The Private Language Argument
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- čas přidán 16. 06. 2024
- This video introduces Wittgenstein's private language argument. First, I place the argument in the context of Wittgenstein's broader critique of the "Augustinian picture" of language. Next, I discuss two interpretations of how the private language argument works.
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0:00 - Introduction
0:44 - The Augustinian picture of language
7:23 - What is a private language?
13:53 - "S"
19:41 - No independent criteria
27:16 - Stage-setting
38:21 - Giving "S" a use
42:29 - Ordinary sensation language
Man I love you so much I’ve emailed you whether you could do private language arguments like years ago and now that it is finally here I’ll pop a bottle and watch this with joy
This is the first video of yours that I've discovered and I totally loved it. After only a cursory glance at some of the other videos and playlists on this channel, I suspect I'm going to love much more of it. Thank you for uploading all this fantastic content
Kane, I immensely appreciate you. Thank you for sharing your knowledge with the public! ❤️💫
this is engaging, and this is engagement
And this is the wedding
I appreciate these videos.
Haven't watched yet, but looking forward to hearing your take on one of Wittgenstein's ideas :)
Keep up the good work!
Babe wake up, new Kane B video dropped
As a Wittgensteinian about language generally who agrees with the conclusion of the PLA but also thinks it doesnt work as an argument I think you did a great job at commmunicating what it is in this video, even though you disagree with it! Good job.
I presume that there are better arguments for the conclusion?
I’m really hoping for more videos on Wittgenstein!
Yes! Finally! I’ve been looking everywhere for an actual explanation of the “private language argument”.
Well, I'm not sure this video achieves that. There'll probably be a bunch of Wittgensteinians along shortly to explain how I've totally misrepresented the argument (and then each of them will explain how the other Wittgensteinians accusing me of misrepresenting the argument have also misrepresented the argument...)
@@KaneByou did pretty good lol. Did you draw mostly on Marie Mcginn? While she's got some exegetical issues i disagree with, she's generally spot on, at least compared to most. good job kane b theres hope for you yet!
@@yyzzyysszznn You've previously accused me of not understanding Wittgenstein -- indeed, I think you even suggested that I hadn't bothered to read Wittgenstein. This video is based entirely on notes that I'd previously made on Wittgenstein during courses on him and that I consulted when expressing my objections to you. (To answer your question, yes, the section on stage-setting draws on McGinn.)
I have provided numerous explanations of it many times over the years but I did so privately. Sorry.
@@KaneB Fair do's bro, im just a youtube comment man u shouldnt remember what i say that much lol. i just remember a lot of your criticisms of wittgenstein seemingly answered pretty clearly in certain sections of the PI, so i thought it was a fair assumption to make. the Baker and Hacker interpretations of it seem pretty water tight to me. a lot of 'major criticisms' (cf Edward Craig) seem to completely miss the mark almost embarrassingly
Great video
18:45 Now that's a new tone😂
Hi Kane. Do you see a similarity between the *mental samples of S presupposing knowing the meaning of S* and something like the many relations problem with correspondence theory of truth?
22:08 : how does this differ from, if one was making up a language of one’s own for something that *was* externally demonstrable (e.g. “referring to a body of water”), but which one forgets the details of how one originally meant for it to be used?
(I will now continue watching the video)
22:51 : it seems to me that there should be a fact of the matter as to whether two experiences or feelings are particularly similar, even if there isn’t external access to this fact with better accuracy than the person’s reporting on it to the best of their memory?
23:02 does “independent standard of successful performance” mean a standard that can actually be evaluated, or just, *some* standard?
Like, suppose I try to remember the kinds of mental motions I made the last time I tried to wiggle my ear *preceding* the one which actually managed to wiggle my ear (and that these preceding ones didn’t result in any observable muscle movement), and try to do those mental motions again, but I remember wrongly, but do not realize this (neither time does it result in muscle movement, but they are different mental motions, because I remembered wrong).
If God (exists and) knows that the mental motions were in fact different, and concludes that I was I was therefore mistaken in thinking that it was the same mental motion, but never reveals this information to anyone,
does that count as an “independent standard”?
24:29 : ah, this is kinda a response to the first thing I said
26:32 : ah, and this *really* responds to it
... though... is the thing with the reference rock really any different from the reference memory?
I guess there are two things now, the memory and the example rock,
but,
well, what if the rock changes?
If the rock is being used as a standard of degree-of-sharpness, it might become duller. If it is a standard of weight, it might erode.
If my memory of the rock fails to remain as it was, and the rock also fails to remain as it was,
well, isn’t this the same issue as if it is just my memory? Sure, the probability of the error is reduced,
and, especially if one can make or find many copies of the rock, and have the chances of failure for each rock be independent, then I suppose the probability can be pushed arbitrarily low,
but that’s like,
just a practical matter?
