French guy Reacts to the End of Napoleon in Spain
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- čas přidán 25. 08. 2024
- Wellington's kicks Napoleon out of Spain! A french guy reacts to Epic History TV "Wellington's Triumph - Vitoria 1813". A French guy Reacts to the End of Napoleon in Spain.
• Napoleonic Wars: Battl...
#napoleon #epichistorytv #napoleonicwars #history #wellington
Many thanks to the person who gave me all this wonderful information about English officers!
As for us, I give you a rendez-vous on Wednesday on the battlefield of Leipzig ⚔
Your welcome mate, if you want more stories and such about Britain too, I’d look up Redcoat history as they do some excellent videos going into the talking of the average British redcoat
As a tactician, a defensive tactician specifically, I'd say that Wellington was the 2nd best of the Wars of the Coalition. The guy had a good eye for terrain and his usage of reverse slopes, while not completely new in warfare, was something he really mastered and popularized. It allowed his men to almost always be in strong defensive positions without any earthworks needing to be dug whenever he chose a more passive approach, but it also allowed them to be masked, as if for ambush. Very cunning and fitting in the hills of Spain.
Logistically, he started off not very good, I would say. His Talavera Campaign, he went in without preparing carts, expecting his Spanish allies to do the legwork of the operation. However, even among the Spanish, they had a difficult time procuring carts and supplies and could not easily extract it from the land without alienating themselves from the local people, as they would be seen as no better than the French had they did so. Wellington, whether because of language barriers, or because he ignored them, placed all the blame on his allies even when they told him it could not be done. He also blamed them for not being able to properly assist at the Battle of Talavera, but there had been a sudden rainfall and flooding recently which made their area of the river not possible to cross.
Therefore, in more pro-Wellington works, you see the Spanish allies being denigrated, while Wellington is praised for having to work with "useless, backwards allies and pick up their slack." It is true that the Spanish generals were more often than not, lackluster. However, on restudying the conflicts in my time, I feel like the Spanish soldiers could still be relied upon to fight with courage, especially when on the defensive, which fits Wellington's style more. By 1813, many had also been retrained together with the Portuguese in order to approach British standards and might have been more than a match for the French regulars and conscripts fighting in Spain.
My criticisms about his logistics and inability to work with his allies aside, I would say that these were learning processes and he improved throughout his journey. Due to how much Portugal and Spain had been stripped of supplies, he did have to deal with supplies being transported from Britain by sea to Lisbon and, in order to conduct inland operations, had to facilitate those communications by his own effort. He nearly saw a breakdown in the pursuit of 1812, but the operation of 1813 must have shown that his ability to provision his army had greatly improved since those bygone days of when he first started out.
Now, this is where I think Wellington falls flat and the subject where many who overly praise him fail to get, enamored as they are with his clean tactical record in battles, that they forget that war is more than just battles. Tactics might win engagements, and he was surely getting better at logistics in the operational sense. However, where he lacked was in his ability of operational manoeuvre and strategy, and this is why he cannot be put on the same level as Napoleon. At Talavera, he was close to being encircled by Soult, who was approaching to cut off his retreat while Victor attacked to pin him in place. He very nearly could have been defeated there had Soult not delayed in his advance and defected French soldiers and guerilleros not informed him of Soult coming. In short, he got as much a lucky break as Bennigsen did against Napoleon early in his career.
In 1812, while Salamanca is often held to a high standard, as it was definitely a good battle, the operations leading up to it and after the matter were not that good. After taking Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz by siege, both of which cost him quite a toll in losses, he then moved on to besiege the Salamanca forts. He then tried very hard to bring Marmont, who was outnumbered and had not fully concentrated his forces, to battle. Wellington's aim was to have a repeat of Busaco, but Marmont could not be drawn to battle by any means of harassment against his lines and kept away as the French army opposing Wellington grew stronger.
Eventually, Marmont had formed up behind the Douro River, as by taking Salamanca, Wellington held the line of the Tormes River. As Wellington advanced, seeking to cross the Douro River, Marmont paralleled him along the opposite bank, shadowing his army at every step and preventing a crossing. At times, the French made threats at his communications and Wellington was forced to turn back. Following him, the French marechal made a variety of turning manoeuvres and, Wellington, in turn, kept withdrawing all the way back to a series of hills at San Cristobal, outside Salamanca, which he had previously tried to goad Marmont to attack him at. Marmont completely outmanoeuvred him by fording downriver of the Tormes at Huerta, and was moving to cut off his communications. Not only had Wellington's time been wasted, but he had been forced to withdraw, manoeuvred into abandoning both the Douro and the Tormes by Marmont, who forced the British-Allied army to retreat to Los Arapiles, south of Salamanca.
