@@patrickmcbrien9303 I'd have gone as a max at 10 miles hitting the pedestrian conversion sequencer and waited with my thumb out for search and rescue.
@@claudiodiaz9752 that’s one of them that is taught in private pilot training. Don’t fall in the trap. Which this pilot did. It’s a human behavior that you have to overcome.
@@tommynikon2283 Do they name stuff after you when your firey jet crashes in a neighborhood because you wanted to land it instead of pointing it where it would have been better off?
This happened when I was a young Airman at Whiteman. Our engineers had a hell of a time digging it out of the field across the country road off the south end of the runway.
@@59thfsaviation79 yeah he probably thought if an f15 can land with one of its wings cut off then why cant i land it while fire is burning the shit out of the plane
My dad joined the Caterpillar Club flying a F-100 Super Sabre over France in the early 60's. The club?; in the USAF, if you have to eject....you turn into a "butterfly". He and his backseater made it. He did the same trick again in the late 60's during Vietnam, over Laos (the secret war) in an A1-E Skyraider. At 91, he's still around and sharp.
2 ejections, pretty crazy! I know someone that got an incentive flight in an f16. He was an air traffic controller and won airman of the year. Squadron commander was flying and they lost the engine and had to eject. Happened at cannon afb back in 1999. Broken ankle but outher than that was good.
Tommy your dad is a brave pilot and flew through some difficult times. I began my Air Force career during the mid to late 60’s as a crew chief on the Sabre and went to Nam with them. Somewhere around this time it was found that pilots who survived an ejection ended up being 1 to 1 1/2 inches shorter a result of spinal compression. With your dad’s case of two ejections in a fairly close time frame My curiosity overwhelms me to wonder if he experienced any permanent spinal compression?
Thanks Mover! Almost had to a leave a T-38 on my first solo (contact) in the aircraft when I couldn't get one of the mains down but did on the way out to the controlled bailout area. Left it down, landed on the apposite traffic runway (with clearance) directly , shut down after one engine quit (after the other quit taxiing back) and went to the O Club. This shit is tough and you got to stay focused. The Commander bought me a Scotch at the O Club and informed me to go home cause I was the first bird out, solo the next day. Thank yo!
My dad (command pilot AF, flew F4s in nam) always used to tell me that what lead was expecting from his wing man (especially from groups like the thunderbirds) was if lead flew into the ground he could look back and see his wingman following him. So I’m not surprised misty was only offering suggestions
Great breakdown, always informative. Something I learned as Safety NCO reading all the USAF safety publications that came across my desk in the '80s was a simple but profound fact: Checklists for aviation are written in blood. We lost pilots in the early Eagles because we didn't know everything about them yet. The checklists come from those experiences. Especially in the '90s, you aren't the first guy with an engine fire in an Eagle. This guy got the best case scenario for not following that checklist, IMHO. ADDED after some reflection: The Aces 2 seat was new when the Eagle was deployed, and a lot of guys were a bit frightened of it. I remember one guy (who ejected) saying that when it was obvious he HAD to punch out, he thought of his wife and kids, he thought about not having use of his legs, he thought about his parents. Deep breath, BOOM. On top of the difficulty of military aviation, on top of having a really bad day, they have to deal with that. It effects the thought process to some degree, no doubt.
Gareth I’m not slamming by no means I just wanted to drop a few cents at this point. I know as a result of several aircraft accidents where the FAA’s final investigative report concluded that poor if any CRM was a major factor in those accidents. This subsequently brought about all the positive changes in CRM in the past 20 to 30 yrs. My point CRM had been employed and used effectively long before it was officially titled and provided its acronym. Even though it may have been briefly touched upon during flight training it was more instinctive reaction with aircrews caught up in severe inflight emergency situations.
I was on the flight line that day and standing with a crew ready to leave on a B2 sortie. They had to shutdown waiting on the IFE and one of the pilots said the same thing as we were watching out of the back of the dock... "Why didn't he eject a long time ago?". And that FOD walk made for a long day, but glad he survived.
I found this video a long time ago. Drove past that field every day heading to work while I was at Whiteman. Couldn't imagine seeing an F-15 hurdling over the road and smashing thru a corn field.
This reminds me of the only time I ever got to "fly a military jet." I was a civilian working at AFFTC, Edwards. Our HITL lab had a full cockpit F-16 simulator. As part of an orientation briefing the lab boys let me try it. When it came time to land I wasn't wasn't watching my airspeed, trying to line up my approach. I touched down at 350 KTAS, skidded off the runway, crashed the airplane, and I died. 😠
@@JC-11111 Well thank you. I'm not sure that reviving me was the best thing for the Air Force because had it been a real world exercise I would have cost the government about $30 M that day. I'd love to tell you about my NDE but there's nothing to tell. One night in Bismarck is pretty much the same as any other ... ink black darkness as far as the eye can see. 😉
Ah the heavy probability of that result, landing at 350 knots would be high. With the other story it’s hard to believe there’s not the slightest to talk about cause that would be a travesty of justice. Your innocent until proven guilty leaving nothing to talk about.
The F-15 has 3 hydro systems, PC1, PC2, & UTILITY. The speedbrake is operated from utility which is powered by both motors. Although you will have diminished hydro pressure with only #1 running. The speedbrake would work but all the flight controls might be sluggish at reduced pressure so he might not have used it.
The F-15 does have three hydraulic systems, each with its own (actually utility has a left and right ) pump but each system is also broken down in to two subsystems or circuits A and B. If a leak occurs, the draining reservoir will shut down circuit A. If the leak continues after circuit A is shut down, circuit A is automatically turned on and circuit B is shut down. This feature is known as reservoir level sensing. On top of that, all of the critical flight control components i.e., L/R aileron and L/R stabilator actuators have switching valves that allow another hydraulic system (PC 1, PC 2 or Utility) to take over which means the F-15's hydraulic system is more that triple redundant. Total hydraulic failure is possible but not likely...the fireball as fuel lines ignited would be the most looming threat. I show this video to all my avionics students, namely to illustrate the importance of communication systems and to let them hear Bitching Betty and RWR tones but also to see HUD presentation. As for single engine operation, there is no appreciable reduction of pressure in the Utility system that would affect aircraft manoeuvrability or braking. Great review of this IFE, keep up the good work. Spam
@@stevecanham1591 Guess McDonald Douglas learned from all the F-4 hydraulic failures we had. I almost felt like a Navy pilot taking the approach cable at high speed.
@@stevecanham1591 I had read in the tech data that hydro pressure is reduced to 1800psi for safety of ground crew on engine #1 ops alone. While #2 runs all at 3k psi. The T.O. doesn't mention that #1 pressures increase with weight off wheels so I assume it holds at 1800. Idk if this affects flight controls during flight. I would assume not but I'm not a pilot and never got a chance to ask before I got out.
You hit the nail on the head when you talked about Crew Resource Management 'back in the day'. Being afraid to speak up was something the Air Force and Navy & Marines, Coast Guard and even the airlines worked very hard to train out of their air crews. Safety in the air had to become the topic air crews were afraid to NOT speak up about. Unfortunately, poor CRM still comes up now and then but when you are the captain or flight lead or whatever you want to call it, you must leave your pride in the locker (or civilian equivalent). Tell your pilots/crew to never worry about speaking up, especially if I seem to be in a bad mood or something, I will get over it and thank you.
Whew. Been there...done that, Mover. Mine was a battery fire in the nose, but just as hazardous with a large can of 20 mm in the bay. Lots of hints from #2 (Get out!), but I kept thinking, "It's still flying, stay with it". Not great presence of mind, but ejection was not my thing. Luckily, mine went out. I got lots of drinks at the club that night, but I had a strong feeling that I had done something idiotic. I still do...
When considering these things, is the unwillingness to eject based on any one thing? Or could you weight/give a percentage of importance to 1. Flight career 2. Ejection survival/injury due to ejection 3. Saving the jet 4. Concern about the ground/crash site Any insight appreciated. Thanks for your service to our country
@@basedchad2196 This was in combat in Vietnam, Ghost, so I was not really concerned about my career or loosing the jet. During that time, we had a number of ejections, and almost all of them resulted in injuries...or in the worst case...capture. I recall thinking at the time, "If I pull those handles, I may never see my family again." It gives you pause to consider it. I guess the fire looked worse from the outside (wingman's position), but all I could see was a bit of smoke along the fuselage. I knew I had gotten hit and the round could have been explosive. The 20mm ammo drum was in that bay and the thought of those 1000 rounds cooking off was the driving thought toward ejection. Luckily, the fire went out.
@@Ed-hz2um ooooh, my bad. I had thought this was in Italy during training. Vietnam is an entirely different animal, from almost anything! Thanks for sharing the story
@@basedchad2196 No worries, Ghost. It's a sure sign of the changing times when a pilot worries more about the career impact of an ejection more than his/her skin.
@@basedchad2196 i just checked, its still there, go see the original version and FF to that point in the video, you will hear him say it, or what it sounds like he said.
Dear Mr. Mover, Thank you for your breakdown videos and analysis, it means a lot for us to learn and pay attention to critical situations, and appreciate well-established emergency rules written by the experts on the field. Yours sincerely, John
I remember seeing this a few years ago when I was in high school, and being really impressed that two thought of those fire dynamics while doing 300+kts to keep up with his lead. Was a good data point on what kind of minds good pilots need to have.
