The Training Flight From Hell | The Crash Of TWA 5787
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- čas přidán 23. 06. 2022
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This is the story of TWA airlines flight 5787. On the 26th of july 1969 a boeing 707 was flying from JFK international to Atlantic city airport in pomona New jersey. This wasnt a regular flight this was a proficiency flight. Back in the day simulators ,well sucked so the best way to test your skills and to learn new procedures was to try them out for real in an actual aircraft. The cargo 707 left JFK international airport at 11:46 am and the captain who was getting the proficiency check was in the captains seat on the left hand side and the instructor was on the right hand side. Once the 707 was in the vicinity of atlantic city airport the jet was handed over to atlantic city ATC and the pilots were getting ready to start their simulations. The first thing that they wanted to try was a full stop landing on runway 13. So the controllers set the plane up on an ILS approach to runway 13, the landing was done successfully. While on the ground the pilots asked the tower if they could back track down the runway, then make a 180 degree turn. For this takeoff the instructing pilot would be simulating an engine failure after V1. V1 is the speed after which you can no longer reject a takeoff so the captain being trained had to carry out a three engined climbout and then talk to ATC and then bring the plane back into land on runway 13.
Like i said before today this would be done in a simulator but they were limited by the technology of their time and so this was the best way to do it.
So with everyone on the same page the 707 lined up on runway 13. The 4 engines roared to life as the 707 started to roll down the runway. As they surged past their V1 speed the instructor pilot pulled back power on engine number 4 to simulate it failing on takeoff. As engine number 4 rolled back to idle the captain in training started to follow the TWA emergency checklists as per procedure. He managed to get the plane level at 1500 feet and then they began to manveer to intercept the ILS of runway 13. At this point the instructor pilot told the captain that he had to carry out a three engined ILS approach and to expect a missed approach at the decision height. The training flight was far from over. As flight 5787 flew towards the outer marker the pre landing and landing checklists were completed. After that the gear was dropped and the flaps were set to 50 degrees. The tower cleared the jet to land the intsruting pilot said “ Ok well take the option” indicating his willingness to land. The huge jet slowly lost altitude and as soon as the jet hit the decision altitude the captain advanced power on engines 1,2 and 3 to commence the go around. Sticking to the checklist he called for flaps 25, max power and for the gear to be retracted. The calls were acknowledged and complied with but unknown to them the flaps and the gears didnt move from where they were. The captain then started to climb away from the airport as part of the go around. 16 seconds into the go around the crew noticed something shocking. Their hydraulic fluid levels had dropped to zero and they were now flying a plane was a disabled engine without any hydraulics. Imediately the captain ordered all hydraulic pumps to be turned off and at this time ATC wanted to know if they wanted to be transferred to the approach controller. The captain replied with “ standby were having a hydraulic problem here” that was the last time that the controller heard from flight 5787. As he watched the plane climb he noticed that the right wing started to drop, the bank was sight at first but it kept building and - Věda a technologie
How 3 AMAZING Pilots Made A Near Impossible Landing | Eastern Airlines Flight 935: czcams.com/video/qe76JiK0ymo/video.html
I noticed you are in Microsoft flight simulator X why is that
Heartbreaking. I was a C-141 instructor pilot in the '80s. The C-141 is a 4-engine high-altitude, high-speed transport with similar numbers as the 707, but a bit slower due to the thick wing for airdrop capability. In instructor school we were told over and over not to let "a simulated failure result in an actual mishap". If something seems wrong, terminate the simulated emergency and fly the jet.
Seems like an extremely obvious thing to do. The fact that it wasn't obvious for any one of the five people on board is just mind boggling.
Unfortunately it's happened over and over again since then...
WHAT F THE SMULATE DTURNS UN A REAL POWER LOASS., RHEWNWHAT?
@@ilovecops5499 are you alright?
@@unvergebeneid HELLO MISTERE PENNEY LANES BEETELS! THAN YOU FO RHT COPLIMENT BU I IZ NOT GOOD ENOUG TO BE TRAFELLING WILLBERRS...
