The 10 Decisions that decided the March to the Marne | Ross Beadle
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- čas přidán 19. 06. 2024
- In terms of sheer scale, no matter how you measure it, the first four weeks were the most appalling of the war. Although there is some dispute over the exact figures, between 20 August and 27 August 1914, the French army lost 40,000 men with 27,000 killed on 22 August alone. The Battle of Charleroi cost the French around 80,000 casualties in three days. There was an almost ‘July 1st 1916’ level of attrition, but over four weeks.
The distances covered were enormous too. The German Second Army marched over 300 kilometres and fought four battles along the way. The First Army outside it marched even further. The final battle front on the river Marne stretched 280 kilometres. Yet this huge campaign was conducted by wholly inexperienced commanders using 19th century tactics of open country fighting but with twentieth century technology, notably quick firing cannon.
Even with so much new technology, and over a million men on either side, in the final analysis it was the key decisions taken by the senior commanders that decided the issue. Not just Joffre and Moltke, but Bulow, Kluck, Sir John French and a little known lieutenant colonel, the German Head of Intelligence Richard Hentsch.
The talk by Ross Beadle identifies the ten key decisions taken by the respective commanders. Understanding what drove these decisions is the best way to get to grips with the crazy swirl of events up until Moltke opted to break of the action and ordered a German retreat to the river Aisne.
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I am always intrigued by the use of the main image that this (excellent) talk also uses in its main thumbnail, and again later in the presentational slides. It is an evocative image of German infantry advancing in open order through crop fields in high summer, always supposedly in France or Belgium in August 1914 Only the image was published on the front page of the newspaper "Die Wochenschau" on 13th September 1913 showing army manouveres for that year.
And your point is what please?
Ross Beadle does well in his presentation to describe a complex battle scenario. Well worth viewing.
44:30 another side effect of von Kluck's furious pursuit of the French was to wear his army out physically! The First was the hardest-marching German army in the advance into France because the wheeling action of Moltke's plan required the right flank to cover a third again as much distance in a day as von Hausen's army closer to the fulcrum of the advance. They were required to cover 30km a day to meet Schlieffen-approved timetables, with a large combat load due to the German armies extending far from their railheads. Kluck putting the spurs to his troops to double-time in pursuit of Lanrezac degraded their combat ability when the test of battle erupted. That all the troops at the Marne fought so hard in spite of the fatigue and rigors of the long retreat from Charleroi, the two weeks of constant sharp skirmishes, is rather impressive.
Thank you for an engaging talk. Reference RFC operations, during my research for the National Trust walks entitled "Wings over Stonehenge" (which gave a detailed history of the development of military aviation at Lark Hill by personnel of first No 2 (Aeroplane) Company Air Battalion RE then No 3 Sqn RFC) I found descriptions of recce sorties flown by the RFC during the "fighting withdrawal" from Mons. There were instances of bombing (using hand held bombs). There was a wireless telegraphy (W/T) section formed in No 4 Sqn. In September 1914 an RFC W/T HQ was set up at Fere-en-Tardenois with a Major Musgrave RE i/c. (He had led the pre-war research into air-to-ground W/T but it might not have featured in this campaign) . In the autumn of 1914 Captain LeFroy did fly early missions with a view to developing W/T techniques. It is worth noting that the RFC flew to France in August 1914 almost immediately after completing an extensive exercise in all of the then forms of "scouting" and army co-operation during "The Concentration Camp" held for all RFC Sqns at RFC Netheravon in July 1914.
Thanks for the brilliant presentation!
Very enjoyable
Don't forget that Joffre sacked 60pc of his generals at the end of August. In your diagrams, you should put Franchet d'Esperet as the head of the 5th army at the Marne.
Great show 👍
this is great
Hi Ross
This is brilliant and have read about and studied the Marne on and off since I was 14 in 1964.
I'm only 14 minutes into it, but you riase some very good bullet points.
It made me think that the Germans, especially, should have used the Army Group concept. Eg imagine if one general had absolute command of 1st, 2nd and 3rd army - there may have been no gaps!
The Germans did in Belgium. First and third armies were under the command of second army's General von Bülow. When they raced into France, Kluck and his first army became independent from Bülow and that#s when the mess started.
An interesting take on the line that the 2nd army was 'Cinders'. Perhaps it is a modernism, but could it be better translated as the army was 'Burnt Out'
Brillant
Lack of cooperation between 1st and 2nd army. von Kluck had to face the British alone at Mons cause von Bülow regarded it the sole responsibility of the 1st army. The battle of Guise could have turned differently too. von Bülow should have bind Lanrezac allowing von Kluck and von Haussen to flank and form a pocket. Instead he went for a costly frontal assault. The gap between the 1st and 2nd army was not only because the different orientation but also because Corps being held at Maubeuge and Antwerp and also being send to Prussia to assist against the Russians. Those Corps were not present at the frontline
Perhaps think about re-editing to tighten the narrative...?
It's tough to say if the Germans had a chance in 1914 at all here... It's something I have been curious about for a while.
To be quite honest I wasn't expecting much as I watched the Schlieffen lecture and I find it somewhat flawed. This one is a bit better! And I know or can imagine how much effort is required to prepare and deliver something like that, so thank you!
You’d better watch out, coz Beadle’s about.
Why didn't the Germans use planes to see where French and British armies were at like the French did during this part of the war? Great video!
because aviation generally and its development was still at a very primitive stage in 1914.remember Bleriot just made it across the english channel flying some flimsy contraction in 1909 so by the time war broke out,nobody within military circles on both sides considered the potential use of planes for spotting and combat purposes plus there probably was very few pre war professional trained pilots
kluck was a full
Very nice. But complete lack of a detailed explanarion of the supply situation is the most glaring omission.... Rail network should somehow limit and channel the military decisions/movements.. We did'nt see that factored in in this presentation...
It is well known that the german logistics of the western front during the static fighting is dependent on two rail systems: One between mezieres and caregnan and the other centered around liege. Can we make a similar analysis for the fluid battle phase described here?
I don't know but I guess that at this point the Germans still had plenty of horses and stockpiled ammuntion.
Disagree on your conclusion of Germany not being good at strategy. They would have won if the Americans had not entered the war. Yes they made mistakes but so did the British and French.
Given Germany’s grim strategic situation they clearly were very good at strategy considering the lasted 4 years surround by the most powerful empires.
No, it wouldn't. That's just a lie. Germany was finished by the end of June of 1918 and their allies would also get beaten in a couple of months. In their Spring Offensive the Germans took hundreds of thousands of casualties, decimated their stormtroopers and captured useless ground, without achieving any strategic objective. They didn't recognize the importance of Amiens and Hazebrouck, failed to knock out the British during operations Michael and Georgette, failed to cut off the British from the French, failed to knock out the French during operation Blucher, then in June failed to achieve any operational success in their 4th and 5th offensives against the French and achieving very modest territorial gains while losing a lot of men, tried to divert British and French reserves from Flanders and Amiens area with those last 3 offensives and clearly failed to do so. German offensive potential was completely exhausted by the end of June and there was nothing they could do to achieve operational breakthrough at the Second Battle of the Marne. Then on August 8th the British and the French smashed the Germans at Amiens.
Genral Patton doesn't get nearly enough credit for winning the Marne.
I too can't understand why General Patton is overlooked here.
Who?
What?
Nah! he was stopped on his heels by Steiner!
Erm .. Wrong war, mate. Patton was a key figure in WW2, Not 1914-18 WW1 as is being discussed here.