It is only then when Marmont got overconfident, and in persisting to turn Wellington's flank yet again, he overextended his army and paid for it. It also didn't help that him and his 2nd in command were wounded and taken from the field, leaving no one able to properly restore the situation. In short, Wellington had been completely checked in terms of operational manoeuvres, but had won a tactical victory by good fortune which turned the tide in his favour. As an American, the episode reminded me of when Sherman kept outflanking Johnston's defensive positions in the American Civil War and compelled his withdrawal. Marmont did that to Wellington and he didn't even have a superior army, but was still outnumbered, albeit marginally. That is not to take credit from Wellington, though. He saw the moment when Marmont got cocky at the end and seized on it; someone like Johnston would have been too passive to do so.
Then, he divided his army between himself and Rowland Hill, and while it was understandable in order to have his communications guarded and a bit of a gambit, it opened himself up to defeat in detail. Had he gone to attack Souham in the north with a concentrated army, he might have been able to defeat him in detail, for during the pursuit, Souham probably had some 53,000 men. The combined army of Wellington and Hill numbered 65,000 late into the campaign. Instead, in typical fashion for the 18th century, he chose to pursue a war of posts by getting bogged down in besieging Burgos and suffered a repulse there, forced to retreat ignominiously in the face of Souham.
Another fault of his operations, on looking back at it, was to cut Soult's lines of communications at Madrid, for it compelled the marechal to come up north to deal with him. Yet, why did he do it? The Siege of Cadiz had proven to be a completely fruitless effort for 2 years by then. Why not allow Soult to continue wasting time and resources there instead of stirring the hornet's nest? That way, defeating Souham in detail was very much a possibility. Only then could he reasonably cut Soult's communications at Madrid, then turn to deal with Soult separately. Due to his failures, both Soult and Souham linked up and outnumbered him with 80,000 men vs. 65,000 men and had their British-Allied army, strung out on the retreat, in their sights near the old Salamanca battlefield. Soult, much as at Talavera, failed to launch the finishing blow even when there were no guerilleros or defectors to save Wellington. I have deep criticisms of Soult as a commander due to these moments, and as a result, it can be said that good fortune smiled on Wellington yet again.
It should be reminded that, while in Spain, most French commanders and marechals were not properly coordinating and many did not listen to each other. There were many cases of insubordination plaguing them and, though they theoretically outnumbered the British-Allied army in Spain, they were all divided in pursuing their own objectives, none able to link together a coherent strategy like Napoleon. The one time anybody tried to do so was Massena, but insubordination plagued him so much that he was doomed to failure at every point. Those who try to paint Wellington as outnumbered also completely ignore the presence of the Spanish regular armies in the field, as well as other British-Allied forces and the countless guerilleros who operated independently, but still worked in tandem with the Allies. That, in the Peninsular War, Wellington had all of the advantages of intelligence on his side due to the guerilleros, while his enemies were impacted at every point and their lines of communications, far more overextended than his own, under constant harassment which tied down tens of thousands of soldiers.
Thank you so much for taking the time to share all this information! I'm reading them bit by bit and the point that struck me about Wellington's difficulty in cooperating with the Spanish: isn't this what helped him to keep his leadership under control throughout the campaign, choosing with whom to coordinate his actions and discarding the more "difficult" allies? As I was reacting to the episodes, I was thinking that in a way he was right not to embarrass himself with an unstable government. Indeed, what seems to have doomed the French is the lack of coherent leadership, to be reconciled with a clear overall strategy and well-defined objectives.
Damn, I'm at work, but will take the time to read this fully later.
Wonderful, and insightful reaction. Thanks for that,
Thank you!
Have you seen the TV series "Sharpe" starring Sean Bean? It's set during the peninsula war. "Old nosey" features throughout 😁
No, and it is a big shortcoming in my personal culture. I'm eager to binge it :)
@@ToonStory-fh4gn It's a fantastic series, I thoroughly recommend it.
