One of the most reasoned, credible and extensive defense of Longstreet I’ve seen. Well done and well deserved for one of the most unfairly maligned and misunderstood figures of the revered Army of N. Virginia.
Yes, Longstreet did not cause the Gettysburg loss..... Several factors played into it..... Too me, the main issue being terrain. Longstreet and Lee both had great ideas for Gettysburg.... Lee's drawback was fighting on that terrain..... Longstreet wanted to place the Army behind the Federals and threaten Washington..... This would have also cut the Confederates off from home. I understand why Lee made the decision that he did .... The result proved Longstreet's reluctance..... Both were right and both were wrong..... I think if Jackson had been alive instead of Ewell, it would have greatly increased their chances. But to Blame James Longstreet for the loss is absurd.....
Definitely a brilliant, cogent and well researched presentation. As others have noted, the Lost Cause movement did, and continues to do so much to denigrate the story of Longstreet, and I can not begin to express how much I enjoyed this very different and scholarly video. Thank you!
@@edwardclement102 Unclear as to what orders you are referring to. Lee had issued no attack order to Longstreet for the morning of the 2nd day. The order Longstreet was given he obeyed and attacked the Federal left in the late afternoon. On the third day Longstreet conducted Pickett's Charge as ordered though he believed it couldn't succeed. Longstreet expressed his objections to Lee's attack plan and then carried out his orders like a good subordinate.
It was a reason for the early attacks on long straight. The Lost Cause mythologizers needed a stab in the back theme. And who better than Long Street who was not only a Republican, friend of Grant and one who did not try to obstruct Federal reconstruction?
Also after multiple deaths in his family he became much more religious than before as well as his conversion to Catholicism after a lifetime of being a Presbyterian I think. Later after his 1st wife died he married a college roommate and friend of his daughter. Many young ladles in the South married Confederate Veterans who received their military service pensions until the spouse passed away long after their Rebel spouses. By the way Longstreet's 2nd spouse was a Rosie the Revitor at a Martin-Manufating plant in Marietta Georgia during WWII. I think she even made the front cover of "Look" and even "Life" along with several others. She still owned the Longstreet Farm Property in Gainesville Georgia and it's operations continued including popular vintage from the farm.
Farm. Must add that I spent about 5 to 6 years at both National Archives locations while in college finishing my BSBA summa cum laude at The American University for Sophomore thru Senior years and also while on K St NW working in Washington DC. I also went to Summer school at the University of Georgia in Athens Georgia and studied their archives. While working in Atlanta for another roughly ten years I went to many archives in the area. I also spent a week in the North Carolina at Duke University, University of North Carolina, Wake Forest and North Carolina Statd archives receiving much material which I had intended to write several things for example a complete analysis of the Sibley Brigade later the Army of New Mexico and the full campaign from Sibley's meetings in Richmond for the government authorization to take Denver and capture Northern California who alledged to support the Confederate need for gold but most intended to keep it for themselves. Supposedly the Morgan's had authorized CSA troops to freely cross their lands in Utah. In 1859 Joseph Johnston command of USA troops putting down the Morgan Insurrection. Also Confederate State Department officials met with Sonora, Chihuahua, and the water control of Southern California still within Mexico. But with the European attack at Veracruz to Mexico City in the collection of debt but the French remained and placed Napoleon Maximilian in charge due to his royal connections. The rebels intended to place the Mexican States that I mentioned to grow cotton, rice, the royal source of purple die from shellfish and other products plus open Pacific Ocean blockade running routes to also be added to those in San Antonio already running the Union blockade at the Mouth of the Rio Grande. I also intended a biography of Longstreet, a separate analysis of Longstreet on the defensive, another of Longstreet's offense assaults such as at 2nd Manassas, the Suffolk Campaign, an inquiry of the waste of time that the Confederate High Command took deciding to move reinforcements to Bragg yet Burnside captured Knoxville Tennessee making the easy railroad ride though the Georgia - Virginia railroad untenable, the winning at the 2nd day of Chickamauga, the Knoxville Tennessee campaign, the attack saving the Rebel Left at the Wilderness and then his horrible wounding. The Yankees actually attempted to raid several of Longstreet's recovery places. The fight after returning but a paralyzed right arm to return to command The First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia from his temporary replacement Richard Anderson. And a commentary of Longstreet's post war fight with notably the worst of the Virginia's offering to the ANV leadership who have become editors of many long lasting publications such as the Confederate Veteran, the Southern Historical Society Papers, and many others who did not choose to blame Longstreet until after Lee's too early death. No one ever thinks to recall several facts about US Grant and Longstreet. One, they were fast friends at West Point and I believe roommates, Grand met his future wife at a dinner in St Louis Missouri with Longstreet's relatives which made them relatives even if only by marriage but Julia Dent was the future wife of US Grant and Longstreet's mother or grandmother were Dents who had a plantation in Alabama which young James finally received his West Point appointment despite his Uncle Baldwin whom he lived with not being able to receive one from either South Carolina or Georgia. But when times are tough friends/family take care to assist and when Grant made appointments such as US Marshall and US Post Master in those days it was REQUIRED TO BE THE SAME PARTY AS THE PRESIDENT WHOM APPOINTED YOU. Did any feeble minds think this. I cannot wait to read this book and another about Longstreet being the First Modern Warrior which will ruffle Sherman. But Sherman did a trial run in the Meridian Campaign from Vicksburg following a railroad line rebuilding going to Meridian and destroying it all over again but much of the line was too far destroyed. Later when Sherman left Atlanta he carried maps which he had cartographer prior to the war, the 1850 and 1860 Census which with the USA Army Intelligence and the then bosses from ONI's reports of suspected military resources and the wealthy influencetial Confederate politicians who seceded and economically supported the war. It is a major Southern bullcrap lie that Sherman destroyed a 60 mile wide swath from Atlanta to the Sea while marching thru Georgia to Savannah. I went to the University of Georgia for two summers and I became friends with music acts of the Southland and I froze back and forth throughout Georgia to see and hear music live and while recording in Athens, Macon, Atlanta, Memphis, Chattanooga, Muscle Shoals, and other spots. I drove and followed musical history as I went. I even managed to be thrown from Phil Walden and Associates Inc's office by Phil and some oversized bodyguard and I weighed about 155 pounds at the most soaking wet, yet at the same time I was offered a job in Atlanta with a free office space in a schoolroom of a elementary school year he purchased, it is now gone and replaced by an Atlanta subway stop. But in my Southern travel I learned that most ante bellum plantation manor houses were still standing in their original state not rebuilt. I walked the Battle of Griswoldville many many times due to it's closeness to Macon. But I was hired away from the then largest CPA firm in the worlsvand was a 6 year Communication Industry Specialist and mostly assisted on the accounting, bookkeeping, and taxation computer systems as well audit financial statements and taxation of Ted Turner and his start-up of CNN, Atlanta Super Station, ESPN and many more but Lowery Music Group Inc owned primarily by Bill Lowery who started as a top Nashville country DJ to music publishing with origins in 1953 with Gene Vincent's first major world wide took and roll hits. A photograph of Bill's first royalty checks which are paid our from BMI and ASCAP every sic months. Those two checks in 1955 were about $760,000. Success. In the early 60s Bill even owned the American publishing rights to the Beatles catalog but he lost them on a steamship gambling jubket, oh well. He lost them to one of his publishing partners so he still owned a very small interest which was sold. I digress but I have 4 lawyer size fireproof file cabinets which contain my research, symposium and Civil War Roundtable notes, my personal drives and travels often with recording acts, then I moved back home to NW Ohio and eventually opened my own CPA firm and tax practice which in it's heights I prepared 1,525 various taxes individuals, small business owners and their kids, corporations, partnerships, LLC's, sole proprietorship, non profit organizations, Trusts and Estates, Personal Foundations usually Family and various Corporate Personal Foundations all non profit organizations. After 29 years I sold my practice and only prepared taxes and my contract more than cut my required work hours in half. I was semi retired but earning I am questing $42,000 in salary and if I worked more I had an hourly contract rate set up. I also received 20% of collections from my client list and 10%;from referrals. I received this for 5+ years so I was banking that which averaged $2,500/month. I also sold the major portion of my Confederate Postal History collection for about $550,000 and retained two collections which I was starting and I sold them by private treaty for $42,500 to each of two people. But I had much research of Confederate paper through connections which for most isn't in museums but in private hands. It is great that this man wrote such a well conceived and needed Longstreet rebuttal that I think will stand the test of time.
Thank God for the South through groups like the Redshirts and KKK that overthrew reconstruction by guerilla warfare by 1876 Grant said he was tired of the uprising in the South, by 1877 came a compromise and the fighting was over, Thank you, John Gordon and Nathan Bedford Forrest. Teach true history.
Lee always said it was all his fault and offered Davis his resignation after the battle. The Lee personality cult would spread their propaganda after he was no longer alive to comment.
He told the troops after Pickets charge that it was all his fault, that could've meant it was his fault for giving Longstreet to much independence during the battle for all we know. He said wayyyyyy more in his letter to President Davis than what people in documentarys like to quote, Lee also suffered a heart attack sometime before Gettysburg and mentions it in his letter.. he was also very humble in not wanting to put blame on any of his subordinates. From Gen. Lee's letter: I therefore, in all sincerity, request Your Excellency to take measures to supply my place. I do this with the more earnestness because no one is more aware than myself of my inability for the duties of my position. I cannot even accomplish what I myself desire. How can I fulfill the expectations of others? In addition I sensibly feel the growing failure of my bodily strength. I have not yet recovered from the attack I experienced the past spring. I am becoming more and more incapable of exertion, and am thus prevented from making the personal examinations and giving the personal supervision to the operations of the field which I feel to be necessary. I am so dull that in making use of the eyes of others I am frequently misled. Everything, therefore, points to the advantages to be derived from a new commander, and I the more anxiously urge the matter upon Your Excellency from my belief that a younger and abler man than myself can readily be attained. You can see he mentions his attack and was not feeling good during Gettysburg.. he was also known for staying with the less inexperienced generals like he did when he split his army at Chancellorsville, he let his Corp commander Jackson attack the flank with full independence while he stayed with the lesser ranked Generals. Longstreet was a Veteran Corp commander, Lee gave him full independence on the missions he gave him. It's funny people that make these videos never throw in actual letters from some of the officers at Gettysburg complaining about Longstreet and how slow he moved and how grumpy he was. Longstreet was known as Lee's "Old War Horse".. he was also known as the "Old Snail" because of how slowwwwwwwwww he moved.
@@jamesbenn692 Longstreet wasn't slow at Gettysburg, and accusations of his alleged slowness didn't appear until after the war- and after Lee was dead. The major errors of the campaign were all made by Lee, and not his subordinates.
I've always had a problem with the lost cause theory and how lee was let down by Longstreet and Stewart. As the presenter pointed out are the lost cause apologists suggesting lee wouldn't address in competence or insubordination from subordinate commanders? The buck stops with general lee. Excellent presentation !
Between Lee's three corps commanders at Gettysburg, Longstreet was the only one who was able to launch a coordinated attack. Hill was a ghost and Ewell indecisive.
Ewell wasn't indecisive. He followed lee's orders to the letter, and his decisions on 1 July were correct at the time. It was only after the war that it became clear that Cemetery Hill could have been taken.
@@manilajohn0182 On day one Ewell violated Lee's order not to bring on a general engagement by allowing Rodes to attack Oak Hill. Rodes had a great opportunity to hit the Union line in the flank but launched piecemeal attacks that necessitated Hill to make a costly frontal attack in order to carry the Union position. Then Ewell rightly withheld an attack on Cemetery Hill because Rodes' Division was combat blown and disordered and Early's scattered, with Johnson not on the field due to Ewell's unfathomable marching orders. On the second day, Ewell failed to attack in concert with Longstreet, allowing Union reserves on the right flank to be used against Longstreet. Ewell then launched an uncoordinated understrength assault on Cemetery Hill that might have succeeded if he had used his whole corps instead of wasting Johnson's effort attacking Culp's Hill. On the third day Ewell allowed the Union forces to preempt his renewed assault on Culp's Hill. But, yeah, sure, Ewell wasn't indecisive, he did a great job.
@@jonathansloane702 Ewell had no clear idea of Union location or strength when he approached Gettysburg, and moving divisions down separate but nearby roads was stock procedure during the war for both combatants. Ewell didn't receive Lee's instruction not to bring on a general engagement until he was told to take Cemetery Hill if practicable. When Lee's note arrived, one of Ewell's divisions had not yet arrived, and he had received a report of Union forces on his left flank. He sent out a reconnaissance force to determine the strength of Union forces on the hill and then dealt with the report of Union forces on his flank. By the time he was able to determine that the report was false, it was dark. His recon team returned at about this time and reported that Cemetery Hill was held by "a superior force". It was only after the war that it became clear that Cemetery Hill could have been taken on 1 July. Ewell's assault on 2 July is hardly an example of indecisiveness. Uncoordinated attacks- both Confederate and Union- were commonplace during the war, and even the best Confederate leaders made them. Your admonition about Ewell using Johnston's division is 20/20 hindsight. Ewell did as well as any other Confederate general might have. The major errors of the campaign were all made by Lee, and not by any of his subordinates.