There was an F-15E at mid America that overran the runway and the crew ejected. This was like last week too. At first glance I thought that's what this vud was about.
It did not overrun the renway, it landed and went off the runway. What happened and why has not been told yet. As Vanquished said, do not speculate about what happened, just wait till the report comes out. The only thing known is It was a F-15QA that landed and went off the runway and the pilots ejected. From the pics you can see it was not an overrun and was to the side of the runway.
If you haven't seen it yet, the Royal Danish Air Force published a video a few years back where they showed a controlled ejection after some issues with the landing gear of a Viper. You probably don't want to film a reaction of it since the video itself is like an hr long, but just know that it's there. Our Danish brothers are very good at what they do.
They also did an interview (unfortunately in Danish) with the pilot that was about as long. It's on CZcams somewhere, I watched it years back. That incident was briefed in a joint Maintenance/Ops briefing by Lockheed when I was at Osan, the CZcams video was even more detailed than that Lockheed Brief.
Mover: if you haven't already, check out Ward Carroll's YT channel. He seems like he could be a great guy to talk to if you got him to do an interview. Great vid btw
as a 500 hour private pilot your presentation of information is wonderful... my grandson is Navy ATC formerly Stennis now in Texas...Keep on with your great videos...
I’ll add some facts, since there was a lot of assumptions in this presentation. I have 2000 hours in the F-15A/C. I also flew with both pilots in this video. Sadly, we lost the lead pilot last summer in a tragic car accident.
First, there are no bold-face procedures in the F-15. Not a big deal, but since Mover mentioned them, I thought I’d clarify that. Second, this was not a “classic” engine fire. It was a contained oil fire in the hot-section of the engine. There was a bearing failure in the right engine which allowed all the engine oil to leak into the combustion section of the engine. Once the oil was completely consumed, the fire would have simply extinguished. So, the first indication of a problem were oil pressure/quantity warnings and some other anomalies that concerned the lead pilot enough to get his wingman to check his a/c out. There was never a fire light and the fire warning system tested good once the engine was shut-down. Unfortunately, this was a known possibility in the F-15 but wasn’t addressed very well in the a/c “dash-one” manual at the time of this event or widely known about throughout the community.
So, since there was no engine fire warning and the very reliable fire warning system was still operational, this was not necessarily a “if fire persists, eject” situation. Could he have ejected once the engine was shut-down and the fire was still visible? Sure, but when we were briefed on this accident that was not the approved solution. Without an actual fire warning from the dual loop, redundant fire detection system, this was not to be treated as an engine fire. If this pilot had been alone, it’s very likely he would have shut the engine down in accordance with the checklist once the oil quantity reached a point to trigger the appropriate warning. He never would have known he even had an oil fire in the part of the engine where the fire is supposed to be. He then would have proceeded at an appropriate pace to Whiteman and this would have been a normal single engine landing that didn’t make it on to youtube.
However, he had a wingman who provided some additional details that painted a more dire situation than necessary. That’s where the chain of mistakes began and as Mover said, there were a lot of them. Since he didn’t know about the bearing failure/oil fire scenario, one could make the argument that he should have followed the checklist and ejected. However, the lack of a fire warning left enough doubt in his mind that he wasn’t ready to go down that route. He wasn’t trying to be a hero. The fact that the engine fire was INSIDE the engine where it belongs should have been communicated. The lack of fire warning and good test on the fire system should have been talked about. The “airflow and fire stagnation discussion” only confused the situation and made it appear even more serious than it was. Lack of knowledge on cable status at the AFB they planned to use multiple times that day was another biggie. And finally, of course the approach and landing speak for itself.
Sorry to hear of the loss that’s sad. However I want to thank you for saving me the effort and doing it much better in covering these important issues, great job.
John, you can't speak for the pilot. Nor the wingman, unless that's you. You're talking about facts determined after the incident. The pilot endangered himself, the public and ground crew against the chance of landing a burning jet against established guidelines. I'm sure, he would be the first to admit any errors in judgement after cooldown and time to think it through. The presenter of the video was kind enough in his soft approach to mistakes made.
I think he had bigger problems to worry about 😂 someone will get the rwy cleaned up pretty quickly if needed. Although, I suspect they shut it down anyways for quite some time.
I think one would have to believe he thought of that and the many other what-ifs and felt his chances were higher that he would get it stopped and do an emergency ground egress but....AYK things don’t always go as planned. However circumventing or failure to comply with every step itemized in the emergency checklist procedures of the -1 is not necessarily something to be disciplined for and different for each case. Let’s say it all went down as he planned and the fire was quickly put out. He’s a hero who bravely saved the USAF and taxpayers a ton of cash. I believe the Air Force places great trust and responsibility in its pilots to collect the facts and make a good logical decision and in this case the pilot (with great billiards and fortitude)did just that but not with the same results. I personally feel the heavy views that he didn’t do the right thing is inappropriate and should be corrected. This goes without knowing what action if any was officially taken.
thks !!great vid , like always !! No report can be found ,only this info : 9 November 1995, F-15A (SN 76-0061/SL) was written off 1 May 1996, plane was with 131st Fighter Wing / 110th Fighter Squadron
Great breakdown. I blew my drink out of my nose when you recapped the cardinal rule of wingman comms: “...Joker, Bingo, Lead, you’re on fire...”. Yep, not often that last one comes into play!
FYI, The F-15 has a UTIL HYD pump on both AMADs. The speed brake runs off UTIL, it will work no matter which engine is out. The UTIL also augments A/B HYD.
Outstanding breakdown. There’s the natural human factor of it being exceedingly difficult to take a step back from what you get in your mind for the correct course of action. Both the checklist and wingman could have helped alleviate that.
Although the checklist says to eject if a fire persists, pilots are expected to utilize judgement when handling emergency situations. In this case, the fire was caused by oil leaking from a bearing into the engine core. The low temperature oil fire was completely contained within the engine and was not hot enough to illuminate the engine fire sensors, which are located in the engine bay outside of the engine, and the only likely indication of a fire was the wingman's observations. Once he shut down the #2 engine, he would have lost 2 of the 7 hydraulic circuits F-15s utilize for normal operations, but all functions would have been operational via backup circuits. Because of all of the built in redundancies, F-15s do not have boldface/critical action procedures that have to be memorized and acted on immediately when confronted with an emergency situation. A good example is one of the most severe emergencies a pilot can have, which is an engine fire on takeoff above abort speed; the F-15 checklist for this EP is to climb to a safe altitude and investigate. I don't fault the pilot's decision to try for an emergency landing, but he let his wingman's prophecy about the fire propagating forward after landing affect his decision making during the approach and landing.
Thanks Mover. But your words, "But for the grace of God go I"... I miss that understanding in people today. To quick to judge are we all. Great video in any case.
I'm sure he was avoiding the checklist on punching out because not only do you lose the aircraft, the seat may malfunction, parachute may malfunction, you could be injured on punch out and never fly again. I can see why he wanted to bring the jet back. With the fire in the afterburner section (that section can take a lot of heat), he may have thought he'd have control long enough to get it down. The scary thing would be to have it burn through on final, you punch out and the jet ends up on someone's house. Tough decision either way.
You also don’t know where the wind current takes you or where your PLF is going to be. It could be many unfavorable places I.e., middle of a forest fire, an inactive volcano, hung up on the side of the 104th level of a skyscraper, inside the heavily fenced in Hazardous Chemicals burial site, it goes on....
Knowing how to identify that you've done everything you can do and it is time to get out is one of those paid in blood lessons. In any dangerous profession, not just flying. You just know "if fire persists, eject" wasn't part of the checklist until some poor guy rode a fireball down into the field and got himself killed. Sometimes the jet just doesn't want to come home.
Good video, Mover. I can understand not wanting to give up the plane but, yeah, time to leave is time to leave. Find a nice open field to let the jet come to its sudden stop then ride that ACES II.
I am not a real pilot in any capacity, but if I'm trying to land an F18 in DCS or MFS 2020, and I'm still pulling 200+ knots right before touchdown, I think "it's time to go around".
used to work on the arresting gear (cables) in the air force. they do engage those for certification, usually an f16 would run into it without taking off. rarely we would have navy jerks that would ram into it so hard we would have to do extra checklist and maintenance work. the cables are usually taken off the runway because they get clobbered by heavys running them over again and again, requiring us to go out and replace the suspension pieces on the cable pendant. unfortunately, they were dragged off when this eagle had an ife. if we were nearby, it'd take 15-20 min to pin them back in
Appreciate your service, but this pilot didn’t have 15-20 min for you or any other Airman to suddenly realize how important arresting cables are in an emergency at any Us airbase in the world. The Arresting cables SHOULD have been present, regardless of the inconvenience to maintenance crew. Nobody gives a damn how much of an inconvenience or pain it was or is for you and your crew to replace them if necessary. That’s part of your job! As taxpayers, we paid you a good salary and benefits to do YOUR job. So do your job! If not, people can and do die in military situations. Hell son, you weren’t exactly flipping burgers at McD’s and forgot to put a slice of cheese on someone’s burger.... I hope you can now see why arresting cables were req’d for certification to begin with.
