Props to these guys for being so willing to discuss and explore their views. They both seem interested in truth in a way that not all philosophers are.
When Mr. Kastrup says in one moment concerning the mind -body that "one is the image of the other" I thing of my most beloved philosopher Spinoza and his famous affirmation of "the mind being the idea of the body". I am currently reading Mr. Kastrup's book on Schopenhauer and I see why he has sometimes been thought to be closer to Spinoza than to Kant. I would love one day to have a commentary by Mr. Kastrup on Spinoza.
@@anteodedi8937 it’s extremely coherent. I’d love to hear your explanation to as to why it’s not. And I’m not being facetious, I’m genuinely curious. I’m always looking to have my mind changed, and it seems to me that Idealism is the most coherent metaphysics we have. In comparison to materialism or even panpsychism, it has far fewer issues.
Goff: "We should let net neuroscientists tell us the neural correlates of consciousness, it´s an empirical question." And it begs the question; he seems to have decided on philosoophical grounds, that consciousness must be neural, cannot be embodied, and then he accuses Kastrup of the same (making decisions on philososphical grounds, while doing philosophy), because he has the opposite view on the role biology-as-such...
@@anteodedi8937I'm beginning to suspect you're actually one of those algorithm A.I. troll 🧌 baby codes 🧐. Riddle me this -- what's the most important question you've ever been asked ??
I think Philip has this bad habit of brining up a point and then rambling and apologising. He should say what he thinks and leave it there. That would be much more powerful imo.
BK: "We don't have good reasons to think that a silicon computer would have inner life... Every thing, every absolutely every computation performed by the world's most sophisticated artificially intelligent computer can be done in principle with a network of pipes, taps and water... " Leibnitz: "If we imagine that there is a machine whose structure makes it think, sense, and have perceptions, we could conceive it enlarged, keeping the same proportions, so that we could enter into it, as one enters into a mill. Assuming that, when inspecting its interior, we will only find parts that push one another, and we will never find anything to explain a perception. And so, we should seek perception in the simple substance and not in the composite or in the machine."
@@marcusnelson1239 I haven't read Leibnitz well enough to tell you without a high probability of being wrong, I just know "Leibnitz's Mill" is often compared to Searle's "Chinese Room" and Jackson's "Mary's Room" to be arguments against a purely materialistic account of consciousness. Kastrup is recapitulating the argument here, with the added twist that, as a computer scientist, he can demystify computers for those of us who might not be fully comfortable assuming that what goes on inside a computer is as materialistic as the workings of a mill from the 1600's.
@@aaronshure3723 thanks. One issue I have with this reasoning is that the whole can be greater than the sum of the parts. Chaos theory. The behavior and patterns of clouds can not be found when examining an individual water droplet. Similarly, when looking at an individual logic gate, one would not expect to 'find' conciousness there.
"Traditional ontology has always sought to understand the everyday world by finding something on the level of the occurrent, such as substance, sense data, or representations in transcendental consciousness, that is supposed to be intelligible without reference to anything else, and then sought to show how everything else can be seen to be intelligible because it is built up out of these self-sufficient elements.Phenomenology, on the contrary, seeks to show that the everyday world is as self-sufficient and self-intelligible as the objects of theory. It cannot and need not be made intelligible in terms of anything else; rather, it can account for the possibility and place of theory. The world is what we directly understand and in terms of which one can see how nature, equipment, persons, etc. fit together and make sense. Thus worldliness and Dasein's correlative understanding of being are the proper themes for ontology. Science can correctly explain the functioning of the available in terms of causal relations between occurrent elements. But this is not the ontological issue. The issue is understanding, not explanation-making sense of how things are, not explaining how they work. Still, this is not the end of the argument. As in the case of Heidegger's critique of the Cartesian notion of self-sufficient subjects with their inner representations, the traditional ontologist can here claim that, although attempts to construct holistic significance out of meaningless elements seem extremely unpromising, still some such construction must be possible, since what is ultimately real are some sort of elements, and everything must be accounted for in terms of some theory relating these elements or else remain unacceptably mysterious". (Dreyfus, 1991: "Being-in-the-World")
This is a wonderful discussion. However, focusing on the brain is not a proper direction. One only needs to read the book The Hearts Code by Paul Pearsall to know that the heart is actually a second brain. Stories of heart transplant patients taking on preference, memories and experiences of the donor indicate to me that different tissues are able to connect with the one mind or universal consciousness.
