Looking forward to when the book's available. On technology as domination, rooted in a relationship to truth based the presence-absence binary: as the world is increasingly mediated by software, the 1s and 0s of digital technology, and the transistors underlying the binary system, would seem to well-exemplify Heidegger's critique. However, while computer science adopted that fundamental binary, quantum physics well-exceeds that framework. Point is that ontological foreclosure in the form of digital technology, though certainly ideological in Marcuse's understanding, isn't supported by physics. Rather, the objective world of quantum physics already points out the reduction inherent in electronics. I'm wondering if Marcuse qualified his analysis of technology with that acknowledgement.
I don't think the issue Marcuse raises can be reduced to a digital binary. Quantum mechanics is no more interested in what he calls "potentialities" than were Newton or Descartes. That is the nub of the problem. We see it in environmentalism which concerns our comfort in the environment, a very different concern from the physics and chemistry of the atmosphere although without knowledge of physics and chemistry there is no solution for us.
@@andrewfeenberg123 I wouldn't want to reduce Marcuse's critique but would point out that, even within the constraints of its own project, quantum physics disrupts the ontology rooted in the presence-absence binary that Heidegger and others have analyzed. Quantum physics does so through its own empiricism. Demonstrations of superposition and entanglement hold open possibilities in relating to the physical world that exceed any current human projects based on digital technology. In terms of the arguments of One Dimensional Man, I would say it's important to say that physics manifests a contradiction: the digital technology that depends on an understanding of quantum mechanics is a reduction of the more radical aspects of quantum physics as a way of knowing the world. Such a reduction enacts the one-dimensional ontology that Marcuse describes; however, it's fundamentally unstable and therefore vulnerable to being revealed as such. In short, let's not give up an opportunity for transforming human understanding implicit in the dominant way of relating to the world. Beyond that, yes, I agree with you and Marcuse that the entire project of science, through the scientific method, brackets the social context in which humans experience the world. I use the word 'bracket' in allustion to Husserl's method of phenomenology {epoche'}. It's interesting to me that extremes meet in acts of bracketing; the extremes being science's project of objectivity and Husserl's project of idealism. A further connection would be to Adorno's critique of Husserl but I'll leave that aside--for now at least.
@@dougpariswhite Actually, Marcuse was aware of quantum mechanics and discusses it at some length in One-Dimensional Man (149-152). He argues that the substantiality of the object is weakened as it is conceptualized in purely mathematical terms. He sees this as merely confirming the technological "apriori" of modern science. His main point, the loss of potentiality, is not affected but rather confirmed.
@@andrewfeenberg123 Thanks for the reference; helpful. In the process of verifying its mathematical hypotheses, quantum mechanics collapses subject and object into relationships within a process using instruments for verifying aspects of objective reality. In the famous double slit experiment, for example, the results, whether the photon manifests on the recording screen as a particle or a wave, depend on how the experiment is instrumented. With detectors in place to determine which slit the photo enters, the photon shows as a pattern characteristic of particles. Without the detectors, the photon shows as a wave that has passed through both slits. Marcuse’s point would seem to be that, regardless of the results, the context of the experiment has predetermined a relationship to the objective world as one of instrumentation. So the instruments of digital technology (iPhones, internet experiences) would ratify scientific rationality in social life. And insofar as digital technology "circumscribes an entire culture it projects a historical totality--a world." The step from there to a world rooted in domination (of nature and humans) is a big one if it undialectically forecloses the possibility for change.
@@dougpariswhite Yes, it would be a mistake to draw social consequences directly from technical features. There is a necessary mediation: experience, the lifeworld. Marcuse draws on Husserl to talk about this but differs from Husserl in focusing on social practices which are contingent on the mode of production. Marxist-phenomenology or Phenomenological Marxism.
One-Dimensional Man has been profoundly influential in my personal evolution
Looking forward to when the book's available. On technology as domination, rooted in a relationship to truth based the presence-absence binary: as the world is increasingly mediated by software, the 1s and 0s of digital technology, and the transistors underlying the binary system, would seem to well-exemplify Heidegger's critique. However, while computer science adopted that fundamental binary, quantum physics well-exceeds that framework. Point is that ontological foreclosure in the form of digital technology, though certainly ideological in Marcuse's understanding, isn't supported by physics. Rather, the objective world of quantum physics already points out the reduction inherent in electronics. I'm wondering if Marcuse qualified his analysis of technology with that acknowledgement.
I don't think the issue Marcuse raises can be reduced to a digital binary. Quantum mechanics is no more interested in what he calls "potentialities" than were Newton or Descartes. That is the nub of the problem. We see it in environmentalism which concerns our comfort in the environment, a very different concern from the physics and chemistry of the atmosphere although without knowledge of physics and chemistry there is no solution for us.
@@andrewfeenberg123 I wouldn't want to reduce Marcuse's critique but would point out that, even within the constraints of its own project, quantum physics disrupts the ontology rooted in the presence-absence binary that Heidegger and others have analyzed. Quantum physics does so through its own empiricism. Demonstrations of superposition and entanglement hold open possibilities in relating to the physical world that exceed any current human projects based on digital technology. In terms of the arguments of One Dimensional Man, I would say it's important to say that physics manifests a contradiction: the digital technology that depends on an understanding of quantum mechanics is a reduction of the more radical aspects of quantum physics as a way of knowing the world. Such a reduction enacts the one-dimensional ontology that Marcuse describes; however, it's fundamentally unstable and therefore vulnerable to being revealed as such. In short, let's not give up an opportunity for transforming human understanding implicit in the dominant way of relating to the world. Beyond that, yes, I agree with you and Marcuse that the entire project of science, through the scientific method, brackets the social context in which humans experience the world. I use the word 'bracket' in allustion to Husserl's method of phenomenology {epoche'}. It's interesting to me that extremes meet in acts of bracketing; the extremes being science's project of objectivity and Husserl's project of idealism. A further connection would be to Adorno's critique of Husserl but I'll leave that aside--for now at least.
@@dougpariswhite Actually, Marcuse was aware of quantum mechanics and discusses it at some length in One-Dimensional Man (149-152). He argues that the substantiality of the object is weakened as it is conceptualized in purely mathematical terms. He sees this as merely confirming the technological "apriori" of modern science. His main point, the loss of potentiality, is not affected but rather confirmed.
@@andrewfeenberg123 Thanks for the reference; helpful. In the process of verifying its mathematical hypotheses, quantum mechanics collapses subject and object into relationships within a process using instruments for verifying aspects of objective reality. In the famous double slit experiment, for example, the results, whether the photon manifests on the recording screen as a particle or a wave, depend on how the experiment is instrumented. With detectors in place to determine which slit the photo enters, the photon shows as a pattern characteristic of particles. Without the detectors, the photon shows as a wave that has passed through both slits. Marcuse’s point would seem to be that, regardless of the results, the context of the experiment has predetermined a relationship to the objective world as one of instrumentation. So the instruments of digital technology (iPhones, internet experiences) would ratify scientific rationality in social life. And insofar as digital technology "circumscribes an entire culture it projects a historical totality--a world." The step from there to a world rooted in domination (of nature and humans) is a big one if it undialectically forecloses the possibility for change.
@@dougpariswhite Yes, it would be a mistake to draw social consequences directly from technical features. There is a necessary mediation: experience, the lifeworld. Marcuse draws on Husserl to talk about this but differs from Husserl in focusing on social practices which are contingent on the mode of production. Marxist-phenomenology or Phenomenological Marxism.
This is great !! Very clear, Very lucid
Thanks!