@@livingadreamlife1428 Generally, bases that host fighter wings have an arresting gear and it is usually controllable from the tower. If it is not always up, it can be raised quickly. But it is not a safe assumption that all military airports have the cables. Not sure what was at Whiteman back in the late 90s. That would have been around the time when the B-2s were first being deployed. As I recall, they also had an A-10 reserve unit, which would not have required a cable (the A-10 has no hook). The F-15 guys involved in this were probably Missouri ANG. They had an F-15 squadron at Lambert St. Louis at the time. They would have had cables there as McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing) builds fighters there and has fighter ops all the time.
@@livingadreamlife1428 i don't think you realize this, but the primary mission of the shop is not arresting gear. it belongs to the power pro shop in the engineering flight. the flight line fire flight used to maintain them, but they found out those guys don't have much mechanical aptitude, so it was dumped on civil engineering. but it's easy to armchair quarterback this, isn't it mr. internet man. airfield ops are the ones ordering them off and on.
@@loginavoidence12 but won't somebody think of the _TAXPAYERS!?!?!?!?!?!?!?_ It's weird how civilians seem to think 1) Airman/Soldiers/Sailors/Marines make "a good salary" lol and 2) we didn't have to pay taxes just like every other damn "taxpayer." Gotta love that know-it-all "I'm basically your boss" attitude, especially the comparison to flipping burgers... when I was in the Army we didn't make much more than fast food employees!
Max tire speed for Shuttle was 230 knots with usual touchdown speeds being 185-196 knots. Nose gear tires(2) used for 2 landings, MLG tires(4) used once.
I used to work on the avionics and flight control systems on the f-111f model. That same engine was also used on the early F-16 F-15. It would have been on a later iteration of the 14 but I don't think they ever got that far. Although I did work on a few f-14s that came into my Air Base. I was also rated on the B1 even though it was not operational when I left the Air Force. That engine does have a tendency for a third stage compressor failure. A number of f-16s were lost due to that because an F-16 has the flight characteristics of a brick when it loses power. If you're not going fairly fast. I had an occasion to watch a pilot completely screw the pooch one day and crash one of our aircraft on the runway actually just adjacent to the runway. They did punch out just before the plane hit the ground the third time. But when the fire truck got to the engine the right engine which is not the one that he had the fire warning on was still running even though he had punched the fire agent discharge and the fuel shut off because it takes several minutes before the engine shuts down because there's still enough fuel left in the system to run it for a number of minutes after you hit the fire agent discharged and the fuel shut off. I don't know how much better they got after that but they still use the same basic size engine but they did move to a general electric version
You r spot on with the CRM piece. When you hear another pilot or crew member point out the obvious it refocuses your decision making process. I only flew 2 pilot aircraft and have been on both the receiving and giving end of that exchange. Sometimes we all try and get creative and the good idea fairy visits us ar terrible times, which is what seems like happened here. But from what I was told in flight school (way back in 2008), the 90s and 80s was before CRM really was widly accepted and checklists were not for studs, they were for staff aviators and trainees.
I love your videos; great breakdown...however, as an F-15 engine mechanic and engine run certified, the fire extinguisher is only useful if the fire is in the engine bay, not the engine itself. Additionally, the checklist you read off said "If warning light remains on..." there was no bitching Betty telling him that he had a right engine fire warning, and no light on that I heard. Pushing the Fire Warning button does turn off all of your fuel to that engine but hitting the fire extinguisher would be as helpful as trying to piss into a bucket into the wind. Sounds like this was an oil fire because the fire never went out...then you're pretty much screwed, a windmilling engine will continue to feed oil to all the bearings...If the fire is contained within the engine, which I'm sure that's what the pilot believed, I can see why he would want to save the aircraft. I'm not sure if there is a separate checklist for engine fire contained in the engine while you're flying or not. I know when you're running an engine on the ground there is a separate checklist for external vs internal engine fire. Everything else you said was pretty spot on, he was definitely coming in too fast, if he had his speed under control and made a quick landing (without blowing the tires), blow the canopy and jump out he probably would have been ok...again, great video and breakdown...Thank you!
One other thing I just noticed looking into this: Whiteman AFB was at the time (and still is today) the home base of the entire B-2 fleet. And there's only one runway there. Follow the checklist and eject over some corn field? OK, that's a bad day. Ignore the checklist and crash on the runway, shutting it down until it can be cleared/repaired? You just shut down the Stealth Bomber program for some period of time. Obviously this is all 20/20 hindsight, but it's no wonder they show this as an example of what not to do.
In January of 1981 an A-7 belonging to an unnamed squadron had a total hydraulics failure while conducting operations off an unnamed Carrier on "Gonzo Station" and there was no bingo field the aircraft could make it to. The pilot wanted to attempt to recover onboard but the Ship's command directed him to point the the aircraft in a safe direction and eject. He flew around for quite awhile until he was almost out of fuel and then ejected.
@@jcheck6 Pilot nicknames (or handles) were not very common back then and I only know of a few aviators from that period of time that had them. Neither the pilot I mentioned originally nor the pilot in the story below had a nickname that I was aware of at the time. The following month (February) the same squadron lost another A-7 due to a midair collision with an F-4 (the F-4 crew was killed in the accident 😕 ). The A-7 was in the pattern waiting for the last launch to complete and recovery ops to begin when the aircraft was struck from behind and below by the F-4 doing an unauthorized high performance climb off the cats. The pilot of the A-7 never even saw the aircraft that hit him. All he knew was one moment he was circling the ship and the next moment he felt a thump and his aircraft started rolling. He tried to correct for the roll and nothing happened, so he looked to the side the aircraft was rolling to and saw he was missing a large piece of that wing. He didn't hesitate to eject.
Usually there's a pilot on the ground radio who can help in emergencies; the SOF, Supervisor of Flying... didn't hear one here. A good SOF would read the same checklist, and when the fire is still raging, ask TWO flatly "Has he ejected yet?"
Hey Mover! I think you would enjoy an interview with Ward Carroll. Some great stories from the f14 Rio side. I tried to see if you had him on your channel yet but did not see it if so. Hope to see you chat with him someday.
Hey, you should do a breakdown of the B-52 crash at Fairchild. There are some great videos showing the reckless flying incidents leading up to and video of the mishap. Its a great example of knowing when to put the foot down on poor airmanship and systematic leadership issues.
Maybe pilot was hesitant to eject based on surface winds? That’s a spicy landing under canopy with gusts up to 31. Could this have played into his decision to land and get out?
Points about the checklist is noteworthy. From a tech view (Former F-18 engine, fuel and secondary power (Assuming the 15 and 18 are similar - same manufacture). I wonder if pilot pushed FIRE warning light. When you push the light it shuts off main fuel to engine. (valve on F18 is in main landing gear (separated by bulkhead and AMAD). When fire warning TEST - its testing the A & B circuits. If Fire light doesn't light then circuit (similar to solder wire throughout engine bay) is compromised. If the throttle was at Idle instead of OFF and fire light not pushed, fuel would continue to feed the fire.
At 20:04, HUD and HUD cam still working and the pilotless Eagle also achieved a complete stop upright (apparently without fireballing). Although left engine and other parts damaged too from the crash landing, it would appear the pilot managed to indeed "save" the Eagle. Comments indicate bearing oil fire that would not have burned through (perhaps before emergency vehicles extinguished all fires). What was ultimate fate of this Eagle? The pilot's behavior was interesting. The rationale to save the Eagle is obvious. In the absence of an absolute necessity to eject, reluctance and hesitancy (and fear) probably played a part too. The decision to approach and land at high speed certainly questionable (using incorrect procedures to fix bad situations usually causes greater failure).
@@CWLemoine the #5 bearing failure was a known problem in those engines. The fix was held in abeyance for funding. The fire was contained in the engine compartment and continued because the engine windmilling kept pumping oil into the fire. The engine oil had cocked due to differential metal expansion in the #5 bearing scavenge fitting. The cocked oil plugged the drain and filled the bearing. That bearing wasn’t designed to hold oil and therefore the oil leaked out into the hot exhaust and ignited. I never understood his decision to land vs eject. His reasoning was that the jet might hurt someone on the ground or slam into a B-2. That being said if he’d just landed on speed he would have saved the jet. I saw the wingman years later at a Red Flag. He told me that the pilot had retired from all flying afterwards. In the final report both were dinged for CRM. Some of the generals insisted it was all pilot error because he didn’t land on speed. I believe they were just covering their ass because the fix had been unfounded. The AF logistics commander was at the final briefing and said as much. That commander had been my wing commander in F-111s and was a complete ass. Your review of the hud tape was spot on. The details of the engine piece just can’t be seen. One change in the F-15 cross country guide was made to have the jopes pulled and tested every flight. They had stopped at Whiteman between BFM sorties. If the JOPES had been pulled they or the transient mx would have noticed that the oil was dark and should have also noticed the burnt smell. Bottom line there were many reasons for the mishap. The least of which was the CRM between the two pilots. By the way the original HUD film showed a pickup screeching to a halt on the perimeter road as the jet flew by before settling in the corn field after leaving the runway.
We'll probably never know what the pilot's motivations were for flying it back, but it would be interesting to see if anything from that plane was salvaged, or if they just scrapped the whole thing.
