Thanks for this discussion. I consider myself a student (in spirit) of the great paleopragmatists and process philosophers CS Peirce, Josiah Royce, AN Whitehead, Robert Cummins Neville, Nicholas Rescher, etc. Dr. Kemple intrigues me greatly because I would love to hear how he reconciles some of the conflicting metaphysical commitments of a Peircian triadic semeiotic with Thomism, for example Peirce's elimination of substance in his categories, a non-reductionist naturalism (rejection of first philosophy), and his doctrines of synechism, fallibilism, and scotistic realism. Triadic semeiotics seems to require at least some of, if not all, these commitments. Thomism subscribes to none of them, even in an analogous way, as far as I know.
@@brianortiz809Caveat, I'm no thomist scholar, which is why I broached the question. They could be completely compatible, and I'd like to hear how. My argument is that Peirce's semeiotics is embedded within a larger metaphysical and epistemological project, the extrication of which may push it into incoherence. Peirce argues for sign action to occur, a sign must be served up as an interpretant to another sign in a causal stream (interpretative action). This action requires time and there is no first or base sign. The implication is that all thought, all knowledge, both requires time, and is mediated and therefore inferential and hypothetical. There is no such thing as absolute certainty in Descartes' sense of clear and distinct ideas or intuition. I have my doubts that thomists would agree that the reality of God is a hypothesis. Process philosophers on the other hand have no problem with this. His classification of sign (qualisign/icon, sinsign/index, legisign/symbol) are derived from his 3 categories; firstness, secondness, thirdness. Secondness represents brute opposition, thisness, or haecceity in Scotus' terminology as the principle of individuation. Scotus (I believe) and Peirce held that haecceity (secondness) cannot be thought or sensed, it is only as a third (generals, common natures) that secondness can be thought and sensed (thirdness of secondness). Peirce also therefore rejects a naive realism in which we are in direct, unmediated contact with the objects of experience. I believe thomists reject the notion of haecceity. There's more that could be said, but I'll leave it at those examples.
Comments for traction apparently help generate more traction the earlier the comment for traction comment is created. Comment for traction. Haven’t watch the vid yet, I think it’s about semi pro sports
Yessss Lovin this stuff
Great episodes recently, Pat.
Thanks, Mark!
Thanks for this discussion. I consider myself a student (in spirit) of the great paleopragmatists and process philosophers CS Peirce, Josiah Royce, AN Whitehead, Robert Cummins Neville, Nicholas Rescher, etc. Dr. Kemple intrigues me greatly because I would love to hear how he reconciles some of the conflicting metaphysical commitments of a Peircian triadic semeiotic with Thomism, for example Peirce's elimination of substance in his categories, a non-reductionist naturalism (rejection of first philosophy), and his doctrines of synechism, fallibilism, and scotistic realism. Triadic semeiotics seems to require at least some of, if not all, these commitments. Thomism subscribes to none of them, even in an analogous way, as far as I know.
@@brianortiz809Caveat, I'm no thomist scholar, which is why I broached the question. They could be completely compatible, and I'd like to hear how. My argument is that Peirce's semeiotics is embedded within a larger metaphysical and epistemological project, the extrication of which may push it into incoherence.
Peirce argues for sign action to occur, a sign must be served up as an interpretant to another sign in a causal stream (interpretative action). This action requires time and there is no first or base sign. The implication is that all thought, all knowledge, both requires time, and is mediated and therefore inferential and hypothetical. There is no such thing as absolute certainty in Descartes' sense of clear and distinct ideas or intuition. I have my doubts that thomists would agree that the reality of God is a hypothesis. Process philosophers on the other hand have no problem with this.
His classification of sign (qualisign/icon, sinsign/index, legisign/symbol) are derived from his 3 categories; firstness, secondness, thirdness. Secondness represents brute opposition, thisness, or haecceity in Scotus' terminology as the principle of individuation. Scotus (I believe) and Peirce held that haecceity (secondness) cannot be thought or sensed, it is only as a third (generals, common natures) that secondness can be thought and sensed (thirdness of secondness). Peirce also therefore rejects a naive realism in which we are in direct, unmediated contact with the objects of experience. I believe thomists reject the notion of haecceity.
There's more that could be said, but I'll leave it at those examples.
Comments for traction apparently help generate more traction the earlier the comment for traction comment is created. Comment for traction. Haven’t watch the vid yet, I think it’s about semi pro sports
Is that right? Would love to know how these magical YT algorithms work. Either way, appreciate your support, Mark!
🙊🙉🙈
You should interview Walker Percy! (If he wasn't dead.)