End Of The Line
Traveling Wilburys
Well it's alright, riding around in the breeze
Well it's alright, if you live the life you please
Well it's alright, doing the best you can
Well it's alright, as long as you lend a hand
You can sit around and wait for the phone to ring
(At the end of the line)
Waiting for someone to tell you everything
THANS YOU ANS THUBBS, UP. I AM SMOKING TH BEARS AND I SHALL CONTROL WTH EARTH SIN 48-72 OF YOUR EARTHE HOURES😁🐻🐻🐻🦏🦏🦣🐱🐻🐻🐻🦏🦏🦬
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Amazing that 5 people had to die because they flew the plane as if the fourth engine was actually damaged, and the fact no one called for the hydraulic pumps to be switched back on just to see if they could have gained anymore control? Heartbreaking.
🙏😢🛫
As far as I understand things, they had zero hydraulics on the hydraulic circuit that had failed and they were attempting to diagnose and restore hydraulic power at the time the aircraft began to roll.
Turning off the pumps didn’t cause the problem… it was the broken hydraulic line.
What went wrong was that they spent the last precious seconds trying to fix the hydraulics instead of first bringing the power up on number 4 which would have given them far more time to correct the hydraulic problem.
Correct. Never bringing the hyd pumps BACK online COMBINED WITH #4…AND to add (apparently) a ‘task saturated’ environment in the cockpit, things compounded between the 2 pilots to lose situational awareness. A LOT OF MOVING PARTS HERE..
"I think that this is why they all died."
"Ok, let's take another plane up, recreate the same scenario and see if we can survive."
Most likely at a much much higher altitude with additional preparation for the test. ;)
I enjoy your videos very much. Please keep up the good work. Having been a 707/720 flight engineer many decades ago, a couple of clarifications are in order - my apologies for the length of this comment. The only hydraulically-boosted primary flight control on the 707/720 is the rudder. The INBOARD and OUTBOARD SPOILERS are also hydraulically actuated. Elevator and aileron operation are by manual pilot inputs only. Tabs on the trailing edge of the control surfaces assist in moving the ailerons and elevators. The 707/720 has two separate hydraulic systems - UTILITY and AUXILIARY (AUX). The AUX system powers the RUDDER and the INBOARD SPOILERS. The UTILITY system powers the FLAPS, LANDING GEAR, NOSE WHEEL STEERING, BRAKES and the OUTBOARD SPOILERS. The UTILITY and AUX hydraulic systems can be connected only on the ground through the SYSTEM INTERCONNECT SWITCH which requires external ground power to be connected to the aircraft to change valve position. If the hydraulic lines supplying the OUTBOARD SPOILERs failed, the UTILITY system would be depleted. We know this was the case because neither the flaps or gear changed position after the hydraulic failure and the flap and gear handles were repositioned. The hydraulic quantity gauge on the F/E panel would have read zero and the two engine driven hydraulic pump low-pressure lights would have been illuminated (F/O's lower instrument panel). The AUX SYSTEM RESERVOIR is supplied by a stand-pipe in the UTILITY SYSTEM RESERVOIR (at the 3.2 gallon level). Even with the UTILITY system reading zero, the AUX system would have been available to power the RUDDER and the INBOARD SPOILERS. Turning OFF all pumps skipped the most important part of the HYDRAULIC SYSTEM ABNORMAL PROCEDURE - identification of the affected system followed by the appropriate procedures.