Motivation? A possible one is that the pilot was aware of an incident 8 years prior where an ANG A7 crashed into a hotel after the pilot ejected. 10 people killed and many more injured. Dash 1 may say to eject but Dash 1 don't care about that elementary school or farm house ahead. I'm glad he didn't just eject and hope that his 50,000 pounds of burning fuel and metal does not hurt anyone!
I guess there is that 'I am junior in rank to the lead' thing, and the more experienced lead probably knew the checklist as well as anyone but chose to do what he did. I think the wingman did the right thing by providing ongoing status updates, as ultimately he knew that the lead was going to do it his way. I wonder if the lead's superior's had something to say to him that the #2 couldn't or wouldn't say? Thanks Mover - I am happy that it ended ok for the pilot.
Re: "8mm tape converted to digital" - it would be great if there was a way to go back and re-scan some of this footage from the original tape. Could probably get a lot more of the detail that was in the original analog tape, by scanning to the latest 4k/8k digital standard. I wonder if the tapes are sitting in a box in some archives somewhere.
Hey Mover. Thank you for your service. New subscriber here. My 2 thoughts are 1. The Pilot was ignoring the checklist and trying to save the plane. And 2. Your breakdown and professional opinion trumps everything he did beyond the point he knew the fire was not going out because the checklist is there for a reason.. I am not a pilot so both of those are my thoughts only. I have the utmost respect for pilots and especially military pilots. They are extremely professional with great integrity. I am a retired underground coal miner. That is the only profession I would critique. Thanks again for your service and for doing these videos.
Interesting. From the "russian point of view". Can the tower give the order to eject? If this happened in Russia / USSR, then in the event of a fire, "Betty" would automatically broadcast "plane number ... fire of the right engine", then the flight director (tower) would ask the pilot what is happening with him, if necessary, he would remind checklist, and if he didn’t help, he would have ordered to eject. That is, the pilot must follow the orders of the flight director in this case. Just in case of such "heroism" - if the follower cannot tell the boss "jump", then the flight director will do it.
late the video but almost feels like the pilot was too scared to eject and because of it tunneled on just landing the plane and there wasn't a single thing the wingman could say that would change his mind especially after the last discussion he had about the fire stagnating after he landed.
Punching out sooner could have made persons on the ground more likely to be injured. He may have made a good decision based on where the F-15 would have impacted with an earlier ejection? Love your videos "MOVER"
F-15 Crew Chief(A/B/C/D and E models) and Aero Repair (and Hydraulics) shop on same. PC1 and PC2 for primary flight controls, and Utility controls everything else. Combined with the PRCA, (mechanical/electrical flight controls) and "mechanical circuit breakers" (switching valves) to provide system pressure augmentation (crossover system supply) in event of loss of pressure in primary/utility systems, and bottles for blowdown pressurization of utility system, gear, brakes etc. Gear is limited to approx 250kts, (cannot recall exact numbers for extending/retracting or in down and locked, as those numbers varied between models, but in an emergency (fire) and ignoring checklist, likely AC not concerned with overspeeding...) The wingman was concerned with engine stagnation and rapid spread of fire from loss of windmill and airflow, as it seemed if the fire was continuing for more than several seconds after shutdown, then likely fuel flow was continuing and a very big concern as you stated from loss of airflow. A ground fire would likely have been very rapid. The "3E" with judicious exclamation marks is order of the day... Very good breakdown. Meanwhile, I'm gonna toss a handful of nickels in the grass. YBYSAIM!!!
Oh, and two hydraulic pumps on each engine. Each has a PC (primary control) and utility pump. PC1 and Utility on #1 and PC2 and Utility on #2 Eagle had lots of redundancy, like a 747.
Back in 1995 things are different with crew coordination. I remember because I used to read accident reports when I was on duty. I also had a good friend who I help become a pilot and he would explain some of the things that happened back then, like with a heavy landing at the wrong airport. If you were Second or First Lieutenant flying with a Colonel at the time and you're coming into the wrong airport you usually would not speak up because you assume the colonel know what he was doing. I think you said something about this before and now the Lieutenant knows today he's allowed to speak up if you see something wrong that the Colonel is doing and correct him without fear retribution.
Reminds me of United Airlines Flight 173. They had a problem with the landing gear. The captain became fixated on landing but failed to notice his fuel running out nor understand the gravity of his crew's warnings. His first officer only gave out indirect hints. They ran out of fuel and crashed. This was one of the major events that led to a change in culture and power dynamics in the cockpit. Captain and copilot became closer in terms of power level. Captains had less of an authoritative role and a more collaborative mindset was fostered among captains, copilots, and flight engineers.
I had this same senerio happen with my great planes .40 size P-51D, engine fire, leaking fuel, wing damaged, instead of just augering it in & got it back to base, it was quite an ordeal.
My only though as a former Army Helo driver is that I was along for the ride, no matter what; and the amount of seat cushion I digested was directly proportional to the nature of the EP. FIRE and MAIN XMSN CHIP light were the two worst! That said, I'm reminded of an F-106 where the pilot ejected due to loss of control at the mandatory minimum ejection altitude and the plane regained control and proceeded to fly until it ran out of fuel and landed gear-up in a farmers field, intact with minimal damage. That plane is in the USAF Museaum in Dayton, OH! The good thing is the pilot controlled where the aircraft ended up, off the end of the runway at Whitman AFB, zero civilian exposure, and CFR was at the crash site in seconds! Checklists ARE written in blood, but pilots are thinking individuals in dynamic situations, and in this case, he always had an exit strategy
The pilot in this incident spent a lot of time between 425-450 knots indicated. Suppose stuff started burning through and it became necessary to eject immediately? That would not be much fun at that speed. Instead it seems like it would be better to get the jet pointed somewhere safe and slowed down to a safer ejection speed, and get out while you still have control of the thing. But I can understand not wanting to eject from a plane that's still controllable, even if there's an engine fire--I would think most of the time, pilots are thinking about ejection criteria like altitude and amount of control available.
Eagle has a huge Dorsal speed break( behind canopy)...just like the gear 300knts is over speeding it...belive me I repaired one at Luke, Young Lt. Snapped off a corner of a bran new composite speedbreak, Long night removing and repairing it,by the way, the jet was on the schedule 📅 to fly the next day...Cann bird did not have a speed break,Imagine that.
"giving the jet back to the taxpayers"
Best phrase for ejecting I've ever heard.
From what I understand that's a pretty common phrase among military pilots for ejecting.
the funniest thing I've heard this week
@@therealsnow it is
Random F-104 driver left the chat.
it thought it was getting the plane home was giving it back to the tax payer cuz if you eject, tax payers aint getting shit back xD
As he was coming over the threshold at 275 kts, I bet he was thinking "This seemed like a better idea a few miles back".
lmao fuckin accurate
Yeah. He should’ve ejected there if nothing else.
@@patrickmcbrien9303 I'd have gone as a max at 10 miles hitting the pedestrian conversion sequencer and waited with my thumb out for search and rescue.
@@spvillano lol
"Give the Jet back to the Taxpayers." That one made me chuckle
With extreme prejudice seems to be implied 😂
Me too. 🤣
Get-home-itis also amused me.
@@claudiodiaz9752 that’s one of them that is taught in private pilot training. Don’t fall in the trap. Which this pilot did. It’s a human behavior that you have to overcome.
And the GA equivalent.
"When the engine goes out, insurance owns the plane"
If you land a fireball and climb out, you're a rockstar. The consolation prize is being the star of a what not to do training video.
Or having a base or street named after you. After you didn't make it.
@@tommynikon2283
Do they name stuff after you when your firey jet crashes in a neighborhood because you wanted to land it instead of pointing it where it would have been better off?
@@jerseyshoredroneservices225 Yeah, the latrine.
@@jerseyshoredroneservices225 yes they do name a street after you normally
@@eldtaylo
That sounds more like it...
This happened when I was a young Airman at Whiteman. Our engineers had a hell of a time digging it out of the field across the country road off the south end of the runway.
Did the taxpayers at least get some spare parts back?
@@timburke127 I use to work F-15's. I bet they got some that didn't burn. Not many though.
@@59thfsaviation79 yeah he probably thought if an f15 can land with one of its wings cut off then why cant i land it while fire is burning the shit out of the plane
"Your life begins with the checklist because it might end without it." Words I lived by.
My dad joined the Caterpillar Club flying a F-100 Super Sabre over France in the early 60's. The club?; in the USAF, if you have to eject....you turn into a "butterfly". He and his backseater made it. He did the same trick again in the late 60's during Vietnam, over Laos (the secret war) in an A1-E Skyraider. At 91, he's still around and sharp.
2 ejections, pretty crazy! I know someone that got an incentive flight in an f16. He was an air traffic controller and won airman of the year. Squadron commander was flying and they lost the engine and had to eject. Happened at cannon afb back in 1999. Broken ankle but outher than that was good.
Tell your father thank you for his service!
God selected legend! Compared to the people learn this story from CZcams comments
Tommy your dad is a brave pilot and flew through some difficult times. I began my Air Force career during the mid to late 60’s as a crew chief on the Sabre and went to Nam with them. Somewhere around this time it was found that pilots who survived an ejection ended up being 1 to 1 1/2 inches shorter a result of spinal compression. With your dad’s case of two ejections in a fairly close time frame My curiosity overwhelms me to wonder if he experienced any permanent spinal compression?