@@manilajohn0182 We have no disagreement that Ewell was correct in not assaulting Cemetery Hill, but you are quite incorrect about when Ewell received the initial order to not bring on a general engagement. After giving Rodes orders to deploy his 8,000 soldiers for battle, Ewell sent Major Campbell Brown, his stepson and principal aide, to find Lee and tell him that Ewell meant to join the fray. Brown found Lee on Herr Ridge, where both he and Hill had come after hearing the bark of muskets and bellow of cannons. Lee sent Campbell back to Ewell with an astounding order: ‘Do not charge; I want to avoid a general engagement.’ Ewell had violated Lee's order in ordering Rodes to the attack. Brown advised that now was not the time to disobey Lee. He described Lee as seething with anger,’ showing a querulous impatience … I never saw before.’ Despite Brown’s warning that Lee was in no mood to see his orders ignored, Ewell could not pass up the opportunity to assault the open Union flank. The enemy troops were so vulnerable that they could be quickly routed, which would not be a ‘general engagement,’ Ewell reasoned. Rodes’ alignment took much longer than he had expected, and the arrival of fresh Federal troops added desperation to his assault. As a result, when Rodes’ troops finally advanced at about 2 p.m., their charge was delivered piecemeal. Heth, on Herr Ridge, saw Ewell’s attack falter. Turning to Lee, he asked if he should press Pettigrew’s and Brockenbrough’s brigades into the fray. ‘No,’ Lee curtly replied. ‘I am not prepared to bring on a general engagement today.’ He was determined to shun battle that day, and no doubt was incensed at Ewell for having defied his orders. When he received Lee's discretionary order to attack Cemetery Hill if practicable, it contained the repeated caveat if he could do so without bringing on a general battle, meaning with just the troops under his control, and Ewell was hesitant to violate that order a second time. As Ewell only had Avery's brigade available, he informed Lee that he would attack if supported by Hill on his right. Hill demurred claiming that Heth and Pender were fought out, and Lee would not commit Anderson's newly arrived division, keeping it as his only reserve, content with the gains made that day, although purchased at a high cost. Of course the ultimate responsibility resides with Lee, but the fact remains that Ewell's Corps was poorly handled and he attacked Oak Hill against Lee's orders. But yeah, keep telling me Ewell performed competently.
@@jonathansloane702 I completely forgot about Lee's Oak Hill note regarding not bringing on a general engagement. So yes, you're correct; Ewell was informed of Lee's desire to not bring on a general engagement earlier. However, Ewell didn't disobey Lee's orders, because Ewell was clearly satisfied that he could avoid bringing on a general engagement (and he did not). He made a decision, and it was the wrong one. It hardly makes Ewell incompetent or guilty of poorly handling his corps. If Ewell habitually made these mistakes, you'd have a solid point here- but he didn't, so you don't. Jackson completely failed Lee- repeatedly, I might add- during the Seven Day's Battles, despite specific knowledge of his vital role in the campaign. As far as I'm aware, no one regards Jackson as incompetent. Lee was not "...determined to shun battle that day..."; he wanted to avoid a general engagement until the Army was concentrated- whenever that might be. The errors of Lee's subordinates are positively minor when compared to those made by Lee. Lee erred in convincing the Confederate government that he could achieve enough of a success in the east to force the Union to remove pressure from (and later, lift the siege of) Vicksburg. He erred again in spending an excessive amount of time in his move northward when time was of the essence. He committed the fatal error of the campaign by giving his cavalry commander two contradictory objectives for one small force. Since they coincided in time, Stuart had literally no chance of carrying them both out successfully. Stuart's failure to get Lee timely information on the strength and location of the AotP led directly to the disastrous meeting engagement of 1 July, which ruined Lee's plan of campaign.
It's kind of crazy how this one guy - obviously an intelligent man and a man with great character - was so close to both the icons of the Union and the rebels.
Brilliant! Very, very well done mate. Though the south lost the war militarily, they won the peace, at least for the next hundred and twenty-five years. That the Lost Cause groupies were allowed to essentially write the history of the war is pathetic at the very least and a shame to the nation at large. The loss at Gettysburg was due to Lee's slack leadership, not Longstreet's supposed inadequacies. But suggesting that Lee was not the flawless genius his numerous, shrill Myrmidons have for all these decades insisted/demanded is just kicking a hornet's nest. Cheers!
This is incredible. I'm a huge Lee fanboi and a true southerner. Read about the Civil War since I was a small boy. There has never been any question that Lee lost the battle and that it was his fault. He gambled wrong on the third day. Big time. That attack was doomed from the outset, obviously. That is why it has been so scrutinized.
By 3 July, Lee had no alternative but to attack- or abandon the campaign in failure and write off Vicksburg (lifting the siege of which was the strategic objective of the campaign).
@@manilajohn0182 I don't hate Lee, but the sense I get about July 3rd is that Lee fell victim to a combination of: "My men struggled and bled for two days" variant of the sunk-cost fallacy; and unintentionally (and probably without realizing) falling for his own myth. That's just my humble take, though.
@@UrbanCohort 1. By Mid- 1863, the Confederacy was losing the war. Their victories in the east had all been indecisive and had done no more than to prevent the capture of Richmond and keep the AoNV intact. In the west, the Confederacy had gone from one defeat to another, and were on the verge of losing control of the Mississippi River and having the Confederacy cut in two. Their sole links across the Mississippi were the fortress at Vicksburg (what President Davis called "The nail that holds the two halves of the Confederacy together") and Port Hudson (a smaller fortified location). 2. The strategic objective of the campaign (hashed out by the Confederate political leadership at Richmond in mid- May) was to at least gain enough of a success to remove pressure from the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg. When Vicksburg was placed under siege before Lee's campaign began, this became achieving enough of a success to force the Union to lift the siege of Vicksburg. 3. Another (operational) objective of the campaign was to take the war away from Virginia and forage off of Union territory to restock the AoNVs supply train. 4. Lee's plan of campaign was to entice the AotP to attack the AoNV and defeat that attack (from Lee's after- action report and Longstreet's memoirs). To accomplish this, Lee needed information on the strength and location of the AotP. Lee assigned this task to his cavalry commander, J.E.B. Stuart. 5. Lee committed the fatal error of the campaign when he violated an elementary military axiom- "One force, one objective"- and gave Stuart two objectives. He instructed Stuart to gather both information (necessary for Lee's plan of campaign) and provisions (the operational objective of the campaign) without designating either as a priority objective. While many blame Stuart for not seeing the gathering of information as the more important of the two, the real responsibility lies with Lee- who should have never instructed Stuart to gather provisions in the first place, particularly since Stuart only had three brigades with him. 6. Stuart was separated from the AoNV by the unexpected and rapid advance northward of the AotP. Then Stuart stumbled onto a Union supply train of 150 new fully stocked wagons. In accordance with Lee's orders, he kept them- and his advance was slowed to a crawl. 7. Lee committed another error by taking an excessive amount of time in his march northward while his army foraged. By the time that he arrived near Cashtown, Vicksburg had been under siege for over five weeks. 8. Lee committed yet another error by not making clear to his corps and division commanders what his plan of campaign actually was. 9. The resulting lack of information from Stuart resulted in Lee being informed by an independent scout of the proximity of the AotP. On 29 June, Lee ordered the AoNV to concentrate near Gettysburg. The lack of information from Stuart on the AotP and his subordinates' lack of a clear understanding as to the plan of campaign resulted in a meeting engagement at Gettysburg in which the Confederates attacked and secured a minor victory. This ruined Lee's plan of campaign by casting the tactical offensive on to Lee. Having been attacked and defeated by the AoNV, it was now unlikely in the extreme that the AotP would go over to the attack as Lee had originally planned. 10. Lee was now stuck. Vicksburg had been under siege for almost six weeks and the clock was ticking. The AoNV could not remain in any one area for more than 3-5 days because it was foraging and had no line of supply. Lee could not send out foraging parties in the immediate presence of the AotP, and his army hadn't foraged since 29 June. His plan of campaign had been ruined and he was engaged in battle on unfamiliar ground. 11. This is why Lee attacked on both 2 and 3 July. He no longer had the time to wait for the AotP to attack, and (by 3 July) had no time to maneuver around the Union left as Longstreet suggested. Lee had to either attack or abandon the campaign in failure. 12. Pickett's Charge was the product of what was, in Napoleonic terminology, "The Strategic Battle". The general concept was that the Union Commander would weaken his center to support both his left and his right (both of which were attacked on 2 July). Meade understood this as well however and had foreseen just such an eventuality. When the Confederate bombardment began on 3 July, Meade had approximately 20,000 reinforcements readied to move toward his center if ordered. These did so and crushed the Confederate attack.
@@manilajohn0182 I can't tell you how much I appreciate how much thought you put into your reply, and I admire how much time you must put in to studying history (certainly more than I, a hobbyist at best). Am I correct in my understanding that you are arguing that Lee was forced to commit to Gettysburg by a combination of errors and tactical considerations?
@@UrbanCohort Many thanks; you're very kind. What I submit is that Lee was forced to commit to offensive action at Gettysburg after 1 July because of a combination of both strategic and operational errors- all of which were made by Lee himself. Believing that his army could decisively impact events almost 1,000 miles away was a great strategic error. Tasking his infantry with both foraging and marching northward in a timely enough manner for a decisive battle was an operational one- as was tasking his cavalry with obtaining both information and provisions (this latter one being the fatal error of the campaign). Whether these errors were due to the pressure of the overall war situation or due to natural human flaws in Lee's character is a good question. Personally, I think both were factors. Lee couldn't remain where he was along the line of the Rappahannock River because his army was literally starving there, but it seems clear that Lee definitely asked far too much of his far too small army. But that's just my opinion. Cheers...
I was drafted as a teenager in1969. Vietnam was going strong. I knew what had gone down during the Civil War so I was grateful it was 1969 and not 1861. It helped.
From what I’ve read, I believe Lee should’ve heeded Longstreet’s advice to move to better ground. I have not listened to the presentation yet so I may be sitting here corrected, which is fine but this is everything that I’ve read up until now without this lecture in my mind yet. I think Lee had several factors going against him. His goal was to draw out the union Army, and to do his best to destroy the army of the Potomac to force Washington DC into negotiations for an agreement of having two separate countries! The main obstacle I think was Lee did not know what was in front of him. Prior to the battle all he is intelligence came from an actor acting as a spy, who gave them and pinpointed the position of the union Army Corp by Corp. JEB Stuart and his ridiculous dislike of two of his cavalry subordinates were left behind in Virginia when they should’ve been marching with Lee while Stuart was under orders, creating a ruckus so as to force the union hand. The problem is 3 to 4 days away would be his usual. Of time, but he was away for eight days and had not reported the whereabouts of the union army! That alone was enough to tell General Lee that he should consider different ground! He allowed the union army to dictate on what ground they would fight! I believe Longstreet was of cerebral commanders who had asked to reposition and deploy to find better ground. General mead would’ve followed the army of northern Virginia anywhere and being as cautious as he was and new to command, he would’ve made a mistake, most likely. He would’ve fought on the wrong ground, which this became the essence of the battle in my opinion. The north had the high ground and the south did not! The southern army could not afford to lose the people on day three. Pikkit charge was lost from the very beginning, and it never happened! I don’t know why Robert E Lee did not listen to his subordinate commanders specifically Longstreet regarding day, two trying to attack an army in trenched in the heights and then day three setting 15,000+ people on a March well over a mile to brave union artillery while Porter Alexander did not have enough artillery to sustain his garage as it was too far behind the lines. Alexander been able to sustain his bombardment, it may have been a different outcome at least a little more challenging anyway!! I’m going to listen to the lecture now so this is my opinion before the lecture and I’m looking forward to hearing it! Thank you very much for posting this ! I’m a Yankee, but for some reason I can’t help but pull for the South in this conflict that had BEWARE written all over it after day one!
Lee had Gettysburg on June 26. He had Early march North, AWAY from the Union army. This mistake led to Lee being unable to fight the approaching Union Corps separately as they entered Pennsylvania. Later he kept his troops in a long arc, giving Meade time to get to the high ground. Lee had no qualms about sending Jackson on a flanking march at Chancellorsville but forbade Longstreet to execute the same maneuver. Lee also made the mistake of starting a battle with out Stuart on the field. Longstreet had only 15 to 20,000 men at his disposal. Not really sure why people think he should have beaten Meade's 80,000 on his own. Lee fought a battle he did not have to, and fought it in a hurry. Meade knew ho to fight on a hill, and Lee obliged him.
Why have historians left the dact that Lee was with Longstreet? Also, people blame Longstreet for the loss, but Lee sent aides and even went himself to the left to get Ewell to move to the right. Would the results have been different if the II corps had added their weight ? Or would it have made command and control worse? Never heard this question asked.Love this book!
Ewell was ordered to attack third day 10AM on expectation of keeping Union forces from Longstreet’s attack, that’s five hours of support so there was some hope for a considerably earlier attack though you explain what happened well. Longstreet does have an interesting wartime history of intrigue especially around Chattanooga and the blaming of his commanders from the Knoxville battle. I don’t disagree with your basic argument and wonder if the cavalry attack was successful if that had made a difference. Pickett when interviewed mentioned that the Union army had something to do with his defeat
I think the big thing historians ignore about the primary sources is they had reasons to lie or play politics. Many of the staff officers and generals were in their 30s or younger during the war. They had 30+ years after the war to live and try to make an income. In that time period a man's reputation was a huge factor in that and so many had very large incentive to flat out lie. I find it funny how with some generals, especially certain union generals, historians always discount or take their primary account with grains of salt but those same historians seem to think all the southern generals are telling the whole truth and nothing but the truth all the time. Col. Long specifically contradicts himself in his personal accounts of gettysburg a few times yet historians use his account more than any to criticize Longstreet. Specifically Long says Lee was bewildered when meeting with Ewell at around 10am why he didn't hear artillery and the attack starting on the right. But that's simply a clear lie. There is no reasonable way that Lee should have expected that or thought that. It's clear Long lied to further the "Longstreet delayed the attack" narrative. This brings up how many other people lied to further that narrative. It's interesting to me that Longstreet received letters from Taylor and Long saying they didn't know of a sunrise attack order but both men later criticized Longstreet along that narrative. Again these were young men who's family well-being relied on their untarnished reputation. Of course they'd lie to protect their reputation. Especially when you boil down to who really was at fault at gettysburg you find it was Lee's staff that was in the wrong many times and leading the failures. Lee himself in his resignation letter to Davis specifically mentions he over estimated the ability of his personal staff to convey his orders and bring him information. So Taylor, Johnston, Long, and the rest of Lee's staff were likely where most of the blame lay so they are the most active in blaming Longstreet later on after initially giving accounts that didn't blame him. Jubal Early and Penelton found and created a scapegoat that these desperate men then latched onto and laid into. As a side note historians do the same with northern general accounts. Meade is painted as truthful and Sickles as a liar. The reality is Meade was political too and likely lied some too. Historians often need to sell books and what sells books is romanticized stereotypic characters. Black and white situations. The liar and the good guy narratives. The victim and the persecutors. In reality almost everyone in society lays in the gray area between these stereotypic black and white realms of narratives. They both act in good intentions and bad. They both win and lose. Real people are complex and not simple.