I don’t see why it should be fundamentally different.
____
Hmm.
Suppose there is a button, and when one presses it, one feels a sensation (beyond that of merely “finger pushing a button”). Suppose that people report that most of the time, the sensation is one way, but a smaller fraction of the time, it is some other way, but that they cannot say anything in particular about how the two sensations differ, other than saying, each time they pressed the button, whether they felt the more common or the less common one. Suppose also that the functioning of the button itself is well understood (e.g. produces an electrical impulse, or injects a chemical, or something), and it is doing the same thing every time, and we have nothing to attribute the reported distinction between the two(?) sensations to, other than “something to do with how the person works, which is beyond our understanding”.
(Suppose that for each person, they try the button out and report the conclusion “there are two different sensations, one which is more common and one which is less common” independently, without first hearing that other people reported the same thing.)
Now, suppose that for each person, the fraction of the time that they report experiencing “the more common sensation” is fairly consistent, but that the fraction varies significantly from person to person.
Then, it seems to make sense that we couldn’t really be sure whether, even assuming that the two sensations are “the same” between two people, whether the sensation that is more common for one person, is the one that is more common, or the one that is less common, for the other person.
(We might be able to make a guess based on the distribution of the ratios that different people report? But that requires a prior about what kinds of distribution over the ratio, would be more likely)
It seems to me like it would be pretty straightforward for people to name these two sensations, but, as it may well be backwards between two different people,
Idk, is it really a public thing that they are naming?
It seems to me like they should be able to name them for themself, before they hear from anyone else about other peoples experience of these things?
_________
35:00 : I don’t understand this point.
Why does one need to “know what S means” in order to recall the sensations one meant to associate with the term “S”? Just recall the sensations one had when one was thinking “let me call these sensations ‘S’ “ and which led one to make that decision?
36:13 : ??? Again I really don’t get this.
If one has perfect memory, then one can just note e.g. the first few times at which one wrote “S”, and remember the sensations one had at those times (or, shortly before those times, leading to one writing “S”), and consider what those had in common. Then, if the sensations one is currently having are similar to those, then it is an example of “S”?
46:19 : a number of times, I’ve felt uncertain as to whether the sensation I was feeling was really pain, or just a rather similar sensation. At other times, I have had no (conscious) doubts that a sensation I was feeling was that of pain. So, it seems to me to make sense to say that at some times, I lacked knowledge of whether what I was feeling was pain, but other times I was quite confident that I was in pain.
Another time, when I was a child, it had been so long since I had felt hunger, that I wasn’t confident that what I was feeling *was* hunger, as I felt I did not remember for sure whether that was what hunger felt like.
I suppose in both of these cases, the uncertainty was about the meaning of the word, rather than about how I felt?
Hm.
I haven't finished the video yet, but I wonder if Wittgenstein's objection applies to strictly descriptive languages, but not necessarily languages with performative aspects. If mental "symbols" for mental states serve a performative function (e.g. to bring about a mental state when the symbol is brought to mind, or cause a second mental state to follow the first), it seems to me like it doesn't matter if you are disallowed to systemize your description in a public language. Maybe you can't be sure that the symbol refers to the same mental state across repetitions, but if it has a performative role, it might happen to end up referring to the same thing across time as your goals and motivations utilize the symbol to do a particular thing
As a matter of fact, human memory is capable of identifying previously experienced sensations quite accurately most of the time. That's why public language works! When I see a small furry animal that has whiskers and a tail and moves in a feline way and meows, the word "cat" pops up in my mind because it recognises a particular bundle of visual and auditory sensations to which the word has been associated. So in a sense public language presupposes private language, a public language being no more than a collection of private languages in alignment with each other.
Very cool concept. Could you make your videos louder? (At least until CZcams implements ReplayGain) I turn up the volume and when the much louder ads come on they're very jarring.
I don't know how to do that; I record them at the highest available volume already
If you cant trust your memory to determine that 2 sensations are the same or similar, how are you gonna trust your memory of peers approving or dissaproving of your use of a word?
I disagree with his argument on the basis that the mind is not a single entity but rather itself a collective, so the social basis of language is expressed even within a single individual.
Sounds a bit like Lacan's theory of speech/four discourses. Speech (thought included) always implies another subject.
"the mind is not a single entity but rather itself a collective"
How so?
@@synchronium24 Thanks for giving me a chance to clarify, I had been questioning my own word choice. What I mean is that while the mind is viewed conceptualy as a single entity it is a complex system of disrtibuted processes. Each process interfaces with others to produce the collection of processes at multiple levels of analysis, the outcome of which is what we refer to as "the mind".
