I'm glad I found this. Being naturally sickly, I miss a lot of classes, and this has really helped me understand, and excel on essays. Thank you so much :D
Omg! This video indeed saves my exam! And just to say, I like the use of fake-hand effect! It helps catching my attention, I find it quite interesting when the hand is sketching...! :) Hope there's more video like this awesome clip.
This series was fantastic, really helped me out, thank you so much! I'm really hoping I find incentive for checking out all the remaining videos, like schoolwork, otherwise I may have to take out some time on a weekend to binge them. Keep up the good work! There's nothing cooler than what you're doing, truly!
I think Locke's view is very plausible, but we need to change how we think about continuity of memory. Rather than saying that for A to be identical to B, one of them must remember everything that the other is doing, we should definite continuity of memory to simply mean that their memories continuously morphed into one another over time. That way, we avoid the breakfast problem where even losing a tiny memory threatens personal identity. We would have to lose all of our memory at once to become a different person. The branching problem can be solved with worm theory, though that leads to some more questions that we would have to figure out.
Even though C doesn't remember being A, i think B's memory of "being A" creates a continuity. This might not fit in locke's theory, but i think B remembering A, and C remembering B is sufficient to say that C is the same person as A. The person protects its identity by remembering a part of the past, which remembers earlier. As long as my memories are connected to each other, I am the same person. so i rather think this is the solution than a problem. what do you think?
Do adress this if you can wireless philosophy : I am not a philosophy student but I had a doubt regarding the 3rd BR problem. If at any point we split the memories of a person into two different people (B and C), why are they not identical? If Obama’s consciousness can enter another body but regain his original personality and be the same human atleast, why can’t both B and C be same (even though they have different/similar bodies)? Of course after some time (or even immediately) both B and C experience different environments (except if they are in control rooms) and develop different identities, but that will only be because the original identity (A) has been added with different memories and actions after the brain splitting. So, why are B and C not considered the same identity before the addition of memories? Couldn’t Locke’s theory be valid, because the two identities, B and C, are identical until their memories start to differ after they are conscious or atleast outside the controlled environment?
Why does the Branching Problem work if we don't yet know if it is possible to split a persons brain and apply it to two different bodies? Maybe this is impossible because Lock's view is correct? Or have I missed something?
Interestingly, people who have complete amnesia have a different sense of personal identity. They think they are not the same people, but other people 'know' that the person has not changed. It is known today that out memories can be faulty. So I think we cannot escape reality and evidence. It is not enough that I remember what happened yesterday, I should be able to substantiate it with evidence. If the consequences of all the things we did yesterday suddenly vanished today, we will start doubting our personal identity. So Locke's idea of memory is insufficient. Further getting a consensus on multiple people's experiences reinforces our belief in our consciousness. This is very important, I feel, to weed out people who extend this theory beyond death and life. Some might say that even if we die, our consciousness might remain. Then it is no different from Descartes' soul. On the other hand, the ship of theseus problem is a little different from this one. We are assigning identity to things other than us. It is the problem of impersonal identity over time. We can apply this idea to dogs, cats and so on. As long as we cannot discuss and come to a consensus, then the assignment of identity for such object is purely functional.
Wonderful BReakdown. I'll remember that I watched it so I'll still be me when I remember but when I forget then I'll be a new person but I should want that person to check this out too. Who should I tell to remind that person to watch this? And will they still be them when that time comes? 😛
Because of the Brave Officer problem, I disagree with Locke's theory. I also disagree with the materialist theory - our bodies are constantly changing. So that leaves the "soul" theory, which makes perfect sense except that there's no evidence of soul. So I have this nihilistic view that identity is an illusion.
+No Name The problem with that is it's willfully ignorant of the empirical phenomena of identity. To say "identity is an illusion" isn't going to make the continuity of identity any less apparent.
Yes. If you accept that two people are identical if and only if they have identical memories, then every time a person forms a new memory they become a new person. Nobody is ever identical to their past self, unless they have severe (non-retrograde) amnesia and cannot form new memories. Therefore the video does not present a contradiction. A =/= B =/=C. Sharing a single memory does not make two people identical.
In the Brave Officer Problem, you said that C = B because C remembers the actions of person B. However, earlier in the video, you had stated that according to Locke, for the same human being to also be the same person, they must also remember the memories and state of mind of the earlier person. If person C does not remember remembering person A, does that not mean that Person C was never truly equal to person B?
Great series! Thank you very much. I'm currently writing a paper on personal identity in regard to Alzheimer's, but I don't really get why, in the third problem, B nor C can be identical to A according to some philosophers. Is it just because both their claims are of equal value and that therefore neither one can claim being identical to A, or is there more to the argument?
So what if you forget something for a long time then outa no we’re I remember that memory. Does that mean I’m not that same person when I don’t remember and then when I do remember that memory do I become that older person again?
According to Bertrand Russell, once philosophy stars giving definite answers, the new answers constitute a separate science. Philosophy is like a key to the creation of new arts in effect.
![PHILOSOPHY - History: Epicurus’ Cure for Unhappiness [HD]](/img/n.gif)
this was a helpful lecture , i think another lecture on david humes personal identity will be greatly appreciated...
I'm glad I found this. Being naturally sickly, I miss a lot of classes, and this has really helped me understand, and excel on essays. Thank you so much :D
Well done! Do you still study Philosophy? I hope you've gotten better.
Omg! This video indeed saves my exam! And just to say, I like the use of fake-hand effect! It helps catching my attention, I find it quite interesting when the hand is sketching...! :) Hope there's more video like this awesome clip.
This series was fantastic, really helped me out, thank you so much!
I'm really hoping I find incentive for checking out all the remaining videos, like schoolwork, otherwise I may have to take out some time on a weekend to binge them.