Lol when you have to eject twice you would think to take the hint
“The encounter was a victory, but I think that we've shown it as an example of what not to do.”~Charlie
You did it. Well done 👏
Under rated comment.
I legit lol d
Thanks Mover! Almost had to a leave a T-38 on my first solo (contact) in the aircraft when I couldn't get one of the mains down but did on the way out to the controlled bailout area. Left it down, landed on the apposite traffic runway (with clearance) directly , shut down after one engine quit (after the other quit taxiing back) and went to the O Club. This shit is tough and you got to stay focused. The Commander bought me a Scotch at the O Club and informed me to go home cause I was the first bird out, solo the next day. Thank yo!
My dad (command pilot AF, flew F4s in nam) always used to tell me that what lead was expecting from his wing man (especially from groups like the thunderbirds) was if lead flew into the ground he could look back and see his wingman following him.
So I’m not surprised misty was only offering suggestions
Great breakdown, always informative. Something I learned as Safety NCO reading all the USAF safety publications that came across my desk in the '80s was a simple but profound fact: Checklists for aviation are written in blood. We lost pilots in the early Eagles because we didn't know everything about them yet. The checklists come from those experiences. Especially in the '90s, you aren't the first guy with an engine fire in an Eagle. This guy got the best case scenario for not following that checklist, IMHO.
ADDED after some reflection: The Aces 2 seat was new when the Eagle was deployed, and a lot of guys were a bit frightened of it. I remember one guy (who ejected) saying that when it was obvious he HAD to punch out, he thought of his wife and kids, he thought about not having use of his legs, he thought about his parents. Deep breath, BOOM. On top of the difficulty of military aviation, on top of having a really bad day, they have to deal with that. It effects the thought process to some degree, no doubt.
I love these breakdowns.
I think you hit the nail on the head. The 90's was a different time with regards to CRM. Thanks for the breakdown. Very interesting
Gareth I’m not slamming by no means I just wanted to drop a few cents at this point. I know as a result of several aircraft accidents where the FAA’s final investigative report concluded that poor if any CRM was a major factor in those accidents. This subsequently brought about all the positive changes in CRM in the past 20 to 30 yrs. My point CRM had been employed and used effectively long before it was officially titled and provided its acronym. Even though it may have been briefly touched upon during flight training it was more instinctive reaction with aircrews caught up in severe inflight emergency situations.
I was on the flight line that day and standing with a crew ready to leave on a B2 sortie. They had to shutdown waiting on the IFE and one of the pilots said the same thing as we were watching out of the back of the dock... "Why didn't he eject a long time ago?". And that FOD walk made for a long day, but glad he survived.
I found this video a long time ago. Drove past that field every day heading to work while I was at Whiteman. Couldn't imagine seeing an F-15 hurdling over the road and smashing thru a corn field.
This reminds me of the only time I ever got to "fly a military jet." I was a civilian working at AFFTC, Edwards. Our HITL lab had a full cockpit F-16 simulator. As part of an orientation briefing the lab boys let me try it. When it came time to land I wasn't wasn't watching my airspeed, trying to line up my approach. I touched down at 350 KTAS, skidded off the runway, crashed the airplane, and I died. 😠
I'm glad they were able to revive you so you could share this story with us 🤣👍
@@JC-11111 Well thank you. I'm not sure that reviving me was the best thing for the Air Force because had it been a real world exercise I would have cost the government about $30 M that day.
I'd love to tell you about my NDE but there's nothing to tell. One night in Bismarck is pretty much the same as any other ... ink black darkness as far as the eye can see. 😉
Ah the heavy probability of that result, landing at 350 knots would be high. With the other story it’s hard to believe there’s not the slightest to talk about cause that would be a travesty of justice. Your innocent until proven guilty leaving nothing to talk about.
The F-15 has 3 hydro systems, PC1, PC2, & UTILITY. The speedbrake is operated from utility which is powered by both motors. Although you will have diminished hydro pressure with only #1 running. The speedbrake would work but all the flight controls might be sluggish at reduced pressure so he might not have used it.
Same as the F-4. Flyable on one but may have to take the approach cable.
The F-15 does have three hydraulic systems, each with its own (actually utility has a left and right ) pump but each system is also broken down in to two subsystems or circuits A and B. If a leak occurs, the draining reservoir will shut down circuit A. If the leak continues after circuit A is shut down, circuit A is automatically turned on and circuit B is shut down. This feature is known as reservoir level sensing. On top of that, all of the critical flight control components i.e., L/R aileron and L/R stabilator actuators have switching valves that allow another hydraulic system (PC 1, PC 2 or Utility) to take over which means the F-15's hydraulic system is more that triple redundant. Total hydraulic failure is possible but not likely...the fireball as fuel lines ignited would be the most looming threat. I show this video to all my avionics students, namely to illustrate the importance of communication systems and to let them hear Bitching Betty and RWR tones but also to see HUD presentation. As for single engine operation, there is no appreciable reduction of pressure in the Utility system that would affect aircraft manoeuvrability or braking. Great review of this IFE, keep up the good work.
Spam
@@stevecanham1591 Guess McDonald Douglas learned from all the F-4 hydraulic failures we had. I almost felt like a Navy pilot taking the approach cable at high speed.
@@stevecanham1591 I had read in the tech data that hydro pressure is reduced to 1800psi for safety of ground crew on engine #1 ops alone. While #2 runs all at 3k psi. The T.O. doesn't mention that #1 pressures increase with weight off wheels so I assume it holds at 1800. Idk if this affects flight controls during flight. I would assume not but I'm not a pilot and never got a chance to ask before I got out.
he did exactly what he said he was going to do. land it and get out quick 🙊
You hit the nail on the head when you talked about Crew Resource Management 'back in the day'. Being afraid to speak up was something the Air Force and Navy & Marines, Coast Guard and even the airlines worked very hard to train out of their air crews. Safety in the air had to become the topic air crews were afraid to NOT speak up about. Unfortunately, poor CRM still comes up now and then but when you are the captain or flight lead or whatever you want to call it, you must leave your pride in the locker (or civilian equivalent). Tell your pilots/crew to never worry about speaking up, especially if I seem to be in a bad mood or something, I will get over it and thank you.
Whew. Been there...done that, Mover. Mine was a battery fire in the nose, but just as hazardous with a large can of 20 mm in the bay. Lots of hints from #2 (Get out!), but I kept thinking, "It's still flying, stay with it". Not great presence of mind, but ejection was not my thing. Luckily, mine went out. I got lots of drinks at the club that night, but I had a strong feeling that I had done something idiotic. I still do...
When considering these things, is the unwillingness to eject based on any one thing? Or could you weight/give a percentage of importance to 1. Flight career 2. Ejection survival/injury due to ejection 3. Saving the jet 4. Concern about the ground/crash site
Any insight appreciated. Thanks for your service to our country
My main question is how much concern of the dangers of ejection play into the thought process.
@@basedchad2196 This was in combat in Vietnam, Ghost, so I was not really concerned about my career or loosing the jet. During that time, we had a number of ejections, and almost all of them resulted in injuries...or in the worst case...capture. I recall thinking at the time, "If I pull those handles, I may never see my family again." It gives you pause to consider it. I guess the fire looked worse from the outside (wingman's position), but all I could see was a bit of smoke along the fuselage. I knew I had gotten hit and the round could have been explosive. The 20mm ammo drum was in that bay and the thought of those 1000 rounds cooking off was the driving thought toward ejection. Luckily, the fire went out.
@@Ed-hz2um ooooh, my bad. I had thought this was in Italy during training.
Vietnam is an entirely different animal, from almost anything! Thanks for sharing the story
@@basedchad2196 No worries, Ghost. It's a sure sign of the changing times when a pilot worries more about the career impact of an ejection more than his/her skin.
17:15 you can hear him breathing heavy and saying " Come on baby, come on baby"
There’s nothing at that time marker
@@basedchad2196 i just checked, its still there, go see the original version and FF to that point in the video, you will hear him say it, or what it sounds like he said.
Dear Mr. Mover,
Thank you for your breakdown videos and analysis, it means a lot for us to learn and pay attention to critical situations, and appreciate well-established emergency rules written by the experts on the field.
Yours sincerely,
John
I remember seeing this a few years ago when I was in high school, and being really impressed that two thought of those fire dynamics while doing 300+kts to keep up with his lead. Was a good data point on what kind of minds good pilots need to have.
Amazing post. Pilots and perfectionists are close but not the same thing. You have a tenth of a second to decide which you are.
There was an F-15E at mid America that overran the runway and the crew ejected. This was like last week too. At first glance I thought that's what this vud was about.
It was an F-15QA
Mover doesn't speculate on things with active investigations.
@@VanquishedAgain right, that's why I was initially confused.
It was Omega 11
It did not overrun the renway, it landed and went off the runway. What happened and why has not been told yet. As Vanquished said, do not speculate about what happened, just wait till the report comes out. The only thing known is It was a F-15QA that landed and went off the runway and the pilots ejected. From the pics you can see it was not an overrun and was to the side of the runway.
If you haven't seen it yet, the Royal Danish Air Force published a video a few years back where they showed a controlled ejection after some issues with the landing gear of a Viper. You probably don't want to film a reaction of it since the video itself is like an hr long, but just know that it's there. Our Danish brothers are very good at what they do.