They waiting till after Lees death because they were lying about Longstreet and Lee wouldn’t have stood for the lies and would have spoken up proving Early and the rest of them were liars.
"Ol Pete" Longstreet was appointed by General Lee to be 1st Corps Commander, that wouldn't have happened if Lee hadn't respected him and held him in high regard. Longstreet 8 Brigades, think about that.
The bottom line is that just about everything that could go wrong for General Lee at Gettysburg did go wrong. At the end of the day, Robert E. Lee was the commanding general, and the Confederate failure at Gettysburg fell on his shoulders above all. Robert E. Lee never attempted to shift the blame to anyone else's shoulders but his own, like a man he publicly acknowledged that the failure was ultimately his. In the post-war years, especially after Lee's death in 1870, in the South, the two icons of "the Lost Cause" above all were Stonewall Jackson and Robert E. Lee. To criticize either in much of the South was all but forbidden. There was always the fantasy of "If Stonewall Jackson had been at Gettysburg, things would have been different" and the desire to place blame on anyone's shoulders bit Robert E. Lee's. The two primary scapegoats became James Longstreet and JEB Stuart. It was unfair to both men. Of course, JEB Stuart was not alive to defend himself, and Longstreet was. The anti Longstreet factions had as much animosity toward Longstreet for things that occurred after the war and his personal relationship with Ulysses Grant, as it has to do with anything that occurred during the war. It would seem that those wishing to exonerate JEB Stuart and defend his reputation often pointed their fingers at Longstreet. Those who supported Longstreet often pointed their fingers at JEB Stuart. But nobody dared point their fingers at Robert E. Lee, upon whose shoulders the blame ultimately laid, a fact that Lee made clear and did not dispute. It often amazes me, the ego you see amongst the officer's corps, on both sides during and after the war. The finger pointing, the politicking that continued until the last of them, were dead of old age long after the war. We often think of the egos amongst the officers during WWII with Montgomery, Patton, MacArthur, and the likes but I dare say they had nothing on the officer's corps of both the Confederate and Union Armies of the Civil War.
IN the usa you missing a part of Longstreet , Longstreet of Langstraat was een Zeeuw ( part of Holland witch is called Zeeland ) There his familu came from , a hard live on the dutch shores and few o ar most polilair admirals cam from Zeeland so .. The Zeeuw is a calculted , stubborn man and he will not give up easily .. Longstraat was on good reasons against the accack so he did less to hurry it ( spare lifes ?? ) maby .., he plan too go too another place too fight is sound en coorect ( like his style ) the pickkett charge great in history is like the accack on the somm e, stupid .. Grtz from Holland ( europ) and a Langstraat ( longstreet ) fan
Was it Mike Tyson who said everyone has a plan until they are punched in the face? The terrain played a vital role in the Union victory At Gettysburg. Only the confederate soldiers tenacity made it a close run affair.
I would disagree with the contention that Lee never responded to Longstreet’s inaction. He sent him to Georgia soon after returning to Virginia. Also the catalyst for Gordon’s, Early’s and others attack of Longstreet after Lee died is because Longstreet waited for Lee to die before he criticized his Gettysburg campaign. No general except for maybe Jackson understood that Lee wanted nothing short of the destruction of the army of the Potomac. Even after Chancellorsville Lee admonished his generals for claiming a great victory. Lee thought having not destroyed the union invaders was nothing to celebrate.
Thanks for your comment, Bill. The assertion Longstreet went West after Gettysburg at the behest of Lee and because Lee didn't want Longstreet serving under him anymore (because of alleged actions at Gettysburg) is yet another myth. Longstreet had been petitioning to go West, even before Gettysburg. During spring 1863 campaign discussions, Longstreet suggested his corps go West and join with multiple Confederate armies as part of his "Kentucky Invasion Plan." There is no evidence Lee actively wanted Longstreet to temporarily leave the AoNV. Rather, after Gettysburg he recognized the deteriorating situation in the West following the fall of Vicksburg and relented to a temporary transfer. Following Chickamauga we have Lee writing Longstreet, telling him to finish his work "and return to me. I want you badly, and you cannot get back too soon.” Longstreet ultimately did that in spring 1864 and served under Lee until the AoNV's surrender. Regarding the comment about Longstreet waiting until Lee died to discuss Gettysburg and some of his and Lee's differences of opinion on tactical matters at the battle...it is actually the opposite. Longstreet discussed Gettysburg with author William Swinton in 1866 in a series of interviews for Swinton's book "The Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac." Early and Pendleton waited until after Lee's death to make their allegations against Longstreet's Gettysburg performance - Early in January 1872 and Pendleton in January 1873.
It appears that the Confederate commander and his corps commanders all performed quite badly at Gettysburg, so it may be unfair to single out Longstreet for criticism. I cannot help but contrast Lee's reported inactivity or reserve with the sort of actions that would have been taken by the Duke of Wellington and the Duke of Marlborough. They would have been everywhere. Arguably age, malnutrition and stress or ill health had taken its toll on Lee, but other than diet the Duke of Marlborough was of comparable age and underwent the same sort of strains. Lee was the best tactician of the war but my admiration for him is less for his military exploits but more for his conduct and the example he set in his life.
I don't wanna make this charge I don't see how it can succeed I wouldn't make it now but General Lee expects and demands it General James Longstreet Confederate Army
Excellent presentation, for l have read many a books on The War Between the States. I know Lee was blind without Stuart, and with troops spread out the Maryland State line to the outskirts of Harrisburg. He really had to scramble to bring the ANV back into close proximity. I can't remember the date when Lee took a tumble from Traveler, and may have suffered a heart attack. I do believe this did take place in Virginia at the onset of the Northern Campaign of 1863 into Pennsylvania. A lot of revisionist historians have maligned Lee &Longstreet and the whole War in recent times; just a ballpark figure- 20 years or so. In conclusion, l do not advocate slavery or condone any type of servitude. It's that you cannot change history, you have to change the present and the future. If that's possible.
Stuart's failure was entirely Lee's fault, and was THE major error of the campaign. Lee violated a fundamental military axiom- "One force, one objective"- by giving Stuart two objectives for one very small force. By tasking Stuart with obtaining both information and provisions (and not stating which was the primary objective), he placed his cavalry commander in an impossible situation. These two objectives coincided in time, so that Stuart could not first accomplish one, and then the other. Obtaining the first required a mobility which only cavalry could provide, while obtaining the second would inevitably impede his mobility. This is exactly what transpired during the campaign. This was the fatal error of the campaign because Lee's plan of campaign was to entice the AotP into attacking the AoNV. Accomplishing this required timely information on the location and strength of the AotP. Stuart's failure led directly to the disastrous (for the Confederates) meeting engagement of 1 July. This minor victory utterly ruined Lee's plan of campaign by casting the tactical initiative onto the AoNV.
@@twinsboy_3410 Some were guarding passes to the Shenandoah Valley and were forgotten about for a period, while another consisted of irregulars who were supposedly considered unreliable for reconnaissance.
You fail to tell that Lee's plan was to threaten Washington, by telling Davis to send men towards Washington under Beauregard, and had this been done Meade would have retreated, Longstreet probably got his flanking idea from this idea. Lee might have lost his whole army if he followed Longstreet's plan as the Union had many men guarding Washington and Baltimore and they could have surrounded Lee with these men and blocked his retreat path. As was the campaign was a success and a failure for Lee, the success his men got many needed supplies off Union land, and they failure they did not win at Gettysburg, They would have had Lee's suggestion to Davis been followed and his orders would most likely had worked also, but were not followed.
You got that right and I'm a Harrisburg Pennsylvania Yankee after Antetum he should of never tried another northern campaign it was doomed from the start the federal army just had to much of everything plus the idea that Yankee boys wouldn't stand and fight was wasn't true bi a long shot
** Everything went awry for Longstreet on Day 2 when John Bell Hood was about to go around the Union left and suddenly realized that he was staring at them face to face. Dan Sickles ruined their plan (albeit by accident) to roll up the Union army starting at Little round top. Just my opinion on when and where things went bad for Longstreet at Gettysburg
I do not find this presentation accurate, or at the very least complete. At the 22:43 mark it says that there was no evidence for a sunrise attack that Longstreet was supposed to conduct on July 2nd. Nevertheless you cite letters by Gen. Early and Pendleton which confirm this. Certainly this is evidence of that order (we can debate though whether it is persuasive or not). Secondly, and more importantly, there was another letter written after the war (June 1875) by John Bell Hood, addressed to James Longstreet, where he confirms that "Lee was anxious for you to attack that morning". Gen. Hood then writes Longstreet said he would wait for Pickett to arrive because "I never like to go into a fight with one boot off." Hood cites this as being the cause as to why the attack did not commence till the late afternoon. It should be noted that Hood was a friend of Longstreet's after the war and had no reason to lie in a letter addressed to Longstreet about his activities that day. Hood was there at day break on the second where Longstreet himself confirmed Lee's desire to have him attack that morning. More firsthand sources for an early morning attack can be found on JSTOR in an article written by Haywood J Pearce Jr entitled Longstreet's Responsibility on the Second Day of Gettysburg. In sum I find this whole video unpersuasive to say the least. We can debate all we want about whether Longstreet received the order or not, but this video does not give an accurate portrayal of all the evidence suggesting there was such an order that was disobeyed by Longstreet due to the fact he desired different conditions than were on the ground to launch an attack.
Well I would be sulking too if Lee ordered 2 of my divisions to an almost certain death. Anyone could see that Picketts chargers wouldn’t work. Longstreet could see it. Why couldn’t Lee or Pickett. Garnett and Armstead knew they weren’t coming back after that charge. Longstreet was the only man there with the balls to tell Lee that the attack was going to fail and fail it did. I think about 6000 people died in that charge with another 3000 wounded. For what? For nothing. If I was a confederate soldier I would have went home after seeing that. I’m from Louisiana but I would not have been a confederate soldier I can promise you that. Everyone thinks that ALL the West Point graduates from Virginia joined the confederacy. Not true. 1/3 of them stayed in the US Army. That’s 33%. If I was an officer in the US Army it would have been dishonorable to resign my commission and draw my sword against my country. Dam my state. Louisiana is nothing without The United States.
There was definitely mistakes made on both sides during the battle....listening to different accounts some people believe general ewell was to blame for the failure of General Lee's plan
Longstreet did complain and disagree with Lee, that is a fact well documented by historians from the South and North. The complaints by Longstreet were in fact correct, this is supported by the events and the outcome of the battle. Lee was responsible for the heavy losses at Gettysburg not Longstreet. Your suggestions of are not supported by historians. Your opinion I respect but totally wrong.
The ridiculous "Lost Cause" tiresome lie about a tragic doomed prideful disaster. Plenty of blame for all persons unnamed.A well defended position should be hailed. Is that time, and place?
You miss the point Lee ordered Longstreet to attack he did not Moxley Sorrel even made the point Longstreet was slow and cost the Confederates a victory, and Longstreet maintained Sickles cost him a lack of big victory.
I agree completely, perhaps even more so as I’m substantially less charitable and admiring of Lee. And I am born in the upper Valley, grew up in the Blue Ridge of Virginia and attended college in SC…. Worship of Lee and the deification of the ‘Lost Cause’ was almost universal there and certainly in my family, which counted 13 veterans of the ANV in its number. But the study of his actions and their results led me, on the basis of the facts, to a very different view. One need not be a ‘Yankee’ to prefer history to myth.
@@nomdeguerre7265 The fact is it was a fringing miracle that Lee was able to keep the underfed, under supplied, numberically inferior ANV together until 1865. If Johnston wouldnt have been wounded he probably would have abandoned Richmond in 1862 and the war was lost much sooner. People know the most about Gettysburg so they study it ad nauseam and act like it was his only battle. His fault or not it was the only battle where his cavalry wasnt properly implored and was the reason for not only the defeat but his inability to make the large flanking movement that Longstreet advised. As for the smaller flanking movement of Hood i am sure the Union Sixth Corps would have had something to say about that. His only real mistake of the war besides expecting all his Corp Commander to be a Jackson in using discretion was he didnt realize the battle was over after the second day. He had Stuart now and using the third day to retreat would have made much more sense then the colossal mistake of Pickett's charge. No excuse can be made for that. He was not overrated he just chose the side with less manpower, less industralized and had a system where state rights ruled. In war you have to have a big centralized governent. People have turned on Lee cause god forbid in this blm day we look up to a General that at one time owned slaves That was of course wrong but it has no bearing on his generalship
@@bobber0623 Lee’s position on slavery has nothing to do with my analysis. He was the best possible choice to fight the wrong war. In doing so he allowed the South to believe it could win the war by winning battles. Perhaps they should have studied a bit less Napoleon & a bit more 2nd Punic war.
I very much agree, but unfortunately he was overpromoted in the end. Longstreet should have paid heed to Hood at Gettysbury and trusted his proposed plan of attack.
That said I think Lee was not himself at G. L was correct in wishing to move around the Roundtops…perhaps Old Pete would have gotten moving faster, not countermarched in Corps order, and swept over the Roundtops had his plan been adopted… and the war would go on an extra 9-12 months. The third day was the result of great miscalculation by Lee.
Sounds like you are suggesting a tactical turning movement around the Round Tops. That's what Hood wanted to do with his division. Have you looked at a map? That space is a cul de sac with Rock Creek on the right and the Round Tops on the left, enough room for a two brigade front and no room for maneuver. The V Corps was positioned in reserve where the Baltimore Pike crosses Rock Creek, closing off the cul de sac. The VI Corps was arriving up the Baltimore Pike on what would have been Hood's right flank and rear. Hood's Division would have never come back if it went around the Round Tops. Had McClaws followed Hood, Sickles would have been free to attack from the west. But it sounds like a really good thing to do. Until you look at a map. And a strategic turning movement would be an even dumber idea, which is why Longstreet never suggested such a thing.
The primary reason why Longstreet wanted to envelop the Union left was to draw the AotP into attacking the AoNV- and the minor Confederate victory on 1 July had already ruined that possibility by casting the tactical initiative onto Lee. Pickett's Charge on 3 July was the only option which Lee had left, because he was all but out of time.