Tldr; Bernardo opened up a can of whoopass on Philip who was often left speechless and trying to defend his counterpoints by deferring to neuroscientists and physicists Does Philip Goff have any mathematical training? One question I’d ask him to answer (again) is: How does the subject/patient who informs the neuro-scientist correlating the patient’s neural network to the patient’s self-perceived emotions validate the truth of the answer coming from the self-perceptions of the patient himself? After watching most of Ep 17 and this follow Ep 19 and 15 minutes of the latest JRE podcast with Goff my armchair conclusion is: 1) BK was pretty clear in his a-priori assumptions, if I understand them correctly: a. Perception is a “dissociated”, re-presented landscape of experience, empirical evidence is drawn from these re-presented perceptions b. Conscious entities metabolize c. Personas, or alters, that I and other conscious selves have, experience reality consciously, whether we remember it or not d. Analytic language in the form of propositions can only get us close to informing us of re-presentations of reality, but not reality itself. i. Knowing the properties of a block of wood can inform us of some related elements of perceptions of it (such as length) but not of the thing itself 2) PG’s Pan-Psychism can be nested in and tested within BK’s Idealism 3) PG appeared to be Technically and Philosophically out of BK’s league 4) You need to host a discussion between Bernardo and Rupert Sheldrake, that would be sweet
12:49 the boundaries of your consciousness are not vague? the notion that your consciousness has boundaries is vague... isn't it? what are the mechanics of jung's synchronicity, and other similar phenomena then?
So true! No neuroscientists that I know of are even _trying_ to explain subjective, first-person experience. Sure, they’re studying the correlations between observed/reported behaviors/experiences and brain activity, but that kind of research program will never be able to _explain_ it. The only attempts at _explanations_ I’ve heard of have either completely missed the point of the Hard Problem (e.g. Global Workspace, IIT) or they have been completely ridiculous (e.g. “Extended Mind” theories, Illusionism/Eliminative Materialism, Identity Theory). IMHO.
Bernardo, whenever asked whether a sufficiently complex computing system could at some point be considered to be conscious, always makes this analogy with the system of pipes, valves and water. However, I think this is an incomplete analogy, as the plumbing system in his analogy is fully disconnected from the external system and does not have any "sensorial" input, whereas a future computing system could be wired up with all sorts of input/output systems. It would have sensors to observe the external system, and motors/speakers/light emitters to influence it itself. This changes everything in my view. Take also the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment: Bernardo entertains the idea that indeed it would still have a conscious experience, but what if the brain is fully isolated and made into a closed of system. Would that change anything? I think it might.
He believes that we will create artificial intelligence but that it will look like life: biology, metabolism, abiogenesis, etc. The analogy works well because right now a ton of AI philosophers think that an isolated computer system, with complex enough AI running on it, will become conscious. Even maybe a computer simulating brain activity perfectly. This is analogous to his planet sized computer becoming conscious. It’s ludicrous. It’s like he says: a perfect simulation of kidney function, down the molecular level, running on my computer will not suddenly pee on my desk. It’s just a simulation, not the thing in itself.
@@cashglobe It might indeed be ludicrous if you require this will happen for an _isolated_ computer system, I agree. But that is my point, that is not a fair comparison to the brain which is not isolated whatsoever. What I am saying is that in order to make this a fair analogy, one should allow the computing system to be able to interact with its environment in both directions. And in that case, I don't think it is ludicrous at all to consider that it might develop what would certainly seem to be consciousness
@@sphogliadelle wouldn't that still be just more simulation and not the real thing? i.e.: you can make the computer with perfect kidney simulation to mimic peeing as well, doesn't mean there's a 'real' peeing process behind it.
@ 27:45 -27:53 _" you seem to be assuming on some sort of philosophical grounds that that biologist that life is necessary and sufficient for consciousness whereas i think that's a mistake, i think it's an empirical question for neuroscientists what are the conditions that are necessary for uh for emergent consciousness."_ This might be where Goff loses the plot so to speak. The only things that are aware are living things...this is our direct experience. Anything beyond that is an abstraction. The major problem i see here is the horribly abysmal DEFINITION of Life we have floating around in our Minds. The presence of Life seemingly makes all forms of biological matter become "brains". No Life = No awareness or Consciousness, that simply cannot be denied. So it logically follows that Life itself is a localized expression of Consciousness. Goff seems to be bent on proving that non conscious elementary particles can produce awareness, furthering what imo ius a FAILED philosophy of Strong Emergence. He never considered that *_it is life itself that radiates awareness thru matter,_* as opposed to non conscious matter producing awareness thru some yet unidentified mechanism or natural law. We are blocked by a failed definition of Life...not the reality of Life as an entity.