They also did an interview (unfortunately in Danish) with the pilot that was about as long. It's on CZcams somewhere, I watched it years back. That incident was briefed in a joint Maintenance/Ops briefing by Lockheed when I was at Osan, the CZcams video was even more detailed than that Lockheed Brief.
Mover: if you haven't already, check out Ward Carroll's YT channel. He seems like he could be a great guy to talk to if you got him to do an interview. Great vid btw
as a 500 hour private pilot your presentation of information is wonderful... my grandson is Navy ATC formerly Stennis now in Texas...Keep on with your great videos...
Kile the overspeed on the F15C gear is 270 to 300 kts max. I agree with you the checklist says jump you jump.being a hero is not always being a hero.
I’ll add some facts, since there was a lot of assumptions in this presentation. I have 2000 hours in the F-15A/C. I also flew with both pilots in this video. Sadly, we lost the lead pilot last summer in a tragic car accident.
First, there are no bold-face procedures in the F-15. Not a big deal, but since Mover mentioned them, I thought I’d clarify that. Second, this was not a “classic” engine fire. It was a contained oil fire in the hot-section of the engine. There was a bearing failure in the right engine which allowed all the engine oil to leak into the combustion section of the engine. Once the oil was completely consumed, the fire would have simply extinguished. So, the first indication of a problem were oil pressure/quantity warnings and some other anomalies that concerned the lead pilot enough to get his wingman to check his a/c out. There was never a fire light and the fire warning system tested good once the engine was shut-down. Unfortunately, this was a known possibility in the F-15 but wasn’t addressed very well in the a/c “dash-one” manual at the time of this event or widely known about throughout the community.
So, since there was no engine fire warning and the very reliable fire warning system was still operational, this was not necessarily a “if fire persists, eject” situation. Could he have ejected once the engine was shut-down and the fire was still visible? Sure, but when we were briefed on this accident that was not the approved solution. Without an actual fire warning from the dual loop, redundant fire detection system, this was not to be treated as an engine fire. If this pilot had been alone, it’s very likely he would have shut the engine down in accordance with the checklist once the oil quantity reached a point to trigger the appropriate warning. He never would have known he even had an oil fire in the part of the engine where the fire is supposed to be. He then would have proceeded at an appropriate pace to Whiteman and this would have been a normal single engine landing that didn’t make it on to youtube.
However, he had a wingman who provided some additional details that painted a more dire situation than necessary. That’s where the chain of mistakes began and as Mover said, there were a lot of them. Since he didn’t know about the bearing failure/oil fire scenario, one could make the argument that he should have followed the checklist and ejected. However, the lack of a fire warning left enough doubt in his mind that he wasn’t ready to go down that route. He wasn’t trying to be a hero. The fact that the engine fire was INSIDE the engine where it belongs should have been communicated. The lack of fire warning and good test on the fire system should have been talked about. The “airflow and fire stagnation discussion” only confused the situation and made it appear even more serious than it was. Lack of knowledge on cable status at the AFB they planned to use multiple times that day was another biggie. And finally, of course the approach and landing speak for itself.
Sorry to hear of the loss that’s sad. However I want to thank you for saving me the effort and doing it much better in covering these important issues, great job.
John, you can't speak for the pilot. Nor the wingman, unless that's you.
You're talking about facts determined after the incident. The pilot endangered himself, the public and ground crew against the chance of landing a burning jet against established guidelines. I'm sure, he would be the first to admit any errors in judgement after cooldown and time to think it through. The presenter of the video was kind enough in his soft approach to mistakes made.
Just when I was asking myself what to watch at lunchtime. Thanks Mover!
Should he have considered that he was going to foul the runway with his debris. Great break down. I love your channel.
No the other aircraft would be diverted to the pre-designated diversion airfield.
I think he had bigger problems to worry about 😂 someone will get the rwy cleaned up pretty quickly if needed. Although, I suspect they shut it down anyways for quite some time.
@@Definitelynotanalienoranything Yes that's what he is saying. The pilot caused a disturbance for everyone else because he ignored the checklist.
I think one would have to believe he thought of that and the many other what-ifs and felt his chances were higher that he would get it stopped and do an emergency ground egress but....AYK things don’t always go as planned. However circumventing or failure to comply with every step itemized in the emergency checklist procedures of the -1 is not necessarily something to be disciplined for and different for each case. Let’s say it all went down as he planned and the fire was quickly put out. He’s a hero who bravely saved the USAF and taxpayers a ton of cash. I believe the Air Force places great trust and responsibility in its pilots to collect the facts and make a good logical decision and in this case the pilot (with great billiards and fortitude)did just that but not with the same results. I personally feel the heavy views that he didn’t do the right thing is inappropriate and should be corrected. This goes without knowing what action if any was officially taken.
thks !!great vid , like always !! No report can be found ,only this info : 9 November 1995, F-15A (SN 76-0061/SL) was written off 1 May 1996, plane was with 131st Fighter Wing / 110th Fighter Squadron
I like the new layout. Good breakdown, as always.
Great breakdown.
I blew my drink out of my nose when you recapped the cardinal rule of wingman comms: “...Joker, Bingo, Lead, you’re on fire...”. Yep, not often that last one comes into play!
Forgot about "save the fat one for me" though 😂
"... Lead, you're on fire!"
"That's okay. I don't mind..."
FYI, The F-15 has a UTIL HYD pump on both AMADs. The speed brake runs off UTIL, it will work no matter which engine is out. The UTIL also augments A/B HYD.
Thanks I was wondering about that.
Outstanding breakdown. There’s the natural human factor of it being exceedingly difficult to take a step back from what you get in your mind for the correct course of action. Both the checklist and wingman could have helped alleviate that.
did you have early access to this video?
Hey how did you comment two days ago?
@@f18murderhornet early access.
@@f18murderhornet I know Mover 😎
@@Deuce_Dufresne Oh! Nice. Have a good day!
19:50 Here we see the jet's life flash before its eyes
Although the checklist says to eject if a fire persists, pilots are expected to utilize judgement when handling emergency situations. In this case, the fire was caused by oil leaking from a bearing into the engine core. The low temperature oil fire was completely contained within the engine and was not hot enough to illuminate the engine fire sensors, which are located in the engine bay outside of the engine, and the only likely indication of a fire was the wingman's observations. Once he shut down the #2 engine, he would have lost 2 of the 7 hydraulic circuits F-15s utilize for normal operations, but all functions would have been operational via backup circuits. Because of all of the built in redundancies, F-15s do not have boldface/critical action procedures that have to be memorized and acted on immediately when confronted with an emergency situation. A good example is one of the most severe emergencies a pilot can have, which is an engine fire on takeoff above abort speed; the F-15 checklist for this EP is to climb to a safe altitude and investigate. I don't fault the pilot's decision to try for an emergency landing, but he let his wingman's prophecy about the fire propagating forward after landing affect his decision making during the approach and landing.
Plus he landed way too fast. That was never going to work.
Thanks Mover. But your words, "But for the grace of God go I"... I miss that understanding in people today. To quick to judge are we all. Great video in any case.
I'm sure he was avoiding the checklist on punching out because not only do you lose the aircraft, the seat may malfunction, parachute may malfunction, you could be injured on punch out and never fly again. I can see why he wanted to bring the jet back. With the fire in the afterburner section (that section can take a lot of heat), he may have thought he'd have control long enough to get it down.
The scary thing would be to have it burn through on final, you punch out and the jet ends up on someone's house. Tough decision either way.
You also don’t know where the wind current takes you or where your PLF is going to be. It could be many unfavorable places I.e., middle of a forest fire, an inactive volcano, hung up on the side of the 104th level of a skyscraper, inside the heavily fenced in Hazardous Chemicals burial site, it goes on....
Knowing how to identify that you've done everything you can do and it is time to get out is one of those paid in blood lessons. In any dangerous profession, not just flying. You just know "if fire persists, eject" wasn't part of the checklist until some poor guy rode a fireball down into the field and got himself killed. Sometimes the jet just doesn't want to come home.
Good video, Mover. I can understand not wanting to give up the plane but, yeah, time to leave is time to leave. Find a nice open field to let the jet come to its sudden stop then ride that ACES II.
I am not a real pilot in any capacity, but if I'm trying to land an F18 in DCS or MFS 2020, and I'm still pulling 200+ knots right before touchdown, I think "it's time to go around".
It's fascinating that the vibrations from landing impacted the write head of the tape in such a way as to show visually in the tape
This videos are pure gold…
Thanks for explaining it all in detail.
Very good breakdown. Always follow the checklist!
used to work on the arresting gear (cables) in the air force. they do engage those for certification, usually an f16 would run into it without taking off. rarely we would have navy jerks that would ram into it so hard we would have to do extra checklist and maintenance work. the cables are usually taken off the runway because they get clobbered by heavys running them over again and again, requiring us to go out and replace the suspension pieces on the cable pendant. unfortunately, they were dragged off when this eagle had an ife. if we were nearby, it'd take 15-20 min to pin them back in
Appreciate your service, but this pilot didn’t have 15-20 min for you or any other Airman to suddenly realize how important arresting cables are in an emergency at any Us airbase in the world.