Forrest was the best division commander. Longstreet was the best Corp commander. Thomas was the best army commander and U.S. Grant was the best commander, period. As for R.E. Lee, for all his tactical brilliance what he was best at was losing a war. The only reason Sherman isn’t in the list isn’t because he wasn’t an exceptional army commander, but that Thomas was actually even better.
I have never blamed Longstreet or Lee ! The culprit is Jeb Stuart , he left the whole army blind ,which is a no - no ! He should have been removed from duty when he finally made his appearance !!!
That is a myth. Stuart was acting on orders from Lee, and though he was slightly late, he performed well in his raid, and he did all he could to reach the battle as soon as possible. Lee had other cavalry available to him that he failed to properly utilize.
I don't know what all the debate is about concerning Gettysburg. The attacker almost never succeeded during the Civil War. Chancellorsville is an obvious outlier, yet look at the confederate casualties. Still huge. And the attack didn't even accomplish anything much beyond spoiling hood's envelopment initiative.
What do you mean why didn’t Lee send him away if L was so obstructive??? 2 months after Gettysburg L was in Tennessee reporting to Braxton Bragg!!! “at his own request”…ahem.
Thanks for your comment, John. You’re right, Longstreet did go “west” two months after Gettysburg. He had been petitioning Lee about his corps joining with western armies, even before Gettysburg. That said, he was not sent at the behest of Lee. In fact, just after Chickamauga we have Lee writing to Longstreet, “Finish your work, my dear General, and return to me. I want you badly, and you cannot get back too soon.” Ultimately, that is just what Longstreet did in early 1864. There were also a number of additional heartfelt letters exchanged between Lee and Longstreet in the lead up to and during Longstreet’s time in the west. Lee had no problem ridding himself of subordinate generals he deemed ineffectual, insubordinate, etc. - think Benjamin Huger, Theophilus Holmes, John Magruder, and even D.H. Hill. And yet, Lee did no such thing to Longstreet after Gettysburg. Rather, Longstreet served under Lee from the Wilderness to Appomattox, and they continued their personal relationship into the postwar years.
@@corypfarr3200 excellent work Mr. Pfarr. Is it possible that Lee broke his own heart at Gettysburg and knew the war in the east was doomed, thus sending or allowing his seemingly most trusted “war horse” to the west to help Bragg?
@@Tusk_III The Confederate government made the decision to reinforce Bragg from Lee's army since Lee was acting strictly on the defensive and the war in Virginia was at a stalemate. Nothing to do with broken hearts or dark forebodings of doom.
Army of Northern Virginia couldn't feed all their troops with supplies in Virginia especially after Vicksburg falling cutting off the Mississippi river and the cutting off of the major RR's around Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Louisiana and Georgia by the Western Union Armies. Longstreet basically had the most well equipped Corp and trained troops that could be pulled in a last moment gasp to try to resolve the situation in the West.
@@bmc7434 There were more than enough supplies east of the Mississippi to supply the AoNV. The fundamental problem was that the Confederate rail net was incapable of effectively moving them to where they were needed. This is the basis for Lee's request to move north. The Confederacy could not adequately supply the AoNV by rail in its position along the Rappahannock, and the surrounding countryside had already been either foraged or devastated by Union forces.
The only mistake that Longstreet made at Gettysburg was that he failed to realize that Lee's plan of campaign had been utterly ruined by the unexpected meeting engagement of 1 July. If he had realized it, he would not have repeatedly suggested a flanking maneuver around the AotP's left. Four fundamental mistakes were made concerning this campaign, and they were all made by Lee. Firstly, Lee insisted on retaining all of the forces under his command in the east. This saddled Lee with accomplishing the strategic objective set out in Richmond in mid- May- namely, to achieve a great enough success to force the Union to lift the siege of Vicksburg. But the sheer distance between Lee and Vicksburg meant that Lee had to achieve a decisive victory on the scale of Austerlitz or Jena to even have a chance of lifting that siege. This was far beyond the ability of any Civil War army to accomplish. Secondly, Lee's plan of campaign centered around maneuvering the AotP into attacking the AoNV. Lee however, failed to make his corps and division commanders adequately aware of this objective, with the result that some of them initiated the disastrous meeting engagement of 1 July- which cast the tactical initiative onto Lee and the AoNV. Thirdly, Lee needed timely information as to the location and strength of the AotP if he was to entice them into attacking at a position of Lee's choosing. Only Lee's cavalry had the mobility to obtain this information- but Lee violated the basic military axiom of "One force, one objective" and gave his cavalry commander two objectives for one small force. Moreover, these two objectives were contradictory in nature, and both coincided in time. Stuart could not possibly have obtained information on the AotP (which would require mobility) while at the same time obtaining provisions for the army (which would impede that very mobility). Since Stuart could not first accomplish one objective and then the other, he was placed in an impossible situation. In fact he attempted to comply with Lee's instructions, and he predictably failed. Lastly, Lee seems not to have fully understood the factor of time in this campaign. Vicksburg was placed under siege before Lee's campaign even began, yet Lee's movement north was made with no haste. Perhaps this was because of Lee's need to forage, but Lee probably should have realized that maneuvering the AotP into attacking him would be difficult enough at best- and could only be made more so by the necessity of his army to live off of the land. In his defense, the strategic position of the Confederacy in mid- 1863 was dire, and Lee had a full plate to deal with. On the other hand, the overconfidence of both the officers and men of the entire AoNV likely prompted them to attempt far too much with far too little.
Stuart was tasked with assigning cavalry to three tasks: his ‘ride’ for diversion and reconnaissance in depth, screening and tactical reconnaissance and supply line cover. Stuart assigned those units which Lee might have been willing to use to the latter, and chose commanders and units Lee didn’t like or trust to the second. He took with him those other commanders Lee might have trusted enough to use. Lee had cavalry even with Stuart gone. But Stuart had left him with officers Lee refused to use. That’s why junior engineers were assigned reconnaissance duties for Longstreet. And Lee was aware of these assignments which Longstreet had recommended against at the time.
@@nomdeguerre7265 Stuart was never assigned a diversionary role by Lee. Stuart was never tasked with supply line cover because Lee had no line of supply; the AoNV was foraging off of the countryside. Stuart was tasked with attaching his command to Ewell's right, gathering information, and gathering provisions. He was also instructed to assign two brigades to guard passes through the Blue Ridge Mountains.
@@manilajohn0182 The groups that went back to guard the passes were the 'supply line' cover forces I refer to. These could have been kept with the army, but were not. These were the officers that Lee might have been willing to use, instead of the ones Stuart chose to keep. If Stuart's 'ride around the AOP wasn't a diversion and deep recon, what was it. I call it that because that is what it was. The ANV did forage, but they also had a well delineated supply line which was defended. The idea he had simply marched into the darkness, like Sherman later actually did, is not at all true. The bottom line is that with Stuart gone Lee still had cavalry he could have used. He did not because they were officers he disapproved and did not trust, at Stuart's specification and with Lee's prior agreement, contrary to Longstreet's recommendation. This thus doubly an indictment of Lee's generalship, first in agreeing to the dispositions and secondly in not using what he had agreed to have available. The 'fault' was not Stuart's. It was all Lee's. Stuart could be a damned fool, but he was under Lee's command and Lee had complete control over his dispositions and movements. The depiction in movies like 'Gettysburg' that Stuart had failed in his responsibility and let Lee down was erroneous. The failure was Lee's, and Lee's alone. He himself was the one who had 'made the army blind'.
@@nomdeguerre7265 Well, the two brigades which guarded passes through the Blue Ridge weren't guarding any supply line, because Lee didn't have one. Lee had a very tenuous line of communications, and they weren't guarding that either. Stuart's movement around the AotP was no diversion. It was a movement by Stuart intended by Lee to obtain information, provisions, and link up with Ewell's right flank. Lee stated this in written orders to Stuart not once, but twice. The idea that Lee didn't trust cavalry officers is nothing but postwar myth. There's nothing written by Lee which states or even suggests that. It's entirely possible that Lee 'may' have placed an excessive reliance on Stuart personally for success by his cavalry, but that's an opinion by some, and not a conclusive fact. I certainly agree with you that while Stuart could definitely be impulsive, his actions in this campaign were almost entirely correct. The major errors of the campaign were all made by Lee, and not by any of his subordinates. The fatal error of the campaign was made by Lee when he gave Stuart two objectives for one force (both of which coincided in time) without assigning either as the priority objective. This placed Stuart in an impossible position. Stuart lacked the available forces to accomplish both simultaneously and lacked the time to accomplish first one and then the other. Gathering information was vital to Lee's plan of campaign (maneuvering the AotP into attacking the AoNV), while gathering provisions was the operational objective of the campaign. Cheers...
the lionization of Lee is central to the maintenance of the lost cause mythology... why so? Lee is the noble heart of that mythology, so if he is shown to be human and fallible then that mythology falls apart. He must, in that mythos, be shown to have only been beaten by conniving and incompetent generals, and the overwhelming and mindlessly wasteful and bloody assaults of Grant and the perfidious bluebellies, despite the heroic and long suffering rebel soldiers stand, in the glorious cause of state's rights... no one of Lee's subordinates is better suited for that purpose to the lost causers, than Longstreet, who openly admitted in later life that the south was the rightful loser in the civil war, and that the cause of slavery had run its course.
Lee was a demagogue, not a great general. He was a sociopathic narcissist who could convince his soldiers to throw away their lives in incredible numbers. The casualties under Lee were horrendous. Longstreet was a workman. He followed his orders, even if he knew they were the wrong way to proceed. He could have easily been a successful general on either side.
That is such a dumb statement from someone who knows nothing about lees accomplishments. Vera cruz, to cerra gordo and mexico city. There is a reason that the Union generals and military took their hats off to lee at the end of the war. They gave respects to who they were at war with. You clearly do not know anything
Lee was so terrible at Gettysburg. Grant had the right approach, make it brutal and quick. Limit casualties. Lee prolonged and caused additional deaths on both sides. Shame on the union for not dropping the hammer right after July 63’. Lee was a war criminal, one of the most overrated Generals in history.
Lol Grant's overland campaign and the siege of richmond - petersburg was neither quick, nor did it have "limited casualties" lol... but you did get one thing right, it WAS indeed "brutal".
The pseudo deep slow pace and earnest body language are an unnecessary distraction. Fortunately, CZcams has 1.25 speed (best for newbies who need the first cut of description and explanation) or even 1.5 (if you are already up on the topic and just need to follow the arguments). Failure to expel Longstreet after GB is not evidence of disagreement with the thesis that Longstreet dragged his feet. Pfarr merely asserts Lee's legitimacy here. Legitimacy for criticizing Longstreet on tardiness is not solely with regard to compliance with Lee's instructions. The issue is also one of Longstreet's own responsibilities as a corp commander with autonomous authority to carry out orders with flexibility. Longstreet was having a pout - and eschewed Longstreet followed the "letter" of Lee's instructions (with regard to the path taken to the battlefield and what to do about LRT and BRT. Instead, Longstreet had a leadership responsibility to act as a command leader, fulfilling the spirit of the orders even as they might deviate with the exact letter of what Lee directed Longstreet to do. Longstreet clearly lost his nerve, he dragged his feet. An assualt earlier in the day would have gone better. Genuinely getting around the right flank would have generated a dynamic that owuld have forced the federal right to reconfigure its own line, creating opportunities for wholes and weaknesses to emerge in the federal lines. Lee had a mission command (Auftragstaktik) relationship with both TJ Jackson and Longstreet. Lee and Ewell and Early needed to work on this in the summer of 63, but that relationship was already established with Pete by GB. But Pete was having a pout and only followed the letter of Lee's directive, but failed to carry out the mission command leadership role. Shame on Pete - but happy me, as the rebels were treasonous reactionaries who deserved to die sooner rather than later.
Longstreet did the best fighting of any corps of the CSA in this battle. His marching time on day 2 was faster than Jackson's flank march at Chancellorsville, without even considering that Jackson began his march 3hrs later than he told Lee he would. Longstreet 's entire march took just over 3hrs. Jackson had twice as many men, and had to take them twice as far, but he had both Stuart's cavalry and a local guide. Longstreet had S.R. Johnston, on Lee's orders, who was competent and experienced, but whose morning recon had not covered the area that Longstreet was going to do his concealed march, as Johnston would write to Fitz Lee years later.
One of the most reasoned, credible and extensive defense of Longstreet I’ve seen. Well done and well deserved for one of the most unfairly maligned and misunderstood figures of the revered Army of N. Virginia.
Yes, Longstreet did not cause the Gettysburg loss..... Several factors played into it..... Too me, the main issue being terrain. Longstreet and Lee both had great ideas for Gettysburg.... Lee's drawback was fighting on that terrain..... Longstreet wanted to place the Army behind the Federals and threaten Washington..... This would have also cut the Confederates off from home. I understand why Lee made the decision that he did .... The result proved Longstreet's reluctance..... Both were right and both were wrong..... I think if Jackson had been alive instead of Ewell, it would have greatly increased their chances. But to Blame James Longstreet for the loss is absurd.....
Definitely a brilliant, cogent and well researched presentation. As others have noted, the Lost Cause movement did, and continues to do so much to denigrate the story of Longstreet, and I can not begin to express how much I enjoyed this very different and scholarly video. Thank you!
Longstreet was the only corps commander Lee had at Gettysburg who performed competently.
Indeed
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Wrong Longstreet did not want to attack and was ordered to attack he did not and that is a clear violation of military rules.
Slow! Slow! Wish he had Stonewall.
@@edwardclement102 Unclear as to what orders you are referring to. Lee had issued no attack order to Longstreet for the morning of the 2nd day. The order Longstreet was given he obeyed and attacked the Federal left in the late afternoon. On the third day Longstreet conducted Pickett's Charge as ordered though he believed it couldn't succeed. Longstreet expressed his objections to Lee's attack plan and then carried out his orders like a good subordinate.
as the old military advice goes" the best laid plans disappear the moment you meet the enemy". Excellent presentation.
It was a reason for the early attacks on long straight. The Lost Cause mythologizers needed a stab in the back theme. And who better than Long Street who was not only a Republican, friend of Grant and one who did not try to obstruct Federal reconstruction?
Also after multiple deaths in his family he became much more religious than before as well as his conversion to Catholicism after a lifetime of being a Presbyterian I think. Later after his 1st wife died he married a college roommate and friend of his daughter. Many young ladles in the South married Confederate Veterans who received their military service pensions until the spouse passed away long after their Rebel spouses.