On the 707/720 the airborne directional control in an engine-out situation is provided primarily by the rudder and to some degree by the ailerons. The VMCA (minimum control speed - air) with a hydraulically boosted rudder is around 117 knots (all speeds are for the -300). With no rudder boost pressure, the 3-ENGINE VMCA is much higher ~ 175 knots. When the crew selected all four pump switches OFF (UTILITY: 2 engine-driven, AUX: 2 electric pumps) the rudder was no longer powered and could only be positioned manually. In manual mode the rudder authority is only 13-degrees compared to 26-degrees when powered. With the outboard engine at idle simulating a three-engine approach, when the crew brought the remaining three engines to go-around power, the aircraft was well below the 3-ENGINE RUDDER BOOST OFF VMCA and they lost control of the aircraft as a result. This accident was often used as a training aide during recurrent simulator training. It is an excellent example of the critical importance of detailed systems knowledge during abnormal and emergency situations. Quite literally the difference between life and death. The flying crew were Captain Donald Sklarin (38), Captain Harry D. Caines (56), and flight engineer Frank J. Jonke (29). Unfortunately I do not know the names of the other two crew members.
This is one of the longest comments I have ever seen! But good to hear the problem from an actual 707 pilot.
A comment better than the video itself.
@@cbuchner1 Yeah lol
All I can say is that I am very certain that if you had been in that cockpit that day no way would we be watching this video today! Astounding! you level of understanding of that particular aircraft’s systems! Well Done!!!
@@steveewing9601 Thank you for those kind words. The cost for my detailed knowledge of the aircraft was paid for by the loss of such men as these.
So many questions with this one. Not that they were doing training flights in actual aircrat which was standard procedure. I'm just shaking my head at the training pilot not abandoning the test.
Exactly right on. If an actual system failure occurs check ride is over. Return the aircraft to normal operation as much as possible and land. Take heart that this type of check ride is no longer allowed in an actual aircraft - at least in the USA. All training, proficiency checks and type ratings are now done in full motion simulators.
Narrator: Engines 1, 2 and 3...
Us: and 4. Training is over.
Pilot: Where's the checklist?
Point being, we aren't working with more than the pilots had. I'm sure many of us caught that error on the fly. It's that obvious.
The simulators of the day did not suck. They were the technology that was available. At the time the ALPA contract at my company required a Captain in training to get 14 hours in the airplane before taking his FAA type rating check ride. It was very expensive to train pilots in those days plus the problem of finding an airplane to be used. In 1969 when I was a new hire DC8 F/O my company sent us to EAL for simulator and airplane training. At the end of 1979 I went to 747 training and all the training was in the simulator with a check ride but then an airplane ride was also required which I did 7 touch&go’s and one full stop landing. When I had my first opportunity to fly Captain it was in the B727 which I had never flown. The Type Rating ride was in the simulator but a single 1:25 airplane ride was required to complete it. In 1987 I went to DC8 Captain took most of the check ride in the simulator and the balance in the airplane. Then in 1992 I went to the MD11 which was brand new and the company had only three when I completed training. The full type rating ride was given in the simulator which used a full four hour simulator period with a short break in the middle. My first time touching the actual airplane was as a student flying with a check airman from Anchorage to Tokyo. Then Tokyo to Taipei and Hong Kong. Hong Kong to Anchorage. Then Anchorage to Memphis for the completion of the IOE (Initial Operating Experience). My company had one more step for the final sign off which they called a Standards Ride. The new Captain had to fly two legs with a Check Airman in the jump seat and a normal line First Officer. The only restrictions were high minimums which you had to raise your DA and MDA by 100’ and I believe the RVR limit had to be increased.The second limitation was you could not let the F/O land for the first 100 hours. There was also a requirement for 300 hours to fly a CAT3 approach but I recall that was a minimum total Captain time.
That TWA airplane could have been saved by adding power to the #4 engine but a quicker result would have been reducing thrust on the #1 Engine. There is far less lag in reducing thrust plus it was the thrust on #1 that was causing loss of control. Delta also had a terrible DC8 in New Orleans when they were simulating the loss of two engines. The crashed into a hotel/motel and killed a number of high school students staying there. If you are flying any multi engine airplane from an C-310 to a B747 if you start losing directional control is you should reduce the power that is causing the problem. Far better to hit something wings level than with lots of bank or inverted.