@@r_se If you abstract away the fundamental processes of the four discourses there seem to be parallels in how neurons communicate as well.
To me it seems like Wittgenstein's argument is correct, but only for purely descriptive languages. If I use symbols internally to induce or transform mental states (instead of just describing them), they might end up referring to consistent things over time, assuming my motivations and uses for the symbols are consistent (or the effects of using the symbol are consistent). I think this actually applies to all language, public or private, though.
It's hard to imagine how more than one mind would make descriptive definition any more grounded than the case with a single mind (especially given your point about the mind involving interaction between a collection of parts internally). I think I think it makes more sense to just view of language as performative at it's root (description being one kind of performative action instantiated in language). Consistent relationships between symbols and objects might arise just as consistent relationships between parts of any dynamical system might arise, but our impression of symbolic "meaning" in these relationships is itself just another feature of the dynamics of our mind and it's performative use of language.
I think the point you draw from PMS Hacker misses something. S doesn't impart meaning at the instance of first reference. The first reference simply marks it as "hey, maybe this could be something that is of a broader kind that could be given a private symbol". It is on the repeat exposure that the person experiences a sensation, flips through their memories and finds the first reference. They then think "These two things appear to have elements in common for which a symbol would be useful. I will call the set of features these two experiences have in common "S". On a third exposure, the person may say "This has x and y in common with S, but not z. I think it is most useful that this symbol is included within S, so z will no longer be considered a necessary feature for something to be S. At this point the person has developed an abstract, subconscious criteria set by which something can be determined to be or not to be S. Since this symbol was created by the person as a useful shorthand, it can either be used concretely, or emended fluidly at the discretion of the agent.
Its rather like a variable name in programming. You can say "let s = [32, 33, 34]". You can then check if a number is an element of s "s.contains(7)" => "false", "s.contains(33)" => "true", or also do something like "s.append(35)" to expand the definition, "s.remove(32)" to restrict it, or "let s = [2,3]" to completely change it and reassign the symbol. At any point, s is a concrete an meaningful name, and its fluidity doesnt contradict this.
Back to sensations, you can imagine and number every possible state of the brain such that the entire state of the brain can be represented as a 5 digit number. In reality, it'd be thousands of digits, but lets stick to 5. I experience something and reflect on my brain state and find it to be 75637. I go "this seems like something thatd be useful to categorise" and mark it as so. Later I experience another sensation and my brain state is 57929. I think for a bit, and notice thay the first two digits sum to 12. Theres any number of ways I could define what these states have in common, but for now I settle with this and I say "this sensation, defined by getting X when I perform function F on my brainstate, I call S". At a later time I experience a third sensation. I reflect that even though this sensation actually does give 12 when I add the first two digits, I dont think it will be helpful to lump it together. I then amend S to be defined as some different function of my brainstate. I then experience more and more sensations, and most of the time I find that by classifying as S or not S, the purpose of the symbol is being achieved.
As robotic as this sounds, this is actually how we operate. Take an idea like "love". What is love? When you are a teenager and get that fluttery feeling about someone, is that love? What about when you've been with someone for years and you suddenly realise you want to be together forever? What about when you've been married for years and then start getting butterflies for a coworker? As we go through life, we feel things and we take this symbol "love" from the public language, and we try to apply it to out private sensations. Every individual goes through a process of seeing what criteria they use to call something love, some of it conscious, and some of it not. At no point is there a public object that someones definition can be verified as, but with enough experience and revisions and so on, a person can say "I'm confident this definition is probably the best one to live by, and I can know for sure whether my feelings for someone meet that. Maybe one day I'll feel something for someone, and that feeling will be different enough that it doesn't meet my definition. All the same I will want to call that feeling love, and on that day I'll update the definition. That feeling wasn't love until I decided it was most useful to call it love, before that it was just a complicated feeling."
About when you impart meaning, I may have a caveat. I'm not familiar with this philosophy, so brace yourself to hear something stupid.
I agree that you don't name it on first encounter. But it's not either on the second one. In a way, it's only after we've experienced the sensation a lot of times we realise they're related and the same, and then can we give it a name. But in a way, the moment you've recognised that sensation is a constant and therefore deserves definition, your brain has already categorised it multiple times, right? It doesn't have a name yet, but your brain has already recognised it and given it a "definition". Just because the "language" used to lump all the intances of that feeling into a recognizable pattern doesn't use language, it doesn't mean it's not a language itself. Maybe the mythical private language is so private we don't recognise it as one, but it's there before we linguistically assign a name to something we had already named?