Keep up the good work! There's nothing cooler than what you're doing, truly!
I think Locke's view is very plausible, but we need to change how we think about continuity of memory. Rather than saying that for A to be identical to B, one of them must remember everything that the other is doing, we should definite continuity of memory to simply mean that their memories continuously morphed into one another over time. That way, we avoid the breakfast problem where even losing a tiny memory threatens personal identity. We would have to lose all of our memory at once to become a different person.
The branching problem can be solved with worm theory, though that leads to some more questions that we would have to figure out.
Even though C doesn't remember being A, i think B's memory of "being A" creates a continuity. This might not fit in locke's theory, but i think B remembering A, and C remembering B is sufficient to say that C is the same person as A. The person protects its identity by remembering a part of the past, which remembers earlier. As long as my memories are connected to each other, I am the same person.
so i rather think this is the solution than a problem. what do you think?
+BurakAIC Kind of like the Ship of Theseus but memories
Splendid critique by Thomas Reid.
The primary text reading for those problems would be really useful
Do adress this if you can wireless philosophy : I am not a philosophy student but I had a doubt regarding the 3rd BR problem. If at any point we split the memories of a person into two different people (B and C), why are they not identical? If Obama’s consciousness can enter another body but regain his original personality and be the same human atleast, why can’t both B and C be same (even though they have different/similar bodies)? Of course after some time (or even immediately) both B and C experience different environments (except if they are in control rooms) and develop different identities, but that will only be because the original identity (A) has been added with different memories and actions after the brain splitting. So, why are B and C not considered the same identity before the addition of memories? Couldn’t Locke’s theory be valid, because the two identities, B and C, are identical until their memories start to differ after they are conscious or atleast outside the controlled environment?
Why does the Branching Problem work if we don't yet know if it is possible to split a persons brain and apply it to two different bodies? Maybe this is impossible because Lock's view is correct? Or have I missed something?
its a stupid problem
This was so helpful even being seven years ago. Thank you!!!!
Now am ready for my philosophical problems and analysis exam coming up next tomorrow 😀... Thank you.
Interestingly, people who have complete amnesia have a different sense of personal identity. They think they are not the same people, but other people 'know' that the person has not changed.
It is known today that out memories can be faulty. So I think we cannot escape reality and evidence. It is not enough that I remember what happened yesterday, I should be able to substantiate it with evidence. If the consequences of all the things we did yesterday suddenly vanished today, we will start doubting our personal identity. So Locke's idea of memory is insufficient.
Further getting a consensus on multiple people's experiences reinforces our belief in our consciousness. This is very important, I feel, to weed out people who extend this theory beyond death and life. Some might say that even if we die, our consciousness might remain. Then it is no different from Descartes' soul.
On the other hand, the ship of theseus problem is a little different from this one. We are assigning identity to things other than us. It is the problem of impersonal identity over time. We can apply this idea to dogs, cats and so on. As long as we cannot discuss and come to a consensus, then the assignment of identity for such object is purely functional.
is there a reason you don't bring up the ancestral relation? It's kind of related to this. Especially the brave officer problem
Wonderful BReakdown. I'll remember that I watched it so I'll still be me when I remember but when I forget then I'll be a new person but I should want that person to check this out too. Who should I tell to remind that person to watch this? And will they still be them when that time comes? 😛
Because of the Brave Officer problem, I disagree with Locke's theory. I also disagree with the materialist theory - our bodies are constantly changing. So that leaves the "soul" theory, which makes perfect sense except that there's no evidence of soul. So I have this nihilistic view that identity is an illusion.
+No Name The problem with that is it's willfully ignorant of the empirical phenomena of identity. To say "identity is an illusion" isn't going to make the continuity of identity any less apparent.
David Hume thinks personal identity is an illusion either. We have the idea of it because of the habitual compilation of our imagination.
Thanks for these great lessons I wish it continued..
5:20 (c) =/= (b) because (b) has memories which (c) does not
but then doesn't that mean that b also has memories which a does not?
Yes. If you accept that two people are identical if and only if they have identical memories, then every time a person forms a new memory they become a new person. Nobody is ever identical to their past self, unless they have severe (non-retrograde) amnesia and cannot form new memories. Therefore the video does not present a contradiction. A =/= B =/=C. Sharing a single memory does not make two people identical.
I think your use of the hand is just fine, Wireless Philosophy.
jenius124 Thanks!
In the Brave Officer Problem, you said that C = B because C remembers the actions of person B. However, earlier in the video, you had stated that according to Locke, for the same human being to also be the same person, they must also remember the memories and state of mind of the earlier person. If person C does not remember remembering person A, does that not mean that Person C was never truly equal to person B?
Great lectures, thanks for posting.
Awesome, helpful series. Thank you!
In the branching problem, what makes B and C unidentical? Why can they not be A?
Great series! Thank you very much. I'm currently writing a paper on personal identity in regard to Alzheimer's, but I don't really get why, in the third problem, B nor C can be identical to A according to some philosophers. Is it just because both their claims are of equal value and that therefore neither one can claim being identical to A, or is there more to the argument?
So what if you forget something for a long time then outa no we’re I remember that memory. Does that mean I’m not that same person when I don’t remember and then when I do remember that memory do I become that older person again?
nothing is understandable
One easy and effective solution to these identity problems is solipsism. In fact it may be the only solution.
Are there any definitive answers in philosophy?
According to Bertrand Russell, once philosophy stars giving definite answers, the new answers constitute a separate science. Philosophy is like a key to the creation of new arts in effect.
Res sunt
WTF does 'BR' mean in "BR problem". Google wasn't helpful here.
OK, I get it now: BReakfast, BRave officer, BRanching.
Are you seriously believe these problems have any credibility? Come on sir!