Wow. Scary stuff. For whatever reason, this reminds me of not only the Eastern Air Lines loss of hydraulics landing, but also United Airlines Flight 232. The more I think about it, the happier I am that CRM has improved throughout the years. I felt as if the CRM wasn't too great in this one (although 1960s CRM is likely a very far cry from 21st century CRM), and that CRM was a big help in the EAL and UA cases.
Thanks for your comment. I was working a DC 10 flight from DEN-IAD that day. And I had flown that DC 10 many times. ( for UA).
Also Japan Airlines 123. Lost all hydraulics *and* the vertical stabilizer. It was the deadliest single-aircraft accident in history.
@@starwarzchik112 That one is so freaking sad. 520 people had to lose their lives in a preventable crash all due to negligent maintenance. What's worse is that more people could have survived, but American military personnel were ordered to not go to the crash site and to turn back.
@@b.t.356 And it killed two more people who were nowhere _near_ the crash site. Both the maintenance worker who signed off on the faulty bulkhead and his supervisor killed themselves.
God, no other air crash haunts me like JAL 123. T_T
wait are you talking about the 1965 carmel mid air collision?
My first, immediate thought was, "end simulation, bring engine 4 back". Literally as they were powering up 1, 2 and 3. Checklists are great, but there are reasons for having humans in the cockpit. Like when you don't have a checklist for, "Hydraulic failure while conducting training/practice of climbing out with a failed engine."
In the 80s I was able to see a "flight simulator". It had no screens for video but was full of buttons and dials. It was more of a procedural trainer. Sitting in the cockpit seat, it looked like an airplane cockpit. Behind this, it was wide open and there was room for trainers and observers.
Yes. So? That's how it was... Doesn't stop you from doing anything but visual manuevers.
There was a Friendship cockpit in the Fokker factory that supplied some basic functions to train ground crews how certain systems worked and were connected. It is now in a museum and I looked at some 'systems'; there were some low and hi freq sound oscillators and shaped noise generators to imitate the RR Dart engines revving up, as heard in the cockpit. There were voltage bus simulations but all pretty basic so actual pilot trainings were done in real life thus not void of risk.
I'm puzzled about the narrative stating several times that the 'pilots' turned off the hydraulic pumps. The 707 had a flight engineer, surely it was him that would have turned off the pumps unbeknown to the flight crew. Why they didn't instinctively call for power to be restored to No4 will forever remain a mystery.
All I can say is that during a 35 year career as a professional pilot followed by several years as an instructor in simulators, it is amazing what even highly qualified, capable and experienced pilots can do when under stress. Not typically, just on rare occasions, but outside of the simulator, it needs only to happen once.
On the 707, the hydraulic system controls and gauges are not on the F/E panel. They are located at the lower end of the F/O instrument panel, so the copilot operates them.
@@WMAcadet thanks for that!! Interesting..well done
Watching this I was screaming "full power on engine 4!!!!" They couldn't hear me
Very well done!! And this from a 30,000 hour retired airline pilot.
your videos are getting better and better. keep it up mate
Biggest mystery for me is why the check pilot did not immediately bring engine 4 back into life and cancelled the test. They were very low and he must have known that there is no room for trying things. So sad...
It wasn't on the hydraulic pressure checklist. I don't mean this sarcastically. I just strongly suspect they went straight to "checklist mode" without thinking about it.
@@briant7265 I know what you mean and yes could have been the reason.
Proficiency tests back then were something like natural selection - effective, but brutal and unethical.
i never heard about this crash. Thank you for making this video and for explaining to us what went wrong!
Really clear and easy to follow explanation as usual. Thanks a lot.
Great video... as usual !! You always deliver !!
Excellent presentation and explanation!! Thanks!! 👍✈✈👍
This training went too far. I have done similar flight training in an actual aircraft (simulator was not avaliable). But we never switched off any systems as described in the checklists. We just pointed at the switch and said "simulated OFF".
How do you simulate off an engine? They had to turn off the hydraulics as they had a hydraulic failure.