This might be the neurodivergence speaking, and this might not be universal, but I kinda recognise multiple paths of though inside me, all at the same time. There's a monologue that uses words, but there's also a "whisper" that neither uses words nor can it's ideas be directly described by words. Like, communication without speech, just thoughts running at the same time part of my mind expresses itself verbally. And that train of thought can be translated into words, it just can't speak by itself without the speaking side acting as translator. Maybe there lies the private language, we just can't talk about it by it's nature, and since we adscribe more value to verbally organised though (since it can be shared, analysed, scrutinized and organised into coherent phrases), when we're thinking we ignore the thoughts that can't be expressed. The infamous subconscious, which can never be heard (unless you stop trying to use language and listen to it on it's own terms)
Anyways, I'm ignoring it rn by focusing on the verbal side that's talking to you, and something inside me is screaming without sound, so I'll stop writing and "listen" to it's insights on this topic. If i manage to translate it into expressable though I'll come back to share what my private language has to say on this topic. Specially because I'm not sure it agrees with what I've written so far, and I'm kinda putting words in it's mouth
I wonder if when some random word use could be associated with some recurring pattern in an fMRI-picture of brain activity, that would all of a sudden make it a non-private language...
Thanks for this video. I think the private language argument is very closely related to the “rule following paradox” and also the idea of a form of life. When the person points inwardly and says “S” this is supposed to establish some rule. This rule is supposed to constrain future uses of “S.” But by the rule-following paradox, it doesn’t constrain the user at all. Hence no definition was established to begin with. Relatedly, because language is part of a form of life, language has to make a difference. To see the meaning of our words we need to see the difference they make when we use them. But this activity of writing S in the diary seems idle.
I think the argument is flawed.
It’s theoretically possible that my memory of the sensation pointed to by ‘S’ is different on day 1 compared to day 2, but at the same time - there’s no particular reason to believe that my memory IS different.
It’s equally plausible that my memory of S is exactly the same on day 2 as day 1. That is, I believe the sensation is the same because it is.
We have to acknowledge that there is a chance the ‘rule’ is inconsistent, but it’s likewise logically plausible that the rule IS consistent.
Our knowledge/doubt about whether the rule is or isn’t consistent doesn’t determine whether the rule actually is consistent.
@@stone_pilot Wittgenstein's argument isn't that we established a rule but don't know if we're following it (maybe due to memory problems). It's not an epistemic problem. He's making an ontological claim that no rule was established so there is nothing to follow or fail to follow.
Suppose I define a word X by showing you a picture of a tiger. This is always open to misinterpretation. X could be taken to mean tiger, mammal, the colour orange, the emotion of anger, or even photograph. You might not even take my gesture of pointing to the photograph as an attempt to define a word. The image itself doesn't fix a usage.
The situation with the sensation is similar. You are supposed to focus your attention on the sensation and call it S, and the sensation itself is supposed to fix its future usage. Wittgenstein's claim is that nothing is fixed by this act.
@@StatelessLiberty I don't understand. What does 'fix' mean in this context?
My decision to use the arbitrarily chosen symbol 'S' to point to the sensation isn't a fixed rule; It could be a one-off or, if I repeatedly use 'S' to point to the sensation, it's a convention.
If by 'fix' we mean permanent... I mean, no words have permanent meaning. Isn't that obvious? They're just pointers, or as modern language describes them, 'metaphors'.
Why would there be an assumption that there is a fixed relationship between the symbol 'S' and the sensation?
Praying for you
I don't understand. If I didn0t have a word for pain, would I not feel it? Would I not be able to distinguish that whenever I'm feeling it, it is worse than whenever I'm feeling other things (such as joy, regardless of whether I have a word for it or not). Is it saying that without words for it, I wouldn't be able to recognize my own sensations? And compare them to one another?
I feel like any speechless being that can feel pain and joy has an internal knowledge that there is a difference between them, even if they can't name them, otherwise they wouldn't seek the latter and avoid the former.
I much rather enjoy the Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein than the pure PLA. Not really Witt, but I do love the meaning skepticism proposed by 'Kripkenstein'
Kripkenstein is super cool. Head and shoulders above Wittgenstein!
@@KaneB exactly, you triggered me to take the book from the shelf and start reading it again.
The non-existence of PL seems to be argued on the same basis global sceptical arguments are argued for - that tracking the sensation is ultimately all we have. If Wittgenstein doesn't have anything better, shouldn't this be considered as (at least ostensibly) a global sceptical argument?
Does ontological relativity necessarily commit one to a PL?
Hi Kane 😊
35:15
Whats the problem here? After all my remembering is *after* the original naming event where I gain my knowledge what the term means.
I am using my memory to see whether this sensation rn is an S, not whether the thing I originally named S is an S.