By the way Longstreet's 2nd spouse was a Rosie the Revitor at a Martin-Manufating plant in Marietta Georgia during WWII. I think she even made the front cover of "Look" and even "Life" along with several others. She still owned the Longstreet Farm Property in Gainesville Georgia and it's operations continued including popular vintage from the farm.
Farm. Must add that I spent about 5 to 6 years at both National Archives locations while in college finishing my BSBA summa cum laude at The American University for Sophomore thru Senior years and also while on K St NW working in Washington DC. I also went to Summer school at the University of Georgia in Athens Georgia and studied their archives. While working in Atlanta for another roughly ten years I went to many archives in the area. I also spent a week in the North Carolina at Duke University, University of North Carolina, Wake Forest and North Carolina Statd archives receiving much material which I had intended to write several things for example a complete analysis of the Sibley Brigade later the Army of New Mexico and the full campaign from Sibley's meetings in Richmond for the government authorization to take Denver and capture Northern California who alledged to support the Confederate need for gold but most intended to keep it for themselves. Supposedly the Morgan's had authorized CSA troops to freely cross their lands in Utah. In 1859 Joseph Johnston command of USA troops putting down the Morgan Insurrection. Also Confederate State Department officials met with Sonora, Chihuahua, and the water control of Southern California still within Mexico. But with the European attack at Veracruz to Mexico City in the collection of debt but the French remained and placed Napoleon Maximilian in charge due to his royal connections. The rebels intended to place the Mexican States that I mentioned to grow cotton, rice, the royal source of purple die from shellfish and other products plus open Pacific Ocean blockade running routes to also be added to those in San Antonio already running the Union blockade at the Mouth of the Rio Grande.
I also intended a biography of Longstreet, a separate analysis of Longstreet on the defensive, another of Longstreet's offense assaults such as at 2nd Manassas, the Suffolk Campaign, an inquiry of the waste of time that the Confederate High Command took deciding to move reinforcements to Bragg yet Burnside captured Knoxville Tennessee making the easy railroad ride though the Georgia - Virginia railroad untenable, the winning at the 2nd day of Chickamauga, the Knoxville Tennessee campaign, the attack saving the Rebel Left at the Wilderness and then his horrible wounding. The Yankees actually attempted to raid several of Longstreet's recovery places. The fight after returning but a paralyzed right arm to return to command The First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia from his temporary replacement Richard Anderson. And a commentary of Longstreet's post war fight with notably the worst of the Virginia's offering to the ANV leadership who have become editors of many long lasting publications such as the Confederate Veteran, the Southern Historical Society Papers, and many others who did not choose to blame Longstreet until after Lee's too early death. No one ever thinks to recall several facts about US Grant and Longstreet. One, they were fast friends at West Point and I believe roommates, Grand met his future wife at a dinner in St Louis Missouri with Longstreet's relatives which made them relatives even if only by marriage but Julia Dent was the future wife of US Grant and Longstreet's mother or grandmother were Dents who had a plantation in Alabama which young James finally received his West Point appointment despite his Uncle Baldwin whom he lived with not being able to receive one from either South Carolina or Georgia. But when times are tough friends/family take care to assist and when Grant made appointments such as US Marshall and US Post Master in those days it was REQUIRED TO BE THE SAME PARTY AS THE PRESIDENT WHOM APPOINTED YOU. Did any feeble minds think this. I cannot wait to read this book and another about Longstreet being the First Modern Warrior which will ruffle Sherman. But Sherman did a trial run in the Meridian Campaign from Vicksburg following a railroad line rebuilding going to Meridian and destroying it all over again but much of the line was too far destroyed. Later when Sherman left Atlanta he carried maps which he had cartographer prior to the war, the 1850 and 1860 Census which with the USA Army Intelligence and the then bosses from ONI's reports of suspected military resources and the wealthy influencetial Confederate politicians who seceded and economically supported the war. It is a major Southern bullcrap lie that Sherman destroyed a 60 mile wide swath from Atlanta to the Sea while marching thru Georgia to Savannah. I went to the University of Georgia for two summers and I became friends with music acts of the Southland and I froze back and forth throughout Georgia to see and hear music live and while recording in Athens, Macon, Atlanta, Memphis, Chattanooga,
Muscle Shoals, and other spots. I drove and followed musical history as I went. I even managed to be thrown from Phil Walden and Associates Inc's office by Phil and some oversized bodyguard and I weighed about 155 pounds at the most soaking wet, yet at the same time I was offered a job in Atlanta with a free office space in a schoolroom of a elementary school year he purchased, it is now gone and replaced by an Atlanta subway stop. But in my Southern travel I learned that most ante bellum plantation manor houses were still standing in their original state not rebuilt. I walked the Battle of Griswoldville many many times due to it's closeness to Macon. But I was hired away from the then largest CPA firm in the worlsvand was a 6 year Communication Industry Specialist and mostly assisted on the accounting, bookkeeping, and taxation computer systems as well audit financial statements and taxation of Ted Turner and his start-up of CNN, Atlanta Super Station, ESPN and many more but Lowery Music Group Inc owned primarily by Bill Lowery who started as a top Nashville country DJ to music publishing with origins in 1953 with Gene
Vincent's first major world wide took and roll hits. A photograph of Bill's first royalty checks which are paid our from BMI and ASCAP every sic months. Those two checks in 1955 were about $760,000. Success. In the early 60s Bill even owned the American publishing rights to the Beatles catalog but he lost them on a steamship gambling jubket, oh well. He lost them to one of his publishing partners so he still owned a very small interest which was sold.
I digress but I have 4 lawyer size fireproof file cabinets which contain my research, symposium and Civil War Roundtable notes, my personal drives and travels often with recording acts, then I moved back home to NW Ohio and eventually opened my own CPA firm and tax practice which in it's heights I prepared 1,525 various taxes individuals, small business owners and their kids, corporations, partnerships, LLC's, sole proprietorship, non profit organizations, Trusts and Estates, Personal Foundations usually Family and various Corporate Personal Foundations all non profit organizations. After 29 years I sold my practice and only prepared taxes and my contract more than cut my required work hours in half. I was semi retired but earning I am questing $42,000 in salary and if I worked more I had an hourly contract rate set up. I also received 20% of collections from my client list and 10%;from referrals. I received this for 5+ years so I was banking that which averaged $2,500/month. I also sold the major portion of my Confederate Postal History collection for about $550,000 and retained two collections which I was starting and I sold them by private treaty for $42,500 to each of two people. But I had much research of Confederate paper through connections which for most isn't in museums but in private hands. It is great that this man wrote such a well conceived and needed Longstreet rebuttal that I think will stand the test of time.
Thank God for the South through groups like the Redshirts and KKK that overthrew reconstruction by guerilla warfare by 1876 Grant said he was tired of the uprising in the South, by 1877 came a compromise and the fighting was over, Thank you, John Gordon and Nathan Bedford Forrest. Teach true history.
Yeah, and he lost the tremendous third battle of New Orleans.
Lee always said it was all his fault and offered Davis his resignation after the battle. The Lee personality cult would spread their propaganda after he was no longer alive to comment.
He told the troops after Pickets charge that it was all his fault, that could've meant it was his fault for giving Longstreet to much independence during the battle for all we know.
He said wayyyyyy more in his letter to President Davis than what people in documentarys like to quote, Lee also suffered a heart attack sometime before Gettysburg and mentions it in his letter.. he was also very humble in not wanting to put blame on any of his subordinates.
From Gen. Lee's letter:
I therefore, in all sincerity, request Your Excellency to take measures to supply my place. I do this with the more earnestness because no one is more aware than myself of my inability for the duties of my position. I cannot even accomplish what I myself desire. How can I fulfill the expectations of others? In addition I sensibly feel the growing failure of my bodily strength. I have not yet recovered from the attack I experienced the past spring. I am becoming more and more incapable of exertion, and am thus prevented from making the personal examinations and giving the personal supervision to the operations of the field which I feel to be necessary. I am so dull that in making use of the eyes of others I am frequently misled. Everything, therefore, points to the advantages to be derived from a new commander, and I the more anxiously urge the matter upon Your Excellency from my belief that a younger and abler man than myself can readily be attained.
You can see he mentions his attack and was not feeling good during Gettysburg.. he was also known for staying with the less inexperienced generals like he did when he split his army at Chancellorsville, he let his Corp commander Jackson attack the flank with full independence while he stayed with the lesser ranked Generals.
Longstreet was a Veteran Corp commander, Lee gave him full independence on the missions he gave him.
It's funny people that make these videos never throw in actual letters from some of the officers at Gettysburg complaining about Longstreet and how slow he moved and how grumpy he was.
Longstreet was known as Lee's "Old War Horse".. he was also known as the "Old Snail" because of how slowwwwwwwwww he moved.
@@jamesbenn692 Longstreet wasn't slow at Gettysburg, and accusations of his alleged slowness didn't appear until after the war- and after Lee was dead. The major errors of the campaign were all made by Lee, and not his subordinates.
@@manilajohn0182 total wrong he was slow. Hence never the flank
Lee said that because he was a humble man
Longstreet and Ewell said they made mistakes.
When I was a young Lieutenant, I learned an invaluable truth. “You delegate authority, but you can never delegate RESPONSIBILITY!”
I've always had a problem with the lost cause theory and how lee was let down by Longstreet and Stewart. As the presenter pointed out are the lost cause apologists suggesting lee wouldn't address in competence or insubordination from subordinate commanders? The buck stops with general lee. Excellent presentation !
Between Lee's three corps commanders at Gettysburg, Longstreet was the only one who was able to launch a coordinated attack. Hill was a ghost and Ewell indecisive.
Ewell wasn't indecisive. He followed lee's orders to the letter, and his decisions on 1 July were correct at the time. It was only after the war that it became clear that Cemetery Hill could have been taken.
@@manilajohn0182 On day one Ewell violated Lee's order not to bring on a general engagement by allowing Rodes to attack Oak Hill. Rodes had a great opportunity to hit the Union line in the flank but launched piecemeal attacks that necessitated Hill to make a costly frontal attack in order to carry the Union position. Then Ewell rightly withheld an attack on Cemetery Hill because Rodes' Division was combat blown and disordered and Early's scattered, with Johnson not on the field due to Ewell's unfathomable marching orders. On the second day, Ewell failed to attack in concert with Longstreet, allowing Union reserves on the right flank to be used against Longstreet. Ewell then launched an uncoordinated understrength assault on Cemetery Hill that might have succeeded if he had used his whole corps instead of wasting Johnson's effort attacking Culp's Hill. On the third day Ewell allowed the Union forces to preempt his renewed assault on Culp's Hill. But, yeah, sure, Ewell wasn't indecisive, he did a great job.
@@jonathansloane702 Ewell had no clear idea of Union location or strength when he approached Gettysburg, and moving divisions down separate but nearby roads was stock procedure during the war for both combatants. Ewell didn't receive Lee's instruction not to bring on a general engagement until he was told to take Cemetery Hill if practicable.
When Lee's note arrived, one of Ewell's divisions had not yet arrived, and he had received a report of Union forces on his left flank. He sent out a reconnaissance force to determine the strength of Union forces on the hill and then dealt with the report of Union forces on his flank. By the time he was able to determine that the report was false, it was dark. His recon team returned at about this time and reported that Cemetery Hill was held by "a superior force". It was only after the war that it became clear that Cemetery Hill could have been taken on 1 July.
Ewell's assault on 2 July is hardly an example of indecisiveness. Uncoordinated attacks- both Confederate and Union- were commonplace during the war, and even the best Confederate leaders made them. Your admonition about Ewell using Johnston's division is 20/20 hindsight. Ewell did as well as any other Confederate general might have. The major errors of the campaign were all made by Lee, and not by any of his subordinates.
@@manilajohn0182 We have no disagreement that Ewell was correct in not assaulting Cemetery Hill, but you are quite incorrect about when Ewell received the initial order to not bring on a general engagement. After giving Rodes orders to deploy his 8,000 soldiers for battle, Ewell sent Major Campbell Brown, his stepson and principal aide, to find Lee and tell him that Ewell meant to join the fray. Brown found Lee on Herr Ridge, where both he and Hill had come after hearing the bark of muskets and bellow of cannons. Lee sent Campbell back to Ewell with an astounding order: ‘Do not charge; I want to avoid a general engagement.’
Ewell had violated Lee's order in ordering Rodes to the attack. Brown advised that now was not the time to disobey Lee. He described Lee as seething with anger,’ showing a querulous impatience … I never saw before.’ Despite Brown’s warning that Lee was in no mood to see his orders ignored, Ewell could not pass up the opportunity to assault the open Union flank. The enemy troops were so vulnerable that they could be quickly routed, which would not be a ‘general engagement,’ Ewell reasoned. Rodes’ alignment took much longer than he had expected, and the arrival of fresh Federal troops added desperation to his assault. As a result, when Rodes’ troops finally advanced at about 2 p.m., their charge was delivered piecemeal. Heth, on Herr Ridge, saw Ewell’s attack falter. Turning to Lee, he asked if he should press Pettigrew’s and Brockenbrough’s brigades into the fray. ‘No,’ Lee curtly replied. ‘I am not prepared to bring on a general engagement today.’ He was determined to shun battle that day, and no doubt was incensed at Ewell for having defied his orders.
When he received Lee's discretionary order to attack Cemetery Hill if practicable, it contained the repeated caveat if he could do so without bringing on a general battle, meaning with just the troops under his control, and Ewell was hesitant to violate that order a second time. As Ewell only had Avery's brigade available, he informed Lee that he would attack if supported by Hill on his right. Hill demurred claiming that Heth and Pender were fought out, and Lee would not commit Anderson's newly arrived division, keeping it as his only reserve, content with the gains made that day, although purchased at a high cost. Of course the ultimate responsibility resides with Lee, but the fact remains that Ewell's Corps was poorly handled and he attacked Oak Hill against Lee's orders. But yeah, keep telling me Ewell performed competently.
@@jonathansloane702 I completely forgot about Lee's Oak Hill note regarding not bringing on a general engagement. So yes, you're correct; Ewell was informed of Lee's desire to not bring on a general engagement earlier.