Thanks for another great video!!
Clinical Precision in the details is nice.
I love this channel.
This crash was very sad for me on a personal level. The older brother of a childhood friend was one of the pilots on this training flight. He was a first officer in training to be upgraded to captain on this flight and was in the first class cabin awaiting his turn to do the simulated scenario.. As you said the simulators of the time sucked and this was the only way that training/practice for certain situations could be conducted. A lot of pilots were unfortunately lost in both civilian and military aircraft at the time since there was no other way to practice. Fortunately we have come a long way in simulator tech and lives do not have to be put at risk so that lives can be saved in a real emergency.
Hi. Thank you for another excellent video. I thought you may want to look at the crash of Japan Air Lines Flight 350.
Excellent clear understanding for all.
Thanks for all you do 💯✋
So....Yes folks - the checklist is never to blame.
At that point I wouldn't care about continuing the test, engine 4 had to come back on immediately!
The 707 is a beautiful bird. Sure miss seeing those big smokey planes in the air.
Well done video. Thank you.
Can someone please explain why the checklist for failure of a single isolated hydraulic circuit would include switching off the full complement of hydraulic pumps? I realise that in the event of a leak you’ve got to prevent loss of fluid as much as possible, but with a redundant system like this won’t turning off the pumps inevitably lead to complete loss of control, which is ultimately the far less likely worst case scenario (all redundancies compromised) when keeping them pumping?
Yay! Another video!! Always enjoy them. Thanks.
I’ve been watching these kinds of videos lately and I wonder if pilots have much exposure to this type of information in this way. I feel like it would be greatly beneficial.
With any genuine hydraulic system problem, it is almost impossible to figure what the fault is until you land. And you only have a finite amount of hydraulic fluid which is leaking away (probably).
Good explanations
good stuff. thanks
Wow, that’s terrifying!
After all the videos I watch pertaining to airplanes and crashes therein, the next time that I fly I want to see the maintenance history of the airplane 1 as well as the pilots flying history 2 and I think that in itself should become a STANDARD for airlines just like we want to know who’s driving the Uber that we call 🤷♀️
woah nice one
Why does the checklist even call for turning off the hydraulic pumps if generally the interconnect valve between the hydraulic systems stays closed? That’s a dangerous check list that needlessly removes layers of redundancy.
The 707 has hydraulic assist for the rudder, but it can be flown without hydraulics. It does take more force though to get the same deflection on the rudder. If they increased speed to 180knots or brought back engine 4, they would have been fine because they would not have needed so much force to counteract the yaw from the engines. The checklist was clearly intended to help diagnose hydraulics issues while in less critical situations.
Good video .
I live 20 minutes From A/C/ pomona airport. I'm born and raised in new jersey. and I never knew why they called it the. atlantic city airport. When it's 40 minutes from atlantic city.
Fight engineer has control of the hyd pumps. Emergency checklist were confused which is normally performed by the Fight engineer and confirmed by the Capt. in control of the plane.
No, no, the Hydraulic System on the 707 is at the lower end of the F/O instrument panel. All of the ones I flew were that way... -321B, -324C, -327C, -338C, -347C, etc.
Not bringing number 4 up right away is a big factor.
Why did they turn off *all* three hydraulic pumps, when only one hydraulic system is bleeding and broken? Isn't it obvious that turning off all pumps will render aircraft uncontrollable without hydraulic power to control? Does the three engine lading procedure checklist call for all pump off? Geez... strange behavior.
The captain was a little behind, and wanted to get his “all hydraulics out” test done at the same time. Sadly he never made it to the “vertical stabilizer gone” test, the in-flight fire test, the deep stall test, the “all engines out” test, the runway incursion test, or the final test, which is just all of the above 😛
Ooh new video
Wow, wow, wow..
Pretty damn amazing.
Good Work!!! 👍
I'm not a pilot but the first thought was 'Start that engine'...never nice to see someone Augering in.