I can't believe people are still making the "simulated fire doesn't produce heat" argument. Of course simulated fire doesn't produce heat OUTSIDE the simulation. That is a red herring and completely beside the point. The question is, would a human body/nervous system simulated in the same environment as the simulated fire EXPERIENCE the heat? That's what the question of substrate dependence is trying to answer. You can't just state that "simulated water isn't wet" and then conclude that consciousness can ONLY exist in non-simulated animal brains - that's a total non sequitur.
No, you're misrepresenting the argument. Even if you simulated a body, a simulated nervous system does not equal feeling. The phenomena of feeling hot still would not occur under those conditions. As a digital kidney would produce digital urine, to exit the digital body, that does not mean that the digital entity is feeling any of those things, no matter how much we attempt to project our own experience on to some code.
1:08 in re. 'pipes, taps and water' - the only reason you wouldn't believe its conscious is because you can't imagine it having agency or how to interacting with it
At ~59 minutes if Goff granted more agency to universal consciousness, not just Bernardo's universal groping will, his idea can work IMDO. But then we are getting too close to disembodied 'intelligences' haha, not somewhere he would want to go probably. Sorry, right out there! But I do wish you guys and science more generally went to empirical data on psi and mediums, wrong channel :) But seriously great discussion
I think Kastrup´s Materialism is Baloney? does give an explanation why vagueness of biology is not a problem, but he didn´t really articulate it here... Just saying:)
you might not be taxed as such, but you will be data mined....your value to the system is your information and it is and will continue to extract it from you at all costs
Are we in the 21st century ? Maybe Aristotle had reason to think that the mind (soul) was localized to the heart not the brain, but come on ! What experience is lost for people who are on dialysis because their kidney(s) were removed ? Same it true for any organ - as long as the brain's supply from the particular organ is substituted the absence of the organ has no introspectively detectable effect on experience.
Man, what a headache. Philip is not very good at explaining himself, at least not to my ears (haven't checked his philosophical theories yet), and Bernardo's ego seems to get in the way a lot of the time. To make things worse, Bernardo's arguments don't seem very watertight. Like the issue with the whole body as one conscious entity. His argument that this is so because it all comes from the same point in space time (cell) is just shoddy. If we assume the big bang (all the universe starts as an infinitelly dense singularity), then we would all be the same concious entity right now per that argument, right? And the same with the "all the body dies together" one; what about siamese twins with conjoined circulatory systems? Hell, the twins one messes with argument #1 too. Not convinced at all. I dunno. Not really what I would expect from experts in the field.
Very hard to believe speculating about “a brain in a vat,” has any intellectual value whatsoever. I regard this as an accessible but wildly non productive rhetorical cul de sac serious thinkers must be wise enough to avoid.
@@onemorebrown you can get a pre-owned Blue Yeti for $50. If you’re not willing to put down 50 bucks to improve the quality of your videos manyfold, you have weird priorities. I think many more would engage with your otherwise great material if it doesn’t sound like shit.
Props to these guys for being so willing to discuss and explore their views. They both seem interested in truth in a way that not all philosophers are.
When Mr. Kastrup says in one moment concerning the mind -body that "one is the image of the other" I thing of my most beloved philosopher Spinoza and his famous affirmation of "the mind being the idea of the body". I am currently reading Mr. Kastrup's book on Schopenhauer and I see why he has sometimes been thought to be closer to Spinoza than to Kant. I would love one day to have a commentary by Mr. Kastrup on Spinoza.
Goff's philosophy it's what a guy thinks after a few beers
Lol, says the self-declared philosopher of the comment section.
I would like to second @anteodedi8937 's suggestion & also personally self-declare @Lclipa to in fact be an esteemed philosopher. 🏆
Yeah I agree, goff should listen to Bernardo (the master)
Does goff get paid???
The only vague thing I can see is goff
Every time these two talk, Bernardo is clearly the alpha in the zoom :))))
Bernardo is a meme. Maybe you translate being arrogant as being alpha.
@@anteodedi8937Bernardo's position is vastly superior.
@@Aaron-bd9sj Wrong. It is not even coherent!
@anteodedi8937 thanks for making it clear you're not intelligent.
@@anteodedi8937 it’s extremely coherent. I’d love to hear your explanation to as to why it’s not. And I’m not being facetious, I’m genuinely curious. I’m always looking to have my mind changed, and it seems to me that Idealism is the most coherent metaphysics we have. In comparison to materialism or even panpsychism, it has far fewer issues.