The Arresting cables SHOULD have been present, regardless of the inconvenience to maintenance crew. Nobody gives a damn how much of an inconvenience or pain it was or is for you and your crew to replace them if necessary. That’s part of your job! As taxpayers, we paid you a good salary and benefits to do YOUR job. So do your job! If not, people can and do die in military situations. Hell son, you weren’t exactly flipping burgers at McD’s and forgot to put a slice of cheese on someone’s burger....
I hope you can now see why arresting cables were req’d for certification to begin with.
@@livingadreamlife1428 Generally, bases that host fighter wings have an arresting gear and it is usually controllable from the tower. If it is not always up, it can be raised quickly. But it is not a safe assumption that all military airports have the cables. Not sure what was at Whiteman back in the late 90s. That would have been around the time when the B-2s were first being deployed. As I recall, they also had an A-10 reserve unit, which would not have required a cable (the A-10 has no hook). The F-15 guys involved in this were probably Missouri ANG. They had an F-15 squadron at Lambert St. Louis at the time. They would have had cables there as McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing) builds fighters there and has fighter ops all the time.
@@livingadreamlife1428 i don't think you realize this, but the primary mission of the shop is not arresting gear. it belongs to the power pro shop in the engineering flight. the flight line fire flight used to maintain them, but they found out those guys don't have much mechanical aptitude, so it was dumped on civil engineering. but it's easy to armchair quarterback this, isn't it mr. internet man. airfield ops are the ones ordering them off and on.
@@loginavoidence12 but won't somebody think of the _TAXPAYERS!?!?!?!?!?!?!?_ It's weird how civilians seem to think 1) Airman/Soldiers/Sailors/Marines make "a good salary" lol and 2) we didn't have to pay taxes just like every other damn "taxpayer." Gotta love that know-it-all "I'm basically your boss" attitude, especially the comparison to flipping burgers... when I was in the Army we didn't make much more than fast food employees!
@@daedalus_20v guy sounds like he must be a pilot haha
"That is faster than the space shuttle would land". That really put this in perspective.
...because he never flew F104!
Max tire speed for Shuttle was 230 knots with usual touchdown speeds being 185-196 knots. Nose gear tires(2) used for 2 landings, MLG tires(4) used once.
Great breakdown, Thank you.
Wonderful breakdown
I used to work on the avionics and flight control systems on the f-111f model. That same engine was also used on the early F-16 F-15. It would have been on a later iteration of the 14 but I don't think they ever got that far. Although I did work on a few f-14s that came into my Air Base. I was also rated on the B1 even though it was not operational when I left the Air Force. That engine does have a tendency for a third stage compressor failure. A number of f-16s were lost due to that because an F-16 has the flight characteristics of a brick when it loses power. If you're not going fairly fast.
I had an occasion to watch a pilot completely screw the pooch one day and crash one of our aircraft on the runway actually just adjacent to the runway. They did punch out just before the plane hit the ground the third time. But when the fire truck got to the engine the right engine which is not the one that he had the fire warning on was still running even though he had punched the fire agent discharge and the fuel shut off because it takes several minutes before the engine shuts down because there's still enough fuel left in the system to run it for a number of minutes after you hit the fire agent discharged and the fuel shut off. I don't know how much better they got after that but they still use the same basic size engine but they did move to a general electric version
You r spot on with the CRM piece. When you hear another pilot or crew member point out the obvious it refocuses your decision making process. I only flew 2 pilot aircraft and have been on both the receiving and giving end of that exchange.
Sometimes we all try and get creative and the good idea fairy visits us ar terrible times, which is what seems like happened here.
But from what I was told in flight school (way back in 2008), the 90s and 80s was before CRM really was widly accepted and checklists were not for studs, they were for staff aviators and trainees.
I love your videos; great breakdown...however, as an F-15 engine mechanic and engine run certified, the fire extinguisher is only useful if the fire is in the engine bay, not the engine itself. Additionally, the checklist you read off said "If warning light remains on..." there was no bitching Betty telling him that he had a right engine fire warning, and no light on that I heard. Pushing the Fire Warning button does turn off all of your fuel to that engine but hitting the fire extinguisher would be as helpful as trying to piss into a bucket into the wind. Sounds like this was an oil fire because the fire never went out...then you're pretty much screwed, a windmilling engine will continue to feed oil to all the bearings...If the fire is contained within the engine, which I'm sure that's what the pilot believed, I can see why he would want to save the aircraft. I'm not sure if there is a separate checklist for engine fire contained in the engine while you're flying or not. I know when you're running an engine on the ground there is a separate checklist for external vs internal engine fire. Everything else you said was pretty spot on, he was definitely coming in too fast, if he had his speed under control and made a quick landing (without blowing the tires), blow the canopy and jump out he probably would have been ok...again, great video and breakdown...Thank you!
Thanks for the great and informative breakdown Mover.
Man, you can hear the pilot panting shortly before touch down ...
One other thing I just noticed looking into this: Whiteman AFB was at the time (and still is today) the home base of the entire B-2 fleet. And there's only one runway there. Follow the checklist and eject over some corn field? OK, that's a bad day. Ignore the checklist and crash on the runway, shutting it down until it can be cleared/repaired? You just shut down the Stealth Bomber program for some period of time.
Obviously this is all 20/20 hindsight, but it's no wonder they show this as an example of what not to do.
BTW, there are no boldface in the F-15.
Very good analysis!
In January of 1981 an A-7 belonging to an unnamed squadron had a total hydraulics failure while conducting operations off an unnamed Carrier on "Gonzo Station" and there was no bingo field the aircraft could make it to. The pilot wanted to attempt to recover onboard but the Ship's command directed him to point the the aircraft in a safe direction and eject. He flew around for quite awhile until he was almost out of fuel and then ejected.
Was this in the Indian Ocean?
@@jcheck6 Yes, technically the operating area was in the Gulf of Oman.
@@sewing1243 Had a roommate at an airline by the nick name of "Hitman" that punched out of an A-7 over there...wonder if that was him.
@@jcheck6 Pilot nicknames (or handles) were not very common back then and I only know of a few aviators from that period of time that had them. Neither the pilot I mentioned originally nor the pilot in the story below had a nickname that I was aware of at the time.
The following month (February) the same squadron lost another A-7 due to a midair collision with an F-4 (the F-4 crew was killed in the accident 😕 ).
The A-7 was in the pattern waiting for the last launch to complete and recovery ops to begin when the aircraft was struck from behind and below by the F-4 doing an unauthorized high performance climb off the cats. The pilot of the A-7 never even saw the aircraft that hit him. All he knew was one moment he was circling the ship and the next moment he felt a thump and his aircraft started rolling. He tried to correct for the roll and nothing happened, so he looked to the side the aircraft was rolling to and saw he was missing a large piece of that wing. He didn't hesitate to eject.
Usually there's a pilot on the ground radio who can help in emergencies; the SOF, Supervisor of Flying... didn't hear one here. A good SOF would read the same checklist, and when the fire is still raging, ask TWO flatly "Has he ejected yet?"
Even if there was an SOF chances that he could see inside the can that was on fire are slim to none.
Hey Mover! I think you would enjoy an interview with Ward Carroll. Some great stories from the f14 Rio side. I tried to see if you had him on your channel yet but did not see it if so. Hope to see you chat with him someday.
I second this.
@@Atlessa hopefully Mover sees this at some point lol
@@mikez4132 Maybe we should go over to Ward's latest video and suggest it to him as well?
Hey, you should do a breakdown of the B-52 crash at Fairchild. There are some great videos showing the reckless flying incidents leading up to and video of the mishap. Its a great example of knowing when to put the foot down on poor airmanship and systematic leadership issues.
Ge been looking forward to Mover reviewing this. I have so many questions. Thankyou mover !!!!!!
I remember this day well. I worked the crash recovery. Also, FOD walked the runway post crash late into the night.
Maybe pilot was hesitant to eject based on surface winds? That’s a spicy landing under canopy with gusts up to 31. Could this have played into his decision to land and get out?
Base C/O - "If you attempt to land that aircraft with an active fire, you will never fly again."
Points about the checklist is noteworthy. From a tech view (Former F-18 engine, fuel and secondary power (Assuming the 15 and 18 are similar - same manufacture). I wonder if pilot pushed FIRE warning light. When you push the light it shuts off main fuel to engine. (valve on F18 is in main landing gear (separated by bulkhead and AMAD). When fire warning TEST - its testing the A & B circuits. If Fire light doesn't light then circuit (similar to solder wire throughout engine bay) is compromised. If the throttle was at Idle instead of OFF and fire light not pushed, fuel would continue to feed the fire.
At 20:04, HUD and HUD cam still working and the pilotless Eagle also achieved a complete stop upright (apparently without fireballing). Although left engine and other parts damaged too from the crash landing, it would appear the pilot managed to indeed "save" the Eagle. Comments indicate bearing oil fire that would not have burned through (perhaps before emergency vehicles extinguished all fires). What was ultimate fate of this Eagle?
The pilot's behavior was interesting. The rationale to save the Eagle is obvious. In the absence of an absolute necessity to eject, reluctance and hesitancy (and fear) probably played a part too. The decision to approach and land at high speed certainly questionable (using incorrect procedures to fix bad situations usually causes greater failure).
I was the investigating officer for this mishap. Want to know more?
Sure!
