J.M.E. McTaggart’s Idealism | Absolute Idealist Philosophy

This is a recording of a 1924 essay published by McTaggart that summarizes the arguments and conclusions he arrives at in his magnum opus, "The Nature of Existence."
Here is a link to McTaggart's essay, "An Ontological Idealism:"
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Below is G.W. Cunningham's summary of McTaggart's argument:
“The idealism which he defends, McTaggart tells us, “rests on the assertion that nothing exists but spirit.” This assertion, he says, is established, or at least rendered highly probable, by the consideration that, among the supposed substances prima facie known to us, spiritual substance alone can escape a fatal contradiction in its nature. The argument in support of this consideration centers round the following theses: Every substance must necessarily have a sufficient description-a description, that is, which is stated in terms of the characteristics (qualities and relations) of the substance, and which applies only to that substance and applies to it in such a manner that the substance is absolutely identified by the description. But every substance has parts which are substances, and, therefore, every substance is infinitely divisible. How, then, under this condition, is a sufficient description of any substance possible? It is possible only on one condition, namely, that the principle of determining correspondence obtains within substance; in other words, only provided there is in substance itself the basis for a chain of implications running downwards from precedent to sequent sets of parts to infinity. And this must be such that sufficient descriptions of the precedent sets of parts imply sufficient descriptions of all the infinite sequent sets of parts In no other manner can the infinite series of parts be other than vicious, and a contradiction in the nature of substance itself be avoided. Therefore, only substance in which the principle of determining correspondence obtains can exist. Spiritual substance is the only substance, among those with which we are prima facie acquainted, in which the principle of determining correspondence holds. Hence substance must be spiritual, and spirit alone truly exists.” (Cunningham, The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy, 459-460)
“The main theses here are four: every substance must have a sufficient description; every substance is infinitely divisible into substances; the principle of determining correspondence must obtain within substance; and spirit is the only known substance within which the principle of determining correspondence obtains.” (Cunningham, The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy, 460)

[@LegionXCV]

Nice Video. Do you think his philosophy still holds today? Seems pretty dope watching this.

[@PessimisticIdealism]

With some modifications, I think that the argument is plausible.

[@allisonsutherland1144]

Excellent video.

[@andrewwells6323]

That's a cool thumbnail.

[@PessimisticIdealism]

Thanks! It’s a visualization of McTaggart’s idea of a determining correspondence system.

[@nightmare_automata]

Wow, this is dense... Or I'm stupid. Great video regardless!

[@PessimisticIdealism]

Don’t worry. The argument is incredibly complex. I’ll actually quote part of my thesis on British Idealism, which goes into some of McTaggart’s philosophy:
McTaggart’s *The Nature of Existence* was as mighty a book as its title suggests. Spanning nearly 800 pages, the two-volume behemoth is McTaggart’s deductive, geometrical demonstration of his entire metaphysic. The work was meant to solidify his thesis that “all that exists is spiritual,” and that matter and sense data are merely misperceptions of a reality composed of a network of spiritual substances (i.e. selves) and their perceptions of themselves and each other. British philosopher S.V. Keeling described McTaggart’s grand conclusion as the following:
“The universe is a community of eternal selves. Each self contains parts which are its perceptions, and each perception will have the quality of being an emotion. Every emotion is directed toward something, and ‘the cogitation of that towards which the emotion is directed, and the emotion towards it are the same mental state,’ being both a perceiving and a loving of that which is perceive. A direct perception of another self will therefore be a loving of that self, and an indirect perception of other selves will be qualified by a feeling of affection for them. Love in ultimate reality will be intenser than now, and felt for more persons than now…our condition will be one of supreme good.”
Although McTaggart admitted that our present state may indeed be a world of misery and sorrow, and hatred, he ensured his readers that they need not fear that which lies ahead; for he was convinced that a supreme and overflowing state of goodness was just beyond the horizon. McTaggart concluded his life’s work with an elegant foreshadowing of what he believed, nay was certain, to be the true nature of reality and was waiting for us at the end of time:
“We know that it is a timeless and endless state of love-love so direct, so intimate, and so powerful that even the deepest mystic rapture gives us but the slightest foretaste of its perfection. We know that we shall know nothing but our beloved, and those they love, and ourselves as loving them, and that only in this shall we seek and find satisfaction. Between the present and that fruition there stretches a future which may well need courage. For, while there will be in it much good, and increasing good, there must await us evils which we can now measure only by their infinite insignificance as compared with the final reward.”

[@nightmare_automata]

@@PessimisticIdealism That's deeply impactful and beautiful. How does this relate to Hegel's Idealism?

[@PessimisticIdealism]

@@nightmare_automata McTaggart believed that his conclusions regarding the nature of Spirit were essentially the same as Hegel’s.

[@nightmare_automata]

@@PessimisticIdealism Fair enough, that's how it seems to me as well.

[@PessimisticIdealism]

@@TheWorldTeacher
By “Experience/Spirit,” I mean that existent substantive which is exhaustively self-differentiated, to, through, and for, a non-presentational determination of itself.
By “Subject” I mean that non-presentational determination of that existent substantive, to which, through which, and for which, said substantive is exhaustively self-differentiated.
By “Object of Consciousness,” I mean that presentational or non-presentational determination of Experience that is actively intended by a non-presentational determination of that Experience itself.