Your videos are great, please keep them coming! Thank you! :)
Thanks! These are a lot of work but I eventually can't resist!
@@onemorebrown That makes us two (parties): you can't resist making them, and we can't resist watching them. :)
So.. same time next week?
Goff: "We should let net neuroscientists tell us the neural correlates of consciousness, it´s an empirical question." And it begs the question; he seems to have decided on philosoophical grounds, that consciousness must be neural, cannot be embodied, and then he accuses Kastrup of the same (making decisions on philososphical grounds, while doing philosophy), because he has the opposite view on the role biology-as-such...
Dude you completely missed the point of everything here.
@@anteodedi8937I'm beginning to suspect you're actually one of those algorithm A.I. troll 🧌 baby codes 🧐. Riddle me this -- what's the most important question you've ever been asked ??
Thanks for an interesting discussion. I think consciousness at its base is about eating and not being eaten
I think Philip has this bad habit of brining up a point and then rambling and apologising. He should say what he thinks and leave it there. That would be much more powerful imo.
BK: "We don't have good reasons to think that a silicon computer would have inner life... Every thing, every absolutely every computation performed by the world's most sophisticated artificially intelligent computer can be done in principle with a network of pipes, taps and water... " Leibnitz: "If we imagine that there is a machine whose structure makes it think, sense, and have perceptions, we could conceive it enlarged, keeping the same proportions, so that we could enter into it, as one enters into a mill. Assuming that, when inspecting its interior, we will only find parts that push one another, and we will never find anything to explain a perception. And so, we should seek perception in the simple substance and not in the composite or in the machine."
What does the final sentence mean?
@@marcusnelson1239 I haven't read Leibnitz well enough to tell you without a high probability of being wrong, I just know "Leibnitz's Mill" is often compared to Searle's "Chinese Room" and Jackson's "Mary's Room" to be arguments against a purely materialistic account of consciousness. Kastrup is recapitulating the argument here, with the added twist that, as a computer scientist, he can demystify computers for those of us who might not be fully comfortable assuming that what goes on inside a computer is as materialistic as the workings of a mill from the 1600's.
@@aaronshure3723 thanks. One issue I have with this reasoning is that the whole can be greater than the sum of the parts. Chaos theory. The behavior and patterns of clouds can not be found when examining an individual water droplet. Similarly, when looking at an individual logic gate, one would not expect to 'find' conciousness there.
Concieve a human enlarged and we entering into it. Wouldn't it be the same thing? I don't think that kind of argument makes any relevant point so far.
Thanks!
"Traditional ontology has always sought to understand the everyday world by finding something on the level of the occurrent, such as substance, sense data, or representations in transcendental consciousness, that is supposed to be intelligible without reference to anything else, and then sought to show how everything else can be seen to be intelligible because it is built up out of these self-sufficient elements.Phenomenology, on the contrary, seeks to show that the everyday world is as self-sufficient and self-intelligible as the objects of theory. It cannot and need not be made intelligible in terms of anything else; rather, it can account for the possibility and place of theory. The world is what we directly understand and in terms of which one can see how nature, equipment, persons, etc. fit together and make sense. Thus worldliness and Dasein's correlative understanding of being are the proper themes for ontology. Science can correctly explain the functioning of the available in terms of causal relations between occurrent elements. But this is not the ontological issue. The issue is understanding, not explanation-making sense of how things are, not explaining how they work. Still, this is not the end of the argument. As in the case of Heidegger's critique of the Cartesian notion of self-sufficient subjects with their inner representations, the traditional ontologist can here claim that, although attempts to construct holistic significance out of meaningless elements seem extremely unpromising, still some such construction must be possible, since what is ultimately real are some sort of elements, and everything must be accounted for in terms of some theory relating these elements or else remain unacceptably mysterious". (Dreyfus, 1991: "Being-in-the-World")
This is a wonderful discussion. However, focusing on the brain is not a proper direction. One only needs to read the book The Hearts Code by Paul Pearsall to know that the heart is actually a second brain. Stories of heart transplant patients taking on preference, memories and experiences of the donor indicate to me that different tissues are able to connect with the one mind or universal consciousness.
Tldr; Bernardo opened up a can of whoopass on Philip who was often left speechless and trying to defend his counterpoints by deferring to neuroscientists and physicists
Does Philip Goff have any mathematical training?
One question I’d ask him to answer (again) is:
How does the subject/patient who informs the neuro-scientist correlating the patient’s neural network to the patient’s self-perceived emotions validate the truth of the answer coming from the self-perceptions of the patient himself?