Hi, I’m not sure if I understood the problem correctly. Still, from my understanding, it is that even if you perfectly remember the mental sample “S,” to say that an afterward sensation is as well “S,” you must already know the meaning of “S” in that first, you must understand that the word “S” refers to the sensation “S.” Second you must prior know “S” to figure out if your afterward sensation is sufficiently similar to the sample of “S.” Third you must know “S” to pick out or recognize the mental sample of “S” in the first place since to recollect something you must know it. The problem is that the mental sample of “S” was supposed to prove that you knew “S,” but to use the mental sample necessarily presupposes, in multiple ways, that you know “S” already. Lmk if i got it wrong or this helps as well!
@@nikhilweerakoon1793
When I originally named my sensation "S", I had particular characteristics in mind which may be shared by other sensations. I remember in order to see whether the characteristics I chose are represented here.
To be able to recall the first S, I, if anything, just need to be able to reliably apply "S" to the first S, not to anything whatsoever. And being able to apply S to the first S is easy because I already applied it to the first S once. I dont need to already know what "S" means, be realibly able to pick out from any number of things those things which have the characteristics of an S, to be able to remember what I originally called "S", because that only requires being able to apply "S" to one example I already applied "S" to in the past, not anything whatsoever.
I could even access my memory without invoking "S" at all. I will just need know that I recently invented _a_ term for _some_ type of sensation and first applied it to _some_ particular sensation. Then I try to remember what this event was and I will probably be successful.
@@KaneBsBett To be clear, I aim to answer your original question and clarify Wittgenstein's problem. Not implying that his problem is justified when brought to its theoretical endpoint. No doubt they are worthwhile objections that others and you have made. The problem is that even if you perfectly remember S, to assign S to an afterward sensation, say Y, requires knowing S to know it is worthwhile to compare to Y in the first place. For example, say you have sensation Y and are trying to assign a word to that sensation. To do so, you recollect S to compare its shared characteristics with Y; however, to recollect, the very decision or catalyst to recollect S requires you to know or have a prior understanding of S to know whether S is a sensation worthwhile comparing to Y if not why even bring S to mind in the first place, the problem is the knowledge that caused bringing to mind S for comparison to Y stems from knowledge of S which S itself was supposed to provide. Moreover, if you didn’t know sample S prior, how could you pick that memory out, in particular, to compare with Y among other memories of sensations. You suggest that you could remember only some terms and then bring to mind some sensation. This could work, albeit you have a low total vocabulary of sensations; say you do so and now have a perfect memory of sample S in mind without invoking S to do so. Still, however, knowing S descriptively is not enough to label Y as S since labeling or applying S to Y is not merely descriptive as the term is. You must understand that if I feel such a way, “S,” then I must apply the term S in such a way. That knowledge of how to use S, however, is again not itself S, meaning to apply S to Y requires you know the nuances of the rules governing the application of S itself outside of the mere descriptive memory of S. Lmk if they’re any misrepresentations regarding my depiction of his ideas.
Thanks
33:05
I don't see how it would be relevant that " "S" names a sensation" is in a public language and correctly describes what I am doing. Besides that, I don't see any in principle problem with giving private counterparts for everything like "thing" or "naming".
20:40
I don't think that knowing whether this sensation is of the same kind of sensation than the first time I named the sensation is required for knowing that I am applying the term correctly to this sensation.
22:04
I don't see a problem with that at all. This is how I would determine whether some publicly observable thing is of the same kind as the ones I called that in the past.
22:22
We have to distinguish here between two senses of criterion of correctness. One concerns how I can tell whether some term applies. The other concerns what makes my application of a term correct. My remembering will only be a criterion of correctness in that first sense. So the slogan "What seems right is right" is misleading.
24:55
I really don't see why I need other people to correct me. If my memory works well, I will be fine. This seems to just generalize into a skeptical worry about memory.
The argument doesn't deserve 40 min of our LIfe.
Is Wittgenstein saying that if there was no public language, no one would be able to make it up for lack of a grammar already in place?
need "ASK ME ABOUT MY PRIVATE LANGUAGE" t-shirt
Private ostensive definition is necessary for meaning because it signifies that a term has meaning for an individual qua neural correlates in relation to the endocrine system for individual interpretation of its survival (black box) for that organism in relation to other organisms (black boxes). So private ostensible definition is a necessary condition for meaning due to the individual is a coherent internally independent bio system. However the cognitive system is in constant search for homeostasis qua meaning which is a necessary condition for its illusion of perpetuity although it (cognitive self referential meaning) senses this is a futile pursuit, its illusion nevertheless persists as a social construct. The evidence for this is through self-evaluative maintaining meaning construction as the individual compares internal semantic map with close others (within an in-group qua coherent society or maybe not event that if enclave as a failed state ie Gaza) and then adjusts that map which seems to give the organism the sense it has a public meaning but this is not the case given the individual positions its meaning as less with a cohort of individual understanding of a concept as a proxy for survival of organism or project, desired outcome. However, this personal understanding is not sufficient for establishing shared meaning within a group. This is because meaning also relies on a structural, functional operation within the group's specific context.
