Great presentation. The German paratroopers landing in the same area as the British reaction force is interesting. Have to keep in mind the island was on a starvation diet. Which would have played into combat effectiveness. 👍
An interesting presentation, but a few elements of the mix are notably absent. First, the British had learned that air superiority was needed before the Axis would consider an invasion - given the catastrophic losses they suffered in Crete. By May 1942 the British were just about able to challenge for air superiority. In this context the mixture of the AA guns and the fighter aircraft, both of which were much more numerous on Malta (which was about 26 times smaller than Crete) made any parachute drop a suicide mission. Second, the Italian planners were also influenced by their 'Glorious Failure' special operations mission against Valletta in July 1941, which was not forewarned by Ultra intelligence as one author has claimed, but was instead detected by the British radar (also not mentioned in the presentation). The surprise attack was almost entirely destroyed. It did not bode well for the invasion they were planning. Third, like for Crete, the British had Ultra intelligence, derived from German Enigma machines. They would have been all over the plan, and would have been waiting for the remaining paratroops and beach landings. Fourth, Hitler only went along with the planning idea as a device he used to pacify Italian worries about their shipping losses. In reality, he wanted Rommel to defeat the British in Egypt after which he expected Malta to fall as . When Rommel was stopped by Auckinleck - advised by the brilliant Eric Dorman-Smith - at Ruwiesat Ridge, Kesselring was obliged to make another attempt, in July 1942, to suppress British air and naval threats to the logistic supplies reaching North Africa. He failed. Which brings me to my sixth point: the presentation forgets the reality of the battle for air superiority and is to and fro progress. Lloyd made the comment used in the presentation to suggest the air power battle - his battle - was one that the British could not afford to lose. It was all about his leadership according to his own book and the books written by his supporters. How that unfolded is the story of the manuscript publishers have not, as yet, been sufficiently confident to offer me a book contract. Overall then, the Axis were never sufficiently ready until too late to mount an invasion, and if they had managed to persuade Hitler to change his mind they would probably have suffered a major catastrophe so great that the resultant attacks on Sicily, the Dodecanese and Italy may have gone much more quickly.
Fascinating presentation, thank you.
Very good presentation. The "blame the Italians" argument always pops-up when the Germans are involved
Great presentation. The German paratroopers landing in the same area as the British reaction force is interesting. Have to keep in mind the island was on a starvation diet. Which would have played into combat effectiveness. 👍
An interesting presentation, but a few elements of the mix are notably absent. First, the British had learned that air superiority was needed before the Axis would consider an invasion - given the catastrophic losses they suffered in Crete. By May 1942 the British were just about able to challenge for air superiority. In this context the mixture of the AA guns and the fighter aircraft, both of which were much more numerous on Malta (which was about 26 times smaller than Crete) made any parachute drop a suicide mission. Second, the Italian planners were also influenced by their 'Glorious Failure' special operations mission against Valletta in July 1941, which was not forewarned by Ultra intelligence as one author has claimed, but was instead detected by the British radar (also not mentioned in the presentation). The surprise attack was almost entirely destroyed. It did not bode well for the invasion they were planning. Third, like for Crete, the British had Ultra intelligence, derived from German Enigma machines. They would have been all over the plan, and would have been waiting for the remaining paratroops and beach landings. Fourth, Hitler only went along with the planning idea as a device he used to pacify Italian worries about their shipping losses. In reality, he wanted Rommel to defeat the British in Egypt after which he expected Malta to fall as . When Rommel was stopped by Auckinleck - advised by the brilliant Eric Dorman-Smith - at Ruwiesat Ridge, Kesselring was obliged to make another attempt, in July 1942, to suppress British air and naval threats to the logistic supplies reaching North Africa. He failed. Which brings me to my sixth point: the presentation forgets the reality of the battle for air superiority and is to and fro progress. Lloyd made the comment used in the presentation to suggest the air power battle - his battle - was one that the British could not afford to lose. It was all about his leadership according to his own book and the books written by his supporters. How that unfolded is the story of the manuscript publishers have not, as yet, been sufficiently confident to offer me a book contract. Overall then, the Axis were never sufficiently ready until too late to mount an invasion, and if they had managed to persuade Hitler to change his mind they would probably have suffered a major catastrophe so great that the resultant attacks on Sicily, the Dodecanese and Italy may have gone much more quickly.