"Limited by the technology of their time"
Don't think I didn't notice this
Mini air crash investigation, could you do UAL232?
Yes please!
Sadly, many emergencies occur at the worst possible time like takeoffs and landings. Not much time to make it right the first time or else. Series of events that start to snowball. Sad
All that talent on the flight deck and this happens.
Theres a lot wrong here. The ailerons worked just fine, since they are cable driven. It was the rudder that stopped working because they turned off ALL pumps. Add to that leading edge slats that retracted earlier on the failed pump side, that already had less thrust, causing the bank. Had they brought no 4 back up to TRT, they would have caught their mistake, but it was common back then to use both failures, one simulated, one real as a teachable moment. In this case, it was tragic.
Runway 31 is the runway you mentioned while looking at the runway numbers upside down, 13.
This is a tough one, almost all the comments are suggesting that bring back the number 4 is a no brainer; and in hindsight it is.
However, imagine you’re in this situation… you’re underpowered but maintaining a safe airspeed and established in a climb. Then you realize you’re hydraulic level on hydraulic circuit in use is indicating zero also confirmed by unresponsive gear and flaps.
You know that zero hydraulics will rapidly if not already equate to unresponsive primary flight controls.
So which would you prefer while the seconds tick by… more power to improve your climb rate or use of your flight controls?
Many emergency procedures are memorized, at least the portions that require an immediate response. Perhaps this was one of them.
The bottom line is that checklists and their memorized portions do not often capture every conceivable combination of events… I have a feeling this one probably didn’t have a HUGE warning before it instructing pilots to minimize asymmetric thrust before initiating, but I bet it did after the accident.
Anyway, y’all are right get the plane normal and then deal with the real emergency… I just feel for the crew because they were dealt a terrible hand with only seconds to figure out a survivable sequence of responses.
TWA also had 2 Jetstars configured to B707 and B727 cockpits.
You never answered why the hydro pumps had burned residue...
Here's a question: Is there no way of telling the pressure levels for the different systems apart? Turning off all pumps would make sense to me if the crew believed ALL hydraulics to be drained, otherwise making sure the interconnect valve is closed and turning off the pumps for the damaged system would do just fine, no?
It is beyond me why they didn't bring the idled engine back up to full power. I just don't understand that. Its not something that is required on a checklist for God's sake, it's common sense.
The checklist is written for "otherwise normal" operation. There is no step for, "If you have an engine idled for a training run, bring it back up." It's still bizarre that they didn't think of it themselves.
It blows my mind that they would spend the time and money doing live test like this and that they would take the risk. Weren't they aware that if there is a mistake, you could crash the plane and kill people on the plane and the ground?
“Okay. You’ve passed the ‘engine out’ test, now let’s try the ‘all hydraulics out’ test. Good luck!”
I cant wrap my head around this. Why did they turn the pumps off? Especially that close to the airport. I'm sure thats not part of the engine out checklist and any residual pressure in the hydraulic system could have lasted a while longer. If anyone with any familiarity with the 707 could let me know.
The check list told them to. The problem was they stopped mid-way in the CL (to discuss landing gear) and never got back to the part of the CL that told them to turn the pumps back on.
At least that's the way I understood it. Crazy!
@@ScottDLR He said there were 5 POB; I'm assuming they had a flight engineer? If so, WTF was he playing at?
@@ScottDLR No, the issue was that with asymmetric thrust and the rudder hydraulically diverted, the rudder will not revert back to manual control automatically. They needed to get engine 4 back up to speed to reduce the asymmetric thrust OR increase their airspeed to 180 kts which is the minimum controllable airspeed with an engine out. Had they done either of these they would have regained control of the aircraft, as there are cable controls for all flight surfaces.
@@tyrotrainer765 According to the NTSB report, the flight engineer was likely monitoring the captain's instruments (altitude, etc) during landing, as was standard procedure. So he never saw the low hydraulic warning on his panel. The rest of the problems (failure to increase airspeed or restoring engine 4 thrust) lie on the training pilot's failure to complete the checklist.