In other words, the definition must fit within the group's "grammar," which can be understood as the conventions and norms for language use within that specific community. This grammar may differ from the national standard definition of the term, as regional variations and idiomatic expressions often exist.
Therefore, while private understanding is a necessary foundation, shared meaning relies on the definition's alignment with the linguistic practices and norms of the group. This alignment ensures the term's functionality and effective communication within that specific context.
Is it necessary for an individual language user to have a particular private definition? Do all users of a language have to have the same private ostensible definition (if that even makes sense)? Or do competent users just have to have some kind of internal representation of a language?
@@wireless849 Arguably a kind of complex interdependent (intra-internal) representation of syntax/semantics qua organ system that has a frontal cortex bias for sufficient social functionalism to perpetuate organism as self as private not publicly knowable thing.
@@italogiardina8183 Is that a yes or a no?
5:30 The longer I live, the less confident I am that we can be certain that our inner experiences are as they appear. Who really knows themself any better than they know the exterior world?
Wittgenstein turned me into a pseud. Just skimming his wikipedia page has rendered me completely unable to read or to admit that i havent read… ALL books
subscribed
28:42 Moore
It looks like you have discovered a new found love for Wittgenstein 😮
The concept of public language aligns with a materialist, behaviorist theory of mind, where language is solely an observable behavior. Conversely, private language is often associated with dualism, suggesting a non-material mind with free will, a concept often linked to theological ideas of God. This framework supports the legal system's view of individuals as moral agents with the capacity for good or evil choices.
However, the rise of public language raises challenges regarding the language of thought (LOT) hypothesis. If language and thought are identical, it implies cognitive closure, where every linguistic output directly maps onto a thought object. Yet, this notion is complicated by the potential for complex interdependence within thought processes. For instance, if the digestive system's "rudimentary thoughts" influence the central nervous system, individuals might seem to understand each other superficially. However, differences in gut bacteria could lead to divergent thought patterns and disagreements on the outputs of the central nervous system.
This revised perspective suggests that private language may not depend on theological concepts like God, but rather on the complex, interconnected material nature of the world, including the interplay between various bodily systems.
I think this argument is pretty weak tbh. It seems like he is trying to point out the flaws in this idea of a PL, without realizing that all the ideas are appliable to public language too. For example, take the color blue. Now, this memory argument of how do we know if one sensation matches another thing later? Well how do we actually do that for blue? Like each blue object we see is in fact a slightly different blue. Indeed there does not exist a "canonical" blue out there, but instead "blue" refers to an entire family of sensations. But because blue refers to a family, the boundaries arent hard and clear, they are fuzzy (you could easily image a color where some people might say its blue and some might say its purple), so there really can't be a clear production rule either (so its a no go for the stage argument). And yet, we still talk about blue!!!
And I think one related train of thought, is that for a sensation that's entirely internal, how do you actually know what it is? Like let's say we took a guy who speaks English fluently but has been depressed his entire life and can't remember feeling any positive emotions before and we hooked up electrodes to his brain and gave him a positive emotional experience. Do you think that guy would be able to distinguish it from say liberated vs ecstatic? Of course not - so you would have someone who has all the linguistic and cultural context who wouldnt be able to connect specific sensations to specific words.
36:52
Why can't inner pointing do that tho? Pointing out that I could name anything "S" seems totally irrelevant.
And why doesn't this generalize to public language? Why wouldn't directing my attention to a publicly observable object and thinking "S" (like my teddy bear) not also be insufficient for naming?
Wittgenstein’s argument is how can you sure at date 2 that the criteria you used to judge you are in pain is the same as the one you used in date 1. Of course you can direct you inner attention to it but is that it the same it as before?
@@amourdesoipittie2621
If my memory is reliable, I will know whether it's the same. If this is an insufficient answer I do heavily suspect this will just become a standard skeptical argument about memory because I don't see anything special about this case that should make me more suspicious about my memory than other cases.
@@KaneBsBett Yes Wittgenstein does provide skeptical arguments about memory. But not here.
Here he is trying to iron out the idea that the causal is not logical. That the picture does not compel a use. You could very well have written down explicit rules on a piece of paper about the nature of the pain so that you may write the symbol.
But there still will be interpretions of the rule which are queer. I am myself deeply opposed to meaning/rule following skepticism. I am only giving the arguments in its best version.