However, Ewell didn't disobey Lee's orders, because Ewell was clearly satisfied that he could avoid bringing on a general engagement (and he did not). He made a decision, and it was the wrong one. It hardly makes Ewell incompetent or guilty of poorly handling his corps. If Ewell habitually made these mistakes, you'd have a solid point here- but he didn't, so you don't. Jackson completely failed Lee- repeatedly, I might add- during the Seven Day's Battles, despite specific knowledge of his vital role in the campaign. As far as I'm aware, no one regards Jackson as incompetent.
Lee was not "...determined to shun battle that day..."; he wanted to avoid a general engagement until the Army was concentrated- whenever that might be.
The errors of Lee's subordinates are positively minor when compared to those made by Lee. Lee erred in convincing the Confederate government that he could achieve enough of a success in the east to force the Union to remove pressure from (and later, lift the siege of) Vicksburg.
He erred again in spending an excessive amount of time in his move northward when time was of the essence.
He committed the fatal error of the campaign by giving his cavalry commander two contradictory objectives for one small force. Since they coincided in time, Stuart had literally no chance of carrying them both out successfully. Stuart's failure to get Lee timely information on the strength and location of the AotP led directly to the disastrous meeting engagement of 1 July, which ruined Lee's plan of campaign.
I really enjoyed reading your book, thanks for clarifying the debate against the lost cause historians.
Excellent. Thank you.
It's kind of crazy how this one guy - obviously an intelligent man and a man with great character - was so close to both the icons of the Union and the rebels.
Brilliant! Very, very well done mate. Though the south lost the war militarily, they won the peace, at least for the next hundred and twenty-five years. That the Lost Cause groupies were allowed to essentially write the history of the war is pathetic at the very least and a shame to the nation at large. The loss at Gettysburg was due to Lee's slack leadership, not Longstreet's supposed inadequacies. But suggesting that Lee was not the flawless genius his numerous, shrill Myrmidons have for all these decades insisted/demanded is just kicking a hornet's nest. Cheers!
Very well presented. Thanks
I must admit to my perception of general longstreet is very much tilted towards favourable by the wonderful tom berenger performance in gettysberg
Don't be seduced by the movie. Longstreet was Slow that day 2 and resented Lee.
I not as informed as i should be on the subject.@@marknewton6984
Well researched, and well presents….and totally convincing.
This is incredible. I'm a huge Lee fanboi and a true southerner. Read about the Civil War since I was a small boy. There has never been any question that Lee lost the battle and that it was his fault. He gambled wrong on the third day. Big time. That attack was doomed from the outset, obviously. That is why it has been so scrutinized.
By 3 July, Lee had no alternative but to attack- or abandon the campaign in failure and write off Vicksburg (lifting the siege of which was the strategic objective of the campaign).
@@manilajohn0182 I don't hate Lee, but the sense I get about July 3rd is that Lee fell victim to a combination of: "My men struggled and bled for two days" variant of the sunk-cost fallacy; and unintentionally (and probably without realizing) falling for his own myth.
That's just my humble take, though.
@@UrbanCohort
1. By Mid- 1863, the Confederacy was losing the war. Their victories in the east had all been indecisive and had done no more than to prevent the capture of Richmond and keep the AoNV intact. In the west, the Confederacy had gone from one defeat to another, and were on the verge of losing control of the Mississippi River and having the Confederacy cut in two. Their sole links across the Mississippi were the fortress at Vicksburg (what President Davis called "The nail that holds the two halves of the Confederacy together") and Port Hudson (a smaller fortified location).
2. The strategic objective of the campaign (hashed out by the Confederate political leadership at Richmond in mid- May) was to at least gain enough of a success to remove pressure from the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg. When Vicksburg was placed under siege before Lee's campaign began, this became achieving enough of a success to force the Union to lift the siege of Vicksburg.
3. Another (operational) objective of the campaign was to take the war away from Virginia and forage off of Union territory to restock the AoNVs supply train.
4. Lee's plan of campaign was to entice the AotP to attack the AoNV and defeat that attack (from Lee's after- action report and Longstreet's memoirs). To accomplish this, Lee needed information on the strength and location of the AotP. Lee assigned this task to his cavalry commander, J.E.B. Stuart.
5. Lee committed the fatal error of the campaign when he violated an elementary military axiom- "One force, one objective"- and gave Stuart two objectives. He instructed Stuart to gather both information (necessary for Lee's plan of campaign) and provisions (the operational objective of the campaign) without designating either as a priority objective. While many blame Stuart for not seeing the gathering of information as the more important of the two, the real responsibility lies with Lee- who should have never instructed Stuart to gather provisions in the first place, particularly since Stuart only had three brigades with him.
6. Stuart was separated from the AoNV by the unexpected and rapid advance northward of the AotP. Then Stuart stumbled onto a Union supply train of 150 new fully stocked wagons. In accordance with Lee's orders, he kept them- and his advance was slowed to a crawl.
7. Lee committed another error by taking an excessive amount of time in his march northward while his army foraged. By the time that he arrived near Cashtown, Vicksburg had been under siege for over five weeks.
8. Lee committed yet another error by not making clear to his corps and division commanders what his plan of campaign actually was.
9. The resulting lack of information from Stuart resulted in Lee being informed by an independent scout of the proximity of the AotP. On 29 June, Lee ordered the AoNV to concentrate near Gettysburg. The lack of information from Stuart on the AotP and his subordinates' lack of a clear understanding as to the plan of campaign resulted in a meeting engagement at Gettysburg in which the Confederates attacked and secured a minor victory. This ruined Lee's plan of campaign by casting the tactical offensive on to Lee. Having been attacked and defeated by the AoNV, it was now unlikely in the extreme that the AotP would go over to the attack as Lee had originally planned.
10. Lee was now stuck. Vicksburg had been under siege for almost six weeks and the clock was ticking. The AoNV could not remain in any one area for more than 3-5 days because it was foraging and had no line of supply. Lee could not send out foraging parties in the immediate presence of the AotP, and his army hadn't foraged since 29 June. His plan of campaign had been ruined and he was engaged in battle on unfamiliar ground.
11. This is why Lee attacked on both 2 and 3 July. He no longer had the time to wait for the AotP to attack, and (by 3 July) had no time to maneuver around the Union left as Longstreet suggested. Lee had to either attack or abandon the campaign in failure.
12. Pickett's Charge was the product of what was, in Napoleonic terminology, "The Strategic Battle". The general concept was that the Union Commander would weaken his center to support both his left and his right (both of which were attacked on 2 July). Meade understood this as well however and had foreseen just such an eventuality. When the Confederate bombardment began on 3 July, Meade had approximately 20,000 reinforcements readied to move toward his center if ordered. These did so and crushed the Confederate attack.
@@manilajohn0182 I can't tell you how much I appreciate how much thought you put into your reply, and I admire how much time you must put in to studying history (certainly more than I, a hobbyist at best).
Am I correct in my understanding that you are arguing that Lee was forced to commit to Gettysburg by a combination of errors and tactical considerations?
@@UrbanCohort Many thanks; you're very kind. What I submit is that Lee was forced to commit to offensive action at Gettysburg after 1 July because of a combination of both strategic and operational errors- all of which were made by Lee himself.
Believing that his army could decisively impact events almost 1,000 miles away was a great strategic error. Tasking his infantry with both foraging and marching northward in a timely enough manner for a decisive battle was an operational one- as was tasking his cavalry with obtaining both information and provisions (this latter one being the fatal error of the campaign).
Whether these errors were due to the pressure of the overall war situation or due to natural human flaws in Lee's character is a good question. Personally, I think both were factors. Lee couldn't remain where he was along the line of the Rappahannock River because his army was literally starving there, but it seems clear that Lee definitely asked far too much of his far too small army. But that's just my opinion.
Cheers...
I was drafted as a teenager in1969. Vietnam was going strong. I knew what had gone down during the Civil War so
I was grateful it was 1969 and not 1861.
It helped.
Well done, interesting presentation, nice job 👍
From what I’ve read, I believe Lee should’ve heeded Longstreet’s advice to move to better ground. I have not listened to the presentation yet so I may be sitting here corrected, which is fine but this is everything that I’ve read up until now without this lecture in my mind yet.
I think Lee had several factors going against him. His goal was to draw out the union Army, and to do his best to destroy the army of the Potomac to force Washington DC into negotiations for an agreement of having two separate countries!
The main obstacle I think was Lee did not know what was in front of him. Prior to the battle all he is intelligence came from an actor acting as a spy, who gave them and pinpointed the position of the union Army Corp by Corp. JEB Stuart and his ridiculous dislike of two of his cavalry subordinates were left behind in Virginia when they should’ve been marching with Lee while Stuart was under orders, creating a ruckus so as to force the union hand. The problem is 3 to 4 days away would be his usual. Of time, but he was away for eight days and had not reported the whereabouts of the union army! That alone was enough to tell General Lee that he should consider different ground! He allowed the union army to dictate on what ground they would fight!
I believe Longstreet was of cerebral commanders who had asked to reposition and deploy to find better ground. General mead would’ve followed the army of northern Virginia anywhere and being as cautious as he was and new to command, he would’ve made a mistake, most likely. He would’ve fought on the wrong ground, which this became the essence of the battle in my opinion. The north had the high ground and the south did not!
The southern army could not afford to lose the people on day three. Pikkit charge was lost from the very beginning, and it never happened! I don’t know why Robert E Lee did not listen to his subordinate commanders specifically Longstreet regarding day, two trying to attack an army in trenched in the heights and then day three setting 15,000+ people on a March well over a mile to brave union artillery while Porter Alexander did not have enough artillery to sustain his garage as it was too far behind the lines. Alexander been able to sustain his bombardment, it may have been a different outcome at least a little more challenging anyway!!
I’m going to listen to the lecture now so this is my opinion before the lecture and I’m looking forward to hearing it! Thank you very much for posting this ! I’m a Yankee, but for some reason I can’t help but pull for the South in this conflict that had BEWARE written all over it after day one!
Lee had Gettysburg on June 26. He had Early march North, AWAY from the Union army. This mistake led to Lee being unable to fight the approaching Union Corps separately as they entered Pennsylvania. Later he kept his troops in a long arc, giving Meade time to get to the high ground. Lee had no qualms about sending Jackson on a flanking march at Chancellorsville but forbade Longstreet to execute the same maneuver. Lee also made the mistake of starting a battle with out Stuart on the field. Longstreet had only 15 to 20,000 men at his disposal. Not really sure why people think he should have beaten Meade's 80,000 on his own. Lee fought a battle he did not have to, and fought it in a hurry. Meade knew ho to fight on a hill, and Lee obliged him.
This was really interesting.
Why have historians left the dact that Lee was with Longstreet? Also, people blame Longstreet for the loss, but Lee sent aides and even went himself to the left to get Ewell to move to the right. Would the results have been different if the II corps had added their weight ? Or would it have made command and control worse? Never heard this question asked.Love this book!
Ewell was ordered to attack third day 10AM on expectation of keeping Union forces from Longstreet’s attack, that’s five hours of support so there was some hope for a considerably earlier attack though you explain what happened well. Longstreet does have an interesting wartime history of intrigue especially around Chattanooga and the blaming of his commanders from the Knoxville battle. I don’t disagree with your basic argument and wonder if the cavalry attack was successful if that had made a difference. Pickett when interviewed mentioned that the Union army had something to do with his defeat
This battle is full of “couldas”, “shouldas”, and “wouldas” with the luxury of knowing the end of the story and nearly 160 years of scholarship.
I think the big thing historians ignore about the primary sources is they had reasons to lie or play politics.
Many of the staff officers and generals were in their 30s or younger during the war. They had 30+ years after the war to live and try to make an income. In that time period a man's reputation was a huge factor in that and so many had very large incentive to flat out lie.
I find it funny how with some generals, especially certain union generals, historians always discount or take their primary account with grains of salt but those same historians seem to think all the southern generals are telling the whole truth and nothing but the truth all the time.
Col. Long specifically contradicts himself in his personal accounts of gettysburg a few times yet historians use his account more than any to criticize Longstreet.
Specifically Long says Lee was bewildered when meeting with Ewell at around 10am why he didn't hear artillery and the attack starting on the right. But that's simply a clear lie. There is no reasonable way that Lee should have expected that or thought that. It's clear Long lied to further the "Longstreet delayed the attack" narrative.
This brings up how many other people lied to further that narrative. It's interesting to me that Longstreet received letters from Taylor and Long saying they didn't know of a sunrise attack order but both men later criticized Longstreet along that narrative.
Again these were young men who's family well-being relied on their untarnished reputation. Of course they'd lie to protect their reputation. Especially when you boil down to who really was at fault at gettysburg you find it was Lee's staff that was in the wrong many times and leading the failures. Lee himself in his resignation letter to Davis specifically mentions he over estimated the ability of his personal staff to convey his orders and bring him information.
So Taylor, Johnston, Long, and the rest of Lee's staff were likely where most of the blame lay so they are the most active in blaming Longstreet later on after initially giving accounts that didn't blame him.
Jubal Early and Penelton found and created a scapegoat that these desperate men then latched onto and laid into.
As a side note historians do the same with northern general accounts. Meade is painted as truthful and Sickles as a liar. The reality is Meade was political too and likely lied some too.
Historians often need to sell books and what sells books is romanticized stereotypic characters. Black and white situations. The liar and the good guy narratives. The victim and the persecutors.
In reality almost everyone in society lays in the gray area between these stereotypic black and white realms of narratives. They both act in good intentions and bad. They both win and lose. Real people are complex and not simple.
well done very nice presentation thanks
They waiting till after Lees death because they were lying about Longstreet and Lee wouldn’t have stood for the lies and would have spoken up proving Early and the rest of them were liars.
Cory does an outstanding job of using the primary source records to show how the propaganda attacks on Longstreet were just that - complete nonsense.
"Ol Pete" Longstreet was appointed by General Lee to be 1st Corps Commander, that wouldn't have happened if Lee hadn't respected him and held him in high regard. Longstreet 8 Brigades, think about that.
Excellent book
Okay, BUT how do you explain this.......