@@stephenj4937 Fair enough; however NO FE I ever flew with would have let a pilot turn off all hydraulics and leave them off. He'd have known those systems intimately, probably far deeper than the pilots. My gut feeling is that the FE here had a (passive/non-assertive) part to play in the captain's failure to complete the checklist.
So it was a mistake in the training combined with a fractured line, what a sad combination of errors
I like the videos that you make very much. In particular the narration. Nicely written with a great voice. I subscribed AGES ago. Maybe mention those already subscribed ? I always want to shout "I already am !"
Minor point regarding the sim. It is highly unlikely that the landing lights in the 1960s would have been PAPI-4s.
This reminds me of a certain Soviet nuclear reactor safety test.
When conducting a dangerous test, if something real goes wrong, stop the test!
If HBO's Chernobyl is accurate, that crew had some pretty bad CRM too.
Chernobyl Reactor Management
@@thewhitefalcon8539 no you did not 😭😭
1:55 FYI you told runway 13, but the plane aligned to runway 31. Love your work though....
Runway 310° is 130° if you are going the other way (180 degrees)
The runway number is the first two digits of the heading.
So a runway that runs due east-west will be 09 on the West end and 27 on the East end (090⁰ and 270⁰)
So runway 13 ( 130⁰) turns into 31 ( 310⁰) from the other end.
So one end is marked "13" and the other is "31"
It's done this way so the Pilot not only knows which runway to use , but which end he's taking off from or landing on and he also knows ( roughly) which way the runway runs so when he's told to take off on runway "27" but when he looks at his compass he sees "243⁰" he knows he turned onto the wrong runway.
Why did the checklist have them shut down *all* of the hydraulic pumps?
Incredibly they didn't add full power on engine #4 until is was too late.
Why the hell wouldn’t you restore number four right away Then the plane would not want to roll over
They wouldn't have enough time for that, not at this altitude
Exactly 💯, my first thought too. The engine was operational.
My first thought too
Right! In the face of a real issue, remove the independent known issue, especially one as critical as engine out.
Clearly they did not work methodically. Partially completed checklists are a great way to make things worse and not restoring engine 4 right away just compounded everything.
@@jpoconnor5744 It didn't take a checklist to recover the engine they "failed". That's Flying 101. In an emergency, the first thing you do is FLY THE PLANE!
I have no flight training and little knowledge. But when the narrator first said (long before presenting the diagnosis) "turned off (all) the hydraulics pumps", I thought, "No, that can't be a good thing," and listened to hear why I was wrong. I wasn't.
By any chance, do you have/know any investigations involving the Colorado Telluride Regional Airport? It's such a fascinating and interesting airport
Oh man, that would be a good one.
@@odinsson204 The airport is so cool. Especially the measures they put in place to prevent planes from going over the edges
@@Baylow94 yes!! I live about 100 miles away and been to the airport a couple of times. It’s a beaut for sure. You better know what you are doing at that airport.
@@odinsson204 Lucky! I don't know if I'll ever be in Colorado, I would love to see it in person.
Definitely! If the pilot doesn't know what they're doing, they'll ruin everyone's day
@@Baylow94 there was a Bonanza lost there a while back. The pilot was a F18 pilot I think. He forgot about density altitude.
There was a series of mistakes made. Sad.
They disabled their control surfaces and killed themselves. I can hear Bob Hoover now...
Why is turning off the pumps part of the checklist? I assume there must be a reason but I don't know what that reason could be. Could someone explain please?
I can only think it’s to absolutely ensure they’re turned ON afterwards.
This is what I came to the comment section to ask! Usually, this channel always explains why so I don’t know why it was left out this time? It seems really counterproductive to turn them all off. Also, I wonder if there’s any way to check if the main valve, that he spoke about, is intact?
My wild guess is to prevent further loss of hydraulic fluid. There should of course be more steps, like starting them one at a time and compare pressure (or flow or something) to see which one is losing oil, and then keep that one shut off but start the others back up to get back controls.