@@KaneBsBett let me give a more aphoristic answer
Your memory doesnt extend into the future.
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I’ve had a question. How can propositions be true? If we are using the correspondence theory of truth, then that would mean the words need to correspond to some fact in the world. But words don’t have any metaphysical connection to the objects they represent. Wouldn’t this mean that no proposition can be true, since words do not correspond to some fact in objective reality?
Also, I’ve seen that only propositions can have truth values. Does this mean that anything that isn’t expressed in language cannot count as knowledge? Would this mean then that animals cannot have knowledge since they do not have language? That seems like a strange claim to make, since animals do seem to know certain things.
Wittgensteinians would first point out that maybe you are looking for a sort of "transcendent" picture of truth. That is, a picture under which even if no human being existed, there still would be a fact of the matter respect to which sentences are true. Bloor in his book "Wittgenstein, Rules, and Institutions" as a chapter on truth where, in a nutshell, he argues that saying that things are true is just a language game like any other. What makes "the dinner is ready" true? Well, you check the oven to see if it stopped. And you learn during your upbringing to use the word "true" in these kinds of contexts. They would completely reject the correspondence theory of true. And, apart from the mundane uses of the word, there is no general theory to be had about what "truth" is.
The second issue I think is addressed by the fact that Wittgenstein stressed that language is not idle, and that philosophy comes when we start playing with idle parts of language. What are you gaining by saying that the animal "knows" something? You can say stuff like "it seems to get things right", "they also get things wrongs", "they seem to 'inquire' sometimes about things (like a monkey checking if a given place is empty or not“。 You can keep coming up with these sentences and think there is a problem about how to explain such intuitions. But what practical matter hinges upon their use? I think nothing much, nothing changes if we endorse or not those sentences that we can muster up after accepting that, for example "animals knows". W. makes a similar point in "On Certainty". A philosopher stands in front of a tree and says: this is a tree, this is a tree, i know that this is a tree, you cannot deny that i know this is a tree. What is the philosopher doing by saying "i know that this is a tree"？ He is misusing the word as he takes it out of the ordinary business of life in which we learn it and that gives it a place in language.
This statement that I have written is proposition X. Proposition X exists. It is therefore true that proposition X exists. This is true for all propositions. Therefore all propositions are true.
Propositions are not facts. Facts are things which are true of the world. These truths of the world are in other types of philosophical dialog called objects. A proposition in the world is an object. The proposition can be wrong about facts.
Animals know facts because they have common sense like touch, smell, sight just like us. They don't have language like us. As far as we know humans are the only creature that is a "language animal". Other animals display a type of language but are not language animals.
I think of propositions not as being comprised of words, but as being a type of thing that words can sometimes be used to express. The sentence “This morning I ate cereal.” expresses the proposition [This morning I ate cereal.].
The sentence doesn’t have intrinsic meaning outside of a community of language users, or at least, not outside of the context of a language,
but, I think, the proposition exists regardless, without needing the context of the English language.
Like, “Two plus two equals four.” Is a sentence, a sequence of words which in a particular language (in this case: English) expresses a complete thing-to-say, which doesn’t grammatically require more to go along with it.
But, [two plus two equals four] (i.e. [2+2=4] ) is a true proposition. (Note: I am not saying that “[2+2=4]” is a proposition. “[2+2=4]” is merely notation I am using to refer to the proposition. And “”[2+2=4]”” is notation I am using to refer to the notation I am using to refer to the proposition.)
@@he1ar1 Thank you for the reply, but I have some worries. You say "...all propositions are true" and "Facts are things which are true of the world," but then say that "Propositions are not facts." I don't follow. Also, how can a proposition "be wrong about facts" if "all propositions are true"; I thought something was true if it corresponded to the facts. Perhaps I am misunderstanding your points. Also, I thought propositions were declarative statements that could be either true or false--true if they correspond to some fact and false if they did not correspond to some fact. Is there a different definition of a proposition?
Wittgenstein: Nooo, you can't have a private language!!!
Me: Zoop.
Bump for the algorithm
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I think a private language, even if possible, is just useless. If i want to refer to a feeling i had last night, i just remember the feeling.
Why?
46:18 Most insane shit I heard in a while
Missing context probably idk
This just seems unintelligible. That's not an objection to your presentation: I think it seemed that way thirty-whatever years ago too. No one has ever had or wanted rules of the sort conceived of in this argument, for anything, not just for stuff like language about sensations.
Mostly-factual statements are always theory-laden. When I have a sensation I can't adequately describe, along with the pain in the upper right quadrant of my abdomen, I imagine that it's the feeling of the common bile duct relaxing enough that a gallstone can move. The point of this imagining isn't to be correct. The point is to give a narrative that enables me to handle these sensations with the narrative-handling wiring of my brain. No two instances of a sensation are exactly alike, any more than two different crabs are absolutely identical down to the atomic level. This doesn't stop us from thinking about our sensations, any more than it stops us from talking about crabs.