The bottom line is that just about everything that could go wrong for General Lee at Gettysburg did go wrong. At the end of the day, Robert E. Lee was the commanding general, and the Confederate failure at Gettysburg fell on his shoulders above all. Robert E. Lee never attempted to shift the blame to anyone else's shoulders but his own, like a man he publicly acknowledged that the failure was ultimately his.
In the post-war years, especially after Lee's death in 1870, in the South, the two icons of "the Lost Cause" above all were Stonewall Jackson and Robert E. Lee. To criticize either in much of the South was all but forbidden. There was always the fantasy of "If Stonewall Jackson had been at Gettysburg, things would have been different" and the desire to place blame on anyone's shoulders bit Robert E. Lee's.
The two primary scapegoats became James Longstreet and JEB Stuart. It was unfair to both men. Of course, JEB Stuart was not alive to defend himself, and Longstreet was.
The anti Longstreet factions had as much animosity toward Longstreet for things that occurred after the war and his personal relationship with Ulysses Grant, as it has to do with anything that occurred during the war.
It would seem that those wishing to exonerate JEB Stuart and defend his reputation often pointed their fingers at Longstreet. Those who supported Longstreet often pointed their fingers at JEB Stuart. But nobody dared point their fingers at Robert E. Lee, upon whose shoulders the blame ultimately laid, a fact that Lee made clear and did not dispute.
It often amazes me, the ego you see amongst the officer's corps, on both sides during and after the war. The finger pointing, the politicking that continued until the last of them, were dead of old age long after the war. We often think of the egos amongst the officers during WWII with Montgomery, Patton, MacArthur, and the likes but I dare say they had nothing on the officer's corps of both the Confederate and Union Armies of the Civil War.
Ewell-Stuart-Longstreet all made Lee look bad. He needed Stonewall. Yes, it would have been different.
IN the usa you missing a part of Longstreet , Longstreet of Langstraat was een Zeeuw ( part of Holland witch is called Zeeland ) There his familu came from , a hard live on the dutch shores and few o ar most polilair admirals cam from Zeeland so ..
The Zeeuw is a calculted , stubborn man and he will not give up easily ..
Longstraat was on good reasons against the accack so he did less to hurry it ( spare lifes ?? ) maby .., he plan too go too another place too fight is sound en coorect ( like his style )
the pickkett charge great in history is like the accack on the somm e, stupid ..
Grtz from Holland ( europ) and a Langstraat ( longstreet ) fan
Was it Mike Tyson who said everyone has a plan until they are punched in the face? The terrain played a vital role in the Union victory At Gettysburg. Only the confederate soldiers tenacity made it a close run affair.
Actually a version of that "No plan survives contact with the enemy dates back to Sun Tzu's The Art of War
I would disagree with the contention that Lee never responded to Longstreet’s inaction. He sent him to Georgia soon after returning to Virginia.
Also the catalyst for Gordon’s, Early’s and others attack of Longstreet after Lee died is because Longstreet waited for Lee to die before he criticized his Gettysburg campaign.
No general except for maybe Jackson understood that Lee wanted nothing short of the destruction of the army of the Potomac. Even after Chancellorsville Lee admonished his generals for claiming a great victory. Lee thought having not destroyed the union invaders was nothing to celebrate.
Thanks for your comment, Bill. The assertion Longstreet went West after Gettysburg at the behest of Lee and because Lee didn't want Longstreet serving under him anymore (because of alleged actions at Gettysburg) is yet another myth. Longstreet had been petitioning to go West, even before Gettysburg. During spring 1863 campaign discussions, Longstreet suggested his corps go West and join with multiple Confederate armies as part of his "Kentucky Invasion Plan." There is no evidence Lee actively wanted Longstreet to temporarily leave the AoNV. Rather, after Gettysburg he recognized the deteriorating situation in the West following the fall of Vicksburg and relented to a temporary transfer. Following Chickamauga we have Lee writing Longstreet, telling him to finish his work "and return to me. I want you badly, and you cannot get back too soon.” Longstreet ultimately did that in spring 1864 and served under Lee until the AoNV's surrender.
Regarding the comment about Longstreet waiting until Lee died to discuss Gettysburg and some of his and Lee's differences of opinion on tactical matters at the battle...it is actually the opposite. Longstreet discussed Gettysburg with author William Swinton in 1866 in a series of interviews for Swinton's book "The Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac." Early and Pendleton waited until after Lee's death to make their allegations against Longstreet's Gettysburg performance - Early in January 1872 and Pendleton in January 1873.
It appears that the Confederate commander and his corps commanders all performed quite badly at Gettysburg, so it may be unfair to single out Longstreet for criticism. I cannot help but contrast Lee's reported inactivity or reserve with the sort of actions that would have been taken by the Duke of Wellington and the Duke of Marlborough. They would have been everywhere. Arguably age, malnutrition and stress or ill health had taken its toll on Lee, but other than diet the Duke of Marlborough was of comparable age and underwent the same sort of strains. Lee was the best tactician of the war but my admiration for him is less for his military exploits but more for his conduct and the example he set in his life.
The charge should have been called Lee's charge....
I don’t think Sam Hood should’ve attacked Little Round Top. I think the second and third days were Lee’s mistake. I think they should’ve re-deployed.
I don't wanna make this charge I don't see how it can succeed I wouldn't make it now but General Lee expects and demands it
General James Longstreet
Confederate Army
Excellent presentation, for l have read many a books on The War Between the States.
I know Lee was blind without Stuart, and with troops spread out the Maryland State line to the outskirts of Harrisburg. He really had to scramble to bring the ANV back into close proximity.
I can't remember the date when Lee took a tumble from Traveler, and may have suffered a heart attack. I do believe this did take place in Virginia at the onset of the Northern Campaign of 1863 into Pennsylvania.
A lot of revisionist historians have maligned Lee &Longstreet and the whole War in recent times; just a ballpark figure- 20 years or so.
In conclusion, l do not advocate slavery or condone any type of servitude. It's that you cannot change history, you have to change the present and the future. If that's possible.
Stuart's failure was entirely Lee's fault, and was THE major error of the campaign. Lee violated a fundamental military axiom- "One force, one objective"- by giving Stuart two objectives for one very small force. By tasking Stuart with obtaining both information and provisions (and not stating which was the primary objective), he placed his cavalry commander in an impossible situation. These two objectives coincided in time, so that Stuart could not first accomplish one, and then the other. Obtaining the first required a mobility which only cavalry could provide, while obtaining the second would inevitably impede his mobility. This is exactly what transpired during the campaign.
This was the fatal error of the campaign because Lee's plan of campaign was to entice the AotP into attacking the AoNV. Accomplishing this required timely information on the location and strength of the AotP. Stuart's failure led directly to the disastrous (for the Confederates) meeting engagement of 1 July. This minor victory utterly ruined Lee's plan of campaign by casting the tactical initiative onto the AoNV.
Lee had other Calvary, why weren’t they used?
@@twinsboy_3410 Some were guarding passes to the Shenandoah Valley and were forgotten about for a period, while another consisted of irregulars who were supposedly considered unreliable for reconnaissance.
Actually Lee took the fall from Traveler before the Antietam campeign
History suggests that Longstreet was right about everything at Gettysburg. It's not right for him to be judged so negatively.
Thanks!
You fail to tell that Lee's plan was to threaten Washington, by telling Davis to send men towards Washington under Beauregard, and had this been done Meade would have retreated, Longstreet probably got his flanking idea from this idea. Lee might have lost his whole army if he followed Longstreet's plan as the Union had many men guarding Washington and Baltimore and they could have surrounded Lee with these men and blocked his retreat path. As was the campaign was a success and a failure for Lee, the success his men got many needed supplies off Union land, and they failure they did not win at Gettysburg, They would have had Lee's suggestion to Davis been followed and his orders would most likely had worked also, but were not followed.
I think its clear that Longstreet disagreed with his boss at Gettysburg and it did affect his "enthusiasm" for Lee's orders.
Lee to Longstreet - I trust you more than anyone… but Im not going to listen to a word you say
You got that right and I'm a Harrisburg Pennsylvania Yankee after Antetum he should of never tried another northern campaign it was doomed from the start the federal army just had to much of everything plus the idea that Yankee boys wouldn't stand and fight was wasn't true bi a long shot
Lee almost pulled it off though. Without Stonewall...oh, well...
** Everything went awry for Longstreet on Day 2 when John Bell Hood was about to go around the Union left and suddenly realized that he was staring at them face to face.
Dan Sickles ruined their plan (albeit by accident) to roll up the Union army starting at Little round top. Just my opinion on when and where things went bad for Longstreet at Gettysburg
Good point, Longstreet agreed.
I do not find this presentation accurate, or at the very least complete. At the 22:43 mark it says that there was no evidence for a sunrise attack that Longstreet was supposed to conduct on July 2nd. Nevertheless you cite letters by Gen. Early and Pendleton which confirm this. Certainly this is evidence of that order (we can debate though whether it is persuasive or not).
Secondly, and more importantly, there was another letter written after the war (June 1875) by John Bell Hood, addressed to James Longstreet, where he confirms that "Lee was anxious for you to attack that morning". Gen. Hood then writes Longstreet said he would wait for Pickett to arrive because "I never like to go into a fight with one boot off." Hood cites this as being the cause as to why the attack did not commence till the late afternoon.
It should be noted that Hood was a friend of Longstreet's after the war and had no reason to lie in a letter addressed to Longstreet about his activities that day. Hood was there at day break on the second where Longstreet himself confirmed Lee's desire to have him attack that morning.
More firsthand sources for an early morning attack can be found on JSTOR in an article written by Haywood J Pearce Jr entitled Longstreet's Responsibility on the Second Day of Gettysburg.
In sum I find this whole video unpersuasive to say the least. We can debate all we want about whether Longstreet received the order or not, but this video does not give an accurate portrayal of all the evidence suggesting there was such an order that was disobeyed by Longstreet due to the fact he desired different conditions than were on the ground to launch an attack.
Well I would be sulking too if Lee ordered 2 of my divisions to an almost certain death. Anyone could see that Picketts chargers wouldn’t work. Longstreet could see it. Why couldn’t Lee or Pickett. Garnett and Armstead knew they weren’t coming back after that charge. Longstreet was the only man there with the balls to tell Lee that the attack was going to fail and fail it did. I think about 6000 people died in that charge with another 3000 wounded. For what? For nothing. If I was a confederate soldier I would have went home after seeing that. I’m from Louisiana but I would not have been a confederate soldier I can promise you that. Everyone thinks that ALL the West Point graduates from Virginia joined the confederacy. Not true. 1/3 of them stayed in the US Army. That’s 33%. If I was an officer in the US Army it would have been dishonorable to resign my commission and draw my sword against my country. Dam my state. Louisiana is nothing without
The United States.
There was definitely mistakes made on both sides during the battle....listening to different accounts some people believe general ewell was to blame for the failure of General Lee's plan
Longstreet did complain and disagree with Lee, that is a fact well documented by historians from the South and North. The complaints by Longstreet were in fact correct, this is supported by the events and the outcome of the battle. Lee was responsible for the heavy losses at Gettysburg not Longstreet. Your suggestions of are not supported by historians. Your opinion I respect but totally wrong.
Chamberlain had a platoon of US sharpshooters armed with Sharp's breach loading long rifles that can kill at 500 yard's
When you claim one is a hero without fail named Lee thrn all the fails of Lee had to be done by a scapegoat.
The ridiculous "Lost Cause" tiresome lie about a tragic doomed prideful disaster. Plenty of blame for all persons unnamed.A well defended position should be hailed. Is that time, and place?
You miss the point Lee ordered Longstreet to attack he did not Moxley Sorrel even made the point Longstreet was slow and cost the Confederates a victory, and Longstreet maintained Sickles cost him a lack of big victory.
There are a lot of blue bellies in the comments...
I agree with this video presentation too. I’m proud to have been born and raised in San Antonio, Texas!
I agree completely, perhaps even more so as I’m substantially less charitable and admiring of Lee. And I am born in the upper Valley, grew up in the Blue Ridge of Virginia and attended college in SC…. Worship of Lee and the deification of the ‘Lost Cause’ was almost universal there and certainly in my family, which counted 13 veterans of the ANV in its number. But the study of his actions and their results led me, on the basis of the facts, to a very different view. One need not be a ‘Yankee’ to prefer history to myth.
@@nomdeguerre7265 The fact is it was a fringing miracle that Lee was able to keep the underfed, under supplied, numberically inferior ANV together until 1865. If Johnston wouldnt have been wounded he probably would have abandoned Richmond in 1862 and the war was lost much sooner. People know the most about Gettysburg so they study it ad nauseam and act like it was his only battle. His fault or not it was the only battle where his cavalry wasnt properly implored and was the reason for not only the defeat but his inability to make the large flanking movement that Longstreet advised. As for the smaller flanking movement of Hood i am sure the Union Sixth Corps would have had something to say about that. His only real mistake of the war besides expecting all his Corp Commander to be a Jackson in using discretion was he didnt realize the battle was over after the second day. He had Stuart now and using the third day to retreat would have made much more sense then the colossal mistake of Pickett's charge. No excuse can be made for that. He was not overrated he just chose the side with less manpower, less industralized and had a system where state rights ruled. In war you have to have a big centralized governent. People have turned on Lee cause god forbid in this blm day we look up to a General that at one time owned slaves That was of course wrong but it has no bearing on his generalship
@@bobber0623 Lee’s position on slavery has nothing to do with my analysis. He was the best possible choice to fight the wrong war. In doing so he allowed the South to believe it could win the war by winning battles. Perhaps they should have studied a bit less Napoleon & a bit more 2nd Punic war.
Lee was the best general the Confederates had, he was not perfect or a god.
I think John Bell Hood was one of the best Generals of the war between the states 🖼️
I very much agree, but unfortunately he was overpromoted in the end. Longstreet should have paid heed to Hood at Gettysbury and trusted his proposed plan of attack.
That said I think Lee was not himself at G. L was correct in wishing to move around the Roundtops…perhaps Old Pete would have gotten moving faster, not countermarched in Corps order, and swept over the Roundtops had his plan been adopted… and the war would go on an extra 9-12 months. The third day was the result of great miscalculation by Lee.
