😆Thanks for the update, Juan. Learned something with the pinned comment, too. 👍👍
Thanks Juan for another great analysis. These pilots can have my old hang glider.
Though not a pilot I worked with lower grade assistants in training we where operating high voltage power equipment and systems and sometimes our personalities clashed with certain individuals while carrying out operational procedures . It was even worse when sometimes I worked with operators on the same grade as there was "no chain of command" between us in some of their minds. For teams to work effectively together they must have respect for each other and someone must be the person in charge especially when carrying out complex or dangerous procedures. As part of our training we where taught many procedures sourced from pilot training principals including nomination of person in charge though some staff had difficultly following that mindset there's nothing worse than having the other person argue or carry out operational changes without the approval of both members of the team but it does happen sometimes. You should never make assumptions but it looks like these two pilots where not suited to work together .
I agree that these pilots didn't seem to be capable of working well together, however (and I know it's never gonna happen because "its too expensive" until maybe we have 10 examples of it happening within the same airline), it could be tested for.
Basically, every pair of pilots should be tested to see if they are capable of working well together. This does create its own problems, but at least you won't have pilots fighting each other at the controls nearly to the point of the aircraft crashing.
This makes two times it has happened at Air France alone. How many more times must it happen before something is done about it?
For instances where two pilots are simultaneously giving differing commands to the yoke (or stick in Airbus) I think there should be a voice alert. "Control conflict!" or something like that.
There is in Airbus, an audible “dual input” annunciation.
this option should be I. French since only Air France pilots have problems with CRM
777 the yokes are linked. If one pilot is pushing the other pilot can feel that. Sounds like the pilots had input saturation and didn't notice the pressures on the yoke.
It does: Stop it !!! Stop
Captain has to say “my controls!” This is taught in private pilot school
Great job juan.
Well, they certainly have a briefing to attend to.
Man your good. But both got in control. Sulley said my air craft. Thank you
Amazing!! The plane was doing great until the pilots got involved!! BASIC procedures!! MOST important items. Thanks again for a super detailed, and understandable, analysis of this event. I sure hope those fellers git hollered at!!
Not if getting hollered at causes them to clam up and withhold pertinent information.
I love this channel, Juan.
As usual Juan, EXCELLENT rundown with the straight hard facts. Welcome to the NO BS zone!
Juan, when you presented this incident a few weeks back my understanding was that the controls on the plane went wonky for a brief period of time. But from this report and your analysis was the upset was pilot induced. I wonder did they have a little pow-wow after they landed the plane. I am going to assume that at least the investigators will be doing that also.
@@DrewNorthup Now that you pointed this out it makes good logical sense. I am not a pilot so I have idea what all the stressors are that they do have to keep up with. Maybe in all of this Air France may want to rethink their number of flying crew corps on a longer flight.
Out standing review as always… In this age of commercial aviation it’s hard to imagine such POOR CRM, from a professional crew. I would sure hate to be a passenger where the crew is acting like a bunch of spoiled teenagers. Thanks again…
Great analysis as always Juan. When I started in the airline world in the late 90's, the simulator instructors would say "get that autopilot off! you need to hand fly this plane during any emergency". Then in the 2000's it went to "get that autopilot on! then you can concentrate on the problem. Now they talk about use the autopilot as needed, which is the best way imo.
Another interesting change that has happened in the airline world since the 90's is the stall recovery. In our initial training, we all learned the stall recovery. First, reduce the angle of attack (push), level the wings and add full power. Once the wings are flying again, recover to a slight nose up attitude to regain the altitude that you lost.
Well, in the 90's, in the airlines, they told us you can't lose altitude in a stall. So the stall recovery was: Max power, and hold altitude until you fly out of the stall. this is what they were trying to do with AF 447 (even though it appears they didn't even know the plane was stalling). Now they are back to reduce the angle of attack first and accept some altitude loss, especially at high altitude.
Again an excellent video; fatigue seems to be an important factor in this case of insufficient CRM.
Was discussing this with a buddy, I told him what I thought and gave him the details that I knew of. He looked at me and asked how do you know so much about this? I told him I have a friend who tells me everything I need to know.
Done that many times.....
👍👍👍
Let me check I got this correctly:
Co-pilot appears to have lost his ability to fly to the instruments, increasingly losing it to the left.
Captain expresses concern over drifting and banking to left.
They commence go-around.
They DON'T mention a transfer of command, it's NOT just one pilot making control inputs.
They blame the plane.
About right?
They almost had the full set: they pancaked a perfectly good Airbus, and here they tried to screw up a Boeing with apparently similar root causes of failure in the crew.
Unbelievable.
Happily I have no likelihood of ever flying Air France.
Me either. 🧐 I’m thinking of the helpless pax and cabin crew in the back, that fortunately were able to walk off still alive after putting their lives in the control of these two. 🥺
@steeltrap - yup I was thinking the exact same. What the hell was going on? Terrible CRM...
@@fredfred2363 Perhaps it's lost in translation and they think CRM = Crew Resource Mayhem?
;-D
Your last comment was unnecessary
As per the AMM the wheel jam breakout ( roll ) and column breakout ( pitch ) mechanism need a force of 50 lb ( 23 kgs ) to operate.
Thanks!
CRM matters
That also happened on Atlas Air 3591
Thanks for this data rich analysis.
Thank you
I started my pilot career flying gliders att young age. I learned the CRM basics the hard way on final approach flying with another 15yo boy sitting behind me. I saw we were going to overshoot the runway, so I asked my friend. How about taking out the air brakes now? He answered: Me ? I thought YOU were flying the airplane. Then I said: ok, now I am. My airplane. We both laughed and with air brakes out and little extra wing slip I got us down safely.
But knowing that experienced AF pilots in a 777 dont have this elementary part of pilot competence, makes me real scared of flying with AF.
I'll bet pilot fatigue will be implicated in the final report.
NTSB loves that one, if ya know what I mean. Unless they see your post. Or Juan/Dan/Scott happens to mention it. Then... meh, maybe not so much.
@@rickrickard2788 It's certainly more politically correct than to suggest it may be a cultural thing. I wonder what other cultures might foster this same mistake, if it is culturally related.
{o.o}
Yup
@@Wizardess I would say that TRUTH, no matter where it leads, nor which country it may need to be found in? Is the only thing that matters. Stopping mistakes such as this, should NEVER have "financial", in any aspect of it.
Well, IF they truly care about human lives over money, that is.
Thank you sir! Show Pete the NBC-7 San Diego clip about the pelican on the TWY at KSAN..
Outstanding video Juan, very interesting. I think the Captain should have taken over at the first sign of trouble.
Can you say, " Screwed the pooch"? FO suffered a little vertigo and luckily here was enough altitude left for a go around.
CRM and situational awareness seem to be severely lacking at AF. That's at least the third time I've seen AF pilots doing something wrong in what should be fairly standard.
“Fairly standard” is too generous. These are utterly basic elements of flight that the pilots are missing.
I hope CZcams are not still demonetizing your channel, because they are throwing adverts in every 5 minutes on my TV.
Fascinating analysis, thanks so much.
Good job expanding the situation..the 777 is awesome and I'm glad it was not her fault and she was landed safely along with the souls on board of course