Great commentary as always,
I’m not a great historian with a library full of books,constantly reviewing tactics,just a fan of history. I always have the impression in Spain there was never really a good French command structure, rather the Marshals looking to advance their own interests. Napoleon would have driven them back into the sea in weeks if he had returned, maybe the time he thought he was unbeatable 🤔
Thanks! I agree with your point: this whole stuff lacked a coherent leadership, and even a clear strategic plan to begin with. And if Napoleon had returned? Alt-history, but this demonstrates that his empire couldn't properly function without him to deal with a crisis
Roland Hill was reported to only swear/curse in public twice. He believed strongly in being a gentleman no matter the circumstances.
A proper bri'ish gentleman!
The issues of communication in this battle.
I’m guessing Berthier wasn’t in Spain at this time (he was with Napoleon in Germany)
Napoleon’s horrible treatment of Berthier in the Russian campaign resulted in Berthier turning himself into a robot, never questioning Napoleon and simply obeying his orders and instructions.
This may have been a factor in him failing to inform Napoleon of the lack of sufficient bridges at Leipzig.
Yes, very good point! Berthier was the kind of guy you needed in order to implement a coherent strategy
Berthier's head was becoming fried by 1813. He would never have overlooked such a vital element as the building of bridges for the French escape at Leipzig before this point. The workload and sheer stress of it all was now taking its toll.
“More than the campaign in Russia”
Makes sense considering that the Peninsular War lasted for years while the invasion of Russia lasted for 6 months.
The Peninsular War…Napoleon probably put it best:
‘That unfortunate war destroyed me; it divided my forces, multiplied my obligations, undermined morale…All the circumstances of my disasters are bound up in that fatal knot.’
Excellent quote! And yes you probably have the right analysis of what caused so many deaths
“It’s going to be both epic and terrible for me as a French dude.”
In my opinion, Napoleon lost the Battle of Leipzig before it even started.
eeeeeeeeeeeeh... That was my assumption before I review it but now I see how I could have been different!
Thomas Picton is indeed an entertaining historical figure, but I couldn’t bring myself to like him due to the scandal of him approving the torture of a 14-year old girl.
Wellington was not exaggerating when he stated that Picton was a “useful scumbag”.
It made me think of Marshal Saint-Cyr, who was disliked by many of his fellow French commanders for having a strong sense of righteousness (Saint-Cyr was against looting)
"scandal of him approving the torture of a 14-year old girl" a young slave no? I oversaw that part, that makes him still a charimsatic leader, but a scumbag above all indeed
He was in our national gallery of Welsh heroes until recently, being the highest ranked officer to have died at Waterloo. They've taken it down now in light of this.
Thanks for talking about Thomas Graham.
While I overall support the French Revolution (the Ancien Regime had to go), there’s no denying it was horrific and bloody.
Inhuman, indeed
“Joseph would have none of it”
Joseph Bonaparte was a skilled diplomat, and to his credit he tried to bring improvements to both Naples and Spain, but he was never going to be a good monarch (Louis Bonaparte in my opinion did a better job in Holland, while Jerome was a complete moron in Westphalia)
It goes back to Napoleon’s policy that when it came to elevating people to royalty, blood counted more than merit.
A Spaniard I spoke to said that Joseph was “the worst King we ever had, and that includes the Spanish King who suffered from mental illness.”
When I asked him if he agrees that Spain was always going to fall into chaos regardless of Napoleon, because of the War of Spanish Succession, he replied, “Spain was always going to fall into chaos because it’s Spain.”
A Spaniard I spoke to said that Joseph was “the worst King we ever had, and that includes the Spanish King who suffered from mental illness.” => I just watched a video about this Habsburg who was the result of an incredible amount of inbreeding, so that's wild !
“Soldiers aren’t rich people.”
Military personnel are often drawn from the poorer and less-educated pools of society.
This can have consequences, as we have seen in a current ongoing war.
In mid-2023, when Russian troops were sent to Belgorod to respond to incursions being carried out by the Free Russia Legion and Russian Volunteer Korps, many of the Russian Armed Forces troops ignored the enemy and started plundering stores and residential buildings instead.
Apparently the Number One reason for Russians who volunteer to join the military in 2022/2023 (joining voluntarily, instead of being conscripted or forcibly mobilised) is crippling financial debt.
Now I’m curious to learn of the recruitment and conscription measures of all sides in the First World War.
Fascinating topic, the one that jumps in my mind is the Kitchener army with the pals batallions and propaganda such as the women distributing the order of the white feather to young men who did not want to join
in hindsight do you reckon he should have just fortified the French Pyrenees border so not to waste so much everything in Spain?
Do you mean at the end of the conflict?
from the very start, never having occupied Spain in the first place@@ToonStory-fh4gn