Sounds like you are suggesting a tactical turning movement around the Round Tops. That's what Hood wanted to do with his division. Have you looked at a map? That space is a cul de sac with Rock Creek on the right and the Round Tops on the left, enough room for a two brigade front and no room for maneuver. The V Corps was positioned in reserve where the Baltimore Pike crosses Rock Creek, closing off the cul de sac. The VI Corps was arriving up the Baltimore Pike on what would have been Hood's right flank and rear. Hood's Division would have never come back if it went around the Round Tops. Had McClaws followed Hood, Sickles would have been free to attack from the west. But it sounds like a really good thing to do. Until you look at a map. And a strategic turning movement would be an even dumber idea, which is why Longstreet never suggested such a thing.
The primary reason why Longstreet wanted to envelop the Union left was to draw the AotP into attacking the AoNV- and the minor Confederate victory on 1 July had already ruined that possibility by casting the tactical initiative onto Lee. Pickett's Charge on 3 July was the only option which Lee had left, because he was all but out of time.
General James Longstreet was the best Commander on either side
Bullshit Read the Knoxville campaign then say that His only independent command was an utter disaster
@@bobber0623 GFY
Forrest was the best division commander. Longstreet was the best Corp commander. Thomas was the best army commander and U.S. Grant was the best commander, period. As for R.E. Lee, for all his tactical brilliance what he was best at was losing a war. The only reason Sherman isn’t in the list isn’t because he wasn’t an exceptional army commander, but that Thomas was actually even better.
@@bobber0623 you can thank General Bragg for that.
@@jerseyrattler Great intelligent comeback. You havent even read the Knoxville campaign have you?
I have never blamed Longstreet or Lee ! The culprit is Jeb Stuart , he left the whole army blind ,which is a no - no ! He should have been removed from duty when he finally made his appearance !!!
That is a myth. Stuart was acting on orders from Lee, and though he was slightly late, he performed well in his raid, and he did all he could to reach the battle as soon as possible. Lee had other cavalry available to him that he failed to properly utilize.
I doubt neither he nor Lee knew that before Pickets charge most of the artillery shells were either over shot or didn’t explode
Who knew the Longstreet family had a publicist?
Lee made it clear Longsastreet was slow on the attack on day three.
😴
I don't know what all the debate is about concerning Gettysburg. The attacker almost never succeeded during the Civil War. Chancellorsville is an obvious outlier, yet look at the confederate casualties. Still huge. And the attack didn't even accomplish anything much beyond spoiling hood's envelopment initiative.
What do you mean why didn’t Lee send him away if L was so obstructive??? 2 months after Gettysburg L was in Tennessee reporting to Braxton Bragg!!! “at his own request”…ahem.
Thanks for your comment, John. You’re right, Longstreet did go “west” two months after Gettysburg. He had been petitioning Lee about his corps joining with western armies, even before Gettysburg. That said, he was not sent at the behest of Lee. In fact, just after Chickamauga we have Lee writing to Longstreet, “Finish your work, my dear General, and return to me. I want you badly, and you cannot get back too soon.” Ultimately, that is just what Longstreet did in early 1864. There were also a number of additional heartfelt letters exchanged between Lee and Longstreet in the lead up to and during Longstreet’s time in the west.
Lee had no problem ridding himself of subordinate generals he deemed ineffectual, insubordinate, etc. - think Benjamin Huger, Theophilus Holmes, John Magruder, and even D.H. Hill. And yet, Lee did no such thing to Longstreet after Gettysburg. Rather, Longstreet served under Lee from the Wilderness to Appomattox, and they continued their personal relationship into the postwar years.
@@corypfarr3200 excellent work Mr. Pfarr. Is it possible that Lee broke his own heart at Gettysburg and knew the war in the east was doomed, thus sending or allowing his seemingly most trusted “war horse” to the west to help Bragg?
@@Tusk_III The Confederate government made the decision to reinforce Bragg from Lee's army since Lee was acting strictly on the defensive and the war in Virginia was at a stalemate. Nothing to do with broken hearts or dark forebodings of doom.
Army of Northern Virginia couldn't feed all their troops with supplies in Virginia especially after Vicksburg falling cutting off the Mississippi river and the cutting off of the major RR's around Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Louisiana and Georgia by the Western Union Armies. Longstreet basically had the most well equipped Corp and trained troops that could be pulled in a last moment gasp to try to resolve the situation in the West.
@@bmc7434 There were more than enough supplies east of the Mississippi to supply the AoNV. The fundamental problem was that the Confederate rail net was incapable of effectively moving them to where they were needed. This is the basis for Lee's request to move north. The Confederacy could not adequately supply the AoNV by rail in its position along the Rappahannock, and the surrounding countryside had already been either foraged or devastated by Union forces.
The only mistake that Longstreet made at Gettysburg was that he failed to realize that Lee's plan of campaign had been utterly ruined by the unexpected meeting engagement of 1 July. If he had realized it, he would not have repeatedly suggested a flanking maneuver around the AotP's left.
Four fundamental mistakes were made concerning this campaign, and they were all made by Lee. Firstly, Lee insisted on retaining all of the forces under his command in the east. This saddled Lee with accomplishing the strategic objective set out in Richmond in mid- May- namely, to achieve a great enough success to force the Union to lift the siege of Vicksburg. But the sheer distance between Lee and Vicksburg meant that Lee had to achieve a decisive victory on the scale of Austerlitz or Jena to even have a chance of lifting that siege. This was far beyond the ability of any Civil War army to accomplish.
Secondly, Lee's plan of campaign centered around maneuvering the AotP into attacking the AoNV. Lee however, failed to make his corps and division commanders adequately aware of this objective, with the result that some of them initiated the disastrous meeting engagement of 1 July- which cast the tactical initiative onto Lee and the AoNV.
Thirdly, Lee needed timely information as to the location and strength of the AotP if he was to entice them into attacking at a position of Lee's choosing. Only Lee's cavalry had the mobility to obtain this information- but Lee violated the basic military axiom of "One force, one objective" and gave his cavalry commander two objectives for one small force. Moreover, these two objectives were contradictory in nature, and both coincided in time. Stuart could not possibly have obtained information on the AotP (which would require mobility) while at the same time obtaining provisions for the army (which would impede that very mobility). Since Stuart could not first accomplish one objective and then the other, he was placed in an impossible situation. In fact he attempted to comply with Lee's instructions, and he predictably failed.
Lastly, Lee seems not to have fully understood the factor of time in this campaign. Vicksburg was placed under siege before Lee's campaign even began, yet Lee's movement north was made with no haste. Perhaps this was because of Lee's need to forage, but Lee probably should have realized that maneuvering the AotP into attacking him would be difficult enough at best- and could only be made more so by the necessity of his army to live off of the land.
In his defense, the strategic position of the Confederacy in mid- 1863 was dire, and Lee had a full plate to deal with. On the other hand, the overconfidence of both the officers and men of the entire AoNV likely prompted them to attempt far too much with far too little.
Stuart was tasked with assigning cavalry to three tasks: his ‘ride’ for diversion and reconnaissance in depth, screening and tactical reconnaissance and supply line cover. Stuart assigned those units which Lee might have been willing to use to the latter, and chose commanders and units Lee didn’t like or trust to the second. He took with him those other commanders Lee might have trusted enough to use. Lee had cavalry even with Stuart gone. But Stuart had left him with officers Lee refused to use. That’s why junior engineers were assigned reconnaissance duties for Longstreet. And Lee was aware of these assignments which Longstreet had recommended against at the time.
@@nomdeguerre7265 Stuart was never assigned a diversionary role by Lee. Stuart was never tasked with supply line cover because Lee had no line of supply; the AoNV was foraging off of the countryside. Stuart was tasked with attaching his command to Ewell's right, gathering information, and gathering provisions. He was also instructed to assign two brigades to guard passes through the Blue Ridge Mountains.
@@manilajohn0182 The groups that went back to guard the passes were the 'supply line' cover forces I refer to. These could have been kept with the army, but were not. These were the officers that Lee might have been willing to use, instead of the ones Stuart chose to keep. If Stuart's 'ride around the AOP wasn't a diversion and deep recon, what was it. I call it that because that is what it was. The ANV did forage, but they also had a well delineated supply line which was defended. The idea he had simply marched into the darkness, like Sherman later actually did, is not at all true. The bottom line is that with Stuart gone Lee still had cavalry he could have used. He did not because they were officers he disapproved and did not trust, at Stuart's specification and with Lee's prior agreement, contrary to Longstreet's recommendation. This thus doubly an indictment of Lee's generalship, first in agreeing to the dispositions and secondly in not using what he had agreed to have available. The 'fault' was not Stuart's. It was all Lee's. Stuart could be a damned fool, but he was under Lee's command and Lee had complete control over his dispositions and movements. The depiction in movies like 'Gettysburg' that Stuart had failed in his responsibility and let Lee down was erroneous. The failure was Lee's, and Lee's alone. He himself was the one who had 'made the army blind'.
@@nomdeguerre7265 Well, the two brigades which guarded passes through the Blue Ridge weren't guarding any supply line, because Lee didn't have one. Lee had a very tenuous line of communications, and they weren't guarding that either. Stuart's movement around the AotP was no diversion. It was a movement by Stuart intended by Lee to obtain information, provisions, and link up with Ewell's right flank. Lee stated this in written orders to Stuart not once, but twice. The idea that Lee didn't trust cavalry officers is nothing but postwar myth. There's nothing written by Lee which states or even suggests that. It's entirely possible that Lee 'may' have placed an excessive reliance on Stuart personally for success by his cavalry, but that's an opinion by some, and not a conclusive fact.
I certainly agree with you that while Stuart could definitely be impulsive, his actions in this campaign were almost entirely correct. The major errors of the campaign were all made by Lee, and not by any of his subordinates. The fatal error of the campaign was made by Lee when he gave Stuart two objectives for one force (both of which coincided in time) without assigning either as the priority objective. This placed Stuart in an impossible position. Stuart lacked the available forces to accomplish both simultaneously and lacked the time to accomplish first one and then the other. Gathering information was vital to Lee's plan of campaign (maneuvering the AotP into attacking the AoNV), while gathering provisions was the operational objective of the campaign.
Cheers...
@@manilajohn0182 You may find this of interest. test.generalmeadesociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/lee-cavalry-5-to-society-Salada-and-Wedo.pdf
the lionization of Lee is central to the maintenance of the lost cause mythology...
why so?
Lee is the noble heart of that mythology, so if he is shown to be human and fallible then that mythology falls apart. He must, in that mythos, be shown to have only been beaten
by conniving and incompetent generals, and the overwhelming and mindlessly wasteful and bloody assaults of Grant and the perfidious bluebellies, despite the heroic and long suffering rebel soldiers stand, in the glorious cause of state's rights...
no one of Lee's subordinates is better suited for that purpose to the lost causers, than Longstreet, who openly admitted in later life that the south was the rightful loser in the civil war, and that the cause of slavery had run its course.
Lee was a demagogue, not a great general. He was a sociopathic narcissist who could convince his soldiers to throw away their lives in incredible numbers. The casualties under Lee were horrendous. Longstreet was a workman. He followed his orders, even if he knew they were the wrong way to proceed. He could have easily been a successful general on either side.
That is such a dumb statement from someone who knows nothing about lees accomplishments. Vera cruz, to cerra gordo and mexico city. There is a reason that the Union generals and military took their hats off to lee at the end of the war. They gave respects to who they were at war with. You clearly do not know anything
@@caughtinthevoidfloyd5821 Princeofcups statement sounds like a woke moment ......garbage
Prince of trolls
While you get Lee’s results right you mischaracterize him so far it’s almost the opposite of his zeitgeist.
Too absurd for comment
Lee was so terrible at Gettysburg. Grant had the right approach, make it brutal and quick. Limit casualties. Lee prolonged and caused additional deaths on both sides. Shame on the union for not dropping the hammer right after July 63’. Lee was a war criminal, one of the most overrated Generals in history.
How do you figure he was a war criminal? If that is true, by the same logic, so is George Washington.
Lol
Buffoonish
Lol Grant's overland campaign and the siege of richmond - petersburg was neither quick, nor did it have "limited casualties" lol... but you did get one thing right, it WAS indeed "brutal".
The pseudo deep slow pace and earnest body language are an unnecessary distraction. Fortunately, CZcams has 1.25 speed (best for newbies who need the first cut of description and explanation) or even 1.5 (if you are already up on the topic and just need to follow the arguments). Failure to expel Longstreet after GB is not evidence of disagreement with the thesis that Longstreet dragged his feet. Pfarr merely asserts Lee's legitimacy here. Legitimacy for criticizing Longstreet on tardiness is not solely with regard to compliance with Lee's instructions. The issue is also one of Longstreet's own responsibilities as a corp commander with autonomous authority to carry out orders with flexibility. Longstreet was having a pout - and eschewed Longstreet followed the "letter" of Lee's instructions (with regard to the path taken to the battlefield and what to do about LRT and BRT. Instead, Longstreet had a leadership responsibility to act as a command leader, fulfilling the spirit of the orders even as they might deviate with the exact letter of what Lee directed Longstreet to do. Longstreet clearly lost his nerve, he dragged his feet. An assualt earlier in the day would have gone better. Genuinely getting around the right flank would have generated a dynamic that owuld have forced the federal right to reconfigure its own line, creating opportunities for wholes and weaknesses to emerge in the federal lines. Lee had a mission command (Auftragstaktik) relationship with both TJ Jackson and Longstreet. Lee and Ewell and Early needed to work on this in the summer of 63, but that relationship was already established with Pete by GB. But Pete was having a pout and only followed the letter of Lee's directive, but failed to carry out the mission command leadership role. Shame on Pete - but happy me, as the rebels were treasonous reactionaries who deserved to die sooner rather than later.
Longstreet did the best fighting of any corps of the CSA in this battle. His marching time on day 2 was faster than Jackson's flank march at Chancellorsville, without even considering that Jackson began his march 3hrs later than he told Lee he would. Longstreet 's entire march took just over 3hrs. Jackson had twice as many men, and had to take them twice as far, but he had both Stuart's cavalry and a local guide. Longstreet had S.R. Johnston, on Lee's orders, who was competent and experienced, but whose morning recon had not covered the area that Longstreet was going to do his concealed march, as Johnston would write to Fitz Lee years later.
Confeds FAFO-ed big time on day 2 .. 👌