@@CWLemoine the #5 bearing failure was a known problem in those engines. The fix was held in abeyance for funding. The fire was contained in the engine compartment and continued because the engine windmilling kept pumping oil into the fire. The engine oil had cocked due to differential metal expansion in the #5 bearing scavenge fitting. The cocked oil plugged the drain and filled the bearing. That bearing wasn’t designed to hold oil and therefore the oil leaked out into the hot exhaust and ignited. I never understood his decision to land vs eject. His reasoning was that the jet might hurt someone on the ground or slam into a B-2. That being said if he’d just landed on speed he would have saved the jet. I saw the wingman years later at a Red Flag. He told me that the pilot had retired from all flying afterwards. In the final report both were dinged for CRM. Some of the generals insisted it was all pilot error because he didn’t land on speed. I believe they were just covering their ass because the fix had been unfounded. The AF logistics commander was at the final briefing and said as much. That commander had been my wing commander in F-111s and was a complete ass. Your review of the hud tape was spot on. The details of the engine piece just can’t be seen. One change in the F-15 cross country guide was made to have the jopes pulled and tested every flight. They had stopped at Whiteman between BFM sorties. If the JOPES had been pulled they or the transient mx would have noticed that the oil was dark and should have also noticed the burnt smell. Bottom line there were many reasons for the mishap. The least of which was the CRM between the two pilots.
By the way the original HUD film showed a pickup screeching to a halt on the perimeter road as the jet flew by before settling in the corn field after leaving the runway.
I meant coked not cocked … lol
We'll probably never know what the pilot's motivations were for flying it back, but it would be interesting to see if anything from that plane was salvaged, or if they just scrapped the whole thing.
Motivation? A possible one is that the pilot was aware of an incident 8 years prior where an ANG A7 crashed into a hotel after the pilot ejected. 10 people killed and many more injured. Dash 1 may say to eject but Dash 1 don't care about that elementary school or farm house ahead. I'm glad he didn't just eject and hope that his 50,000 pounds of burning fuel and metal does not hurt anyone!
Fantastic breakdown Mover. Really enjoyed this!
I would try same size of your video, but side by side layout is best so no info is lost from the source video :)
I guess there is that 'I am junior in rank to the lead' thing, and the more experienced lead probably knew the checklist as well as anyone but chose to do what he did. I think the wingman did the right thing by providing ongoing status updates, as ultimately he knew that the lead was going to do it his way. I wonder if the lead's superior's had something to say to him that the #2 couldn't or wouldn't say? Thanks Mover - I am happy that it ended ok for the pilot.
Excellent case study. I look forward to more!
Re: "8mm tape converted to digital" - it would be great if there was a way to go back and re-scan some of this footage from the original tape. Could probably get a lot more of the detail that was in the original analog tape, by scanning to the latest 4k/8k digital standard. I wonder if the tapes are sitting in a box in some archives somewhere.
Stinger: "Son your ego is writing cheques your body can't cash"
I know this is a fighter pilot event, but I’m pretty sure there are some darn good life lessons here. “If fire persists….…” 😎
At first sign of visible fire (EJECT)
I remember reading that somewhere....
I am sure a taxpayer would appreciate the jet not going into their house. Thank you for the work on the break down.
No houses out in the desert
But it didn’t! Pay attention and watch it again.
Very educational. I enjoy learning. Thank you for sharing.
Hey Mover. Thank you for your service. New subscriber here. My 2 thoughts are 1. The Pilot was ignoring the checklist and trying to save the plane. And 2. Your breakdown and professional opinion trumps everything he did beyond the point he knew the fire was not going out because the checklist is there for a reason.. I am not a pilot so both of those are my thoughts only. I have the utmost respect for pilots and especially military pilots. They are extremely professional with great integrity. I am a retired underground coal miner. That is the only profession I would critique. Thanks again for your service and for doing these videos.
Interesting.
From the "russian point of view". Can the tower give the order to eject?
If this happened in Russia / USSR, then in the event of a fire, "Betty" would automatically broadcast "plane number ... fire of the right engine", then the flight director (tower) would ask the pilot what is happening with him, if necessary, he would remind checklist, and if he didn’t help, he would have ordered to eject. That is, the pilot must follow the orders of the flight director in this case. Just in case of such "heroism" - if the follower cannot tell the boss "jump", then the flight director will do it.
Do all Russian aircraft have an automated in-flight emergency broadcast?
I was wondering if the tower could order the ejection also.
That sounds like a very interesting system.
Thanks for the info!
It's really interesting to see the differences in philosophy, especially when it comes to safety procedures.
This is very interesting to know! Thank you for sharing this perspective!
"I'm going to get out of the jet....real quick." Oh I bet you will
late the video but almost feels like the pilot was too scared to eject and because of it tunneled on just landing the plane and there wasn't a single thing the wingman could say that would change his mind especially after the last discussion he had about the fire stagnating after he landed.
Punching out sooner could have made persons on the ground more likely to be injured. He may have made a good decision based on where the F-15 would have impacted with an earlier ejection? Love your videos "MOVER"
This almost seems like a case of "Don't worry bro, I know my aircraft she'll make it" lol
F-15 Crew Chief(A/B/C/D and E models) and Aero Repair (and Hydraulics) shop on same.
PC1 and PC2 for primary flight controls, and Utility controls everything else. Combined with the PRCA, (mechanical/electrical flight controls) and "mechanical circuit breakers" (switching valves) to provide system pressure augmentation (crossover system supply) in event of loss of pressure in primary/utility systems, and bottles for blowdown pressurization of utility system, gear, brakes etc.
Gear is limited to approx 250kts, (cannot recall exact numbers for extending/retracting or in down and locked, as those numbers varied between models, but in an emergency (fire) and ignoring checklist, likely AC not concerned with overspeeding...)
The wingman was concerned with engine stagnation and rapid spread of fire from loss of windmill and airflow, as it seemed if the fire was continuing for more than several seconds after shutdown, then likely fuel flow was continuing and a very big concern as you stated from loss of airflow.
A ground fire would likely have been very rapid.
The "3E" with judicious exclamation marks is order of the day...
Very good breakdown.
Meanwhile, I'm gonna toss a handful of nickels in the grass.
YBYSAIM!!!
Oh, and two hydraulic pumps on each engine. Each has a PC (primary control) and utility pump.
PC1 and Utility on #1 and PC2 and Utility on #2
Eagle had lots of redundancy, like a 747.
Back in 1995 things are different with crew coordination. I remember because I used to read accident reports when I was on duty.
I also had a good friend who I help become a pilot and he would explain some of the things that happened back then, like with a heavy landing at the wrong airport.
If you were Second or First Lieutenant flying with a Colonel at the time and you're coming into the wrong airport you usually would not speak up because you assume the colonel know what he was doing.
I think you said something about this before and now the Lieutenant knows today he's allowed to speak up if you see something wrong that the Colonel is doing and correct him without fear retribution.
The numbers on final gave me goosebumps.
Reminds me of United Airlines Flight 173. They had a problem with the landing gear. The captain became fixated on landing but failed to notice his fuel running out nor understand the gravity of his crew's warnings. His first officer only gave out indirect hints. They ran out of fuel and crashed.
This was one of the major events that led to a change in culture and power dynamics in the cockpit. Captain and copilot became closer in terms of power level. Captains had less of an authoritative role and a more collaborative mindset was fostered among captains, copilots, and flight engineers.
I had this same senerio happen with my great planes .40 size P-51D, engine fire, leaking fuel, wing damaged, instead of just augering it in & got it back to base, it was quite an ordeal.
My only though as a former Army Helo driver is that I was along for the ride, no matter what; and the amount of seat cushion I digested was directly proportional to the nature of the EP. FIRE and MAIN XMSN CHIP light were the two worst! That said, I'm reminded of an F-106 where the pilot ejected due to loss of control at the mandatory minimum ejection altitude and the plane regained control and proceeded to fly until it ran out of fuel and landed gear-up in a farmers field, intact with minimal damage. That plane is in the USAF Museaum in Dayton, OH! The good thing is the pilot controlled where the aircraft ended up, off the end of the runway at Whitman AFB, zero civilian exposure, and CFR was at the crash site in seconds! Checklists ARE written in blood, but pilots are thinking individuals in dynamic situations, and in this case, he always had an exit strategy
The pilot in this incident spent a lot of time between 425-450 knots indicated. Suppose stuff started burning through and it became necessary to eject immediately? That would not be much fun at that speed. Instead it seems like it would be better to get the jet pointed somewhere safe and slowed down to a safer ejection speed, and get out while you still have control of the thing. But I can understand not wanting to eject from a plane that's still controllable, even if there's an engine fire--I would think most of the time, pilots are thinking about ejection criteria like altitude and amount of control available.
WOW! I'm a USAF CFR vet. Brings back a lot...
Eagle has a huge Dorsal speed break( behind canopy)...just like the gear 300knts is over speeding it...belive me I repaired one at Luke, Young Lt. Snapped off a corner of a bran new composite speedbreak, Long night removing and repairing it,by the way, the jet was on the schedule 📅 to fly the next day...Cann bird did not have a speed break,Imagine that.
It wasn't ignoring the checklist, he was getting the aircraft closer to maintenance. ;)
This is a case of: “I’m the boss.. don’t challenge my decisions or point out that I’m making bad ones because I control your future”