(1) "How do you feel?" vs "What do you feel?" (2) A grammatical distinction between belief and knowledge. We ask (i) 'Why do you believe?' (ii) 'How do you know?' but not (or rarely) (i') 'How do you believe?' (ii') 'Why do you know?'
The last question is really good. How has something so banal like smoking in the house become immoral? Of course, a mother would answer "Because I say so", and that's a fine illustration of a confident argument.
Professor , Your lecture take us to ''a place where you let us connect to the great minds in a true sense''. This, I said, can not be a literary hyperbole, but a logical error.
"Attributing meaning depends on a certain shared form of life"? Or a concensus. A.I. is not alive, yet certain cues, p then q, work with it. Reversals: p because q or q because p. Aren't those tautologies, or indistinguishable from tautologies? It is what it is? Invertable causal statements or recursion? Like a feedback loop, a fractal? Agreement or alignment? Meaning or cue? Function or form? Context or text?
It is a justified belief. The thought experiment shows, or seems to show that true beliefs which are unjustified don't count as knowledge. In the end we might want to say that there are classes of knowledge which don't require justification, but the thought experiments draw out enough linguistic intuitions for us to say that we have some reason/justification to accept the JTB model of knowledge.
@@alwaysgreatusa223 I don't really know how to answer that. The thought experiment lays out a scenario and asked whether we were inclined to attribute knowledge to someone or not. It pumps your intuition about the use of the word "knowledge" - hence my use of the phrase "linguistic intuitions." The above commenter asks if we are justified in believing in the definition of "knowledge," but this is an odd question given that there is no fact of the matter about the meaning of the term, independent of language speakers. Skepticism about meaning (the subject of the lecture) is an entirely different Beast than skepticism about facts
@@ianhruday9584 It almost sounds like you are saying knowledge exists only as a matter of mere convention. Granted that a word only has meaning when someone gives it a meaning in the first place, and granted that the general meaning is the one agreed upon by those who use it, but surely you do not want to say there is not really any such thing as knowledge to which the word corresponds. Or do you ?
@@alwaysgreatusa223 I take it that the original comment was asking if we have justification to believe that the term "knowledge" means what we say it means. I also take it that the thought experiments give this justification. In the early part of the lecture he is outlining skeptical problems in epistemology, because they parallel skeptical problems in the philosophy of language. At that point in the lecture, he had not yet moved onto skeptical problems related to meaning - which are far more destructive. There is a relationship between the two types of skepticism, but they are very different. The skeptic about knowledge can at least Express their skepticism, but the skeptic about meaning is literally unable to State their position with certainty.
@Michael People have meanings they wish to express, and they use words, gestures, tones, bodily movements, and so forth to express their meanings. Use reveals meaning hardly seems to be a revelation. Who would ever be so naive as to believe a word could ever have a meaning of its own before someone actually used it, and before somebody actually understood what the user was attempting to express by means of that word ?
This is exactly what most people believed & still do. For example, whenever someone says, "That's not love" they are saying there is an essence to live which defines all forms of love & only love, thus, we can exclude those actions which we find do not accurately encapsulate "love" & partake in the essence of "love." Instead, Wittgenstein says there is not a core essence of the word "love" & only a form of life which the word love is used in. As such, if a community of people use the word love to describe sacrificing children to their God of crops, then it is every bit "love" as me loving my child; it's dependant on the communal understanding of love & nothing else. Another example is when someone buys "ethical beef" The rancher & his consumer believes how he raises & slaughters the cows is ethical thus it is as there's no essence, no nature to what is ethical, only the form of life, the communal use of the word which makes it correct. It that community, ethical is that practice so a vegan saying there is not a form of ethical beef is wrong as the have a theoretical form of ethics, not a form of life, ie communal use
I really like you, professor.
(1) "How do you feel?" vs "What do you feel?"
(2) A grammatical distinction between belief and knowledge. We ask
(i) 'Why do you believe?'
(ii) 'How do you know?'
but not (or rarely)
(i') 'How do you believe?'
(ii') 'Why do you know?'
Great explanation
The last question is really good. How has something so banal like smoking in the house become immoral? Of course, a mother would answer "Because I say so", and that's a fine illustration of a confident argument.
Professor , Your lecture take us to ''a place where you let us connect to the great minds in a true sense''. This, I said, can not be a literary hyperbole, but a logical error.
"Attributing meaning depends on a certain shared form of life"? Or a concensus. A.I. is not alive, yet certain cues, p then q, work with it.
Reversals: p because q or q because p. Aren't those tautologies, or indistinguishable from tautologies? It is what it is?
Invertable causal statements or recursion? Like a feedback loop, a fractal?
Agreement or alignment? Meaning or cue? Function or form? Context or text?
How is the idea that knowledge requires justification itself not an unjustified belief?
It is a justified belief. The thought experiment shows, or seems to show that true beliefs which are unjustified don't count as knowledge. In the end we might want to say that there are classes of knowledge which don't require justification, but the thought experiments draw out enough linguistic intuitions for us to say that we have some reason/justification to accept the JTB model of knowledge.
@@ianhruday9584 What exactly are these linguistic intuitions? Be so good as to provide an example.
@@alwaysgreatusa223 I don't really know how to answer that. The thought experiment lays out a scenario and asked whether we were inclined to attribute knowledge to someone or not. It pumps your intuition about the use of the word "knowledge" - hence my use of the phrase "linguistic intuitions." The above commenter asks if we are justified in believing in the definition of "knowledge," but this is an odd question given that there is no fact of the matter about the meaning of the term, independent of language speakers.
Skepticism about meaning (the subject of the lecture) is an entirely different Beast than skepticism about facts
@@ianhruday9584 It almost sounds like you are saying knowledge exists only as a matter of mere convention. Granted that a word only has meaning when someone gives it a meaning in the first place, and granted that the general meaning is the one agreed upon by those who use it, but surely you do not want to say there is not really any such thing as knowledge to which the word corresponds. Or do you ?
@@alwaysgreatusa223 I take it that the original comment was asking if we have justification to believe that the term "knowledge" means what we say it means. I also take it that the thought experiments give this justification.
In the early part of the lecture he is outlining skeptical problems in epistemology, because they parallel skeptical problems in the philosophy of language. At that point in the lecture, he had not yet moved onto skeptical problems related to meaning - which are far more destructive.
There is a relationship between the two types of skepticism, but they are very different. The skeptic about knowledge can at least Express their skepticism, but the skeptic about meaning is literally unable to State their position with certainty.
Forms of life ???
@Michael People have meanings they wish to express, and they use words, gestures, tones, bodily movements, and so forth to express their meanings. Use reveals meaning hardly seems to be a revelation. Who would ever be so naive as to believe a word could ever have a meaning of its own before someone actually used it, and before somebody actually understood what the user was attempting to express by means of that word ?
This is exactly what most people believed & still do. For example, whenever someone says, "That's not love" they are saying there is an essence to live which defines all forms of love & only love, thus, we can exclude those actions which we find do not accurately encapsulate "love" & partake in the essence of "love."
Instead, Wittgenstein says there is not a core essence of the word "love" & only a form of life which the word love is used in. As such, if a community of people use the word love to describe sacrificing children to their God of crops, then it is every bit "love" as me loving my child; it's dependant on the communal understanding of love & nothing else.
Another example is when someone buys "ethical beef" The rancher & his consumer believes how he raises & slaughters the cows is ethical thus it is as there's no essence, no nature to what is ethical, only the form of life, the communal use of the word which makes it correct. It that community, ethical is that practice so a vegan saying there is not a form of ethical beef is wrong as the have a theoretical form of ethics, not a form of life, ie communal use