After watching most of Ep 17 and this follow Ep 19 and 15 minutes of the latest JRE podcast with Goff my armchair conclusion is:
1) BK was pretty clear in his a-priori assumptions, if I understand them correctly:
a. Perception is a “dissociated”, re-presented landscape of experience, empirical evidence is drawn from these re-presented perceptions
b. Conscious entities metabolize
c. Personas, or alters, that I and other conscious selves have, experience reality consciously, whether we remember it or not
d. Analytic language in the form of propositions can only get us close to informing us of re-presentations of reality, but not reality itself.
i. Knowing the properties of a block of wood can inform us of some related elements of perceptions of it (such as length) but not of the thing itself
2) PG’s Pan-Psychism can be nested in and tested within BK’s Idealism
3) PG appeared to be Technically and Philosophically out of BK’s league
4) You need to host a discussion between Bernardo and Rupert Sheldrake, that would be sweet
I don't think the conscious AI argument can be made yet for either side, because we *don't* yet have a general AI.
12:49 the boundaries of your consciousness are not vague? the notion that your consciousness has boundaries is vague... isn't it? what are the mechanics of jung's synchronicity, and other similar phenomena then?
Neuroscientists, ironically enough, are not the best people to ask about purest consciousness.
So true!
No neuroscientists that I know of are even _trying_ to explain subjective, first-person experience. Sure, they’re studying the correlations between observed/reported behaviors/experiences and brain activity, but that kind of research program will never be able to _explain_ it.
The only attempts at _explanations_ I’ve heard of have either completely missed the point of the Hard Problem (e.g. Global Workspace, IIT) or they have been completely ridiculous (e.g. “Extended Mind” theories, Illusionism/Eliminative Materialism, Identity Theory).
IMHO.
I wish RB was talking the most
thanks, I appreciate the sentiment but these guys don't want to hear what I have to say!
Alas. I liked your latest piece.
Not the best conversation with BK - PG can not understand the arguments so BK has to explain the same thing over and over again😬
I think it was quite the opposite. BK can not understand the arguments so PG has to explain the same thing over and over again.
Bernardo, whenever asked whether a sufficiently complex computing system could at some point be considered to be conscious, always makes this analogy with the system of pipes, valves and water. However, I think this is an incomplete analogy, as the plumbing system in his analogy is fully disconnected from the external system and does not have any "sensorial" input, whereas a future computing system could be wired up with all sorts of input/output systems. It would have sensors to observe the external system, and motors/speakers/light emitters to influence it itself. This changes everything in my view. Take also the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment: Bernardo entertains the idea that indeed it would still have a conscious experience, but what if the brain is fully isolated and made into a closed of system. Would that change anything? I think it might.
He believes that we will create artificial intelligence but that it will look like life: biology, metabolism, abiogenesis, etc. The analogy works well because right now a ton of AI philosophers think that an isolated computer system, with complex enough AI running on it, will become conscious. Even maybe a computer simulating brain activity perfectly. This is analogous to his planet sized computer becoming conscious. It’s ludicrous. It’s like he says: a perfect simulation of kidney function, down the molecular level, running on my computer will not suddenly pee on my desk. It’s just a simulation, not the thing in itself.
@@cashglobe It might indeed be ludicrous if you require this will happen for an _isolated_ computer system, I agree. But that is my point, that is not a fair comparison to the brain which is not isolated whatsoever. What I am saying is that in order to make this a fair analogy, one should allow the computing system to be able to interact with its environment in both directions. And in that case, I don't think it is ludicrous at all to consider that it might develop what would certainly seem to be consciousness
@@sphogliadelle wouldn't that still be just more simulation and not the real thing? i.e.: you can make the computer with perfect kidney simulation to mimic peeing as well, doesn't mean there's a 'real' peeing process behind it.
there's not such a thing as the alter and the body, there's only the living being.
@ 27:45 -27:53 _" you seem to be assuming on some sort of philosophical grounds that that biologist that life is necessary and sufficient for consciousness whereas i think that's a mistake, i think it's an empirical question for neuroscientists what are the conditions that are necessary for uh for emergent consciousness."_
This might be where Goff loses the plot so to speak. The only things that are aware are living things...this is our direct experience. Anything beyond that is an abstraction. The major problem i see here is the horribly abysmal DEFINITION of Life we have floating around in our Minds. The presence of Life seemingly makes all forms of biological matter become "brains".