So basically, Wittgenstein wants an a priori foundation for "sameness detection" that would allow you to "see" that it's the same sensation as it was previously. Whereas here in the real world, the "sameness detector" is already *in fact* built into our brains. And our languages, whether public or private, just use that already existing machinery.
I don't think it's unintelligible. The fact you've written quite a nice criticism kind of suggests that too.
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Engaging comment
Comment for the Algorithm 👍
Comment comment comment comment
what a bunch or hooplah
One of the worst arguments in the history of philosophy! It essentially goes like this: "If you presuppose this utterly crazy view of language, according to which language is primarily about rule-following, which - by the way - I give no argument whatsoever for and which is rejected by the vast majority of linguists, then it follows that private language is impossible". Why on Earth should any reasonable person accept this presupposition?! It's incredibly obvious that the argument begs the question in favour of externalism and the fact that many philosophers don't call this out is an embarrassment to the field as a whole.
This guy philosophises
> the fact that many philosophers don't call this out is an embarrassment to the field as a whole.
Yeah, agreed. But that's normal with all fields I've gotten to know. I assume it's just ubiquitous to human affairs. All human affairs are messy like humans are.
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Here is one comment.
Wittenstien is correct in this argument but he has contradicted himself. He insists strongly that there are no meta-languages and nothing that all languages have in common. He then turns around and says no languages are private. They are all public. Thats a meta language rule. A universal principle that applies to all languages. Common wittenstien L.
To me, the argument as stated in the first version is entirely self-contradictory:
How could someone be able to feel the need to name a feeling unless they were reliably able to identify it as something not hitherto experienced?
For the sake of argument they can, but when it comes to identifying it correctly at another occasion, suddenly they can't anymore?
Bc inner perceptions aren't perceptions in the first place, but mere "feelings" (whatever that is, it was never defined and seems to be derived from some use the author thinks of as intuituve?).
I can't even see an argument here, just pure sophistry - redefining terms in the middle of your argument...
Its that there is no criteria for remembering correctly, unlike remembering normally, as if it seems you remembered correctly, that makes it correct, so it doesnt really make sense to speak of correct here
unsubscribed
D:
Not an airport - you don't need to announce your departure. Bye.
@@Jaggerbushget away from me
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Lol what
It's one of the worst arguments ever🔥
Yeah, it's garbage. I only made this video because I'm writing a video on ordinary language philosophy which requires me to reference the PLA, and it was easier to shunt that part to a separate video.
@@KaneB Some evils are necessary for a greater good
@@KaneBBruh😱
@@KaneB I remember that you once said that you don't like Wittgenstein lol
@KaneB do you have any idea why it's so popular given how bad the argument is?
top 5 most overrated arguments in philosophy
How is it overrated whats wrong with it🥺
Oh, that's a fun question. Here's my top 5 off the top of my head (and I'm focusing on contemporary analytic philosophy):
-- The PLA
-- Putnam's Twin Earth
-- Quine's critique of analyticity
-- Frege's critique of psychologism
-- The appeal to "strange characters" in defense of norms of practical reason (e.g. the blade of grass counter or Parfit's Future Tuesday indifference)
@@KaneB With respect to the last of these, Street calls them "Ideally coherent eccentrics" and I like that term.
I'd like to see more tier lists with respect to bad arguments and why they're bad, though I'd also be interested in what you regard as comparatively better (if not good) arguments.
The entire idea of an "internal private language" that can't be used to transfer meaning to someone else seems nonsensical because what is language if not a mechanism to transfer meaning? Heck, where we have had feelings without a public language word we, as individuals in society, have come up with new words, or new uses of words, to describe them. If anything this feels related to the very old idea that we can't know if our experience of, say, seeing something green is the same experience someone else has, the same inner feeling, but we can give it the same label, use the same language, for the equivalent experience because what that experience is about is the same. We don't have language, *can't* have language, that describes the experience of "seeing green" from an internal perspective because the bits that could be unique, the private parts, in any way that might differ from experiencer to experiencer can't be pinpointed to even identify let alone label let alone communicate. There can't be a private language because language can't be private.
@@phyphorHave you heard the phrase “notation is a tool for thought.”? Maybe you would consider this an example of transferring information from one’s past self to one’s future self, but I think this is insufficient as a description. Notation can be used to assist in reasoning not just as a memory aid, but as a thing to be acted on and modified in ways that reflect the kinds of relationships between different ideas.
So, if notation is a type of language, I think language isn’t *just* a means of communicating.