Not a procedure to do at low altitude of course...
@@ziiofswe... and with engine no 4 turned off.
TW5787 departed three hours after I was born. Never came across any other events on my birth date.
Can you make 2021 Mlian Airplane Crash please!!! The Takeoff was Annoying | The Crash Of YR-PDV
Aren't the engines somewhat too large in that model? The windows too.
What a crazy, needless accident. Madness!
Rather interesting that the checklist called for all hydraulic systems to be shut down.
I don't know much about aviation, so forgive my ignorance, but can anyone tell me why it's even possible for a pilot to turn off the hydraulic pumps? Is there a situation where this would be necessary?
What things did the FAA do to make accidents like this a thing of the past?
Was there no analysis of the human factor? Why did eperienced pilots do such errors?
Good English. Thanks
So, it seems to me they should only have shut off the hydraulic system that had the failure. Granted, maybe they didn’t know which one it was. But it seems to me it would’ve been better just to leave all pumps on and let the bad one bleed out if they were isolated from each other. At least the three good ones would still have worked? I wonder why the checklist has them shut them all off?
Seems kinda pointless to shut off hydrualics voluntarily if you have a failure anyway, yeah. Either they're redundant and you get to keep the non-leaking ones, or they aren't and you were going to lose all pressure anyway... But you'd have gotten at least another few seconds of full control by just not shutting it off entirely!
I am not a pilot, but the very first thing I'd do is restore power to the "failed" engine. What a shame that they died for a little mistake.
Shades of Delta 9877. That killed 13 people on the ground, some of them high school students staying at the hotel it hit.
I'm not even a pilot but I believed that as soon as the real issue with hydraulics occurred, they should terminate any tests and land. So the No 4. engine should have been spooled-up. Or is that now only obvious in our safety-conscious world?
If you're the pilot in that situation, wouldn't the FIRST thing you do at any sign of trouble be to bring engine #4 back to full power?
I have wifi high def infrared and normal vision cameras in my home. Why don't planes have camera views of the wings/engines tail and landing gear for the pilots in he cockpit.? Seems like the aircraft industry is neglecting an important safety opportunity!
How is it written at the beginning of the runway 31 and the other end 13
The runway numbers relate to the compass heading when the aircraft is facing down the runway (as if to take off or approaching it while landing) so if you are sitting at the 31 end of the runway with the runway in front of you then your compass should read 310° otherwise if you are sat at the 13 end looking down the runway then your compass should read 130°
If one of the multiple hydraulic systems develops a leak, why would you turn ALL of your hydraulic pumps off?
why they turm pumps off ?
if fluid level is zero, why kill the pump? if #4 is dead, why not slow #1?
Morr than one captain in cockpit leads to disaster it seems
For those of us of a certain age.... "Up, up and away with TWA"
Or " Try Walking Across" was our phrase in the UK 8)
FAA requirements didn't have a checklist to dictate what to do when the other checklist was disregarded. When I was in the Air Force of the United States of America the working troops, the crew chiefs, the mechanics, were under constant harassmen, I would call it, by Quality Control, and other Supervisors to use checklist. Our maintenance superintendent could often be heard saying "checklist, checklist, checklist, checklists." I can only think that some pencil pushers somewhere in the heiarchy of pencil pushers in government required this. If we went by their standards all the time nothing would get done. Planes would not fly. Checklists are fine, and of course to government...necessary. I wonder if government doctors who operate on serviemen are required to use checklists. Did we just open Pandora's box? Oh no the horror
The question is: why did they turn off ALL pumps rather than just one?
If memory serves me, the reason they turned off all the pumps was because the checklist told them to. This was done in order to facilitate the identification (and potential isolation) of the problem. The checklist would have a line item later to turn them back on, but the crew never got to that item due to leaving the checklist half done.
This one did not start with "This is the story of..." 😢
"that begs the question" a question you ask that you already know the answer to. wtf??