No Life = No awareness or Consciousness, that simply cannot be denied. So it logically follows that Life itself is a localized expression of Consciousness.
Goff seems to be bent on proving that non conscious elementary particles can produce awareness, furthering what imo ius a FAILED philosophy of Strong Emergence.
He never considered that *_it is life itself that radiates awareness thru matter,_* as opposed to non conscious matter producing awareness thru some yet unidentified mechanism or natural law. We are blocked by a failed definition of Life...not the reality of Life as an entity.
I can't believe people are still making the "simulated fire doesn't produce heat" argument. Of course simulated fire doesn't produce heat OUTSIDE the simulation. That is a red herring and completely beside the point. The question is, would a human body/nervous system simulated in the same environment as the simulated fire EXPERIENCE the heat? That's what the question of substrate dependence is trying to answer. You can't just state that "simulated water isn't wet" and then conclude that consciousness can ONLY exist in non-simulated animal brains - that's a total non sequitur.
No, you're misrepresenting the argument. Even if you simulated a body, a simulated nervous system does not equal feeling. The phenomena of feeling hot still would not occur under those conditions. As a digital kidney would produce digital urine, to exit the digital body, that does not mean that the digital entity is feeling any of those things, no matter how much we attempt to project our own experience on to some code.
1:08 in re. 'pipes, taps and water' - the only reason you wouldn't believe its conscious is because you can't imagine it having agency or how to interacting with it
Planet earth includes a metabolising system of pipes, taps and water
the question is about isomorphic patterns / processes across different substrates
@@richdorset Not really, it's a rock with a liquid core.
At ~59 minutes if Goff granted more agency to universal consciousness, not just Bernardo's universal groping will, his idea can work IMDO. But then we are getting too close to disembodied 'intelligences' haha, not somewhere he would want to go probably. Sorry, right out there! But I do wish you guys and science more generally went to empirical data on psi and mediums, wrong channel :) But seriously great discussion
I think Kastrup´s Materialism is Baloney? does give an explanation why vagueness of biology is not a problem, but he didn´t really articulate it here... Just saying:)
Hellooo .... I am conscious ... don't tax me !!!
you might not be taxed as such, but you will be data mined....your value to the system is your information and it is and will continue to extract it from you at all costs
44:31
lol ???????
A 501c. So like a church.
Are we in the 21st century ? Maybe Aristotle had reason to think that the mind (soul) was localized to the heart not the brain, but come on ! What experience is lost for people who are on dialysis because their kidney(s) were removed ? Same it true for any organ - as long as the brain's supply from the particular organ is substituted the absence of the organ has no introspectively detectable effect on experience.
sorry "think"
This is as much of a serous conversation as the old time discussion about the number of angels that can dance on the tip of a pin.
Man, what a headache. Philip is not very good at explaining himself, at least not to my ears (haven't checked his philosophical theories yet), and Bernardo's ego seems to get in the way a lot of the time.
To make things worse, Bernardo's arguments don't seem very watertight. Like the issue with the whole body as one conscious entity. His argument that this is so because it all comes from the same point in space time (cell) is just shoddy. If we assume the big bang (all the universe starts as an infinitelly dense singularity), then we would all be the same concious entity right now per that argument, right?
And the same with the "all the body dies together" one; what about siamese twins with conjoined circulatory systems? Hell, the twins one messes with argument #1 too. Not convinced at all.
I dunno. Not really what I would expect from experts in the field.
Bernardo’s voice sounds so much like Massimo Piggliucci
I don't detect that at all. Lol.
I used to confuse the two
Very hard to believe speculating about “a brain in a vat,” has any intellectual value whatsoever. I regard this as an accessible but wildly non productive rhetorical cul de sac serious thinkers must be wise enough to avoid.
Is Philip short-circuiting?
Or perhaps a plant?
AI is surely not this advanced yet... 😅
Richard, take heed and get a proper mic. It’s 50% of what you’re saying.
you buying?
@@onemorebrown You’re a middleclass academic. If you can’t afford a mic something is seriously wrong.
@@PlatonsArm right, but I'm happy with the one I have
@@onemorebrown you can get a pre-owned Blue Yeti for $50. If you’re not willing to put down 50 bucks to improve the quality of your videos manyfold, you have weird priorities. I think many more would engage with your otherwise great material if it doesn’t sound like shit.
@@PlatonsArm thanks, but I do this for fun in my spare time and am happy with the way things are.
Bernardo is clear, goff is vague
Goff loses yet again 😊
Goff is a man! He drinks tap water.